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Qing territorial administration at both the provincial and county levels included functional specialists such as provincial judges and treasurers. In later years, regional satraps assumed unprecedented discretion over the appointments of provincial treasurers and judges, prefects and county magistrates.
[1]
[1]: (Rowe 2010, p.38, 207) |
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Archaeological evidence suggests a ranked society with only part-time specialization in burgeoning sociopolitical, religious, and/or military institutional roles.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[1]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [2]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [4]: Paul Tolstoy. (1989) "Coapexco and Tlatilco: sites with Olmec material in the Basin of Mexico", In Regional Perspectives on the Olmec, Robert J. Sharer & David C. Grove (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 87-121. [5]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. |
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Archaeological evidence suggests a ranked society with only part-time specialization in burgeoning sociopolitical, religious, and/or military institutional roles.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[1]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [2]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [4]: Paul Tolstoy. (1989) "Coapexco and Tlatilco: sites with Olmec material in the Basin of Mexico", In Regional Perspectives on the Olmec, Robert J. Sharer & David C. Grove (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 87-121. [5]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. |
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inferred from discussion in sources of development/introduction in later periods
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“One of the speakers at the first meeting of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in April 1850 was Judge William Lee, formerly of New York. He reported on a bill before the legislature (which he himself had probably authored) which would provide the solution to both Hawaiian idleness and the quantities of labor needed for land development.”
[1]
[1]: (Beechert 1985: 41) Beechert, Edward D. 1985. Working in Hawaii: A Labour History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/338XH58H |
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Following polity: "The statute-book, the judiciary, and courts of law with their prisons and instruments of punishment, were unknown"
[1]
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[1]: J. Monette, History of the discovery and settlement of the valley of the Mississippi, by the three great European powers, Spain, France, and Great Britain (1971 [c. 1846]), p. 191 |
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"The statute-book, the judiciary, and courts of law with their prisons and instruments of punishment, were unknown"
[1]
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[1]: J. Monette, History of the discovery and settlement of the valley of the Mississippi, by the three great European powers, Spain, France, and Great Britain (1971 [c. 1846]), p. 191 |
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This may be more accurate toward the end of the Funan period, but worth noting: "Before a case reached the king, it might go through various lower courts; inscriptions frequently mention officials who appear to have functions connected with courts of law. There is no way of measuring the extent of discrimination and corruption in the administration of ustice. The ideal of fiarness to all was certainly recognized; one judge, for example, is declared to have been appointed on the strength of his impartiality.
[1]
[1]: (Mabbett and Changler 1995, p. 168) |
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’The first Chinese envoys who wrote about Funan in about 250 c.e. described it as an urbanized kingdom that resembled the Chinese state rather than the region’s other tribal social systems. They pointed to the structured political hierarchy and bureaucracy including a centralized judiciary system, institutionalized religion, and even libraries.’
[1]
[1]: (West 2009, p. 224) |
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This may be more accurate toward the end of the Funan period, but worth noting: "Before a case reached the king, it might go through various lower courts; inscriptions frequently mention officials who appear to have functions connected with courts of law. There is no way of measuring the extent of discrimination and corruption in the administration of justice. The ideal of fairness to all was certainly recognized; one judge, for example, is declared to have been appointed on the strength of his impartiality.
[1]
[1]: (Mabbett and Changler 1995, 168) |
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’Persons accused of crimes were taken before examining magistrates called sabhachara; these were peripatetic investigators of the court. Witnesses were called, testimony sworn, and written depositions taken. Often, fines were assessed, but punishments for serious infractions of the law was severe.’
[1]
’The king was recognised as the final court of appeal and final authority in law. Before a case reached the king, it might go through various lower courts; inscriptions frequently mention officials who appear to have functions connected with courts of law. There is no way of measuring the extent of discrimination and corruption in the administration of justice. The ideal of fairness to all was certainly recognized; one judge, or [sic] example, is declared to have been appointed on the strength of his impartiality’
[2]
[2]
’From its earliest appearance, the Khmer language adopted a great many lexical terms from Sanskrit (Bhattacharya 1991: 6; Pou 2003: 283). However, the content of the Khmer inscriptions differ markedly from the Sanskrit ones. They are not addressed to gods, but to a temporal audience: authorities and officials, relatives of the founders, and in their broad imprecations, to the world in general. The authors tend not to express a political agenda here, in that they do not praise or assert power. The Khmer inscriptions seem more like legal documents - they often record the history of endowments made to foundations and they establish the ownership of land, setting out the rights of the foundation and the founder’s family. Vickery (1985) has suggested that many such texts in the 10th and 11th centuries have a certain political agenda on the part of the authors, who often appear to be concerned with their claims to titles and land. The texts may list and describe in detail the property of the foundation, record the donors, the circumstances under which land was acquired, the price paid, and settlement of disputes by courts. They may note the weight, quantity and material of temple ‘treasure’ or objects used in exchanges, the rice production of foundation lands, sometimes their location and dimensions. Requirements for continuing support for divinities and temple personnel may be set out and personnel might be listed, sometimes by name, gender, dependents, duties or place of origin, or else as totals. The texts may also refer to imposts or immunities granted to the foundations. The king is frequently acknowledged in inscriptions authored by individuals other than rulers, and a date is often recorded. The king is depicted as having a key role in state administration, establishing inquiries and being at least nominally responsible for legal decisions, ordering building works to be initiated, etc. There is an emphasis on the role of the ruler or of his predecessors in giving land, granting permission to purchase it or materially supporting the foundation, presumably placing the founder and his relatives under some future obligations. The authors record the merit, accrued by the ruler through his generosity, which is mostly dealt with poetically in the Sanskrit texts. Inscriptions written by rulers in Old Khmer are edicts relating mostly to matters of law, temple administration or land allocation and taxation. The texts are somewhat formulaic, though of varying length. Presumably, wealthier temples had more resources warranting recording, and had more literate scribes to produce the texts.’
[3]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 144) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, pp.167-168) [3]: (Lustig 2009, p. 108) |
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’Persons accused of crimes were taken before examining magistrates called sabhachara; these were peripatetic investigators of the court. Witnesses were called, testimony sworn, and written depositions taken. Often, fines were assessed, but punishments for serious infractions of the law was severe.’
[1]
’The king was recognised as the final court of appeal and final authority in law. Before a case reached the king, it might go through various lower courts; inscriptions frequently mention officials who appear to have functions connected with courts of law. There is no way of measuring the extent of discrimination and corruption in the administration of justice. The ideal of fairness to all was certainly recognized; one judge, or [sic] example, is declared to have been appointed on the strength of his impartiality’
[2]
[2]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 144) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, pp.167-168) |
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’Persons accused of crimes were taken before examining magistrates called sabhachara; these were peripatetic investigators of the court. Witnesses were called, testimony sworn, and written depositions taken. Often, fines were assessed, but punishments for serious infractions of the law was severe.’
[1]
’The king was recognised as the final court of appeal and final authority in law. Before a case reached the king, it might go through various lower courts; inscriptions frequently mention officials who appear to have functions connected with courts of law. There is no way of measuring the extent of discrimination and corruption in the administration of justice. The ideal of fairness to all was certainly recognized; one judge, or [sic] example, is declared to have been appointed on the strength of his impartiality’
[2]
[2]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 144) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, pp.167-168) |
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’Persons accused of crimes were taken before examining magistrates called sabhachara; these were peripatetic investigators of the court. Witnesses were called, testimony sworn, and written depositions taken. Often, fines were assessed, but punishments for serious infractions of the law was severe.’
[1]
’The king was recognised as the final court of appeal and final authority in law. Before a case reached the king, it might go through various lower courts; inscriptions frequently mention officials who appear to have functions connected with courts of law. There is no way of measuring the extent of discrimination and corruption in the administration of justice. The ideal of fairness to all was certainly recognized; one judge, or [sic] example, is declared to have been appointed on the strength of his impartiality’
[2]
[2]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 144) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, pp.167-168) |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ‘1’ or ’absent’. Writing in the colonial period, Bollig describes the resolution of disputes in public meetings: ’The chief does all these duties in the kobu[unknown], the public meeting. Men as well as women are invited to this kobu[unknown]. All the participants are called together by the blowing of the large shell from the chief’s house. The kobu[unknown] takes place in the udd, the large men’s house. All the dealings of the tribe are discussed in it, marital matters, land matters, quarrels, in short, all the linen, whether clean or dirty, is spread out before all eyes. Everybody is allowed to talk and present his complaints. Of course there is no lack of amusing scenes too. Sometimes the people become so excited that the parties insult each other, grab each other, and come to blows, so that the meeting has to be dissolved. The following remark was made in a kobu[unknown] which I attended: “He is a bad fellow because he stole my log.” The person insulted in such a manner jumped up angrily and defended himself so convincingly that the accuser let his head sink and replied dejectedly: “ Kinisou, mei bu[unknown]me rem, excuse me, you are right.” In another kobu[unknown] a subchief said to the head chief: “I do not like you as head chief, for you put some into paradise, others into hell.” With this plain allusion to his partiality, the head chief became very excited, while the audience laughed. From the same chief came the familiar quotation: “ siwilin ni efot, ni efot; siwilim mas eu, mas eu, ina Lamalamen Moses, /116/ tooth for tooth, eye for eye, that is the religion of Moses.” As one sees, the chief concerned had not read the Protestant Bible in vain and knew very well how to cloak his thirst for revenge very nicely. Things go along quite pleasantly in the kobu[unknown] of the Truk people. Each one chatters as long and as [Page 127] much as he likes. If he uses sharp, objectionable expressions, wiser ones will certainly call out to him: “ a emuen, it is enough.” Some smoke, some eat. One sits on the floor, another one on an upturned bowl, or anywhere else. Here and there one also sees some who are asleep, tired from listening for a long time. In short it goes along in true Kanaka fashion, and the result of the kobu[unknown], usually lasting for hours, is “much ado about nothing.” The matter at issue remains as it was, or it has become even more complicated. The government has often tried to give the kobu[unknown] a more serious air, but quite in vain. The main person at the kobu[unknown] is the chief, who makes the decision in the individual cases. Formerly his decision was absolutely decisive for all questions. In more recent times appeal to a higher authority, to the head chief and the government, has been possible. The government has also pruned the jurisdiction of the chief. Some things are reserved solely for the head chief, some solely for the government representative. During the kobu[unknown], the chief is surrounded by his relatives and advisors who watch over him. If he wants to say something that does not suit them, they call out to him: “ a niku[unknown], that is too much.”’
[1]
[1]: Bollig, Laurentius 1927. “Inhabitants Of The Truk Islands: Religion, Life And A Short Grammar Of A Micronesian People”, 126 |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ‘1’ or ’absent’. Chiefs served as primary judicial authorities on the local level, but Goodenough mentions colonial courts that dealt with issues that could not be resolved on the local level: ’As soon as courts were re-established, they were deluged with property disputes. The Japanese had treated grants of corporation land to the children of one of its men as if they were an inheritance by a man’s children of his individually owned land. The result was that many disputes coming before the American high court were between the members of a corporation and the children of its men. The latter were disputing the residual title of the former and claiming full title for themselves, and the former were asserting their confiscatory and reversionary rights under traditional residual title. The court undertook seriously to follow local custom, but some witnesses presented the rulings of the Japanese courts as representing local custom whereas others presented the traditional system as local custom, depending on which representation was to their immediate advantage.The high court, I am told, chose to follow the precedent set by the Japanese and ruled that if it could be established that a corporation grant to the children of one of its men had been made with the consent of the corporation’s members, then the children had [Page 80] the same rights as if it had been their father’s personal property.’
[1]
We have assumed that colonial courts employed professional judges.
[1]: Goodenough, Ward Hunt 1974. “Changing Social Organization On Romónum, Truk, 1947-1965”, 79 |
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The council of elders, the Gerousia, whose members were chosen among the best Kosmoi, had legislative and juridical authority.
[1]
[2]
Officials appointed by the state, they are called dikastai (δικαστές), acted as judges; they deal mostly with cases involving inheritances and pledges. Special judges, the hetaireai, deal with matters of tribal law and custom, others, called orfanodikastes (ορφανοδικαστές) were appointed to supervise the affairs of orphans or minors, the ksenios Kosmos (ξένιος κόσμος) had important duties connected with the foreigners living in the city, and finally the cosmos hiarorgos (ιαροργός) was responsible for matters related to the religion.
[1]: Willetts, R. F. 1965. Ancient Crete. A Social History, London and Torondo, 77 [2]: Chaniotis, A. 1897. "Κλασική και Ελληνιστική Κρήτη," in Panagiotakis, N. (ed.), Κρήτη: Ιστορία και Πολιτισμός, Heraklion, 203. |
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The council of elders, the Gerousia, whose members were chosen among the best Kosmoi, had legislative and juridical authority.
[1]
[2]
Officials appointed by the state, they are called dikastai (δικαστές), acted as judges; they deal mostly with cases involving inheritances and pledges. Special judges, the hetaireai, deal with matters of tribal law and custom, others, called orfanodikastes (ορφανοδικαστές) were appointed to supervise the affairs of orphans or minors, the ksenios cosmos (ξένιος κόσμος) had important duties connected with the foreigners living in the city, and finally the cosmos hiarorgos (ιαροργός) was responsible for matters related to the religion.
Crete owes much of its fame in Classical Greece to its internal organization and its cultivation of the laws. This prestige is partly due to mythological traditions and Minoan memories and survivals. The laws that, according to legend, Minos received every nine years, and the figure of Rhadamanthys the just judge, bear witness to a dim recollection of an earlier rule of law. From as early as the 7th century BCE, Crete had engaged in important legislative innovations, some of which can be reconstructed from the later laws of Gortyn. The famous legal inscription of Gortyn is not an isolated example. Fragments of laws dating from the 7th to the mid-5th century survive in many cities. The reasons for this legislative activity - an activity that includes both the recording of older laws and the introduction of new ones - were the major problems concerning land ownership, inheritance, small landowners’ dependence on creditors as a result of the gradual spread of a monetary economy, and the presence of individuals who lacked political rights but engaged in important financial activities as traders, craftsmen and freelance workers. There was very little interest in reform of the existing regime: the handful of laws on civic issues were intended to limit the arbitrary actions and immunity of the Kosmoi. [1]: Willetts, R. F. 1965. Ancient Crete. A Social History, London and Torondo, 77 [2]: Chaniotis, A. 1897. "Κλασική και Ελληνιστική Κρήτη," in Panagiotakis, N. (ed.), Κρήτη: Ιστορία και Πολιτισμός, Heraklion, 203. |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
Salvian’s "On God’s Governance of the World" highlights the corruption among Roman judges in the fifth century: "A transgressor who belongs to the wealthy classes is not punished for his injustice, while a poor man, who does not understand business, undergoes the legal penalty, that is, if he does not depart this life before the trial, so long is the course of lawsuits protracted, and so much money is expended on them. The climax of the misery is to have to pay in order to obtain justice. For no one will give a court to the injured man unless he pay a sum of money to the judge and the judge’s clerks." [2] [1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"These schools were attended by practically everyone who wanted a public appointment. There were for instance the notaries. They began as legal copyists of documents (donations, wills) and deed of sale. After a lengthy private practice they would then get an appointment as judge in one of the provinces and then, after some years in office, with the help of influential friends would enter the imperial chancery." [2] [1]: (Johannes Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 179) Haussig, H W.trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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Himyari, an Arab author, mentions that Fath bn al-Ala was the chief judge of Crete while another author and jurist, Ibn al-Faradi, mention a famous jurist from Crete, Marwan bn.
[1]
[1]: Christides, B. The Conquest of Crete by Arabs (ca. 824). A Turning Point in the Struggle Between Byzantium and Islam, Athens, 115. |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"These schools were attended by practically everyone who wanted a public appointment. There were for instance the notaries. They began as legal copyists of documents (donations, wills) and deed of sale. After a lengthy private practice they would then get an appointment as judge in one of the provinces and then, after some years in office, with the help of influential friends would enter the imperial chancery." [2] In mid-11th CE, Constantine IX "founded a bureau for private legal cases, calling its overseer epi ton kriseon. Provincial judges were to set their verdicts down in writing and deposit copies of them with this bureau, in order to be free of all suspicion." [3] [1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 179) Haussig, H W.trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. [3]: (Attaleiates 2012, 37) Attaleiates, Michael in Kaldellis, Anthony and Krallis, Dimitris trans. 2012. The History: Michael Attaleiates. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"These schools were attended by practically everyone who wanted a public appointment. There were for instance the notaries. They began as legal copyists of documents (donations, wills) and deed of sale. After a lengthy private practice they would then get an appointment as judge in one of the provinces and then, after some years in office, with the help of influential friends would enter the imperial chancery." [2] [1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 179) Haussig, H W.trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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Does not seem to be a specialised function. Alan Covey: The Quechua title apu means “lord,” but also “judge.” There was also an official called an huchukamayuq who dealt with offenses against Inca majesty in the provinces. These were not necessarily full-time or bureaucratic appointments.
[1]
On provincial governors (tokrikoq): "He also judged all the cases that were related to state interests and had the authority to pass sentences up to and including the death penalty (Cobo 1979: 194-202; Moore 1958: 115)." [2] . It seems that being a judge was only one of his many functions. "Further aspects of law emphasized the cleavages of status found in Inca society (Moore 1958: 74-5). In general, any individual in the state hierarchy could be judged only by someone of higher rank." [3] "Inspectors and JudgesCuzco also appointed a centrally controlled set of inspectors (tokoyrikoq, “He Who Sees All”) who checked on affairs in the provinces. Diez de Betanzos (1996: 110-11) wrote that the sons of the ruler were charged with the inquiries. The highest-ranking official may have been the “Inspector General” of the conquered territories, a position that was sometimes filled by the emperor’s brother. The existence of these independent agents implies that the rulers evidently did not fully trust the provincial officials to conduct all affairs with the best interests of the Sapa Inca and the state in mind." [4] [1]: (Covey 2015, personal communication) [2]: (D’Altroy 2014, 354) [3]: (D’Altroy 2014, 359) [4]: (D’Altroy 2014, 358) |
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Judges present in Europe and the colonies. “In 1511, a tribunal of independent royal judges was constituted in the colony of Espanola to try cases appealed from the town magistrates and the governor.”
[1]
[2]
[1]: (Cunningham 1919, 25.) Cunningham, Charles Henry. 1919. The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies As illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila (1583-1800). Berkeley, California: University of California Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/CM5NJJRR) [2]: (Casey 2002, 88) Casey, James. 2002. Early Modern Spain: A Social History. New York: Routledge. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/2SNTRSWT |
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"Hindu tradition required the king to administer justice himself when he was present at the capital. If ill-health or pressure of other work prevented him from discharging this duty, the Chief Justice presided over the court at the capital, and decided cases with the help of jurors. The Supreme Court tried important local cases and also entertained appeals against the decisions of the lower courts in the moffusil. The evidence of the contemporary Smritis like Narada and Brihaspati shows that the judicial procedure was very well developed in the Gupta period."
[1]
[1]: (Majumdar and Altekar 1986, 278) Anant Sadashiv Altekar. The Administrative Organisation. Ramesh Chandra Majumdar. Anant Sadashiv Altekar. 1986. Vakataka - Gupta Age Circa 200-550 A.D. Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi. |
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The "judicial [...] administration of the Chalukyas resembled that of their ancestors"
[1]
, the Chalukyas of Badami, for whom the Emperor was the supreme judge, but he also dispensed justice through judges he himself appointed
[2]
.
[1]: H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy and R. Ramakrishnan, A History of Karnataka (1978), p. 91 [2]: B.K. Singh, The Early Chalukyas of Vatapi (1991), p. 159 |
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Chiefs and councils doubled as judicial authorities: ’Crimes and offences were so unfrequent under their social system, that the Iroquois can scarcely be said to have had a criminal code. Yet there were certain misdemeanors which fell under the judicial cognizance of the sachems, and were punished by them in proportion to their magnitude. Witchcraft was punishable with death. Any person could take the life of a witch when discovered in the act. If this was not done, a council was called, and the witch arraigned before it, in the presence of the accuser. A full confession, with a promise of amendment, secured a discharge. But if the accusation was denied, witnesses were called and examined concerning the circumstances of the case; and if they established the charge to the satisfaction of the council, which they rarely failed to do, condemnation followed, with a sentence of death. The witch was then delivered over to such executioners as volunteered for the purpose, and by them was led away to punishment. After the decision of the council, the relatives of the witch gave him up to his doom without a murmur.’
[1]
[1]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 321 |
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Chiefs and councils doubled as judicial authorities: ’Crimes and offences were so unfrequent under their social system, that the Iroquois can scarcely be said to have had a criminal code. Yet there were certain misdemeanors which fell under the judicial cognizance of the sachems, and were punished by them in proportion to their magnitude. Witchcraft was punishable with death. Any person could take the life of a witch when discovered in the act. If this was not done, a council was called, and the witch arraigned before it, in the presence of the accuser. A full confession, with a promise of amendment, secured a discharge. But if the accusation was denied, witnesses were called and examined concerning the circumstances of the case; and if they established the charge to the satisfaction of the council, which they rarely failed to do, condemnation followed, with a sentence of death. The witch was then delivered over to such executioners as volunteered for the purpose, and by them was led away to punishment. After the decision of the council, the relatives of the witch gave him up to his doom without a murmur.’
[1]
The same seems to be true for the early reservation period: ’Iroquois legal procedure during the reservation period was marked by the absence of symbols. Wampum which had extensive symbolic connotations, both in religious and civil procedures, was used in legal convocations only to convene the judicial body. In the longhouse, wampum validated the confessions of religious performers, but in the trials conducted by the Confederate Council no use of wampum was made to validate the testimony given by litigants. One instance was cited of a trial for murder being conducted in the provincial courts at Brantford wherein the accused, a Six Nations Indian, refused to take an oath upon the Bible and requested that the Council wampum be brought to court for the purpose of validating his oath. It may be suggested that writing had produced new legal symbols such as wills and quit claim deeds. The succeeding chapters will develop in detail the coordination of reservation society by the government of the Confederacy.’
[2]
’The legislative enactments of the Council represent in content an adequate means of coordinating reservation society with particular stress on the regulation of economic activity. The formulation of laws does not of itself assure the coordination of societal activity. Ethical values, as a rule, are not at issue in regulatory legislation, and deprived of the weight of ethical sanction, their enforcement depends heavily upon compulsive mechanisms. The Council, by exercise of its appointive powers, had created an adequate personnel to enforce its legislation. If any weakness existed, it was the neglect to include in their legislation the penalties to be assessed against violators.’
[3]
But decisions made by American and Canadian judicial authorities affected reservation communities: ’Finally the case reached the United States Supreme Court, and the Court’s decison forced the United States Senate to resolve the matter. The result was a treaty signed in 1857 by which 7,549 acres of the Tonawanda Reservation were to be bought back with money that had been set aside for their removal to Kansas (fig. 1)(Kappler 1904-1941, 2:767-771).’
[4]
[1]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 321 [2]: Noon, John A. 1949. “Law And Government Of The Grand River Iroquois”, 43 [3]: Noon, John A. 1949. “Law And Government Of The Grand River Iroquois”, 59 [4]: Abler, Thomas S., and Elisabeth Tooker 1978. “Seneca”, 512 |
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Note the above, in which a lawsuit is judged by the king himself rather than a dedicated judge.
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From the example of Carthage, as well as that of the Israelites.
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E.g. Ahab securing the vineyard of Naboth by having him accused of blasphemy (I Kings 21).
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There was no legislative body and no division between executive and judiciary: administrative officials of all levels also held judicial authority. That the profession of a judge did not exist-in contrast to contemporary Babylonia-is also shown by the fact that the word dayānu, “judge, ” was not used for human beings in Neo-Assyrian.” No court building.
[1]
[1]: (Westbrook et al. 2003, 883, 886, 890) |
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[1]
Egyptian and Greek courts used different systems. In the Egyptian courts the judges were usually temple priests and were therefore not full time judges. In the Greek courts the local and regional(the strategos) officials performed this function. dikastai, dikasteria [2] (itinerant judges?) [1]: (Manning 2015, Personal Communication) [2]: (Cohen 2006, 350) |
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Village headmen and lineage elders exercised judicial authority on the local level: ‘Among the Garos most disputes arise over the issues of property, inheritance, and domestic quarrels within the family. Such problems are to a large extent settled by the MAHARI (lineage) of the offended and the offender. A new situation develops when someone’s cattle cause damage to another’s crops. Under such situation the NOKMA (village headman) acts as an intermediary only. If he fails to settle the dispute, the matter can go to the civil court of the district council.’
[1]
‘The judicial authority of the Garo is based on the institution of Nokma. Nokma looks after the village land as well as members of the village. The village judiciary system started with the a’king Nokma or Songni Nokma and the clan elders of that village. Nokma took the leadership in all village activities and since he was supposed to be a warrior, he was not expected to hesitate to punish the guilty if he suspected a foul play. In the past the Garo principle was ‘blood for blood, head for head’.’
[2]
Only during the colonial period were higher-level judicial authorities established: ‘Many of the disputes of the Garos decided in their village Panchayats. When a man has some complaints against another he reports them to the Nokma or the village-head. If the nature of the complaints is simple, the Nokma in a meeting of the few leading persons of the village, decides the dispute; but if the nature of the complaints is complicated and not easy of solution the Nokma reports the matter to the Laskar. The Laskar is a very important and influential man in the Garo Hills District. The hills areas are divided into some elekas and each of such elekas is placed under a Laskar for convenient collection of the house tax as well as for deciding the disputes of small nature locally. The Laskar need not essentially be a literate man, worldly prudence is enough for the management of his eleka. In practice a Laskar wields immense influence in his eleka.’
[3]
It seems that the Zamindars did not push for legal formalization.
[1]: Roy, Sankar Kumar: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Garo [2]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 43 [3]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 40 |
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No specialist judges, as illage headmen and lineage elders exercise judicial authority. SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ’Appointed by executive’. Village headmen and lineage elders exercise judicial authority on the local level: ‘Among the Garos most disputes arise over the issues of property, inheritance, and domestic quarrels within the family. Such problems are to a large extent settled by the MAHARI (lineage) of the offended and the offender. A new situation develops when someone’s cattle cause damage to another’s crops. Under such situation the NOKMA (village headman) acts as an intermediary only. If he fails to settle the dispute, the matter can go to the civil court of the district council.’
[1]
‘The judicial authority of the Garo is based on the institution of Nokma. Nokma looks after the village land as well as members of the village. The village judiciary system started with the a’king Nokma or Songni Nokma and the clan elders of that village. Nokma took the leadership in all village activities and since he was supposed to be a warrior, he was not expected to hesitate to punish the guilty if he suspected a foul play. In the past the Garo principle was ‘blood for blood, head for head’.’
[2]
If a dispute cannot be resolved on village level, the case is transferred to higher-level courts an authorities: ‘Many of the disputes of the Garos decided in their village Panchayats. When a man has some complaints against another he reports them to the Nokma or the village-head. If the nature of the complaints is simple, the Nokma in a meeting of the few leading persons of the village, decides the dispute; but if the nature of the complaints is complicated and not easy of solution the Nokma reports the matter to the Laskar. The Laskar is a very important and influential man in the Garo Hills District. The hills areas are divided into some elekas and each of such elekas is placed under a Laskar for convenient collection of the house tax as well as for deciding the disputes of small nature locally. The Laskar need not essentially be a literate man, worldly prudence is enough for the management of his eleka. In practice a Laskar wields immense influence in his eleka.’
[3]
The highest judicial authorities operate as judges on the district level: ‘The Judicial Officer appointed to preside over the District Council Court, exercises original jurisdiction to try cases and suits and exercises such powers as defined in Chapter III of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1898, and such other powers conferred by or under these rules, as he is invested with by the Executive Member of the District Council with the approval of the Governor for the disposal of the case and suits arising within the territorial jurisdiction of the said court.’
[4]
They may be assited by appointed elders: ‘The District Council may, whenever it deems necessary, also nominate two or more local elders well conversant with the tribal usages and customary laws, to sit with the judicial officer of the court as a bench and may, by order, invest such bench with any of the powers conferred or conferrable by or under the rules for the trial of suits and cases based on the tribal usages and the tribal customary laws only.’
[5]
[1]: Roy, Sankar Kumar: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Garo [2]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 43 [3]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 40 [4]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 69 [5]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 61 |
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Councillors assisted rulers in judicial matters: ’But as a man attracts the favourable attention of the observant ones of his tribe, as he more and more impresses the people by his ability in their public gatherings, by the soundness of his opinion, by the depth of his knowledge of the customary laws and traditions, by his skill in public debate, by his keen interest in public affairs, by his bravery or warlike qualities, or by some other qualifications, he acquires public influence, and is accepted, in a greater or less degree, as a public man, representative of a portion of the community. Success in trade, or other personal attributes, are likewise qualifications for this post. The position of such a person is definitely confirmed when the head ruler with his council invites him to be a councillor. Attending an Omanhene or Ohene are always to be found some councillors, who assist him in hearing and determining lawsuits and administering justice. In the town of the [Page 11] Omanhene these men perform many of the duties of officers, who in European countries are known as ministers of state. It is worthy of note that, as a general rule, a Tufuhene is not a member of the Council (Begwa) of the Ohene or Omanhene.’
[1]
’The several households of each town are divided into wards, which are under the control of several heads of families; an elder of these is called Penin (pl. Mpeninfu). A council, composed of Mpeninfu and other representative men, as well as Abremponfu * and the Ohene, governs the town. This council is the tribunal that settles all law-suits and regulates the internal organization of the community and enacts laws. There are other persons elected to see after local sanitary matters, such as the cleaning of the country lanes, footpaths, and market roads. They summon before the council persons breaking sanitary regulations, as well as those committing any serious breach of the public peace.’
[2]
The councillors were not legal professionals, but rather men of standing in the community: ’The council is composed of (1) the head ruler; (2) worthy old men of intelligence and experience, not necessarily men called chiefs; (3) men of position and wealth, generally heads of families and stoolholders; (4) representative men invited by the head ruler and his council. The Tufuhene is not generally a member of this council. In the coast towns a person severs his connection with his company and relinquishes any office he holds when he becomes a councillor. A councillor holds his office for life, but, should he be guilty of treason or receiving bribes to pervert justice, he can be suspended or dismissed. Councillors with the ruler may hear and decide cases, and advise on the general administration of public affairs.’
[3]
There were civil and military tribunals: ’For the determination of plaints there are two kinds of tribunals-military, that is, Asafu, and civil. No case is tried in default of appearance. These Asafu tribunals exist principally in coast towns. Each company has the right to determine cases, especially on matters of discipline and charges of misconduct and intrigue between a member of one company and a married woman of the same or other company. Bosman and other writers call this tribunal the Manceros, evidently a corruption of the Fanti word Mbrantsé, meaning “young men.” The court summarily deals with cases, which the civil or ordinary tribunal is unable to hear, through the refusal of one of the parties to attend the trial or any adjournment thereof. The proceedings are somewhat like a drumhead court-martial. An Asafu trial is so expensive to the litigants that no one appeals to such tribunal if he can possibly avoid doing so. The expression used by the complainant or plaintiff when applying for summons runs somewhat thus: “Dompo or Damfu (whatever may be the name of the other party) [Page 32] has wronged me. I sell, or hand him to you; deal with him accordingly.”’
[4]
The Ohene presided over the tribunal, assisted also by a ’linguist’, an official versed in what Sarbah walls customary law: ’The Ohene, presiding over the tribunal, as well as the several councillors, express themselves through the linguist. The decision in every trial is pronounced by him. He goes with the president and councillors when they retire to deliberate on the case before them, and he delivers the judgment of the court. A linguist occupies a most confidential position, and the head linguist is usually one of the principal advisers of the ruler. In ordinary cases the [Page 33] ruler and he alone can lawfully constitute a court and decide cases. It is his duty to be conversant with the history of his country and the family history of the stool. At the yearly observance of the stool custom he takes a prominent part; moreover, he should be learned in the customary law, command a large stock of parables and apt phrases, be a man of ready and effective speech, and not unacquainted with the arts of diplomacy. In former years public speakers, for such are linguists, were not considered competent until they had been trained in the courts of the Asanti king and certain principal towns in Fantiland, which the non-Fanti inhabitants called the land of history, the seat of poetry, and the abode of enlightenment.’
[5]
[1]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 10p [2]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 26 [3]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 32 [4]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 31p [5]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 32p |
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The Executive, not a full-time professional judge, functions in judicial proceedings. SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ’Executive’. ’The initial processes applicable to civil, oath, accused or criminal summonses have already been described. In order to meet the clerical service required for these forms, there is attached to the important Tribunals a Registrar’s office where summonses and all the other processes are taken. The Registrar has charge of the cause list and the Record Books. In Akim Abuakwa the tribunal sits for five days in the week, Wednesday being excluded by the “Awukudae” custom, and Sunday by the British connexion and other Christian influences. Sittings of Tribunal last for about 6 to 10 working hours each day, and the Omanhene, as responsible judge, is always expected to be present throughout the day’s sitting. We have already described the constitution of the Tribunal as consisting of the Omanhene, his Linguists, his four principal Executive Chiefs, the Queen-Mother, the non-Stool owning Elders and Councillors (including in the latter term the Christian Elders and Presbyters). The Tribunal is summoned by the “Kantamanto” or “woni-mini” drum ( q.v.) and on the Omanhene taking his seat at the third beating of the drum, the Registrar proceeds to deal with his cause list.’
[1]
[1]: Danquah, J. B. (Joseph Boakye), 1928: 97; Literacy Database |
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’Presiding as a judge was only a part time occupation. Godordsmen (chieftains) and the lords of the territorial lordships could act as arbitrators and the Lögrétta, where they all had a seat, may sometimes have acted as a court of law. However, jurors would normally have been farmers nominated by the godordsmen, not legal professionals.’
[1]
Icelandic assemblies relied on a legal code but established no formal institutions for the purpose of law enforcement: ’Iceland had established systems of laws, assemblies, and judicial institutions to serve in resolving conflict but no centralized power to enforce order or verdicts. Everyone was legally required to belong to a farming household and individual farmers had authority over and responsibility for their households. Disputes, including injuries and killings, were settled through arbitration. The offending party paid compensation to the offended party. In more extreme cases the offending individual was outlawed, either for three years or permanently, and was official cast out of society and any right to compensation. Prosecution and collection of settlements was up to private individuals. Conflicts often overstepped institutional boundaries into blood feuds. Feuds could escalate well beyond the immediate individuals or households until the involved whole social networks. With the rise of chiefly power and territoriality in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries regional conflicts developed that eventually encompassed t he entire island. The decades of civil strife ended in 1262 A.D. when Iceland came under the authority of the Norwegian crown.’
[2]
Enforcement of settlements was the responsibility of the individual and therefore highly dependent on social and political power: ’Turner (1971) recognized that there was no state in medieval Iceland, and that while there was law, it did not count for much. Force was decisive. Miller asks under what circumstances people settled disputes by arbitration rather than legal judgments or violent self-help (1984). He describes the system of assemblies, courts, quarters, chieftains and followers, and points out that the sanction behind all legal judgments was feud or the fear of it. There were no corporate kin groups, and in any situation the kin group “had to be actively [Page 234] assembled,” its composition reflecting the “popularity, wealth, and persuasive skills of the organizer” and the seriousness of the wrong to be remedied (p. 99). Kin bonds were stronger closer to home, but this pattern was offset by attendance at the general assembly, where relatives tended to each others’ business.’
[3]
’One of the peculiarities of early Iceland was the lack of formal state institutions. The legislature, extensive law code, and judicial system of local and higher courts left prosecution and the enforcement of settlements in the hands of individuals. From an early date, the country was divided into Quarters. Each quarter constituted a broad community with three assemblies (ÞINGS), with the exception of the Northern Quarter that had four, and a system of local courts. Once a year the General Assembly (ALÞINGI) met in the southwest of Iceland. Judicial cases that could not be resolved in local quarters were heard and the parliament (LÖGRÉTTA) convened. The parliament was the principal legislative institution and was responsible for the introduction and maintanence of law. It consisted of chieftains (GOÐAR) from the local quarters. After the conversion to Christianity, the two Icelandic bishops were each given a seat in the parliament. The institution of chieftaincy (GOÐORÐ) was the main locus of political leadership in the country. Originally there were 36 but this number was later expanded. Chieftaincies themselves were a form of property and could be alienated and even divided among multiple individuals. In some cases, individuals asserted power beyond the scope of the political system and controlled multiple chieftaincies. All independent farmers had to be affiliated with a chieftain, although they could choose among any of the chieftains in their quarter and could switch allegiances if they did not feel that their needs were being met. Other than a seat on the parliament, chieftains had few rights beyond those of other independent farmers and few institutional means of dominating others. Chieftains derived much of their authority from their ability to broker support as advocates for their constituents in legal disputes or feuds.’
[2]
Entitlement to personal property was equally defended by force: ’In Commonwealth Iceland there was a system of extraction based on claims to ownership of property, on concepts of the unproblematic [Page 161] differential access to resources in favour of a chieftainly class. The chieftains were unwilling to subordinate themselves to state institutions to protect their privileged positions. The consequence was stratification without a state, the contradiction of an economic system based on property relationships without a congruent institutional system to enforce them. Ownership was as sound as the force one could muster to defend it. There was a complex system of law, but it was all just so much labyrinthine rhetoric in the face of the stark reality that power decided. As slavery diminished, claimants to land enlarged their holdings by using wage labour and tenancy arrangements to work them. To support their claims, they had to increase their power by enlarging their entourages.’
[4]
State-enforced justice was formalized only during the Norwegian period: ’From the legal and political perspective, it is more or less agreed that the absorption of the Icelandic Commonwealth by the Norwegian monarchy after 1263 changed substantially the penal nature of outlawry and the legal status of the outlaw in society. Banishment from the community or exile from the country became a dead letter of law, as in the Jónsbók of 1281 (1970), even though magicians would occasionally be banished as late as the seventeenth century (Reykers 1936:16). And as a fugitive from justice rather than the outcast of the community, the postmedieval Icelandic outlaw was no longer punishable by the people he had wronged but instead by state-appointed magistrates and the public executioner. This was the sort of juridical transition from personal vengeance to state-enforced ‘justice’ which Lord Acton would have approved of but Andreas Heusler deplored.’
[5]
[1]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [2]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders [3]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1989. “Anthropological Perspectives On The Commonwealth Period”, 233 [4]: Durrenberger, E. Paul, Dorothy Durrenberger, and Ástráður Eysteinsson 1988. “Economic Representation And Narrative Structure In Hœnsa-Þóris Saga”, 160 [5]: Amory, Frederic 1992. “Medieval Icelandic Outlaw: Lifestyle, Saga, And Legend”, 190 |
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The crown appointed Icelandic lawmen or judges: ’These new codes wrought a fundamental change in the conception of positive law as well as in legal practice in Iceland. The old court procedures with its intricacies and formalities was replaced by the simpler Norwegian system. The king was ruler and lawgiver was regarded as the source of justice, and behind the laws now stood the royal authority, ready to execute the decrees of the courts even against the most powerful offenders. Violation of the law was no longer viewed as a private affair to be settled by the offender and the party injured, but as a crime for which the wrong-doer had to answer to the government. The fines to be paid and other punishments to be inflicted were still to be determined by twelve men according to ancient usage. The old punishment of banishment for serious offenses was retained, but fines payable to the king were instituted in numerous cases, and capital punishment was to be inflicted for grave crimes, like murder, robbery, rape, counterfeiting, forgery, and seduction. Other severe punishments were also established. [...] But care had been taken by the lawgiver to guard against hasty action and undue harshness in the treatment of wrong-doers. In a chapter about legal decisions he advises the judges to consider carefully truth, justice, patience and mercy, in order that their decisions not bear the marks of cruelty and hatred. [...] The first lawmen appointed under the new law were Stural Thordsson and Jon Einarsson. The first royal magistrates who received the title of sýslumadr were Hrafn Oddsson in western Iceland, and Thorvard Thorarinsson for the southern and eastern districts, and Asgrim Thorsteinsson in the south-western districts. Others may have been appointed, but their names are not known. In 1279 Hrafn Oddsson became royal merkismadr with authority over all Iceland, as already noted.’
[1]
’These lawmen (lögmenn) can be considered full-time judges.’
[2]
The lögrétta assumed judicial duties: ’The judicial powers were lodged in the lögrétta; the legislative functions should be exercized by the Althing and the king conjointly. But the thing and the crown might take the initiative in legislation. As the king now acted as lawgiver, the legislative functions of the thing were greatly reduced, and it became principally a judicial tribunal like the Norwegian lagthings. The laws were no longer recited from the Mount of Laws, and as the Althing now consisted of chosen representatives, who were soon further reduced in number, it lost its popular character. As the general public ceased to attend its sessions, its significance as a center of national and social life disappeared.’
[3]
’This was made especially manifest by the new procedure introduced at this time of summoning people to Norway for trial. [...] The king’s officers also travelled about collecting the royal revenues with greater severity that had hitherto been customary. They reproved the people for appealing to the bishop, and in some cases forbade them to pay as large church dues as the bishop had demanded.’
[4]
The practice of summoning Icelanders to Norway for trial met with opposition and was ultimately curtailed: ’This reminder had the result that in 1315 a full representation again met at the Althing from all parts of Iceland. In 1314 he issues a new supplement to the Icelandic code, in which he sought to right some of the wrongs complained of in the remonstrance submitted by the Althing. Regarding the bringing of Icelanders to Norway for trial, the law was made to conform to the remonstrance. A provision was inserted stating that such a step should be taken only if the sýslumenn and lawmen were unable to try the case. The demand for new taxes was definitely dropped. But nothing was said regarding the appointment of native Icelanders for office; nor was any assurance given that six ships would be sent to Iceland every year, though this matter was now of greater importance than ever, since the trade with Iceland had become a Norwegian monopoly. No guarantee existed that the king would respect the provisions in the union agreement. Hitherto he had shown a disposition to place Iceland on the level with the Norwegian dependencies. What the future relation between the two countries was to be seemed as much as ever an unsettled question.’
[5]
The regional courts were abolished: ’The Icelanders also received two new law codes during Magnus’ reign. In 1271 the king sent to Iceland a new legal code known as Járnsída (Ironside), followed by another book which bears the name of its main author, Jón Einarsson, Jónsbók (Jón’s Book). But, contrary to developments in Norway, this second revision led Iceland further from conformity with Norwegian law. Jónsbók was admittedly based largely on Norwegian law, but it was drawn up for Iceland alone, and it remained in force there for four to five centuries, while Norwegian law underwent many revisions. Jónsbók thus made Iceland a separate jurisdictional area under royal rule. Iceland’s system of government was radically altered by Járnsída and Jónsbók. Alpingi continued to meet, but the Law Council, which had been a legislative body, became primarily a court of law. The four regional courts, the Fifth court and the spring assemblies were abolished; new officials, lögmenn (lawmen) and sýslumenn (district commissioners) presided over regional court proceedings as required. Iceland was also assigned its own administrative officials. Around 1300 a demand was first put forward at Alpingi that Icelanders of the old chieftain clans should be apointed royal representatives in Iceland. For centuries after this, most administrative offices were held by Icelanders. Only the office of governor (hirdstjóri), the supreme royal official in Iceland, was held by foreigners as often as Icelanders.’
[6]
[1]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 215pp [2]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [3]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 214p [4]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 220 [5]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 233 [6]: Karlsson, Gunnar 2000. "A Brief History of Iceland", 18p |
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No evidence for employment specialization characteristic of a developed urban society. Agricultural and herding would be typical occupations with "some internal differentiation ... in view of the sophistication of craft production documented at Mehrgarh.”
[1]
[1]: Agrawal, D. P. (2007) The Indus Civilization: An interdisciplinary perspective. Aryan Books International: New Delhi. |
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No evidence for employment specialization characteristic of a developed urban society. Agricultural and herding would be typical occupations with "some internal differentiation ... in view of the sophistication of craft production documented at Mehrgarh.”
[1]
[1]: Agrawal, D. P. (2007) The Indus Civilization: An interdisciplinary perspective. Aryan Books International: New Delhi. |
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No evidence has been found of state organisation at Mehrgarh.
[1]
[2]
An urban community of thousands suggests Mehrgarh likely had some degree of hierarchy for dispute resolution, perhaps a chief or collective decision making body but there is no evidence for any formal institutions or significant occupational specialization.
[1]: Gregory L. Possehl. The Indus Civilization. A Contemporary Perspective. Walnut Creek, Altamira, 2002, p. 6 [2]: Petrie, C. A. (in press) Chapter 11, Case Study: Mehrgarh. In, Barker, G and Goucher, C (eds.) Cambridge World History, Volume 2: A World with Agriculture, 12,000 BCE - 500 CE. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge |
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"While the necessary reliance on archaeological evidence has ensured that many aspects of Harappan civilization, such as economic activities, settlements, industry, and biological anthropology, have been investigated as well as or better than those of literate civilizations, the absence of intelligible documentary material is a major handicap to understanding Harappan social and political organization and has put some aspects of Harappan life, such as the law, quite beyond cognizance."
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh 2008: 245) Jane McIntosh. 2008. The Ancient Indus Valley. Santa Barbara; Denver; Oxford: ABC-CLIO. |
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According to Coningham, while archaeologists such as Maurizio Tosi attempted to find evidence of courts and the rule of law, they have only found stamp seals that did not change over time or, by their concentration in a given place, indicate an authoritarian locus.
[1]
[1]: Coningham pers. comm. interview with Harvey Whitehouse and Christina Collins, Jan 2017 |
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Inferred from presence of law courts.
[1]
"The advent of the Parthians did not mark a break in the cultural history of the Greek cities, which retained their constitutions and magistrates, their schools, language, and law, long after the decline of Seleucid power." [2] [1]: Perikhanian, A., ‘Iranian Society and Law’, in The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2, ed. by Ehsan Yar-Shater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),vol. III, p.676. [2]: (Neusner 2008, 10) Neusner, Jacob. 2008. A History of the Jews in Babylonia. 1. The Parthian Period. Wipf & Stock. Eugene. |
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There were such things as legal documents and land transfer deeds written in Kharoshthi.
[1]
"The dandanayaka was presumably the wielder of the rod (dandayaka), acting both as commissioner of police to prevent crime and as a judge or criminal magistrate administering justice."" [2] [1]: (Samad 2011, 89) Samad, R. U. 2011. The Grandeur of Gandhara: The Ancient Buddhist Civilization of the Swat, Peshawar, Kabul and Indus Valleys. Angora Publishing. [2]: (Puri 1994, 254) Puri, B. N. The Kushans. in Harmatta, Janos. Puri, B. N. Etemadi, G. F. eds. 1994. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume II. The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations 700 B.C. to A.D. 250. UNESCO Publishing. |
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The highest legal official was the mowbedan mowbed, the top religious leader within the Zoroastrian church
[1]
, whose precise relationship with the sahr dadwaran dadwar (the judge of the judges of the State, the head of the state judges)
[1]
is unknown. The mowbed were priest judges.
[2]
Judges known as rads were among other city officials including tax officials who "represented the central government and were responsible to provincial administrators".
[3]
The king could "pass judgement in criminal cases, as we may conclude from the Acts of the Christian Martyrs (see Wiessner 1967)."
[2]
[1]: (Shaki 2011) Shaki, Mansour. 2011. CLASS SYSTEM iii. Encylopaedia Iranica. Vol. V. Fasc. 6. pp. 652-658. Site accessed 21 September 2016: www.iranicaonline.org/articles/class-system-iii [2]: (Macuch 2012) Macuch, Maria. 2016. Judicial and Legal Systems iii. Sasanian Legal System. Vol. XV. Fasc. 2. pp. 181-196. Site accessed: 21 September 2016: www.iranicaonline.org/articles/judicial-and-legal-systems-iii-sasanian-legal-system [3]: (Lambton 2011) Lambton, Ann K S. 2011. CITIES iii. Administration and Social Organization. Encyclopedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iii |
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The highest legal official was the mowbedan mowbed, the top religious leader within the Zoroastrian church
[1]
, whose precise relationship with the sahr dadwaran dadwar (the judge of the judges of the State, the head of the state judges)
[1]
is unknown. The mowbed were priest judges.
[2]
Judges known as rads were among other city officials including tax officials who "represented the central government and were responsible to provincial administrators".
[3]
The king could "pass judgement in criminal cases, as we may conclude from the Acts of the Christian Martyrs (see Wiessner 1967)."
[2]
[1]: (Shaki 2011) Shaki, Mansour. 2011. CLASS SYSTEM iii. Encylopaedia Iranica. Vol. V. Fasc. 6. pp. 652-658. Site accessed 21 September 2016: www.iranicaonline.org/articles/class-system-iii [2]: (Macuch 2012) Macuch, Maria. 2016. Judicial and Legal Systems iii. Sasanian Legal System. Vol. XV. Fasc. 2. pp. 181-196. Site accessed: 21 September 2016: www.iranicaonline.org/articles/judicial-and-legal-systems-iii-sasanian-legal-system [3]: (Lambton 2011) Lambton, Ann K S. 2011. CITIES iii. Administration and Social Organization. Encyclopedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iii |
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We code present for specialist judges. If judges were "multicompetent state officials" it does not appear they are specialists who only judge law. For similar case e.g. the Roman Principate.
Judges were "multicompetent state officials dealing with justice, police, tax, and finance issues." [1] Judges were appointed by the Caliph and were called Qadi. [2] Caliphal appointment of judges from 642 CE. [1] In Egypt "a judge (qadi) arbitrated civil and criminal cases." [3] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 96) [2]: (Weiss 1998, 6) [3]: (Raymond 2000, 17) |
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We code present for specialist judges. If judges were "multicompetent state officials" it does not appear they are specialists who only judge law. For similar case e.g. the Roman Principate. On the other hand, another source says Qadis were "full time judiciary officials" so maybe there were some specialists.
In the Abbasid Caliphate formal the law was promulgated by a body known as the Fuqaha. The law code was heavily influenced by Sharia law. Sharia was based on the Sunna, which were teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Legal thought was also influenced by Ijma’, which were a body of rulings on legal issues based on the consensus of scholars who had met to discuss specific cases. Despite the Caliphate’s claims to religious authority based on their links to the Prophet Muhammed, it was rare for direct rulings on legal matters to originate from the caliphal authorities. Alongside a developing legal code was the development of the Qudis, who were full time judiciary officials. [1] At least in the Umayyad period judges were "multicompetent state officials dealing with justice, police, tax, and finance issues." [2] Judges were appointed and were called Qadi. [3] [1]: Zubaida, Sami, Law and power in the Islamic world. (Tauris & Company Limited, 2005) pp. 74-84 [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 96) [3]: Zubaida, Sami, Law and power in the Islamic world. (Tauris & Company Limited, 2005) p. 46 |
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We code present for specialist judges. If judges were "multicompetent state officials" it does not appear they are specialists who only judge law. For similar case e.g. the Roman Principate. On the other hand, another source says Qadis were "full time judiciary officials" so maybe there were some specialists.
In the Abbasid Caliphate formal the law was promulgated by a body known as the Fuqaha. The law code was heavily influenced by Sharia law. Sharia was based on the Sunna, which were teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Legal thought was also influenced by Ijma’, which were a body of rulings on legal issues based on the consensus of scholars who had met to discuss specific cases. Despite the Caliphate’s claims to religious authority based on their links to the Prophet Muhammed, it was rare for direct rulings on legal matters to originate from the caliphal authorities. Alongside a developing legal code was the development of the Qudis, who were full time judiciary officials. [1] At least in the Umayyad period judges were "multicompetent state officials dealing with justice, police, tax, and finance issues." [2] Judges were appointed and were called Qadi. [3] [1]: Zubaida, Sami, Law and power in the Islamic world. (Tauris & Company Limited, 2005) pp. 74-84 [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 96) [3]: Zubaida, Sami, Law and power in the Islamic world. (Tauris & Company Limited, 2005) p. 46 |
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Presumably the late Abbasids employed qadi (judge).
Late Abbasid period: "the religious establishment - that is, the ulama - were responsible for education, administering the awqaf, and the administration of justice". [1] [1]: (Elbendary 2015, 40) Elbendary, Amina. 2015. Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protest in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria. The American University in Cairo Press. |
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“Government machinery in the earlier period was confined to the management of essential government functions, but when Ghazna came under Ghurid control, it was natural that the administrative institutions as developed by the Ghaznavids should be adopted. A certain number of features of the Seljuq administrative system were also taken over. […] The vizier was the head of the civil administration. The qa ̄d ̄ı al-quda ̄t (supreme judge) was the head of the judiciary, with numerous subordinate qa ̄d ̄ıs, including a qa ̄d ̄ı for the army.”
[1]
[1]: (Nizami 1999, 194) K A Nizami. The Ghurids. M S Asimov. C E Bosworth. eds. 1999. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part One. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. Delhi. |
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“Government machinery in the earlier period was confined to the management of essential government functions, but when Ghazna came under Ghurid control, it was natural that the administrative institutions as developed by the Ghaznavids should be adopted. A certain number of features of the Seljuq administrative system were also taken over. […] The vizier was the head of the civil administration. The qa ̄d ̄ı al-quda ̄t (supreme judge) was the head of the judiciary, with numerous subordinate qa ̄d ̄ıs, including a qa ̄d ̄ı for the army.”
[1]
[1]: (Nizami 1999, 194) K A Nizami. The Ghurids. M S Asimov. C E Bosworth. eds. 1999. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part One. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. Delhi. |
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The king was the highest judge, although other judges and magistrates also operated in the state. There were different courts of law (primarily for Muslim and non-Muslim law codes) which needed separate judges.
[1]
"the sultan appointed judges to dispense justice and also acted as a court of appeal to hear cases against the decisions taken by judges."
[2]
[1]: Habibullah, A. B. M. (1961). The foundation of Muslim rule in India. Central Book Depot, pp 271-4. [2]: (Ahmed 2011, 97) Ahmed, Farooqui Salma. 2011. A Comprehensive History of Medieval India: Twelfth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century. Pearson Education India. |
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Inferred from the following quotes, which broadly refer to Indian polities under early Muslim rule.
The king was the highest judge, although other judges and magistrates also operated in the state. There were different courts of law (primarily for Muslim and non-Muslim law codes) which needed separate judges. [1] "the sultan appointed judges to dispense justice and also acted as a court of appeal to hear cases against the decisions taken by judges." [2] reference of the Chief Qazi of Mansura in the writing of the contemporaneous Abdul Hassan. [3] [1]: Habibullah, A. B. M. (1961). The foundation of Muslim rule in India. Central Book Depot, pp 271-4. [2]: (Ahmed 2011, 97) Ahmed, Farooqui Salma. 2011. A Comprehensive History of Medieval India: Twelfth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century. Pearson Education India. [3]: Panhwar, M. H. "Chronological Dictionary of Sind, (Karachi, 1983) pp. 192 |
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During the era of Yoritorno[1192-1199CE], justice, it may be said, remained the prerogative of the chieftain. Though he assigned trusted followers to cases and allowed them some leeway, he did not have professional investigators, much less a class of judges. A "judiciary" in the sense of a separate organ did not appear until later.’
[1]
’A case in 1187 demonstrates the enormous potential of a system of justice whose principal objective was equity for the litigants rather than aggrandizement by their judges.’
[2]
’the post-shikimoku era carried Kamakura justice to a new plateau of excellence. From about 1230 the Rokuhara deputyship in Kyoto became an adjunct to the system, fully empowered to judge suits independently of Kamakura.’
[3]
[1]: Yamamura, Kozo (ed). 2008. The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 3. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press [sixth edition].p.76 [2]: Yamamura, Kozo (ed). 2008. The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 3. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press [sixth edition].p.75 [3]: Yamamura, Kozo (ed). 2008. The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 3. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press [sixth edition].p.79 |
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‘In addition to issuing travel passes and resolving civil disputes, the machi bugyô would sit in judgement for offences committed by townsmen. Several times a month, the Edo magistrates would form a sort of high court along with senior councillors to judge more serious cases...’
[1]
[1]: Cunningham, Don. 2004.Taiho-jutsu: Law and Order in the Age of the Samurai. Tuttle Publishing.p.42. |
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From the point of view of Iban adat, a longhouse community functions as a judicial unit: ’Although each of its component families is largely autonomous, the longhouse as a whole also functions as an important legal unit. In former times, every longhouse was, as we have noted, a politically sovereign community. Even now, the longhouse headman is looked upon as the chief guardian of community adat . He and other longhouse elders are expected to be well-versed in adat and to make known to their followers what the rules of adat require of them. Through informal meetings and judicial hearings they are also expected to enforce compliance with these rules and, following their stipulations, resolve disputes and redress compliants that arise within the community. In addition to this the longhouse as a whole is thought to possess a collective ritual status with regard to the spiritual world (Richards 1963:1-2).’
[1]
Village headmen double as judges in local matters: ’When the Tuai Rumah learns that a serious offence, such as adultery, has been committed, he must sacrifice a chicken at once. The significance of this sacrifice is that it calls public attention to the offence and indicates that it is now under formal juridical review, and that the parties involved are no longer permitted to resort to private vengeance or self-help. He must act at once, as any delay might result in bloodshed, in which case the Tuai Rumah himself is liable to be fined. Traditionally an injured husband or wife had the right to retaliate in the case of adultery provided the adulterous couple were found in flogrante delicto and the retaliation was carried out at once.’
[2]
[1]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, xxi [2]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, 4 |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ’absent’. From the point of view of Iban adat, a longhouse community functions as a judicial unit: ’Although each of its component families is largely autonomous, the longhouse as a whole also functions as an important legal unit. In former times, every longhouse was, as we have noted, a politically sovereign community. Even now, the longhouse headman is looked upon as the chief guardian of community adat . He and other longhouse elders are expected to be well-versed in adat and to make known to their followers what the rules of adat require of them. Through informal meetings and judicial hearings they are also expected to enforce compliance with these rules and, following their stipulations, resolve disputes and redress compliants that arise within the community. In addition to this the longhouse as a whole is thought to possess a collective ritual status with regard to the spiritual world (Richards 1963:1-2).’
[1]
Village headmen double as judges in local matters: ’When the Tuai Rumah learns that a serious offence, such as adultery, has been committed, he must sacrifice a chicken at once. The significance of this sacrifice is that it calls public attention to the offence and indicates that it is now under formal juridical review, and that the parties involved are no longer permitted to resort to private vengeance or self-help. He must act at once, as any delay might result in bloodshed, in which case the Tuai Rumah himself is liable to be fined. Traditionally an injured husband or wife had the right to retaliate in the case of adultery provided the adulterous couple were found in flogrante delicto and the retaliation was carried out at once.’
[2]
But the Brooke administration established formal courts on district/polity level: ’By 1900, Brooke control of Sarawak was fairly well established. The government was gradually extending its efforts into such fields as agricultural research. As it established a system of courts and law, effort was made, whenever possible, to codify and preserve local customary law ( adat ). From this time on, the mainstream of Iban migration was much less violent, despite cultural ideals, and as we will see, much slower. However, government regulations notwithstanding, the migrations did not cease.’
[3]
We have assumed that the above-mentioned penal code was applied to Iban offenders as well. We have selected the same provisional date of transition.
[1]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, xxi [2]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, 4 [3]: Austin, Robert Frederi. 1978. “Iban Migration: Patterns Of Mobility And Employment In The 20Th Century”, 16 |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ’absent’. From the point of view of Iban adat, a longhouse community functions as a judicial unit: ’Although each of its component families is largely autonomous, the longhouse as a whole also functions as an important legal unit. In former times, every longhouse was, as we have noted, a politically sovereign community. Even now, the longhouse headman is looked upon as the chief guardian of community adat . He and other longhouse elders are expected to be well-versed in adat and to make known to their followers what the rules of adat require of them. Through informal meetings and judicial hearings they are also expected to enforce compliance with these rules and, following their stipulations, resolve disputes and redress compliants that arise within the community. In addition to this the longhouse as a whole is thought to possess a collective ritual status with regard to the spiritual world (Richards 1963:1-2).’
[1]
Village headmen double as judges in local matters: ’When the Tuai Rumah learns that a serious offence, such as adultery, has been committed, he must sacrifice a chicken at once. The significance of this sacrifice is that it calls public attention to the offence and indicates that it is now under formal juridical review, and that the parties involved are no longer permitted to resort to private vengeance or self-help. He must act at once, as any delay might result in bloodshed, in which case the Tuai Rumah himself is liable to be fined. Traditionally an injured husband or wife had the right to retaliate in the case of adultery provided the adulterous couple were found in flogrante delicto and the retaliation was carried out at once.’
[2]
But the Brooke administration established formal courts on district/polity level: ’By 1900, Brooke control of Sarawak was fairly well established. The government was gradually extending its efforts into such fields as agricultural research. As it established a system of courts and law, effort was made, whenever possible, to codify and preserve local customary law ( adat ). From this time on, the mainstream of Iban migration was much less violent, despite cultural ideals, and as we will see, much slower. However, government regulations notwithstanding, the migrations did not cease.’
[3]
We have assumed that the above-mentioned penal code was applied to Iban offenders as well. We have selected the same provisional date of transition.
[1]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, xxi [2]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, 4 [3]: Austin, Robert Frederi. 1978. “Iban Migration: Patterns Of Mobility And Employment In The 20Th Century”, 16 |
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Coded present for New Kingdom of Hatti (predecessor). "Carchemish and probably Malatya apparently continued from their Late Bronze Age predecessors with little or no interruption."
[1]
Tabal region (Konya Plain): "There is nothing in the material record to indicate that it was significantly affected by the upheavals at the end of the Late Bronze Age, or by the collapse of the Hittite empire. Certainly there is no evidence of a shift of peoples from it in this period."
[2]
[1]: (Bryce 2012, 63) [2]: (Bryce 2002, 43) |
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Religious judges called kadis.
[1]
Military judges (kadi’asker) were the "chief judges of the Empire, who were responsible for judicial matters that came before the council." [2] First one dated to Murad I. [3] [1]: (Shaw 1976) [2]: (Imber 2002, 157) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [3]: (Imber 2002, 159) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. |
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Called a Kadi.
[1]
"The Ottoman state appointed all important judges, jurisconsults, and professors of law." [2] Military judges (kadi’asker) were the "chief judges of the Empire, who were responsible for judicial matters that came before the council." [3] [1]: (Finkel 2012) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 440) [3]: (Imber 2002, 157) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. |
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Called a Kadi.
[1]
"The Ottoman state appointed all important judges, jurisconsults, and professors of law." [2] Military judges (kadi’asker) were the "chief judges of the Empire, who were responsible for judicial matters that came before the council." [3] Judges in towns. [4] [1]: (Finkel 2012) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 440) [3]: (Imber 2002, 157) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [4]: (Imber 2002, 171) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. |
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Called a Kadi.
[1]
"The Ottoman state appointed all important judges, jurisconsults, and professors of law." [2] Military judges (kadi’asker) were the "chief judges of the Empire, who were responsible for judicial matters that came before the council." [3] Judges in towns. [4] [1]: (Finkel 2012) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 440) [3]: (Imber 2002, 157) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [4]: (Imber 2002, 171) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 161) Mousourakis, G. 2007. A Legal History of Rome, Routledge. |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Professional judges did not exist until the Roman Dominate although at that time their precise role vis-a-vis that of Imperial officials is a matter of debate.
[1]
Before this time there were no judges as a distinct profession in the Roman system of law. Local magistrates dealt with local matters, provincial governors dealt with provincial matters, and the praetors often dealt with cases in Rome. The Roman people could be duly convened as a final court of appeal in cases involving citizens.
[1]: (Mousourakis 2007, 163) |
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Judicial positions.
[1]
Judges.
[2]
Praetorian prefect had "final judgement in legal disputes". [3] [1]: (Wolfram and Dunlap 1990, 293) [2]: (Burns 1991, 100) [3]: (Bjornlie 2016, 61) Bjornlie, Shane M. Governmental Administration. in Arnold, Jonathan J. Bjornlie, Shane M. Sessa, Kristina. eds. 2016. A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy. BRILL. Leiden. |
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"The classic placitum romanum (a convenient modern phrase; our sources just say placitum) consisted of a court president, who was the ruler of Rome or his delegate; some or all of the palatine judges, assisted by dativi iudices who were chosen case by case; a variable number of named Roman nobiles, who could make up a high percentage of the city’s ‘old aristocracy’ in major cases; and numerous other unnamed adstantes, who might sometimes have been non-aristocratic."
[1]
The pope himself heard legal cases - in particular disputes over church lands and ecclesiastical rights-from all over Latin Christian Europe, and the cardinals and legates (see "Administrative levels") served as judges as well. Judges were appointed in the provinces of the Patrimony for more humdrum legal work later in the period. [1]: (Wickham 2015, 387) Wickham, C. 2015. Medieval Rome: Stability and Crisis of a City, 900-1150. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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"The classic placitum romanum (a convenient modern phrase; our sources just say placitum) consisted of a court president, who was the ruler of Rome or his delegate; some or all of the palatine judges, assisted by dativi iudices who were chosen case by case; a variable number of named Roman nobiles, who could make up a high percentage of the city’s ‘old aristocracy’ in major cases; and numerous other unnamed adstantes, who might sometimes have been non-aristocratic."
[1]
[1]: (Wickham 2015, 387) Wickham, C. 2015. Medieval Rome: Stability and Crisis of a City, 900-1150. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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Clan elders fulfilled judicial, but also ceremonial and other duties: ’The oldest kinsman in the clan, or the [unknown]iye-[unknown]usa , is always heaped with honors, if he is both rich and has never been put on trial. To him pertains the jurisdiction in trifling quarrels between kinsfolk. The following ceremonies serve to recall the religious functions that he (Ysekh) formerly exercised a. At the time of the spring festival, which bears a strictly clan character, they bring to him, first of all, a large wooden vessel ( Choron ) containing kumiss; he pronounces a prayer of thanks to the gods and then pours the kumiss upon the fire. b. At the time of the arrival of the betrothed at the bridegroom’s yurt, they take from the sleigh of the betrothed, and place upon a table in front of the fire place the boiled head of a horse, whose eyes are covered with butter, to whose ears are attached intestines filled with horse’s blood, and a wooden cup filled with butter. After this the betrothed enters the yurt, and stands, having first untied her girdle, on the right side of the komelok [RCH: i. e., the fireplace] where she is met by the oldest kinsman, whose place is sometimes taken nowadays by the most honored guest, who, kneeling, throws into the fire pieces of meat, blood and butter, and blesses the bride. For the completion of this ceremony, whose obvious object is to unite the bride with the bridegroom’s home, the oldest kinsman secures for his use the head, blood and butter brought into the yurt, and in addition the sum of one ruble.’
[1]
Clans also handled criminal cases and litigation in assemblies of elders: ’I shall end this survey of Yakut clan institutions and their self-government by a note about Yakut legal procedure. Strictly speaking the Yakut court is the assembly: the clan, nasleg, or ulus assembly, depending on the circumstances. These courts are under each other’s jurisdiction as courts of appeal. The Yakut enjoy waging law suits against each other and witnessing court proceedings. More important matters are always handed over to the assembly. At the assembly the wealthy people usually put in their comments, which areheard attentively, and although the final judgement is pronounced by the chairman of the assembly, he usually simply transmits a condensed form of the general opinion. The ligitants stand before the presiding clansmen with their heads bare, and, frequently nodding their heads and, while making the most important points, making deep bows from the waist, each in turn expound their case. Witnesses are called forth and interrogated on the spot, while unruly witnesses are brought by policemen. The judges always have to sit. In some localities it is customary for the judges to wear caps on their head.’
[2]
Criminal cases were transferred to Russian courts only after 1889: ’Nevertheless until very r ecently and even criminal cases such as beatings, personal injury, and thefts, even for a considerable amount, as long as a house was not broken into, were judged by the clan administration. Only from the year 1889, when an order came out to proceed against the trible authorities if they did not communicate such matters, have thefts begun to be referred to the Russian courts and judged according to Russian laws. For theft the Yakut usually punished wealthy people by a fine which was two or three times the value of the stolen article, depending on the circumstances. For beatings and personal injuries they sentenced the guilty party to support the injured party during his disablement or to pay him a lump sum. Now the guilty are put in prison, and to the great horror of their neighbors they usually leave out and out scoundrels. Such crimes as the violation of women, the breaking of agreements, fraud, and forgery were apparently unknown to the Yakut and went unpunished. But the violation of the wedding agreement was provided for by the kalym. At the present time most of the cases and statements of claim which come before the clan administrations concern the violation of boundary lines and various disputed lands.’
[3]
[1]: Kharuzin, Aleksai Nikolaevich 1898. “Juridicial Customs Of The Yakut”, 40p [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 797 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 798 |
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|
Clan elders fulfilled judicial, but also ceremonial and other duties: ’The oldest kinsman in the clan, or the [unknown]iye-[unknown]usa , is always heaped with honors, if he is both rich and has never been put on trial. To him pertains the jurisdiction in trifling quarrels between kinsfolk. The following ceremonies serve to recall the religious functions that he (Ysekh) formerly exercised a. At the time of the spring festival, which bears a strictly clan character, they bring to him, first of all, a large wooden vessel ( Choron ) containing kumiss; he pronounces a prayer of thanks to the gods and then pours the kumiss upon the fire. b. At the time of the arrival of the betrothed at the bridegroom’s yurt, they take from the sleigh of the betrothed, and place upon a table in front of the fire place the boiled head of a horse, whose eyes are covered with butter, to whose ears are attached intestines filled with horse’s blood, and a wooden cup filled with butter. After this the betrothed enters the yurt, and stands, having first untied her girdle, on the right side of the komelok [RCH: i. e., the fireplace] where she is met by the oldest kinsman, whose place is sometimes taken nowadays by the most honored guest, who, kneeling, throws into the fire pieces of meat, blood and butter, and blesses the bride. For the completion of this ceremony, whose obvious object is to unite the bride with the bridegroom’s home, the oldest kinsman secures for his use the head, blood and butter brought into the yurt, and in addition the sum of one ruble.’
[1]
Clans also handled criminal cases and litigation in assemblies of elders: ’I shall end this survey of Yakut clan institutions and their self-government by a note about Yakut legal procedure. Strictly speaking the Yakut court is the assembly: the clan, nasleg, or ulus assembly, depending on the circumstances. These courts are under each other’s jurisdiction as courts of appeal. The Yakut enjoy waging law suits against each other and witnessing court proceedings. More important matters are always handed over to the assembly. At the assembly the wealthy people usually put in their comments, which are heard attentively, and although the final judgement is pronounced by the chairman of the assembly, he usually simply transmits a condensed form of the general opinion. The ligitants stand before the presiding clansmen with their heads bare, and, frequently nodding their heads and, while making the most important points, making deep bows from the waist, each in turn expound their case. Witnesses are called forth and interrogated on the spot, while unruly witnesses are brought by policemen. The judges always have to sit. In some localities it is customary for the judges to wear caps on their head.’
[2]
Criminal cases were transferred to Russian courts only after 1889: ’Nevertheless until very r ecently and even criminal cases such as beatings, personal injury, and thefts, even for a considerable amount, as long as a house was not broken into, were judged by the clan administration. Only from the year 1889, when an order came out to proceed against the trible authorities if they did not communicate such matters, have thefts begun to be referred to the Russian courts and judged according to Russian laws. For theft the Yakut usually punished wealthy people by a fine which was two or three times the value of the stolen article, depending on the circumstances. For beatings and personal injuries they sentenced the guilty party to support the injured party during his disablement or to pay him a lump sum. Now the guilty are put in prison, and to the great horror of their neighbors they usually leave out and out scoundrels. Such crimes as the violation of women, the breaking of agreements, fraud, and forgery were apparently unknown to the Yakut and went unpunished. But the violation of the wedding agreement was provided for by the kalym. At the present time most of the cases and statements of claim which come before the clan administrations concern the violation of boundary lines and various disputed lands.’
[3]
Clerical courts occasionally prosecuted polygamy prior to that date: ’Such polygamy, which is tolerated for the above reasons, and which has existed since ancient times and does not do any harm, had not become bad in the judgement of the Yakut, and no regulations for the abolition of this custom have been set up by the Yakut. However, since the Yakut adopted the Christian faith, and as they have become enlightened by strict surveillance and sometimes by indulgent reprimands from the eparchial priests, it has been gradually dying out, but nevertheless denunciations on this subject are made concerning people who have lawfully wedded wives but keep the others, and people who had several wives before conversion and married one of them in church without leaving the others, who were left at home with their children; in the case of such a denunciation the local authorities, on the grounds of the repugnance of the Christian religion for this custom, pressed formal charges, and the guilty parties were handed over to the clerical court as fornicators, and the cases were decided according to general state laws, which constituted and still constitute and extreme burden for the Yakut.’
[4]
Sieroszewski’s material on punishment seems to refer to Yakut assemblies rather than Russian courts: ’In 1867, according to official data, 1870 cases were judged in the upravas in the vicinity of Yakutsk: out of the total, 1855 concerned land disputes; in the Vilyuysk Okrug, out of 3786 cases, more than half had to do with land. Besides levying fines the Yakut also punish a guilty party by reprimanding him publicly, before the assembly, by sending him on some job, or putting him into solitary confinement. The latter is apparently a Russian innovation. Punishment with birch-rods was quite unknown to the Yakut in the past. Even now they have recourse to this very rarely and with great distaste. In the north they did not even know what this was like, and once, in the Kolymsk Ulus, when the assembly did not known what to do with one of its disobedient members and decided, on the advice of some Yakut who had come from the south, to flog him, they turned to me with questions: where should we beat him?, and do we have to lay him down and undress him or is that not permitted? (Kolymsk Ulus, Undzha, 1883). Usually the influence of the commune is quite sufficient to exert necessary compulsion. In the south, where the ties of the commune have weakened, we find disobedient people whose cattle are taken away as a punishment, or who are forced to obey. Many decisions of the clan assemblies astonished me by their strangeness, but once I looked closer into their life and made thorough inquiries into their motives I always found at the bottom a deep respect for the individual and a striving toward equality. Naturally I say nothing about those decisions which are demonstrably incorrect, and not in accord with custom and the conscience of the people, but which they have been forced to make because of the economic pressure of unscrupulous rich people or because of administrative arbitrariness.’
[5]
[1]: Kharuzin, Aleksai Nikolaevich 1898. “Juridicial Customs Of The Yakut”, 40p [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 797 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 798 [4]: Samokvasov, D. I. A. 1876. “Collection Of Customary Law Of The Siberian Natives”, 14 [5]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 799 |
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|
Clan elders fulfilled judicial, but also ceremonial and other duties: ’The oldest kinsman in the clan, or the [unknown]iye-[unknown]usa , is always heaped with honors, if he is both rich and has never been put on trial. To him pertains the jurisdiction in trifling quarrels between kinsfolk. The following ceremonies serve to recall the religious functions that he (Ysekh) formerly exercised a. At the time of the spring festival, which bears a strictly clan character, they bring to him, first of all, a large wooden vessel ( Choron ) containing kumiss; he pronounces a prayer of thanks to the gods and then pours the kumiss upon the fire. b. At the time of the arrival of the betrothed at the bridegroom’s yurt, they take from the sleigh of the betrothed, and place upon a table in front of the fire place the boiled head of a horse, whose eyes are covered with butter, to whose ears are attached intestines filled with horse’s blood, and a wooden cup filled with butter. After this the betrothed enters the yurt, and stands, having first untied her girdle, on the right side of the komelok [RCH: i. e., the fireplace] where she is met by the oldest kinsman, whose place is sometimes taken nowadays by the most honored guest, who, kneeling, throws into the fire pieces of meat, blood and butter, and blesses the bride. For the completion of this ceremony, whose obvious object is to unite the bride with the bridegroom’s home, the oldest kinsman secures for his use the head, blood and butter brought into the yurt, and in addition the sum of one ruble.’
[1]
Clans also handled criminal cases and litigation in assemblies of elders: ’I shall end this survey of Yakut clan institutions and their self-government by a note about Yakut legal procedure. Strictly speaking the Yakut court is the assembly: the clan, nasleg, or ulus assembly, depending on the circumstances. These courts are under each other’s jurisdiction as courts of appeal. The Yakut enjoy waging law suits against each other and witnessing court proceedings. More important matters are always handed over to the assembly. At the assembly the wealthy people usually put in their comments, which are heard attentively, and although the final judgement is pronounced by the chairman of the assembly, he usually simply transmits a condensed form of the general opinion. The ligitants stand before the presiding clansmen with their heads bare, and, frequently nodding their heads and, while making the most important points, making deep bows from the waist, each in turn expound their case. Witnesses are called forth and interrogated on the spot, while unruly witnesses are brought by policemen. The judges always have to sit. In some localities it is customary for the judges to wear caps on their head.’
[2]
Criminal cases were transferred to Russian courts only after 1889: ’Nevertheless until very r ecently and even criminal cases such as beatings, personal injury, and thefts, even for a considerable amount, as long as a house was not broken into, were judged by the clan administration. Only from the year 1889, when an order came out to proceed against the trible authorities if they did not communicate such matters, have thefts begun to be referred to the Russian courts and judged according to Russian laws. For theft the Yakut usually punished wealthy people by a fine which was two or three times the value of the stolen article, depending on the circumstances. For beatings and personal injuries they sentenced the guilty party to support the injured party during his disablement or to pay him a lump sum. Now the guilty are put in prison, and to the great horror of their neighbors they usually leave out and out scoundrels. Such crimes as the violation of women, the breaking of agreements, fraud, and forgery were apparently unknown to the Yakut and went unpunished. But the violation of the wedding agreement was provided for by the kalym. At the present time most of the cases and statements of claim which come before the clan administrations concern the violation of boundary lines and various disputed lands.’
[3]
Clerical courts occasionally prosecuted polygamy prior to that date: ’Such polygamy, which is tolerated for the above reasons, and which has existed since ancient times and does not do any harm, had not become bad in the judgement of the Yakut, and no regulations for the abolition of this custom have been set up by the Yakut. However, since the Yakut adopted the Christian faith, and as they have become enlightened by strict surveillance and sometimes by indulgent reprimands from the eparchial priests, it has been gradually dying out, but nevertheless denunciations on this subject are made concerning people who have lawfully wedded wives but keep the others, and people who had several wives before conversion and married one of them in church without leaving the others, who were left at home with their children; in the case of such a denunciation the local authorities, on the grounds of the repugnance of the Christian religion for this custom, pressed formal charges, and the guilty parties were handed over to the clerical court as fornicators, and the cases were decided according to general state laws, which constituted and still constitute and extreme burden for the Yakut.’
[4]
Sieroszewski’s material on punishment seems to refer to Yakut assemblies rather than Russian courts: ’In 1867, according to official data, 1870 cases were judged in the upravas in the vicinity of Yakutsk: out of the total, 1855 concerned land disputes; in the Vilyuysk Okrug, out of 3786 cases, more than half had to do with land. Besides levying fines the Yakut also punish a guilty party by reprimanding him publicly, before the assembly, by sending him on some job, or putting him into solitary confinement. The latter is apparently a Russian innovation. Punishment with birch-rods was quite unknown to the Yakut in the past. Even now they have recourse to this very rarely and with great distaste. In the north they did not even know what this was like, and once, in the Kolymsk Ulus, when the assembly did not known what to do with one of its disobedient members and decided, on the advice of some Yakut who had come from the south, to flog him, they turned to me with questions: where should we beat him?, and do we have to lay him down and undress him or is that not permitted? (Kolymsk Ulus, Undzha, 1883). Usually the influence of the commune is quite sufficient to exert necessary compulsion. In the south, where the ties of the commune have weakened, we find disobedient people whose cattle are taken away as a punishment, or who are forced to obey. Many decisions of the clan assemblies astonished me by their strangeness, but once I looked closer into their life and made thorough inquiries into their motives I always found at the bottom a deep respect for the individual and a striving toward equality. Naturally I say nothing about those decisions which are demonstrably incorrect, and not in accord with custom and the conscience of the people, but which they have been forced to make because of the economic pressure of unscrupulous rich people or because of administrative arbitrariness.’
[5]
[1]: Kharuzin, Aleksai Nikolaevich 1898. “Juridicial Customs Of The Yakut”, 40p [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 797 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 798 [4]: Samokvasov, D. I. A. 1876. “Collection Of Customary Law Of The Siberian Natives”, 14 [5]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 799 |
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Kinsmen of the dead, not judges, decided on the course of action taken: ’Feuding or warfare is endemic among the Jivaro. Because of the retaliatory nature of legal sanctions in the society, the application of avenging action frequently initiates long and drawn out hostilities between two groups of kinsmen. This pattern of repeated application of sanctions by two families against one another is a dominant preoccupation especially among the interior Jivaro. These feuds may be formally ended by payment to the deceased’s relatives, or when one of the eldest men on one side is killed, or when each group of kinsmen has lost a man.’
[1]
’After this idea took hold, they travelled upriver to the settlement of Bupátä’s brother Ungúmï, a húndach, or old one (although he is only about 45 years old), to seek his counsel. Then, Santü journeyed further north into Ecuador to converse with Mukwíngü, the mother’s brother of Bupátä and Ungúmï. Such counsel, as I have indicated, forms an important part of the protocol that characterizes the pattern of Achuarä hostilities. Not every death attributed to sorcery is avenged, especially in the case of young children. But, once a homicide is committed in retaliation for perceived sorcery-related deaths, it inevitably calls forth a revenge raid sometime in the future on the part of close relatives-brothers-in-law or sons-in-law, usually-of the victims. Should their retaliation prove successful, close relatives of the person whose death initiated the feud also become obligated to avenge the more recent killing. Each successive death draws greater numbers of relatives into the feud on each side, and more and more lives are placed in jeopardy.’
[2]
[1]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [2]: Bennett Ross, Jane 1984. “Effects Of Contact On Revenge Hostilities Among The Achuará Jívaro”, 102 |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ‘1’ or ’absent’. Kinsmen of the dead, not judges, decided on the course of action taken: ’Feuding or warfare is endemic among the Jivaro. Because of the retaliatory nature of legal sanctions in the society, the application of avenging action frequently initiates long and drawn out hostilities between two groups of kinsmen. This pattern of repeated application of sanctions by two families against one another is a dominant preoccupation especially among the interior Jivaro. These feuds may be formally ended by payment to the deceased’s relatives, or when one of the eldest men on one side is killed, or when each group of kinsmen has lost a man.’
[1]
’After this idea took hold, they travelled upriver to the settlement of Bupátä’s brother Ungúmï, a húndach, or old one (although he is only about 45 years old), to seek his counsel. Then, Santü journeyed further north into Ecuador to converse with Mukwíngü, the mother’s brother of Bupátä and Ungúmï. Such counsel, as I have indicated, forms an important part of the protocol that characterizes the pattern of Achuarä hostilities. Not every death attributed to sorcery is avenged, especially in the case of young children. But, once a homicide is committed in retaliation for perceived sorcery-related deaths, it inevitably calls forth a revenge raid sometime in the future on the part of close relatives-brothers-in-law or sons-in-law, usually-of the victims. Should their retaliation prove successful, close relatives of the person whose death initiated the feud also become obligated to avenge the more recent killing. Each successive death draws greater numbers of relatives into the feud on each side, and more and more lives are placed in jeopardy.’
[2]
[1]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [2]: Bennett Ross, Jane 1984. “Effects Of Contact On Revenge Hostilities Among The Achuará Jívaro”, 102 |
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King highest judge, vizier second highest judge. However, law usually administered at local level.
[1]
JGM: Note the important text: "The Duties of the Vizier" that lays out the chief judges responsibilities, and provides the formal organization of the legal system of the New Kingdom. See G.P.F. Van Den Boorn,The Duties of the Vizier:Civil Administration in the Early New Kingdom. Kegan Paul, 1988. [1]: (Brewer and Teeter 1999, 73) |
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King highest judge, vizier second highest judge. However, law usually administered at local level.
[1]
JGM: Note the important text: "The Duties of the Vizier" that lays out the chief judges responsibilities, and provides the formal organization of the legal system of the New Kingdom. See G.P.F. Van Den Boorn,The Duties of the Vizier:Civil Administration in the Early New Kingdom. Kegan Paul, 1988. [1]: (Brewer and Teeter 1999, 73) |
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inferred absent or unknown. In temples. Were these judges priests? If so will need to code absent because we are coding judges as a specialized position.
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During Saite Period judges were in temples. If priests were judges then this was not a specialised position.
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[1]
Egyptian and Greek courts used different systems. In the Egyptian courts the judges were usually temple priests and were therefore not full time judges. In the Greek courts the local and regional(the strategos) officials performed this function. dikastai, dikasteria [2] (itinerant judges?) [1]: (Manning 2015, Personal Communication) [2]: (Cohen 2006, 350) |
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"The common norms of law that prevailed in the kingdom may be studied in the first juridicial records of Aksum: in the four laws from the Safra (Drewes, p. 73)."
[1]
"Later Ethiopian law followed the Fetha Nagast, ’The Law of the Kings’ written in Arabic by a Copt in the mid-thirteenth century, and translated into Ge’ez perhaps in the middle of the fifteenth century (Tzadua 1968), but inscriptions like that of Safra show that there were earlier legal codes in use (Drewes 1962)." [2] "high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include government officials, scribes, priests of temple or church, middle-ranking members of the army, merchants, and perhaps some of the more skilled craftsmen. Amongst such a class there would probably be some foreigners, permitted to live in Ethiopia because of their special skills." [3] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Munro-Hay 1991, 252) Stuart C Munro-Hay. 1991. Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiquity. Edinburgh University Press. [3]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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"The city of Ghana consists of two towns situated on a plain. One of those towns, which is inhabited by Muslims is large and possesses twelve mosques... There are salaried imams and muezzin, as well as jurists and scholars."
[1]
Whilst the state was pagan, Muslims were permitted to be judged according to the Koran.
[2]
"In the traditional empire, justice was inseparable from religion. It was a compensatory punishment ritually administered to one who offended against social order." [3] The cadi was a Muslim judge appointed by the king who "handled mainly common-law misdemeanors, disputes between citizens, or between citizens and foreigners." [3] [1]: (Al-Bakri 1068 CE in Levtzion and Spaulding 2003, 15) [2]: (Kabore, P. http://lewebpedagogique.com/patco/tag/ouagadou/) [3]: (Diop 1987, 124) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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Chief qadis and qadis.
[1]
The chief qadis did not appear until the Egyptian period."
[2]
"Judges hold authority over Muslims, all Muslims, the broader and more inclusive category, while da’is administer to the needs of the true believers, a much smaller but more select group within the larger body of Islam. Strictly from the viewpoint of a believer, the chief da’i is more important than the chief qadi; quite possibly in this respect he holds higher authority, even with regard to questions involving the application of law. But, for the common citizen of the Fatimid empire, non-Muslims and especially non-Ismaili Muslims, the qadi remained, in part because of the greater numbers of those who required what he provided, more important. Most inhabitants of the realm never accepted da’wa and they had no dealings with the da’i." [3] [1]: (Cortese 2003, 3) Cortese, Delia. 2003. Arabic Ismaili Manuscripts: The Zahid Ali Collection. I.B. Tauris. [2]: (Walker 2006, 91) Walker, Paul E. The Relationship Between Chief Qadi and Chief Da’i Under The Fatimids. Kramer, Gudrun. Schmidtke, Sabine. eds. 2006. Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies. BRILL. [3]: (Walker 2006, 92) Walker, Paul E. The Relationship Between Chief Qadi and Chief Da’i Under The Fatimids. Kramer, Gudrun. Schmidtke, Sabine. eds. 2006. Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies. BRILL. |
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"In former times the people of this country professed paganism until the year 469/1076-1077 when Yahya b. Abu Bakr the amir of Masufa made his appearance."
[1]
"The city of Ghana consists of two towns situated on a plain. One of those towns, which is inhabited by Muslims is large and possesses twelve mosques... There are salaried imams and muezzin, as well as jurists and scholars."
[2]
The cadi was a Muslim judge appointed by the king who "handled mainly common-law misdemeanors, disputes between citizens, or between citizens and foreigners." [3] [1]: (Al-Zuhri c1130-1155 CE in Levtzion and Spaulding 2003, 24-25) [2]: (Al-Bakri 1068 CE in Levtzion and Spaulding 2003, 15) [3]: (Diop 1987, 124) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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"Mali rulers enforced customary law when it suited them and preserved ancient ceremonials." Some of the ruling classes and merchant classes were Muslim, everyone else pagan.
[1]
"It was customary for rulers of Western Sudan kingdoms to hold what were called audiences, during which ordinary citizens could submit complaints and legal disputes."
[2]
They were held in public and one was witnessed by Ibn Battuta on his 1352-1353 visit.
[2]
The cadi was a Muslim judge appointed by the king who "handled mainly common-law misdemeanors, disputes between citizens, or between citizens and foreigners." [3] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 592) [2]: (Conrad 2010, 52) [3]: (Diop 1987, 124) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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Chief judges.
[1]
"Under the Mamluks the state appointed judges, legal administrators, professors, Sufi shaykhs, prayer leaders, and other Muslim officials."
[2]
"In 1263, Sultan Baybars (1260-77) appointed a chief qadi for each of the four major schools of law, a chief shaykh (master, teacher) for the Sufis, and a syndic for the corporation of descendants of the Prophet (naqib al-ashraf). Under the Mamluks the state appointed judges, legal administrators, professors, Sufi shaykhs, prayer leaders and other Muslim officials." [3] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 248) [2]: (Lapidus 2002, 294) [3]: (Lapidus 2012, 249) |
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Chief judges.
[1]
"In 1263, Sultan Baybars (1260-77) appointed a chief qadi for each of the four major schools of law, a chief shaykh (master, teacher) for the Sufis, and a syndic for the corporation of descendants of the Prophet (naqib al-ashraf). Under the Mamluks the state appointed judges, legal administrators, professors, Sufi shaykhs, prayer leaders and other Muslim officials." [2] Judges. [3] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 248) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 249) [3]: (Dols 1977, 153) |
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Chief judges.
[1]
"Under the Mamluks the state appointed judges, legal administrators, professors, Sufi shaykhs, prayer leaders, and other Muslim officials."
[2]
"In 1263, Sultan Baybars (1260-77) appointed a chief qadi for each of the four major schools of law, a chief shaykh (master, teacher) for the Sufis, and a syndic for the corporation of descendants of the Prophet (naqib al-ashraf). Under the Mamluks the state appointed judges, legal administrators, professors, Sufi shaykhs, prayer leaders and other Muslim officials." [3] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 248) [2]: (Lapidus 2002, 294) [3]: (Lapidus 2012, 249) |
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Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "appointed the first qadi of Jenne and extended Islamic judicial administration to other towns by establishing courts and appointing judges."
[1]
Kadi. Islamic law. Legal system independent of tribal chiefs. Customary law. Court to punish adultery. Tribunals. [2] The cadi was a Muslim judge appointed by the king who "handled mainly common-law misdemeanors, disputes between citizens, or between citizens and foreigners." [3] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [2]: (Cissoko 1984, 196, 199-202) [3]: (Diop 1987, 124) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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The fact that there were no full-time, professional judges is suggested by the following: "In addition to the legislative power, the monarchs in ancient times were also endowed with the supreme judicial power." This is shown by readings of oracle bone text.
[1]
inferred present: precursor to Zhou development? "With the development of the state machine of the Zhou dynasty, under the leadership of the monarch, the central judicial organizations headed by "Si Kou" (the minister of justice) and "Shi Shi" (the official in charge of criminal affairs) were established, and the local judicial organizations, named "Xiang Shi", "Sui Shi", "Xian Shi", "Fang Shi", and "Ya Shi", had also been set up to deal with the judicial affairs." [1] [1]: (Zhang 2014, 155) Zhang, Jinfan. 2014. The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese Law. Springer Science & Business Media. |
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Chief justice was the king.
[1]
"During the period of Western Zhou Dynasty, the rulers were in fact also the supreme arbiters dealing with the legal disputes between the states.
[2]
"With the development of the state machine of the Zhou dynasty, under the leadership of the monarch, the central judicial organizations headed by "Si Kou" (the minister of justice) and "Shi Shi" (the official in charge of criminal affairs) were established, and the local judicial organizations, named "Xiang Shi", "Sui Shi", "Xian Shi", "Fang Shi", and "Ya Shi", had also been set up to deal with the judicial affairs." [3] "In the late Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn periods, several inscriptions record decisions in legal cases, most commonly disputes over land." [4] [1]: (Roberts 2003, 14) [2]: (Zhang 2014, 154) Zhang, Jinfan. 2014. The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese Law. Springer Science & Business Media. [3]: (Zhang 2014, 155) Zhang, Jinfan. 2014. The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese Law. Springer Science & Business Media. [4]: (Lewis 2009, 228) Lewis, Mark Edward. 2009. The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han. Harvard University Press. |
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"In the late Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn periods, several inscriptions record decisions in legal cases, most commonly disputes over land."
[1]
- who made the decisions in legal cases?
[1]: (Lewis 2009, 228) Lewis, Mark Edward. 2009. The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han. Harvard University Press. |
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The magistrate of the county enforced law and order and judged civil and criminal cases.
[1]
-- Is this magistrate a specialist in judging law?
There was an official at the district level responsible for law, tax and labour. At the commune level the chief maintained law and order. [2] Commandery governor responsible for "the administration of civil and criminal law." [3] [1]: (Bielenstein 1986, 508) [2]: (Bielenstein 1986, 509) [3]: (Bielenstein 1986, 507) |
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Inferred retention of institutions from Eastern Han.
What happened after Eastern Han? Under the Eastern Han the magistrate of the county enforced law and order and judged civil and criminal cases. [1] -- Is this magistrate a specialist in judging law? Under the Eastern Han there was an official at the district level responsible for law, tax and labour. At the commune level the chief maintained law and order. [2] [1]: (Bielenstein 1986, 508) [2]: (Bielenstein 1986, 509) |
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"Throughout China’s imperial history, local administrators exercised judicial as well as executive powers in their areas, and routine trial and punishment was, in Sui as in other dynasties, part of their regular duties."
[1]
“[Emperor Xiaowen] promoted Confucian learning, modeled the Northern Wei bureaucratic system and legal system after the Han dynasty as protocol for court proceedings and rituals.”
[2]
[1]: (Wright, Arthur. 1978. The Sui Dynasty: The Unification of China, AD 581-617. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 117) [2]: (Zhao, Dingxin. 2015. The Confucian-Legalist State: A New Theory of Chinese History. Oxford: OUP, 303.) |
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Judges are not officials who are specialized in that role. "local administrators had the judicial as well as the executive power in their areas, and routine trial and punishment were part of their regular duties."
[1]
The chief of the Censorate "was charged not only with the investigation and prosecution of very serious crimes but also with the general supervision of all officials in the empire."
[2]
"The Supreme Court of Justice (Ta-li ssu), including both high officials and legal experts, considered the written evidence regarding a serious crime, determined the character of the crime and recommended the final sentence, which was pronounced by the emperor."
[2]
"During the Sui and Tang Dynasties, China created the administrative positions of facao cajun (judge of criminal cases) and sihu cajun (judge of civil cases) in a zhou (equivalent to province). At the county level, the administrative positions sifa zuo and sifa li were established to assist the magistrate to judge cases. In the Song Dynasty, the administrative position tidian xing yusi in a lu (equivalent to province) and zhizhou (equivalent to Mayor) of a zhou (equivalent to city) were established, with the magistrate of a county still the chief judge in their governing regions. During the Yuan Dynasty, administrative organs in administrative divisions were judicial organs and judicial organs were also administrative organs. In the Ming Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty, the tixing ancha shi si was a judicial organ specifically dealing with judicial cases. It was only set at a provincial level. ... in most fu (equivalent to city) and counties, the zhifu (equivalent to Mayor) and the magistrate still governed both administrative business and judged judicial cases. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, an administrative system with a judiciary was still maintained." [3] [1]: (Wright 1979, 104-105) [2]: (Wright 1979, 105) [3]: (Li 2014, 103-104) Luo Li. 2014. Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: Folklore in China. Springer Science & Business. Switzerland. |
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’If he were both the chief administrator and the chief judge, he was in a position to judge whether he himself had committed a crime and, if so, what his punishment would be.’
[1]
[1]: Brown, Delmer M. 1993. The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 1: Ancient Japan. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press.p.237 |
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Chief Judge (yeke jardhuchi) who had two roles: "to oversee the apportionment of subject peoples and to preserve Chinggis Khan’s legislative pronouncements, known as jasaghs."
[1]
[1]: Beatrice Forbes Manz, ‘The Rule of the Infidels: The Mongols and the Islamic World’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.131. |
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Punishments proposed by a judge or judges had to be sent to the Ministry of Justice for deliberation and memorialized to the throne for final approval. Any judge who deliberately or negligently reduced or increased a punishment violated the law (Art. 46).
[1]
"Judges were required to cite the relevant article of the code when setting a provisional sentence for a criminal...Thus, as far as Chinese judges were concerned, the doctrine of nulla poena sine lege or ’no punishment without a law’ may be said to have been in force. The work of a judge often included investigation and fact finding, research into legal precedents and in some cases, forensic work.
[2]
[1]: (Jiang, 2011, p.45) [2]: (Fairbank, 1978, p.178, 185) |
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Judicial work happened but it was not a full-time (specialist?) occupation. "Another indicator for an early state is the availability of special judicial manpower which was responsible for the majority of legal questions. The presence of persons who investigated disputes and conflicts was known in Chinese sources (Fan Ye 1965, ch. 79; Zhongyang 1958, 680; Taskin 1973, 73)."
[1]
However, perhaps this was not a full-time occupation. "Thus, for the Hsiung-nu society, only one feature of the early state (judges) can be identified."
[2]
[1]: (Kradin 2011, 94) [2]: (Kradin 2008, 119) |
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"Another indicator for an early state is the availability of special judicial manpower which was responsible for the majority of legal questions. The presence of persons who investigated disputes and conflicts was known in Chinese sources (Fan Ye 1965, ch. 79; Zhongyang 1958, 680; Taskin 1973, 73)."
[1]
However, perhaps this was not a full-time occupation. "Thus, for the Hsiung-nu society, only one feature of the early state (judges) can be identified."
[2]
[1]: (Kradin 2011, 94) [2]: (Kradin 2008, 119) |
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"the former nomadic invaders came into possession of vast territories inhabited by settled agricultural peoples with a culture and traditions dating back many centuries, just as had been the case with the Tokharians ... who created the Kushan Empire. It seems likely that the administrative and government structure created by the Kushans was left largely intact under the Kidarites."
[1]
We know from the Kushan period there were such things as legal documents and land transfer deeds written in Kharoshthi. [2] [1]: (Zeimal 1996, 132) Zeimal, E. V. The Kidarite Kingdom In Central Asia. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.123-137. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf [2]: (Samad 2011, 89) Samad, R. U. 2011. The Grandeur of Gandhara: The Ancient Buddhist Civilization of the Swat, Peshawar, Kabul and Indus Valleys. Angora Publishing. |
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unknown for previous polity.
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qadi. "The purchase of milk [private property] was registered in the offices of the qadi (judge) through the issue of a wathiqa (legal deed) and was a secure form of property protected by the law."
[1]
[1]: (Davidovich 1997, 147) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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Highly likely given that they had a formal legal code, law schools and lawyers but this has not been mentioned in the sources consulted.
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"There is also disagreement about how Mongol customary law and Shari’ia law may have co-existed in Muslim territories. Successful coexistence seems to depend on the particular Khan."
[1]
[1]: 1. Beatrice Forbes Manz, ‘The Rule of the Infidels: The Mongols and the Islamic World’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 161. |
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"There is also disagreement about how Mongol customary law and Shari’ia law may have co-existed in Muslim territories. Successful coexistence seems to depend on the particular Khan."
[1]
[1]: 1. Beatrice Forbes Manz, ‘The Rule of the Infidels: The Mongols and the Islamic World’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 161. |
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“Once passed, a law had to be administered and enforced. In the country at large, the king employed up to 40 administrators of Crown lands (who supervised an army of stewards, bailiffs, keepers, and wardens) and up to 90 Customs officials to collect his revenues. He also appointed traveling assize judges to provide royal justice in major felony cases, biannually, to the shire court of each county.”
[1]
“That is, the king could once again conduct foreign policy as he saw fit. According to the Militia Acts of 1661 and 1662, he, and only he, could call out that body – an issue that had been disputed on the eve of the Civil War. He could appoint what ministers he wanted and he could remove judges at will.”
[2]
“Proceedings for distraint, threats of imprisonment in the house of correction and arbitration by assize judges are all symptomatic of the birthpangs of a system of transfer payments. These were the parameters of tolerance within which social policy was implemented. This explains both the repetitive nature of judges’ orders and the moral outrage of grand juries.”
[3]
[1]: (Bucholz et al 2013: 51) Bucholz, Robert, Newton Key, and R.O. Bucholz. 2013. Early Modern England 1485-1714: A Narrative History. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uvic/detail.action?docID=1166775. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XQGJH96U [2]: (Bucholz et al 2013: 278) Bucholz, Robert, Newton Key, and R.O. Bucholz. 2013. Early Modern England 1485-1714: A Narrative History. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uvic/detail.action?docID=1166775. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XQGJH96U [3]: (Hindle 2002: 157) Hindle, Steve. 2002. The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, 1550–1640 (London: Palgrave https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/GVIZDIC9 |
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DB: can you provide details here in a short descriptive paragraph? DH: later period has inferred absent here -- | any clear indication of a change between periods?
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Though full-time judges did not exists, officials would act as judges. [Perrie 2006, p. 363]
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"The judiciary operated at three levels. Local councils of elders representing a village or an urban ward dealt with everyday matters such as divorce applications, disputed paternity, and conflicts over inheritance. [...] If the council felt unable to deal with a case or one of the parties at law was dissatisfied with its outcome, the matter could be referred to a higher authority, a judge appointed by the king, or to the king himself, the highest authority. Some serious offenses, such as murder, known as din napishtim (“case of life”), were referred directly to the king as a matter of course[...]. The role of the judiciary was not only to resolve disputes and punish criminal behavior but also to administer and enforce government decrees and to witness and record legally binding agreements between individuals."
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh 2005: 158) McIntosh, J. 2005. Ancient Mesopotamia: New Perspective. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/KK2E3KMD. |
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present under Seleucids. may have been present at start then lost.
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No specialized judges.
"Not only were rulings passed and policies determined in tribal councils, but also misdemeanours might be heard and their perpetrators examined: ’Excellent is the man upon whom you can call for defence when the plaintiff in the council brings his charge’ (’Amr ibn Qami’a 1)." [1] "Among the wealthier sedentary polities of Arabia there existed a more elaborate legal system with more of an institutional framework. A number of the cities of south Arabia had a council (mswd), and at each of the capital cities there was a supreme council where the king sat along with delegates from a certain number of tribal groups, representing the whole nation and issuing edicts on its behalf." [2] [1]: (Hoyland 2001, 122) Robert G Hoyland. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. London. [2]: (Hoyland 2001, 124) Robert G Hoyland. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. London. |
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No specialized judges.
"Not only were rulings passed and policies determined in tribal councils, but also misdemeanours might be heard and their perpetrators examined: ’Excellent is the man upon whom you can call for defence when the plaintiff in the council brings his charge’ (’Amr ibn Qami’a 1)." [1] "Among the wealthier sedentary polities of Arabia there existed a more elaborate legal system with more of an institutional framework. A number of the cities of south Arabia had a council (mswd), and at each of the capital cities there was a supreme council where the king sat along with delegates from a certain number of tribal groups, representing the whole nation and issuing edicts on its behalf." [2] [1]: (Hoyland 2001, 122) Robert G Hoyland. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. London. [2]: (Hoyland 2001, 124) Robert G Hoyland. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. London. |
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In the Abbasid Caliphate formal the law was promulgated by a body known as the Fuqaha. The law code was heavily influenced by Sharia law. Sharia was based on the Sunna, which were teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Legal thought was also influenced by Ijma’, which were a body of rulings on legal issues based on the consensus of scholars who had met to discuss specific cases. Despite the Caliphate’s claims to religious authority based on their links to the Prophet Muhammed, it was rare for direct rulings on legal matters to originate from the caliphal authorities. Alongside a developing legal code was the development of the Qudis, who were full time judiciary officials.
[1]
Judges were appointed and were called Qadi.
[2]
At least in the Umayyad period judges were "multicompetent state officials dealing with justice, police, tax, and finance issues." [3] previous code: disputed_absent_present (refs below suggest presence, no clear indication of argument for absence) | Note: This is the code for Abbasid Caliphate. We code present for specialist judges. If judges were "multicompetent state officials" it does not appear they are specialists who only judge law. For similar case e.g. the Roman Principate. On the other hand, the source below suggests that qadis were "full time judiciary officials’. [1]: Zubaida, Sami, Law and power in the Islamic world. (Tauris & Company Limited, 2005) pp. 74-84 [2]: Zubaida, Sami, Law and power in the Islamic world. (Tauris & Company Limited, 2005) p. 46 [3]: (Lapidus 2012, 96) |
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Judges were semi-religious, semi-political figures. There was a heirarchy of judges: the chief judge appointed deputies in the provinces, who appointed their own deputies.
[1]
[2]
Full-time judges seem to have been absent.
[1]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran under the Būyids. In Frye, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuq’s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.277 [2]: Donohue, J. J. 2003. The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334H./945 to 403H./1012: Shaping Institutions for the Future. Leiden: Brill. p.289-302 |
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"the ulama were a third pillar of Seljuk administration, providing qadis, whose appointments were ratified by the sultan."
[1]
a faqih was a jurist "one who specialises in fiqh" (Islamic jurisprudence). [2] The "mazalim court" was a "potent symbol of sovereignty. Seljuk sultans sat in mazalim in person and conferred decision-making powers on subordinates. Qadis and viziers also consulted with the mazalim court and sometimes presided over it in the sultan’s name. Governors and military officers, besides holding their own courts, also enforced the judgements of the shariah courts, fulfilling their responsibility to preserve order, punish criminals, and keep the roads safe." [3] [1]: (Peacock 2015, 191) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [2]: (Peacock 2015, 333) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [3]: (Darling 2013, 96) Darling, Linda T. 2013. A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization. Routledge. |
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Sulayhids: provincial administration included a chief judge.
[1]
"When al-Mukarram died in 477/1084, the queen faced a rivalry between the two Qadis - ’Imran ibn al-Fadl and Lamak ibn Malik. Imran was stationed in San’a’ and was the commander-in-chief of the Sulayhid army." [2] "Evidence that the magistrates who judged the citizens and counseled them were following sound doctrine was a psychologically necessary reassurance. Within a few centuries after the rise of Islam the rules were compiled into voluminous compendia of law by various schools of jurists working for the most part independently of the secular authorities." [3] "a specialized professional class, the ulama, grew up to preserve, perfect, and administer" the Islamic jurisprudence. [3] [1]: (Stookey 1978, 63) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. [2]: (Hamdani 2006, 777) Hamdani, Abbas. Sulayhids. Josef W Meri ed. 2006. Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia. Volume 1, A - K, Index. Routledge. Abingdon. [3]: (Stookey 1978, 58) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. |
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"Within the bureaucracy, mobility was lateral as well. As indicated by the content of the biographical dictionaries pertaining to the period and the obituaries interspersed in the chronicles, a judge or administrator might serve in up to a half-dozen posts throughout Lower Yemen during his career."
[1]
Provinces had a chief judge who could get into disputes with the provincial governor. [1] [1]: (Stookey 1978, 114) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. |
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This is based on the codes for the Rasulids as ’Sultan ’Amir also appears to have been emulating the high period of Rasulid power a hundred years earlier’
[1]
"Within the bureaucracy, mobility was lateral as well. As indicated by the content of the biographical dictionaries pertaining to the period and the obituaries interspersed in the chronicles, a judge or administrator might serve in up to a half-dozen posts throughout Lower Yemen during his career." [2] Provinces had a chief judge who could get into disputes with the provincial governor. [2] [1]: Porter, Venetia Ann (1992) The history and monuments of the Tahirid dynasty of the Yemen 858-923/1454-1517, Durham theses, Durham University, p. 4 Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5867/ [2]: (Stookey 1978, 114) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. |
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"the dīvānbegī, the chief ’orfī judge of the empire, who could intervene in any matter under the jurisdiction of the dārūḡa; once he had done so, the latter could no longer concern himself with it"
[1]
[1]: (Lambton 2011) Lambton, Ann K S. 2011. CITIES iii. Administration and Social Organization. Encyclopedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cities-iii |
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The presence of a formal legal system is not discussed in the literature, and is therefore presumed absent.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Singh, U. (2008) A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India, From the Stone Age to the 12th Century. Dorling Kindersley: Delhi. [2]: Avari, B. (2007) India: The Ancient Past: A history of the India sub-continent from c. 7,000 BC to AD 1200. Routledge: London and New York. |
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The following quote suggests that judicial functions were the province of the Brahmanic caste more broadly, rather than professional specialists. "This inscription is significant as it shows the judicial powers enjoyed by the brahmanas. The inscript assembled to fix a decision (sthiti) for a crime committed in the village. Sircar suggest that the term Sthiti meant ’a fixed decision, ordnance or a decree’".
[1]
[1]: (Yadav 2011: 365) Yadav, D. 2011. ASPECTS OF RURAL SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GAHAAVALA DYNASTY: C. 11 TH CENTURY CE TO 13 TH CENTURY CE (AN INSCRIPTIONAL ANALYSIS). Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 2011, Vol. 72, PART-I (2011), pp. 360-367. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/F8STV588/library |
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"The king was the original court and an appellate tribunal. Occupying the judgement-seat (dharmasana), he dispensed justice with the help and guidance of judicial officials."
[1]
"Asahaya enumerates noble lineage, ripe wisdom, truthfulness, proficiency in the sacred law and close acquaintance with worldly ways, as the qualifications of a judge." [2] [1]: (Mishra 1977, 151) Shyam Manohar Mishra. 1977. Yaśovarman of Kanauj: A Study of Political History, Social, and Cultural Life of Northern India During the Reign of Yaśovarman. Abhinav Publications. [2]: (Mishra 1977, 152) Shyam Manohar Mishra. 1977. Yaśovarman of Kanauj: A Study of Political History, Social, and Cultural Life of Northern India During the Reign of Yaśovarman. Abhinav Publications. |
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Specialist judges require a culture of high degree of literacy not present at this time.
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Specialist, full-time judge unlikely at this time. Before specialist judge we might expect a generalist or part-time judge would evolve, but we have no data. Due to central importance of religious ritual to this authoritarian society we could infer there was no secular sphere of law over which a non-religious specialist could adjudicate.
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"In terms of legal systems, its implement and practical application in the dynasties of Xia, Shang and Zhou had all centered on the will of the monarchs. As a result, the law was overtopped by the imperial power, and both law and punishment were made by the rulers. For example, the law of the Xia Dynasty was generously referred to as Yu Xing (The Penal Code of Yu), which was named after the emperor."
[1]
[1]: (Zhang 2014, 154) Zhang, Jinfan. 2014. The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese Law. Springer Science & Business Media. |
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"The Legalists were the chief proponents of the use of a penal code to control the people. During the Warring States period, the sovereigns of the various states had little use for morals and rites. They were more concerned with building strong states, strengthening their armies, and enlarging their territories. This can only be realized by being able to keep a submissive people. The Legalists proved more useful for their political aspirations, as they exerted a major influence on Chinese traditional law and legal institutions, which were set up under their direction."
[1]
[1]: (Fu 1993, 107) Fu, Zhengyuan. 1993. Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. |
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"Ordinary prefectures had a prefectural court (chou-yuan) headed by an executive inspector (lu-shih ts’an-chun), an on-duty office (tang chih-ssu) headed by a staff-supervisor (p’an kuan) or prefectural judge (t’ui kuan), and a court of the police inspector (ssu-li ts’an-chun)."
[1]
"During the Northern Sung the village officer in charge of rural law and order was the elder (ch’i-chang), who was assisted by unpaid drafted assistants called stalwart men (chuang-ting)" [2] County magistrate (chih-hsien) "could investigate, try, sentence, and punish crimes" however trial usually at prefectural level. [3] At the prefectural level "The presiding judge there would ordinarily be a subordinate official and not the chief administrative officer." [3] [1]: (McKnight 2015, 267) [2]: (McKnight 2015, 262) [3]: (McKnight 2015, 265) |
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’In several decades of excavation, clear evidence for hierarchies of any kind has yet to be unearthed: it seems that Jenne-jeno had no palaces, rich tombs, temples, public buildings, or monumental architecture. Indeed, the city’s very layout ‒ an assemblage of dispersed clusters - suggests a resistance to centralization.’
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh 2006, 189) Roderick McIntosh. 2006. Ancient Middle Niger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
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In Jenne-Jeno there is no evidence for a state bureaucracy, priesthood, military or a king.
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh, 31) McIntosh, Roderick J. Clustered Cities of the Middle Niger: Alternative Routes to Authority in Prehistory. in Anderson, David M. Rathbone, Richard. eds. 2000. Africa’s Urban Past. James Currey Ltd. Oxford. |
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Islamic
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Not enough data, though it seems to reasonable infer absence.
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"The chiefs of bu, tribes or simple chiefdoms, fulfilled the following functions: [...] Judicial: the settlement of disputes concerning the territories where nomads live, stealing of livestock, violation of customs, mutilation, murders, etc. When Tanshihuai came to power he laid out ‘law rules for disposition of cases between innocent and guilty and nobody dared to break them’ (Ibid.: 75, 330). The same duties are also mentioned with respect to his son, Helian (Ibid.: 80). One of the reasons for Kebineng’s election as a chief was his equitable investigation of lawsuits (Ibid.: 324). However, it is unlikely that these actions were based on written law; "
[1]
Not a full-time job.
[1]: (Kradin 2011, 199) |
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Chiefs were the judges.
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Existence of judges (though unclear how professional they may have been): "During this period the adminstration was centered in the headquarters of the appanage or Hoshun (Ulus) prince, where there were special officials concerned with the conduct of military, administrative, and judicial functions.""
[1]
However, may not have existed before establishment of legal codes starting in late 16th century. Late 16th century: “Tümen Jasaghtu Khan tried to unify the country administratively and so included in his government not only Abtai, Altan and Khutughtai Sechen, but also other influential nobles from all the tümens and from the Oirat regions. He compiled a new code that was supposed to be based on Chinggis Khan’s Great Ya ̄sa ̄ or Jasaq (see Volume IV, Part One). Subsequently, Altan Khan, Abtai Khan and, most likely, several others followed his example and adopted their own laws and codes in their respective tümens. But only some of these have been preserved, whether wholly or partially. They were written in the old Mongol script, which had been borrowed from the Uighur, and adopted under Chinggis Khan as the official script of the Mongols. » [2] "Records of Law: The basic records of the law of this period were the Ancient Tsaadjin Bichik, the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640, the Great Code of the Seven Khoshuns, and the Khalkha-Djirom of 1709. Of these records, the Mongot-Oirat Regulations of 1640 were the most important, being, for a time, the effective code in both Northern and Western Mongolia (Khalkha and Djungaria) After the disintegration of the alliance of the "Forty and Four," this code remained effective in Djungaria until the promulgation of the Chinese Code or Regulations of 1789 and among the Rusian Kalmucks until 1917 In Northern Mongolia the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640 were replaced by the Great Code of the Seven Hoshuns and later by the Khalkha-Djirom, which also retained its effectiveness until 1789. The Khalkha-Djirom also continued to function among the herdsmen Shabinars of the Urga Gegen until superseded in 1925." [3] [1]: (Riasananovsky 1948: 172) Riasanovsky, V. A. 1948. Mongol Law—A Concise Historical Survey. Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 166: 160-178. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/9JCNB66X/library [2]: (Ishjamts 2003, 214) [3]: (Riasananovsky 1948: 170) Riasanovsky, V. A. 1948. Mongol Law—A Concise Historical Survey. Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 166: 160-178. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/9JCNB66X/library |
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Existence of judges (though unclear how professional they may have been): "During this period the adminstration was centered in the headquarters of the appanage or Hoshun (Ulus) prince, where there were special officials concerned with the conduct of military, administrative, and judicial functions.""
[1]
However, may not have existed before establishment of legal codes starting in late 16th century. Late 16th century: “Tümen Jasaghtu Khan tried to unify the country administratively and so included in his government not only Abtai, Altan and Khutughtai Sechen, but also other influential nobles from all the tümens and from the Oirat regions. He compiled a new code that was supposed to be based on Chinggis Khan’s Great Ya ̄sa ̄ or Jasaq (see Volume IV, Part One). Subsequently, Altan Khan, Abtai Khan and, most likely, several others followed his example and adopted their own laws and codes in their respective tümens. But only some of these have been preserved, whether wholly or partially. They were written in the old Mongol script, which had been borrowed from the Uighur, and adopted under Chinggis Khan as the official script of the Mongols. » [2] "Records of Law: The basic records of the law of this period were the Ancient Tsaadjin Bichik, the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640, the Great Code of the Seven Khoshuns, and the Khalkha-Djirom of 1709. Of these records, the Mongot-Oirat Regulations of 1640 were the most important, being, for a time, the effective code in both Northern and Western Mongolia (Khalkha and Djungaria) After the disintegration of the alliance of the "Forty and Four," this code remained effective in Djungaria until the promulgation of the Chinese Code or Regulations of 1789 and among the Rusian Kalmucks until 1917 In Northern Mongolia the Mongol-Oirat Regulations of 1640 were replaced by the Great Code of the Seven Hoshuns and later by the Khalkha-Djirom, which also retained its effectiveness until 1789. The Khalkha-Djirom also continued to function among the herdsmen Shabinars of the Urga Gegen until superseded in 1925." [3] [1]: (Riasananovsky 1948: 172) Riasanovsky, V. A. 1948. Mongol Law—A Concise Historical Survey. Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 166: 160-178. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/9JCNB66X/library [2]: (Ishjamts 2003, 214) [3]: (Riasananovsky 1948: 170) Riasanovsky, V. A. 1948. Mongol Law—A Concise Historical Survey. Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 166: 160-178. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/9JCNB66X/library |
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Non-specialised function. "The Kalmyk and Zünghar confederations were similar in many ways. Both were divided into tribes (AIMAG), which themselves were conglomerations of exogamous yasun (bones, or patrilineages). The khan or khung-taiji was assisted by an office (yamu) or court (zarghu) composed of four chief officials, variously called ministers (tüshimed), judges (zarghuchis; see JARGHUCHI), or zaisangs (from Chinese zaixiang, grand councillor). These were commoner retainers of the ruler’s tribe. The Zünghar ruler GALDAN-TSEREN (r. 1727-45) expanded the council by adding six zarghuchis to assist the four tüshimed."
[1]
[1]: (Atwood 2004, 421) |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ‘1’ or ’absent’. Village procedure remained informal even after colonization: ’There is no judicial procedure among the Orokaiva, and no ‘police force’. In so far as sorcery is concerned, by the way, these deficiencies are perhaps not altogether deplorable. The suspicion of sorcery, where it is backed up by ignorant legal authority, may go to extraordinary lengths of oppression. No Papuan people has reached that stage of legal development which would have made possible such condemnations as those of West Africa’
[1]
’There are customary restrictions upon feuding within the tribe, which exist in sharp contrast to the standard acceptance and formalization of hostility between tribes. Formerly, official legal penalties, generally violent, were meted out to criminals. Fear of the ancestors and desire to avoid unfavorable public opinion remain the major mechanisms of social control.’
[2]
’For those who remain in the village, the sanctioning mechanisms are mostly informal. Failure in one’s obligations means loss of status, leads to gossip, derogatory remarks to one’s face, perhaps even a harangue at night by a man at the other end in the village. The councillor, the court and the police are only a last resort in serious quarrels. I saw a councillor enter a dispute once, playing a mediating role between disputants from two villages, but without playing more than an advisory role. One quarrel was taken to court, but this was not a case where traditional mechanisms of social control had failed. A woman accused her husband of adultery with one of the new Garombi arrivals. She and the husband fought and had to be separated as the lady had an axe; the domestic dispute soon died down but the Garombi woman laid a complaint for slander with the police. Before this came to court, the wife had been roundly condemned by almost everyone in the village; she had repented, had gone round the village to signify her regrets, and been as contrite as her pride could possibly allow her to be. The court let her off with a reprimand. The episode, far from suggesting a flagging of Orokaiva traditional social control, had demonstrated to me that it was still effective. Nonetheless, the Orokaiva, as so many other peoples in contact with Western civilisation, have been quick to see the advantages of a judicial system providing an impartial arbiter in disputes, to whose decisions both parties will defer. At the moment, this western judicial system is an additional resource of Orokaiva law, without undermining its existing institutions.’
[3]
[1]: Williams, F. E. (Francis Edgar) 1928. “Orokaiva Magic”, 224 [2]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva [3]: Schwimmer, Eric G. 1969. “Cultural Consequences Of A Volcanic Eruption Experienced By The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 182p |
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SCCS variable 89 ’Judiciary’ is coded as ‘1’ or ’absent’. Village procedure was informal: ’For those who remain in the village, the sanctioning mechanisms are mostly informal. Failure in one’s obligations means loss of status, leads to gossip, derogatory remarks to one’s face, perhaps even a harangue at night by a man at the other end in the village. The councillor, the court and the police are only a last resort in serious quarrels. I saw a councillor enter a dispute once, playing a mediating role between disputants from two villages, but without playing more than an advisory role. One quarrel was taken to court, but this was not a case where traditional mechanisms of social control had failed. A woman accused her husband of adultery with one of the new Garombi arrivals. She and the husband fought and had to be separated as the lady had an axe; the domestic dispute soon died down but the Garombi woman laid a complaint for slander with the police. Before this came to court, the wife had been roundly condemned by almost everyone in the village; she had repented, had gone round the village to signify her regrets, and been as contrite as her pride could possibly allow her to be. The court let her off with a reprimand. The episode, far from suggesting a flagging of Orokaiva traditional social control, had demonstrated to me that it was still effective. Nonetheless, the Orokaiva, as so many other peoples in contact with Western civilisation, have been quick to see the advantages of a judicial system providing an impartial arbiter in disputes, to whose decisions both parties will defer. At the moment, this western judicial system is an additional resource of Orokaiva law, without undermining its existing institutions.’
[1]
’There is no judicial procedure among the Orokaiva, and no ‘police force’. In so far as sorcery is concerned, by the way, these deficiencies are perhaps not altogether deplorable. The suspicion of sorcery, where it is backed up by ignorant legal authority, may go to extraordinary lengths of oppression. No Papuan people has reached that stage of legal development which would have made possible such condemnations as those of West Africa’
[2]
The Constabulary did not have judicial powers and mostly filled the role of law enforcement: ’Village Constables. The suppression by force which had marked the early contact phase gave way to a form of ‘indirect rule’ through the appointment of Village Constables. The earliest Village Constables were the strong, leading men who had confronted the Europeans as warriors. As time passed war leaders were no longer a feature of the society, but patrol reports indicate that by and large Village Constables were influential and effective in the maintenance of law and order. The position of Village Constables was an uncomfortable and interstitial one. They had the difficult task of attempting to juggle the interests of their relatives and exchange partners and of the Administration, so that both sides were reasonably happy most of the time. Between 1907 and 1914 the number of Village Constables in the Northern Division rose from fifty-four to eighty-three, indicating that this system of administration was satisfactory to the Australian authorities. The Village Constables were concerned with enforcing legislation which impinged upon many aspects of daily life: burial of the dead, upkeep of roads, construction of latrines, neatness of houses and so on. Failure to obey these regulations could lead to imprisonment.’
[3]
The colonial authorities established prisons: ’Part of the setting up of a governmental organization was the establishment of gaols and the punishment of villagers who infringed the laws and regulations. By 1903, 100 Orokaivans had been committed for trial on charges ranging from murder to breach of school regulations. Kokoda gaol alone had seventy-nine prisoners in 1905 and 168 in 1906. Speaking of one of the groups who inhabited Northern Division, Wetherell observes that this time they had ‘brushed with a tribe they could never conquer’’
[4]
Colonial magistrates fulfilled both executive and judicial roles rather than being full-time judges (see below).
[1]: Schwimmer, Eric G. 1969. “Cultural Consequences Of A Volcanic Eruption Experienced By The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 182p [2]: Williams, F. E. (Francis Edgar) 1928. “Orokaiva Magic”, 224 [3]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 38 [4]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 32p |
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No information found in sources so far.
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[1]
Justice system with courts set up for fairs to enable dispute resolution. [2] In 1260 CE Montpellier University had a law department and its graduates became judges and administrators in southern France in the 13th century. [3] [1]: (Spufford 2006, 68) [2]: (Spufford 2006, 146) [3]: (Pegues 1995, 1005-1010) |
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"The urban community, n’b—nàf, had rights of its own in Sogdiana. This is specified in the legal texts."
[1]
. A lawsuit is mentioned: "Without mentioning the case of Maniakh, who mounted an expedition from the Altai to Byzantium, and to whom I will return at greater length below, it is enough to recall the case of Nanai-vandak, who wrote to Samarkand from Guzang/Wuwei, and to compare it with the lawsuit of the Cao family against the Chinese merchant Li of Chang’an: the range of activity in this instance was from Almalig, in the Ili valley north of the Tianshan, to Chang’an, which is not exactly local!"
[2]
"The contract for the lease of the bridge at Panjikent shows that relatively complex legal and commercial formulae were in contemporary use in Sogdiana."
[3]
"On the other hand, we do not possess the texts of any Sogdian laws. We know of their existence from a reference in an inscription on the great painting of Samarkand, but nothing of them has reached us.44 Further to the south, Syriac texts have preserved scraps of the commercial regulations of the Sassanid Empire, and testify to a developed organization of commerce. A detailed jurisprudence made allowances for the risks of long-distance trade (shipwreck, fire, confiscations or plundering) in the rules of compensation in case of bankruptcy, organized the collective ownership of merchandise and the distribution of the shares in case of a separation of the partners, and fixed the rates of interest for merchants providing themselves with credit and counting on the profits from sales for their reim- bursement.45 We can only suppose the existence of such rules among the Sogdians, but the proofs are lacking."
[4]
[1]: (De la Vaissière 2005, 168) [2]: (De la Vaissière 2005, 165) [3]: (De la Vaissière 2005, 170-171) [4]: (De la Vaissière 2005, 171) |
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Disputes between villagers were settled by respected elders rather than judges: ’In every Sheng Miao village there is a set of rules and regulations which are voluntarily observed. In case of violation the offense is quickly adjudged by the public and an elder is invited to execute the punishment. Before it is carried out, however, he would tell the accused in a solemn manner the myths of their ancestors. Also in the case of a serious dispute the elder would summon both parties together, and first tell them the story of their ancestors before settling the dispute. After a decision is rendered in this fashion both parties would show compliance and would not carry the case to the law courts. Although the mythology handed down from mouth to mouth does not have religious contents, it becomes a kind of prophecy to those people who hold everything pertaining to their ancestors in the highest respect. It is entirely due to this inherent respect for their ancestors that the ancestral myth is recounted before carrying out the punishment or at the time of settling a dispute. The idea is to employ the will of the ancestors to restrain the actions of their descendants. It is interesting to note that the mythology of the Sheng Miao, meant originally to inform posterity of the stories of their ancestors’ life, has also assumed the corrective and preventive functions of law.’
[1]
’These, of course, were only a few of the disputes which arose in the village or among the whole group of Cowrie Shell Miao. Most small matters were settled among themselves. Much of the old man’s time was taken up with such cases. Sometimes others of the village elders were called in for consultation. This was according to the Chinese Government system, though in effect this formed the village government, or council. If matters could not be settled by them, they were taken before the lien pao official, and, if necessary, to the hsien magistrate.’
[2]
Cases were occasionally decided by ordeal: ’The Miao are addicted to kuei and to litigation. Sometimes litigation may last a year, and the court, unable to decide the case, may ask both parties to eat blood. This serves as a deterrent. Yen Ju-yü in his Miao Fang-pei Lan says: “Those who enter the temple to drink blood move on their knees and bellies, not daring to look up; those who are in the wrong dare not drink it, but repent and yield.” In the course of our investigations in the Miao frontier area, the private secretary of the hsien government at Feng-huang, Mr. Wang Yüeh-yen told us: “The T ’ien Wang temple is the Supreme Court of the Miao area. When a Miao is not satisfied with the decision of the hsien government, then he is ordered to go to the T ’ien Wang temple to drink blood. Whatever the litigation, big or small, it receives immediate settlement.” It can be seen that the Miao’s awe of kuei is greater than their awe of the law.’
[3]
Formal courts presided over by Chinese judges were located in towns and handled disputes that could not be settled on the local level: ’Like Kweiyang, the hsien city of Lung-li was in an open plain, but a narrow one. The space between the mountains was sufficient for a walled town of one long street between the east and west gates and one or two on either side. There were fields outside the city walls. Its normal population was between three and four thousand, augmented during the war by the coming of some “companies” for the installation and repair of charcoal burners in motor lorries and the distillation of grain alcohol for fuel, an Army officers’ training school, and the engineers’ corps of the railway being built through the town from Kwangsi to Kweiyang. To it the people of the surrounding contryside, including at least three groups of Miao and the Chung-chia, went to market. It was also the seat of the hsien government and contained a middle school, postal and telegraph offices, and a cooperative bank, with all of which the non-Chinese, as well as the Chinese, had some dealings. A few of the more well-to-do families sent one of their boys to the middle school. Cases which could not be settled in the village or by the lien pao official, who was also a Chinese, were of necessity brought to the hsien court, as well as cases which involved both Miao and Chinese.’
[4]
’The Magpie Miao live in villages, occasionally compact but normally consisting of a cluster of separate hamlets. These are located on mountain slopes, usually far enough away from main transportation routes to be inaccessible and readily defensible. The Miao lack any political organization of their own, and are thoroughly integrated into the Chinese administrative system. The basic political, as well as economic and social unit, is the village. Villages are grouped into townships and divided into hamlets of about ten to twenty households each. The headmen of both the village and the hamlet are appointed by the chief of the township. The members of different villages or hamlets are bound principally by affinal ties. They may cooperate for the common good, but they lack any formal organization of an indigenous character. Disputes between members of the same hamlet are settled, if possible, within the hamlet. Those between members of different hamlets of the same village are adjudicated by a council composed of the village headman and the heads of the hamlets involved. If this council cannot effect a settlement, the litigants have a right to carry their dispute to the chief of the township or even to the Chinese court of the county.’
[5]
Given how Hmong villagers made use of the Chinese legal system, we have decided to code the variable ’present’.
[1]: Che-lin, Wu, Chen Kuo-chün, and Lien-en Tsao 1942. “Studies Of Miao-I Societies In Kweichow", 76 [2]: Mickey, Margaret Portia 1947. “Cowrie Shell Miao Of Kweichow”, 45a [3]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 228 [4]: Mickey, Margaret Portia 1947. “Cowrie Shell Miao Of Kweichow”, 40b [5]: Rui, Yifu 1960. “Magpie Miao Of Southern Szechuan”, 145 |
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No specific legal training. Was this "important dignitary" a specialist at judging or did he/she also have other jobs?
"There was also a formal court procedure before judges, but this cost money, so was presumably resorted to only by people with means. Judges were important dignitaries, entitled to enjoy the income from good-sized estates given them by the king’s officials; the act of judging was a divine attribute, associated with profound knowledge, probity, fairness, and wisdom, rather than with specific legal training." [1] [1]: (Foster 2016, 38) Foster, Benjamin R. 2016. The Age of Agade. Inventing Empire In Ancient Mesopotamia. Routledge. London. |
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Copied from IqAkkad. "There was also a formal court procedure before judges, but this cost money, so was presumably resorted to only by people with means. Judges were important dignitaries, entitled to enjoy the income from good-sized estates given them by the king’s officials; the act of judging was a divine attribute, associated with profound knowledge, probity, fairness, and wisdom, rather than with specific legal training."
[1]
Was this "important dignitary" a specialist at judging or did they also have other jobs?
[1]: (Foster 2016, 38) Foster, Benjamin R. 2016. The Age of Agade. Inventing Empire In Ancient Mesopotamia. Routledge. London. |
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Before Hammurabi, cases were heard by judges in individual cities. These judges appear to have been "ad hoc appointments", probably appointed from the council of elders. Hammurabi established himself as the head judge of the empire, though there existed officials called ’judges of the king’ who probably made a substantial number of the judgements. In the provinces, the puhrum, elders and headman made judgements.
[1]
[1]: Oates, J. Babylon. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson. p.71 |
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"The judiciary operated at three levels. Local councils of elders representing a village or an urban ward dealt with everyday matters such as divorce applications, disputed paternity, and conflicts over inheritance. [...] If the council felt unable to deal with a case or one of the parties at law was dissatisfied with its outcome, the matter could be referred to a higher authority, a judge appointed by the king, or to the king himself, the highest authority. Some serious offenses, such as murder, known as din napishtim (“case of life”), were referred directly to the king as a matter of course[...]. The role of the judiciary was not only to resolve disputes and punish criminal behavior but also to administer and enforce government decrees and to witness and record legally binding agreements between individuals."
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh 2005: 158) McIntosh, J. 2005. Ancient Mesopotamia: New Perspective. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/KK2E3KMD. |
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"Rather than governors appointed by the kingdom, temples acted as the real centres of local resources and activities. Indeed, temples could rely on their millenary tradition, administrative structure, prestige, and ability to motivate the population. They therefore required and obtained from the kings (probably the weakest ones) a certain degree of autonomy and various exemptions from tributes and obligations (defined with the terms kidinnu in Kassite and zakûtu in Akkadian). They also had a certain degree of self-government for the administration of justice and of the cities’ internal affairs."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 471) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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"Rather than governors appointed by the kingdom, temples acted as the real centres of local resources and activities. Indeed, temples could rely on their millenary tradition, administrative structure, prestige, and ability to motivate the population. They therefore required and obtained from the kings (probably the weakest ones) a certain degree of autonomy and various exemptions from tributes and obligations (defined with the terms kidinnu in Kassite and zakûtu in Akkadian). They also had a certain degree of self-government for the administration of justice and of the cities’ internal affairs."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 471) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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Inferred from presence of law courts.
[1]
"The advent of the Parthians did not mark a break in the cultural history of the Greek cities, which retained their constitutions and magistrates, their schools, language, and law, long after the decline of Seleucid power." [2] [1]: Perikhanian, A., ‘Iranian Society and Law’, in The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2, ed. by Ehsan Yar-Shater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),vol. III, p.676. [2]: (Neusner 2008, 10) Neusner, Jacob. 2008. A History of the Jews in Babylonia. 1. The Parthian Period. Wipf & Stock. Eugene. |
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Presumably the late Abbasids employed qadi (judge).
Late Abbasid period: "the religious establishment - that is, the ulama - were responsible for education, administering the awqaf, and the administration of justice". [1] [1]: (Elbendary 2015, 40) Elbendary, Amina. 2015. Crowds and Sultans: Urban Protest in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria. The American University in Cairo Press. |
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Temple complex based government. "Temple complexes, such as the temple of the goddess Inanna at Eana in Uruk (3200 BC), were large-scale enterprises, dealing in considerable quantities of goods and labor."
[1]
A "legal system" was present. Were there specialist judges or were judges priests? "the Sumerian civilisation which flourished before 3500 BC. This was an advanced civilisation building cities and supporting the people with irrigation systems, a legal system, administration, and even a postal service. Writing developed and counting was based on a sexagesimal system, that is to say base 60." [2] [1]: (Joseph 2011, 135) Joseph, George Gheverghese. The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics (Third Edition). Princeton University Press. [2]: J J O’Connor, J J. Robertson, E F. December 2000. http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Babylonian_mathematics.html |
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Temple complex based government. "Temple complexes, such as the temple of the goddess Inanna at Eana in Uruk (3200 BC), were large-scale enterprises, dealing in considerable quantities of goods and labor."
[1]
A "legal system" may have been present. Were there specialist judges or were judges priests? "the Sumerian civilisation which flourished before 3500 BC. This was an advanced civilisation building cities and supporting the people with irrigation systems, a legal system, administration, and even a postal service. Writing developed and counting was based on a sexagesimal system, that is to say base 60." [2] [1]: (Joseph 2011, 135) Joseph, George Gheverghese. The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics (Third Edition). Princeton University Press. [2]: J J O’Connor, J J. Robertson, E F. December 2000. http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Babylonian_mathematics.html |
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Temple complex based government. "Temple complexes, such as the temple of the goddess Inanna at Eana in Uruk (3200 BC), were large-scale enterprises, dealing in considerable quantities of goods and labor."
[1]
A "legal system" may have been present. Were there specialist judges or were judges priests? "the Sumerian civilisation which flourished before 3500 BC. This was an advanced civilisation building cities and supporting the people with irrigation systems, a legal system, administration, and even a postal service. Writing developed and counting was based on a sexagesimal system, that is to say base 60." [2] [1]: (Joseph 2011, 135) Joseph, George Gheverghese. The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics (Third Edition). Princeton University Press. [2]: J J O’Connor, J J. Robertson, E F. December 2000. http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Babylonian_mathematics.html |
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"The advent of the Parthians did not mark a break in the cultural history of the Greek cities, which retained their constitutions and magistrates, their schools, language, and law, long after the decline of Seleucid power."
[1]
[1]: (Neusner 2008, 10) Neusner, Jacob. 2008. A History of the Jews in Babylonia. 1. The Parthian Period. Wipf & Stock. Eugene. |
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Qadi.
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"There seems to have been no separate architectural or engineering division of the administration any more than there was a separate judiciary. The title sʒb is often translated “judge,” but it seems to be a generic term for “official” when applied to a named individual."
[1]
-- no specialist judge
"typical of the Egyptian system that the judicial function was not the prerogative of a professional, specialist body reflected in a clearly defined category of official titles. It is true that the titles of certain officers and bodies ... are suspected to relate entirely to the judiciary, but the basic capacity of making accepted judgements see also to have extended generally to men in a position of authority, even where their titles seem primarily administrative." [2] There was "a distinct layer of judicial administration that was in charge of investigating matters relating to discrepancies in the handling of grain resources." [3] -- yes specialist judge [1]: (Quirke 2001) [2]: (Kemp 1983, 83) Kemp, Barry. "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period c. 2686-1552 BC" in Trigger, B G. Kemp, B J. O’Connor, D. LLoyd, A B. 1983. Ancient Egypt: A Social History. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [3]: (Papazian 2013, 67) |
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"There seems to have been no separate architectural or engineering division of the administration any more than there was a separate judiciary. The title sʒb is often translated “judge,” but it seems to be a generic term for “official” when applied to a named individual."
[1]
-- no specialist judge
"typical of the Egyptian system that the judicial function was not the prerogative of a professional, specialist body reflected in a clearly defined category of official titles. It is true that the titles of certain officers and bodies ... are suspected to relate entirely to the judiciary, but the basic capacity of making accepted judgements see also to have extended generally to men in a position of authority, even where their titles seem primarily administrative." [2] There was "a distinct layer of judicial administration that was in charge of investigating matters relating to discrepancies in the handling of grain resources." [3] -- yes specialist judge [1]: (Quirke 2001) [2]: (Kemp 1983, 83) Kemp, Barry. "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period c. 2686-1552 BC" in Trigger, B G. Kemp, B J. O’Connor, D. LLoyd, A B. 1983. Ancient Egypt: A Social History. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [3]: (Papazian 2013, 67) |
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"There seems to have been no separate architectural or engineering division of the administration any more than there was a separate judiciary. The title sʒb is often translated “judge,” but it seems to be a generic term for “official” when applied to a named individual."
[1]
"typical of the Egyptian system that the judicial function was not the prerogative of a professional, specialist body reflected in a clearly defined category of official titles. It is true that the titles of certain officers and bodies ... are suspected to relate entirely to the judiciary, but the basic capacity of making accepted judgements see also to have extended generally to men in a position of authority, even where their titles seem primarily administrative." [2] There was "a distinct layer of judicial administration that was in charge of investigating matters relating to discrepancies in the handling of grain resources." [3] [1]: (Quirke 2001) [2]: (Kemp 1983, 83) Kemp, Barry. "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period c. 2686-1552 BC" in Trigger, B G. Kemp, B J. O’Connor, D. LLoyd, A B. 1983. Ancient Egypt: A Social History. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [3]: (Papazian 2013, 67) |
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"There seems to have been no separate architectural or engineering division of the administration any more than there was a separate judiciary. The title sʒb is often translated “judge,” but it seems to be a generic term for “official” when applied to a named individual."
[1]
"typical of the Egyptian system that the judicial function was not the prerogative of a professional, specialist body reflected in a clearly defined category of official titles. It is true that the titles of certain officers and bodies ... are suspected to relate entirely to the judiciary, but the basic capacity of making accepted judgements see also to have extended generally to men in a position of authority, even where their titles seem primarily administrative." [2] There was "a distinct layer of judicial administration that was in charge of investigating matters relating to discrepancies in the handling of grain resources." [3] [1]: (Quirke 2001) [2]: (Kemp 1983, 83) Kemp, Barry. "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period c. 2686-1552 BC" in Trigger, B G. Kemp, B J. O’Connor, D. LLoyd, A B. 1983. Ancient Egypt: A Social History. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [3]: (Papazian 2013, 67) |
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inferred absent Middle Kingdom. disagreement Old Kingdom.
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In the Story of Khuninpu ("Tale of the Eloquent Peasant") a victim of crime could petition a high official at his town house.
[1]
-- may not be a specialist if the petitioner had to visit the official’s house, rather than e.g. justice building
Also there is no evidence for the same system of law that existed in the Old Kingdom. [2] All officials were responsible for reporting crime to the vizier’s office, which either ratified decisions made by the lower officials or set up an investigation itself (and if necessary enacted a punishment). [2] [1]: (Quirke 2001) [2]: (McDowell 2001) |
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No specialised judges can be confirmed for the Middle Kingdom.
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Considering the small size of polities, full-time judges were probably absent. Coded as absent as sources do not suggest there were legal writings or buildings for legal proceedings.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London. [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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Coded as absent as sources do not suggest there are written records of a legal code or buildings for legal proceedings. Considering the small size of the polities, full-time judges would be very unlikely.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London. [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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A formal legal system, as associated buildings and lawyers, is assumed absent as the only evidence for writing during this period is from the carved stone slab (Monument 3) at San José Mogote
[1]
and the largest buildings were used as temples and elite residences.
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London, p130 [2]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London, p131-4 |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for a formal legal system during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for a formal legal system during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for a formal legal system during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for a formal legal system during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for a formal legal system during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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"Almost all the inhabitants of pre-Islamic Arabia were members of a tribe, that is, a mutual aid group bound together by a notion of kinship. As one pre-Islamic poet astutely observed (‘Amr ibn Qami‘a 8), ‘a man’s tribe are his claws [with which he fends off enemies] and his props [which support him]’. Unlike a state, tribes have no specialised institutions of law and order, so a person’s life, honour and goods were protected by his relatives, who were obliged to assist him in trouble and to avenge or seek compensation for him if he was wronged. ‘When fighting comes, your kinsman alone is near; your true friend your kinsman is, who answers your call for aid with good will, when deeply drenched in bloodshed are sword and spear’ (H. am. 225)."
[1]
"So tribal law was customary law, deter- mined by ancient practice. It is therefore inherently conservative; ‘We found our fathers on a path and we follow in their footsteps’ was the reply of most Meccans to the Prophet Muhammad’s new message (Quran 43.22, 24). And it is echoed by pre-Islamic Arab poets: ‘We follow the ways of our forefathers, those who kindled wars and were faithful to the ties of kinship’ (‘Abid 20). It could only be updated either by such aforementioned paragons of tribal virtue, who won the approval of all, or by the consensus of all full members of the community meeting together." [2] "Among the wealthier sedentary polities of Arabia there existed a more elaborate legal system with more of an institutional framework. A number of the cities of south Arabia had a council (mswd), and at each of the capital cities there was a supreme council where the king sat along with delegates from a certain number of tribal groups, representing the whole nation and issuing edicts on its behalf. Such an edict might begin as follows: ‘Thus have ordered and directed and decreed Shahr Yagill Yuhargib, the son of Hawfa‘amm, the king of the Qatabanians, and the Qatabanians, the council, having its full complement. . . . ’ (RES 3566). In this particular text it would appear that Shahr Yagill had to fight to maintain his position, for he goes on to complain that ‘some people from the council and community of landowners determined and enforced their decisions by swearing oaths between themselves in that temple in their very self-willed and loutish manner without the sanction of [me] their lord’." [3] [1]: (Hoyland 2001, 113) Hoyland, R. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/hoylan/titleCreatorYear/items/AUHRSTGG/item-list [2]: (Hoyland 2001, 121-122) Hoyland, R. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/hoylan/titleCreatorYear/items/AUHRSTGG/item-list [3]: (Hoyland 2001, 124) Hoyland, R. 2001. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/hoylan/titleCreatorYear/items/AUHRSTGG/item-list |
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Political leadership and judicial duties overlapped in the person of the imam: ’Hakim, the standard term for “judge” (qadi was also used), as in hakim sharʿi or “shariʽa judge,” had another sense, which meant “ruler,” as in the identification of Imam Yahya as hakim al-yaman, “ruler of Yemen.?”3 In this domain of overlapping terminology a verb from the same h-k-m root, followed by bainahum (lit. “between them”) can mean “he governed” when used of an imam or, beyond the sphere of the state, ofan important rural shaykh, and “he adjudicated their case” (p.169) when used in reference to a judge. One is reminded of a similar double resonance of the English word “court,” held by both kings and judges. While the categories judge and imam are not to be confused, it is also true that the activity of governing in Yemen was in general very much devoted to settling disputes, with only a specialized part of this activity being handled by the shariʽa court variety of hakim.’
[1]
Messick describes the interaction of imams, judges and muftis with the public: ’To Yemenis, judges in this type of open setting, accessible to the public, appeared in a posture known as muwajaha, from wajh meaning “face,” the quintessential face-to-face encounter of official public life (see fig. 9). Muwajaha was also the format in which the mufti received afternoon fatwa seekers, and the same sort of generic activity was characteristic as well of both ruling imams and local governors. Direct accessibility, based on a public presence that enabled personal encounters and personal solutions to problems, was a fundamental value of the old administrative style.’
[2]
[1]: Messick, Brinkley 1992. "The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society", 168p [2]: Messick, Brinkley 1992. "The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society", 168 |
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"On the one hand, the Roman law-based tradition of terraferma statutes, sources of law in general, and judicial practice was a tradition much dependent on the legal expertise of jurists organic to local elites. On the other hand, Venice’s own, separate legal and judicial tradition was characterized by the space for empirical, informal, ’political criteria of equity in judging and by assignment of judicial posts to patricians with no legal training. Though much mainland judging remained the business of local courts with local judges, the uneasy reconciliation of these thwo approaches was evident in the dual options of mainland governors: they an entourage of legal professionals, judging by local law, but were also empowered to override the usual priority in sources of law. ... Local statutory traditions continued essentially intact, with periodic renewal of statues subject to Venetian approval, which entailed no drastic interference. Such codes were generally not significantly updated by new laws formulated by mainland legislators once under Venetian dominion, nor did they include as statutory norms the heterogeneous accumulation of Venetian laws and rulings, referred to single territories or (more rarely) to the whole of the mainland."
[1]
Need to confirm exact time period this quote relates too: "The local nobilities acted as judges in courts of first instance, including the basic inquests of criminal cases, and when they were the accused, intimidated testimonies and influenced inquests and verdicts by using patronage and violence..." [2] [1]: (Knapton 2014, 98) Michael Knapton. The Terraferma State. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2014. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. [2]: (Arbel 2014, 163) Benjamin Arbel. Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2014. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. |
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"On the one hand, the Roman law-based tradition of terraferma statutes, sources of law in general, and judicial practice was a tradition much dependent on the legal expertise of jurists organic to local elites. On the other hand, Venice’s own, separate legal and judicial tradition was characterized by the space for empirical, informal, ’political criteria of equity in judging and by assignment of judicial posts to patricians with no legal training. Though much mainland judging remained the business of local courts with local judges, the uneasy reconciliation of these thwo approaches was evident in the dual options of mainland governors: they an entourage of legal professionals, judging by local law, but were also empowered to override the usual priority in sources of law. ... Local statutory traditions continued essentially intact, with periodic renewal of statues subject to Venetian approval, which entailed no drastic interference. Such codes were generally not significantly updated by new laws formulated by mainland legislators once under Venetian dominion, nor did they include as statutory norms the heterogeneous accumulation of Venetian laws and rulings, referred to single territories or (more rarely) to the whole of the mainland."
[1]
Need to confirm exact time period this quote relates too: "The local nobilities acted as judges in courts of first instance, including the basic inquests of criminal cases, and when they were the accused, intimidated testimonies and influenced inquests and verdicts by using patronage and violence..." [2] [1]: (Knapton 2014, 98) Michael Knapton. The Terraferma State. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2014. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. [2]: (Arbel 2014, 163) Benjamin Arbel. Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2014. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. |
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"As in the later Roman Empire, officers of the royal bureaucracy were expected to fulfil any number of functions on behalf of the king. Under this administrative prerogative a judge was any officer who possessed executive authority, such as a count, duke, governor, or prefect. In other words, there was no branch of government dedicated exclusively to the maintenance of the law. This lack of a professional judiciary meant that the majority of judges performed their duties without the benefit of significant legal training or expertize."
[1]
[1]: (Lafferty 2016: 162) Lafferty, S. The Law. In Arnold, Bjornlie and Sessa (eds) A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy pp. 147-172. Brill. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/VQ8MC72F/item-list |
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There were judges at federal and local level.
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“As emperor, Friedrich formally recognized the Privilegium maius and made it a part of imperial law. Thereby all Rudolf IV’s imagined privileges and prerogatives of the dynasty became reality. Making the Privilegium maius official meant that the Austrian archdukes now had a more solid legal basis to raise new taxes, tolls and fines, to grant titles of nobility, and to name officers such as judges and notaries.”
[1]
[1]: (Curtis 2013: 68) Curtis, Benjamin. 2013. The Habsburgs: The History of a Dynasty. London; New York: Bloomsbury. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/TRKUBP92 |
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“Among the most decisive changes implemented in 1867 was a new judicial system, which was the first piece of constitutional legislation that the parliament considered in October 1867. This bill provided for the strict separation of justice and administration on all levels of government and for the development of professional norms that would protect the independence of the judiciary. The law stipulated jury trials for all particularly serious crimes, and for all offenses against the press laws. All judicial officers were required to take an oath of allegiance to uphold the constitutional system. The law also guaranteed life tenure to judges and sought to protect them against political interference and harassment.”
[1]
[1]: (Boyer 2022: 99) Boyer, John W. 2022. Austria, 1867–1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/CG3P4KKD |
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“In accordance with the agreement with the constituency of Czech nobles from 1310, King John named his most important Land officials – i.e., the Supreme Burgrave, Supreme Chamberlains and the Land Judges – from the ranks of the noble lines. The first of these took executive power as the ruler’s deputy; the others looked after finances of the country and ran the Land court, generally considered the foundation of legal order in the country.”
[1]
“Clergymen were subject almost exclusively to ecclesiastical law and their local highest-ranking judge was either the bishop or archbishop of their diocese. Before the Hussite Revolution, the seats of the dioceses in and around the Bohemian lands were: Prague (the only archbishopric before the Hussite Revolution), Litomyšl, Olomouc, Wrocław (Breslau), Meissen, Naumburg, and Passau.”
[2]
“Ondřej’s tenure as the highest judge on the land court spanned most of Charles iv’s and Vaclav iv’s reigns. Because his father was a member of Charles iv’s court, Ondřej had early and frequent access to the royal court, and may explain why he was appointed highest land judge at the young age of approximately twenty-five. Charles iv appointed him land judge on June 6, 1343, to replace Oldřich Pluh.”
[3]
[1]: (Pánek and Oldřich 2009: 142) Pánek, Jaroslav and Oldřich, Tůma. 2009. A History of the Czech Lands. University of Chicago Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4NAX9KBJ [2]: (Grant 2014: 32) Grant, Jeanne E. 2014. For the Common Good: The Bohemian Land Law and the Beginning of the Hussite Revolution, East Central and Eastern in the Middle Ages, 450–1450. Leiden; Boston: Brill. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/GCJGUZZZ [3]: (Grant 2014: 52) Grant, Jeanne E. 2014. For the Common Good: The Bohemian Land Law and the Beginning of the Hussite Revolution, East Central and Eastern in the Middle Ages, 450–1450. Leiden; Boston: Brill. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/GCJGUZZZ |
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“Also in 1717, the crown established the Real Factoría de Indias, an institution controlled by the intendente general of the navy on behalf of the king… The Factoría would also generate sufficient funds for paying the return voyages of its own ships without having to wait endlessly in the Indies, to pay the salaries of the judges of the Casa de Contratación and to constitute a source of loans for the crown in emergencies.”(Eissa-Barroso 2017: 136-137) Eissa-Barroso, Francisco A. 2017. The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717–1739). Leiden: Brill. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XNET89MW
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The Russian judicial system until 1864 was based on "Estates-of-the-realm" courts serving different social estates.
This system, largely intact since Catherine II’s reign, lacked modern professional judges. Judicial reforms started on November 20, 1864, under Tsar Alexander II, introducing a unified judicial system. Professional judges were nominated by the Minister of Justice and appointed by the Tsar, with specific qualifications required. Introduction of jury trials with professional judges in the judicial system marked a significant change. [1] [1]: Peter H. Solomon, ed., Reforming Justice in Russia, 1864-1996: Power, Culture, and the Limits of Legal Order (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015). Zotero link: 6F93JTAI |
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No reference to judge-type positions in the sources consulted. Rather, ealdormen, port-reeves or sheriffs presided over court matters.
[1]
[1]: (Roberts et al 2014: 31) Roberts, Clayton, Roberts, F. David, and Bisson, Douglas. 2014. ‘Anglo-Saxon England: 450–1066’, in A History of England, Volume 1, 6th ed. Routledge. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/P2IHD9U3 |
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There were judges at federal and local level.
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“Moroccan chronicler Muhammad al-Kardudi (d. 1851) commented that when Mawlay Isma‘il was in the process of organizing his army, initially recruiting Arabs from the Udaya tribe, he consulted with an influential Muslim scholar, Muhammad b. al-‘Ayyashi, one of his loyalists, asking which tribe would be best suited to provide recruits. Al-‘Ayyashi suggested that the slaves who came (through saby) from West Africa after the 1591 Sa‘di invasion of Songhay and who formerly had been in service to the Makhzan might serve well as they were still slaves belonging to the state. The sultan regarded the idea so highly that he made al-‘Ayyashi a supreme judge (qadi al-qudat) acting on his behalf in all the legal matters related to their collection.”
[1]
[1]: (El Hamel 2014: 160) El Hamel, Chouki. 2014. Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/T9JFH8AS |
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The Russian judicial system until 1864 was based on "Estates-of-the-realm" courts serving different social estates.
This system, largely intact since Catherine II’s reign, lacked modern professional judges. [1] [1]: Peter H. Solomon, ed., Reforming Justice in Russia, 1864-1996: Power, Culture, and the Limits of Legal Order (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015). Zotero link: 6F93JTAI |
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No reference to judge-type positions in the sources consulted. Rather, ealdormen, port-reeves or sheriffs presided over court matters.
[1]
[1]: (Roberts et al 2014: 31) Roberts, Clayton, Roberts, F. David, and Bisson, Douglas. 2014. ‘Anglo-Saxon England: 450–1066’, in A History of England, Volume 1, 6th ed. Routledge. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/P2IHD9U3 |
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Inferred from the study of Islamic law. "In the field of religion and culture, the nineteenth century is said to have witnessed the golden age of Islam in the Futa Jalon. It was the century of great scholars and the growth of Islamic culture. All the disciplines of the Quran were known and taught: translation, the hadiths, law, apologetics, the ancillary sciences such as grammar, rhetoric, literature, astronomy, local works in Pular and Arabic, and mysticism."
[1]
[1]: (Barry 2005: 539) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/SU25S5BX/items/6TXWGHAX/item-list |
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The following reconstruction of small communities consisting of extended families based in autonomous homesteads suggests minimal social diffrentiation. ”For the first 400 years of the settlement’s history, Kirikongo was a single economically generalized social group (Figure 6). The occupants were self-sufficient farmers who cultivated grains and herded livestock, smelted and forged iron, opportunistically hunted, lived in puddled earthen structures with pounded clay floors, and fished in the seasonal drainages. [...] Since Kirikongo did not grow (at least not significantly) for over 400 years, it is likely that extra-community fissioning continually occurred to contribute to regional population growth, and it is also likely that Kirikongo itself was the result of budding from a previous homestead. However, with the small scale of settlement, the inhabitants of individual homesteads must have interacted with a wider community for social and demographic reasons. [...] It may be that generalized single-kin homesteads like Kirikongo were the societal model for a post-LSA expansion of farming peoples along the Nakambe (White Volta) and Mouhoun (Black Volta) River basins. A homestead settlement pattern would fit well with the transitional nature of early sedentary life, where societies are shifting from generalized reciprocity to more restricted and formalized group membership, and single-kin communities like Kirikongo’s house (Mound 4) would be roughly the size of a band.”
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 27, 32) |
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No distinction between executive and judicial branch (though the following information applies to the 19th centuries, it seems reasonable to infer continuity with previous centuries). "Tribunals were graded according to the political divisions within the kingdom. The lowest court was that of the ward head, who dealt with all cases concerning the lineage segment under his authority. The village head, with his ‘ministers’ and ward heads, constituted the next grade and also heard appeals from the courts of ward heads. The court of the ‘canton’ chief dealt with intervillage disputes. The court of a ‘provincial’ chief (palace minister) was concerned with disputes between the Fulbe, Yarse, Dioula, and others (see p. 160), and between these and the Mossi proper. He also examined appeals from the lower courts. Supreme judicial authority was vested in the king, although in practice he only gave judgement in criminal cases, such as homicide, and cases which proved too difficult for subordinate tribunals. He also constituted the only court qualified to try nakombse.//"These five types of tribunals were constituted on the same hierarchical pattern as the administration of the kingdom, with no distinction between the judiciary and the executive."
[1]
[1]: (Zahan 1960: 170-171) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TVIRPGXD/collection. |
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No distinction between executive and judicial branch (though the following information applies to the 19th centuries, it seems reasonable to infer continuity with previous centuries). "Tribunals were graded according to the political divisions within the kingdom. The lowest court was that of the ward head, who dealt with all cases concerning the lineage segment under his authority. The village head, with his ‘ministers’ and ward heads, constituted the next grade and also heard appeals from the courts of ward heads. The court of the ‘canton’ chief dealt with intervillage disputes. The court of a ‘provincial’ chief (palace minister) was concerned with disputes between the Fulbe, Yarse, Dioula, and others (see p. 160), and between these and the Mossi proper. He also examined appeals from the lower courts. Supreme judicial authority was vested in the king, although in practice he only gave judgement in criminal cases, such as homicide, and cases which proved too difficult for subordinate tribunals. He also constituted the only court qualified to try nakombse.//"These five types of tribunals were constituted on the same hierarchical pattern as the administration of the kingdom, with no distinction between the judiciary and the executive."
[1]
[1]: (Zahan 1960: 170-171) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TVIRPGXD/collection. |
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The following quote suggests the emergence of social differentiation in this period, but little appears to be understood about this phenomenon apart from the appearance of specialised smiths and the formation of senior and cadet social segments. "During Yellow II, the inhabitants of Mound 4 began a process that eventually led to centralization of iron production, as described in detail above. Iron ore extraction involves profound digging in the earth, the realm of spirits, and historically in Bwa society the practice is reserved solely for specialized smiths, who also excavate burials (see discussions below). The mid first millennium A.D. therefore witnessed a transformation from redundant social and economic roles for houses to specialization in at least one craft activity. While houses were still highly independent, even producing their own pottery, a formalized village structure was likely present with both cadet and senior social segments, founded upon common descent with a common ancestor."
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 28) |
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“Among my principal informants were an eighty-year-old former K’adi (Islamic judge) who had held that post for many years.”
[1]
[1]: (Lewis 2001, xvii) Lewis, Herbert S. 2001. Jimma Abba Jifar, an Oromo Monarchy: Ethiopia, 1830-1932. Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NRZVWSCD/collection |
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As a Muslim sultanate, Islamic law and Sharia courts would have likely been used to regulate society. In Islamic law the judges are known as qādī. “Apart from scattered references to qādīs in surviving papyri, our knowledge of judicial practices during the formative period of Islamic history – roughly 600-1000 – is based largely on literary sources: biographical dictionaries of qādīs, treatises devoted to adab al-qādī or ‘the etiquette of judging,’ historical texts, and belles-lettres. Of these sources, biographical dictionaries are especially important, and we are fortunate to have at least three such works that treat the regions of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Akhbār al-qudāt of Wakī (d.306/918) is arranged regionally according to garrison towns and chronologically by qādī within those regions. Some of the entries contain lists of judicial rulings that can be used to reconstruct the earliest stages of Islamic judicial practices.”
[1]
[1]: (Masud 2006, 2) Masud, Muhammad K. 2006. Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements. Leiden: Brill Publishing. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Masud/titleCreatorYear/items/8VRVCUC6/item-list |
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As a Muslim sultanate, Islamic law and Sharia courts would have likely been used to regulate society. In Islamic law the judges are known as qādī. “Apart from scattered references to qādīs in surviving papyri, our knowledge of judicial practices during the formative period of Islamic history – roughly 600-1000 – is based largely on literary sources: biographical dictionaries of qādīs, treatises devoted to adab al-qādī or ‘the etiquette of judging,’ historical texts, and belles-lettres. Of these sources, biographical dictionaries are especially important, and we are fortunate to have at least three such works that treat the regions of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Akhbār al-qudāt of Wakī (d.306/918) is arranged regionally according to garrison towns and chronologically by qādī within those regions. Some of the entries contain lists of judicial rulings that can be used to reconstruct the earliest stages of Islamic judicial practices.”
[1]
[1]: (Masud 2006, 2) Masud, Muhammad K. 2006. Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements. Leiden: Brill Publishing. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/TWITJWK4/items/8VRVCUC6/collection |
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As a Muslim sultanate, Islamic law and Sharia courts would have likely been used to regulate society. In Islamic law the judges are known as qādī. “Apart from scattered references to qādīs in surviving papyri, our knowledge of judicial practices during the formative period of Islamic history – roughly 600-1000 – is based largely on literary sources: biographical dictionaries of qādīs, treatises devoted to adab al-qādī or ‘the etiquette of judging,’ historical texts, and belles-lettres. Of these sources, biographical dictionaries are especially important, and we are fortunate to have at least three such works that treat the regions of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Akhbār al-qudāt of Wakī (d.306/918) is arranged regionally according to garrison towns and chronologically by qādī within those regions. Some of the entries contain lists of judicial rulings that can be used to reconstruct the earliest stages of Islamic judicial practices.”
[1]
[1]: (Masud 2006, 2) Masud, Muhammad K. 2006. Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements. Leiden: Brill Publishing. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Masud/titleCreatorYear/items/8VRVCUC6/item-list |
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“The kadi administering Islamic law was at this time a Hawiye Somali whose predecessors, from about 1670, had been sayyids from Arabia.”
[1]
[1]: (Lewis 2002, 33) Lewis, Ioan M. 2002. A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/KHB7VSJK/collection |
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The quote below suggests that legal affairs were informal matters for local leaders rather than carried out through Sharia law. “As power devolved to local leaders, customary rather than Sharia’atic law dominated political relations at the local level. We saw in the previous section how the saints of Somali tradition contributed to the evolution of xeer (customary law) in the various communities where they settled. They mediated disputes, helped assess blood-wealth (diya) payments, and assisted at rituals of reconciliation. Such mediation was particularly critical in the evolving Rahanwiin confederations, which typically consisted of lineages of diverse genealogical origins and perhaps different marriage and inheritance customs.
[1]
[1]: (Cassanelli 1982, 130) Cassanelli, Lee. V. 1982. The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/TKPH7Z89/library |
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"The precise use of the Islamic calendar and of Arabic script and language are strong evidence of the presence of an Islamic scholarly elite. This literate elite is represented by the faqīh Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥasan, “ qāḍī al-quḍā (lit. “cadi of the cadis”) of Šawah” whose death occurred in 1255. The title “cadi of the cadis” refers to the judge at the head of the judiciary of a state or of a city, and therefore presupposes a sophisticated judicial hierarchy."
[1]
[1]: (Chekroun and Hirsch 2020: 94-95) Seshat url: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/SU25S5BX/items/TA84VGHX/item-list |
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As a Muslim sultanate, Islamic law and Sharia courts would have likely been used to regulate society. In Islamic law the judges are known as qādī. “Apart from scattered references to qādīs in surviving papyri, our knowledge of judicial practices during the formative period of Islamic history – roughly 600-1000 – is based largely on literary sources: biographical dictionaries of qādīs, treatises devoted to adab al-qādī or ‘the etiquette of judging,’ historical texts, and belles-lettres. Of these sources, biographical dictionaries are especially important, and we are fortunate to have at least three such works that treat the regions of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Akhbār al-qudāt of Wakī (d.306/918) is arranged regionally according to garrison towns and chronologically by qādī within those regions. Some of the entries contain lists of judicial rulings that can be used to reconstruct the earliest stages of Islamic judicial practices.”
[1]
[1]: (Masud 2006, 2) Masud, Muhammad K. 2006. Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and Their Judgements. Leiden: Brill Publishing. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Masud/titleCreatorYear/items/8VRVCUC6/item-list |
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“‘Ajib is describe as a great Islamizing ruler, who appointed Sharia judges in his territory, made grants of land to holy men, and fought in the jihad.”
[1]
[1]: (Holt 2008, 42) Holt, P.M. 2008. ‘Egypt, the Funj and Darfur’ In The Cambridge History of Africa c. 1600 – c.1790. Edited by Richard Grey. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/WC9FQBRM/collection |
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The following quote suggest that there was not a formal legal code with courts, professional judges and lawyers, but instead there was a group of local arbitrators for various communal disputes. “Every gafo (aggregate of houses) had its clan elder, called duke niho, father of the people, who was a functionary only in the most general sense of the word, acting as an arbitrator in disputes and as a link between his gafo and that of the rashe showo. In fact, all of the positions lower than rashe showo were engaged primarily in matters of justice. The duke niho was considered to be a nali areto or ari gecho, ‘one who knows’. The tatikisho and the gudo were also in the category of ‘those who know,’ and they were asked to arbitrate and to sit in judgement in all cases affecting a gafo or subdistrict. Usually the duke niho was asked his opinion, but a binding judgement was left to the tatikisho. If this judgement was not acceptable to either of the parties, they could appeal to the gudo. Up to this level decisions could involve the division of a piece of land or compensation for damages. The rashe showo represented the next level of appeal, although the right to arrest people or to lock them in irons was reserved for the worabi rasho.”
[1]
[1]: (Orent 1970, 292) Orent, Amnon. 1970. ‘Refocusing on the History of Kafa Prior to 1897: A Discussion of Political Processes’. African Historical Studies. Vol. 3:2. Pp 263-293. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2A389XGK/collection |
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The following quote suggests that Islamic judges were likely present. “With a long tradition of trading connections to the Arabian Peninsula, the Somalis were converted to Islam at an early date and remain staunch Muslims (Sunnis, of the Sha afi School of Law).”
[1]
[1]: (Lewis 2008, 1-2) Lewis, Ioan M. 2008. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society. New York, Columbia University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Understanding%20Somalia/titleCreatorYear/items/7J425GTZ/item-list |
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The following quote seems to suggest that rulers were also expected to mediate conflicts in a judge-like fashion. "These oba [rulers], however, did not only manage people and economic resources, especially land and labor. They also managed the temples, shrines, and festivals dedicated to their Houses’ deities and ancestors. Likewise, they managed conflicts, especially at the interhousehold and inter-House levels."
[1]
[1]: (Ogundiran 2020: 51-52) |
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Oyo Mesi is the Oyo Empire term for the broader Yoruba role of Igbimo: “The authority of the chiefs of state and the Igbimo extended to the performance of judicial functions. Their authority in this realm straddled the dimension of Directiveness and the exaction of compliance to judgments that they handed down in capital cases from members of the society. In this capacity, they constituted the Supreme Court in the central polity with the sole authority to try capital cases and other ‘indictable offences such as murder, treason, burglary, arson, unlawful wounding, manslaughter, incest … ’ (Fadipe, 1970: 209), as well as disputes between occupants of authority positions and appeals that emanated from lower judicial bodies in the constituent polities. The authority to grant pardons of all types belonged to the chiefs of state in its entirety. They and members of the Igbimo handled regular cases in regular sessions of the Igbimo during the course of the week while special sessions were convened when the occasion called for them (Fadipe, 1970). The fact that executions and jail terms were exacted in the capital by designated institutions in the state bureaucracy (Bascom, 1955; Fadipe, 1970; Akintoye, 1971) indicated the presence of some measure of regulated regimentation in the Yoruba authority patterns (Ejiogu, 2004).”
[1]
[1]: Ejiogu, EC. ‘State Building in the Niger Basin in the Common Era and Beyond, 1000–Mid 1800s: The Case of Yorubaland’. Journal of Asian and African Studies vol.46, no.6 (1 December 2011): 600. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2H2CJNHP/collection |
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"Contexts that could shed light on the dynamics of social structure and hierarchies in the metropolis, such as the royal burial site of Oyo monarchs and the residences of the elite population, have not been investigated. The mapping of the palace structures has not been followed by systematic excavations (Soper, 1992); and questions of the economy, military system, and ideology of the empire have not been addressed archaeologically, although their general patterns are known from historical studies (e.g, Johnson, 1921; Law, 1977)."
[1]
Regarding this period, however, one of the historical studies mentioned in this quote also notes: "Of the earliestperiod of Oyo history, before the sixteenth century, very little is known."
[2]
Law does not then go on to provide specific information directly relevant to this variable.
[1]: (Ogundiran 2005: 151-152) [2]: (Law 1977: 33) |
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“Let us note that in the Igbo traditional setting, the oracle held executive, legislative, and judicial powers.”
[1]
[1]: Innocent, Rev. (2020). A Critical Study on the Ibini Ukpabi (Arochukwu Long Juju) Oracle and its Implications on the International Relations During the 20th Century. London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences, 20(10): 6. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZXZGZSM3/collection |
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“Judges were learned and in order to maintain checks and balances, judgments at emirate level were appealed at the Caliphal headquarters; judgments in some cases were nullified by the Caliph at Sokoto. No one was allowed to operate above the law as the rules of law were upheld.”
[1]
“The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.”
[2]
[1]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection [2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection |
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“In Idah, the capital of the Igala kingdom as well as in the districts, disputes among individuals and groups were settled before family heads. Those between one family group and another were settled by heads of both group and family who sought to reach compromise for the purpose of peace and stability. In the districts, the district rulers referred to as the Onu exercised both judicial and executive powers; the village chiefs popularly called Omadachi and Gago handled divorce cases, land disputes and several other minor cases but cases of murder and treason were reserved exclusively for Attah’s attention. Attah’s court (Ogbede) was the highest court located in front of Ede market which day’s cases were heard publicly. Attah was the president of the court but because of many engagements, such power was delegated to one of the senior eunuchs called Ogbe who acted as president of the court. Ogbe acted as president of the court took final decisions on minor and non complicated cases while serious ones would be referred to the Attah for final decisions. Available records reveal that Ochalla Angna and Olimamu Attah both Islamic clerics served as court scribes (what is today known as court clerks) and records of proceedings were written and kept in Arabic. This system was and is very effective as few cases are expected to be reported to the police. Acrimony and bitterness which could arise from cases reported to the police were reduced to the barest minimum.”
[1]
[1]: Jacob, Audu. “Pre-Colonial Political Administration in the North Central Nigeria: a Study of the Igala Political Kingdom.” European Scientific Journal, vol. 10, no. 19, 2014, pp. 392–402: 399. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5AN8R7UW/collection |
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“Also, in the fourteenth century Al-Qalqashandi mentioned judges, magistrates and jurists, with reference to the king of Borno, Borno being located in the same vicinity as it is now, in north east Nigeria, although in those times Nigeria did not exist as a state.”
[1]
“The categories of officials which the inscriptio mentions are the umara (amirs), shurta (guards), hukama (governors), "ulama (scholars), ummal (officers), qudat (judges), wuzara (viziers), fursan (horsemen, warriors), ra’aya (subjects) and ma’shar al-muslimln (the generality of Muslims).”
[2]
“Also, in the fourteenth century Al-Qalqashandi mentioned judges, magistrates and jurists, with reference to the king of Borno, Borno being located in the same vicinity as it is now, in north east Nigeria, although in those times Nigeria did not exist as a state.”
[1]
[1]: Dalgleish, D. (2005). Pre-Colonial Criminal Justice In West Africa: Eurocentric Thought Versus Africentric Evidence. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 1(1), 55–69: 62. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NKVJZI32/collection [2]: Bobboyi, H. (1993). RELATIONS OF THE BORNO ʿULAMĀʾ WITH THE SAYFAWA RULERS: THE ROLE OF THE MAḤRAMS. Sudanic Africa, 4, 175–204: 189–190. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/JE5VQ8NI/collection |
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“The king, as we have seen, was supreme judge, with power of life and death over his subjects. There was, however, a well organized hierarchy of courts. Village chiefs dealt only with civil disputes. Criminal cases were adjudicated by the provincial governor or the king’s councillors. At village level there was a court of first instance only; sanctions were limited to fines and short periods of imprisonment. Village chiefs supervised trials by ordeal.The provincial chief had wider powers. He could inflict the bastinado or impose lengthy periods of imprisonment. In all cases, however, the death penalty was the king’s prerogative.”
[1]
[1]: Lombard, J. (1976). The Kingdom of Dahomey. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 70–92). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 89. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/T6WTVSHZ/collection |
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The following quote suggests that the king or Damel was the judge or decision maker in legal proceedings. “Each province then, which contains many villages, is governed either by a Laman, or by a Laman and a Fara together, and of course all the villages in each are subject to their orders. There is besides, in each village, an officer totally distinct from the former. This officer is called the Gueraff. He may be considered as the mayor of the village, for it is his business to take cognizance of any violation of the laws, to bring the offenders to trial, and to repot the case, with the decision upon it, to the king.”
[1]
[1]: (The Philanthropist no. II 1811, 205) 1811. ‘Manners and Customs of the People of Cayor, Sin and Sallum’ In The Philanthropist no. II. London: Longman and Company. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/C5553ITD/collection |
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The following quote notes the existence of officials with judicial functions in the Kingdom of Sine, but they were clearly non-specialists, as they also collected taxes. “Locally, the king was represented by the saaxsaax who exerted judicial functions and received taxes in each village, and the jaraaf, who were generally chosen from the lineage of the village founder and acted essentially as village heads.”
[1]
[1]: (Richard 2018, 107) Richard, Francois G. 2018. Reluctant Landscapes: Historical Anthropologies of Political Experience in Siin, Senegal. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZNV5RKBU/collection |
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The following quote suggests that Islamic judges were likely present. “The tokolor revolution resulted in the replacement of one elite by another, and in the creation of a society within which the Sharia, the Muslim law, was enforced.”
[1]
[1]: (Klein 1972, 429) Klein, Martin A. 1972. ‘Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia.’ The Journal of Africa History. Vol. 13:3. Pp 419-441. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZJRN8UJ8/collection |
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The following quote suggests that Islamic judges were likely present with the Empire of Great Fulo. “In Mauritania and Senegambia, there was a network of rural schools, at which the Koran and certain important works of technology and law were studied. The more learned marabouts studied at different schools. Some of these schools seem to have played an important revolutionary role. Thus, according to Futa Toro traditions, all the major leaders of the 1776 torodbe revolt studied at Pir Saniokhor in Cayor.”
[1]
[1]: (Klein 1972, 428) Klein, Martin A. 1972. ‘Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia.’ The Journal of Africa History. Vol. 13:3. Pp 419-441. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZJRN8UJ8/collection |
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"As there existed no codified law, no formal tribunals, no structure for appealing judicial decisions, no separation between civil and criminal law, no distinction between a judicial session and a general audience, the king and the queen mother settled disputes according to their own wishes. When they felt they had been slighted or wronged, they summoned the culprits and sentenced them without further ado."
[1]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 89-90) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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"In Burundi, the scenario was different: other than the lineages of influential ritualists, present in different regions of the country, the most original institution was the bashinaantahe (literally "those who plant the staff of arbitration," or hill judges), who were chosen locally among different Hutu and Tutsi lineage groups. The choice was made on the basis of their moral authority, their wisdom, their linguistic mastery, their skill in social relations, and their experience in jurisprudence. They were appointed during a great fe stival, and they judged in the mwami’s name. However, their decisions were autonomously made after a public hearing of the opposing parties and collection of testimony."
[1]
[1]: (Chrétien 2006: 176) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/FXCVWDRI/collection. |
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The following quote suggests that judicial fucntions were the prerogative of members of the pastoral aristocracy. "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux, although the colonial era saw the formation of a council of chiefs (Eishengyero) claiming traditional status. In fact, the only governmental business conducted at court was the hearing of cases, often involving the disputed possession of cattle or women by the Hima. The appointment and dismissal of military and administrative functionaries from among those aristocratic Hima and Hinda princes who regularly attended court was the Mugabe’s sole administrative function."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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