Sokoto Caliphate

Seems that the population fluctuated throughout the nineteenth century, at least in part linked to where the caliph was residing. 1827 is an estimated date based on the timing of Clapperton and Lander’s visit to Sokoto. “Therefore a network of settlements grew up which led to the development of areas of close-settled farmland, the most important of which was that centred on the capital, Sokoto. The 19th-century explorers such as Clapperton (1966) and Lander (1967) believed that Sokoto was the largest city in the interior of Africa that they had seen: Lander estimated Sokoto’s population as 120,000 - compared with Kano’s 40,000. But by the time Barth arrived in 1853 it was thinly inhabited and greatly dilapidated. This was one of the periods in the 19th century when the caliph and his court were residing at Wurno 30 km away.” ^[1] “Sokoto itself was transformed from a small hamlet in 1809 into one of the largest cities in the Central Sudan, with a population of about 100,000 by the end of the century.” ^[2]

[1]: Swindell, K. (1986). Population and Agriculture in the Sokoto-Rima Basin of North-West Nigeria: A Study of Political Intervention, Adaptation and Change, 1800–1980 (Population et agriculture dans le bassin Sokoto-Rima (nord-ouest du Nigeria): étude de l’intervention politique, de l’adaptation et du changement, 1800-1980). Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 26(101/102), 75–111: 84. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/7XV2T4N8/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 104. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

in squared kilometers. Converted from: “The Caliphate covered an area of 250,000 sq miles and stretched as far as Nikki in the present day Benin Republic, Ngaundere and Tibati in the Republic of Cameroon and much of the southern part of Niger Republic. Its institutional influence also extended to Segou and Masina in the Republic of Mali, Fouta Djallon in the Republic of Guinea, Fouta Toro in the Sene-Gambia area, Northern Ghana, Chad in the Central Africa and further east into the Republic of Sudan.” ^[1]

[1]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 81. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection

“By 1837, the population of the Sokoto Caliphate had reached 10 million people, with an estimated 1.25 million of the total population enslaved.” ^[1]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 331. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

1) Capital city; 2) Regional cities and cities in other emirates; 3) Towns; 4) Villages; 5) Homesteads (gandu, patrilineal homesteads). “One of the most striking features of the caliphal system was the emergence of new political centres, many of which also became centres of agricultural production, manufacturing and trade. Sokoto itself was transformed from a small hamlet in 1809 into one of the largest cities in the Central Sudan, with a population of about 100,000 by the end of the century. The city became noted for its heterogeneous wards and its many celebrated artisans, traders and scholars. Many other cities such as Gusau, Kaura-Namoda, Gwadabawa and Illela grew up in the metropolitan region, all with substantial populations drawn from all parts of Western and Central Sudan and Sahel. Outside the Rima Basin, several new towns were built, Bauchi, Ja-lingo and Yola to name but three, all of which grew into large cosmopolitan settlements which drew traders, artisans and peasant cultivators from all over their respective regions.” ^[1] “The dominant unit of production in the Caliphate was the gandu (patrilineal homestead), comprising several generations of kin, clients and slaves.” ^[2]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 104. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 105. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

1) Caliph (amir al-muminin, Commander of the Faithful); 2) Limamai (imams); 3) Islamic scholars; 4) Mallams (teachers of Islam). “SOKOTO. The capital of Sokoto State, with a population of approximately 500,000. It is historically significant for the Hausa and Fulani as the seat of the great Sokoto Caliphate between 1804 and 1903. Today, it is the home of the University of Sokoto, the sultan’s palace, and the Shehu Mosque. Of interest to historians are the Centre for Islamic Studies in Sokoto and the Waziri Junaidu History and Culture Bureau, which house manuscripts from Islamic scholars in Nigeria dating back to at least the 17th century.” ^[1] “The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.” ^[2]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 331. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

1) Military commanders in Sokoto administration; 2) General (in each emirate); 3) Military commanders (in each emirate); 4) Soldiers. As noted below, the Sokoto Caliphate did not have a standing or professional army, even though military commanders were a set part of the administration. Individual emirates enjoyed considerable autonomy and appear to have raised their own armies as and when the occasion demanded. The Caliph would, in theory, have had overall control of these disparate military forces, but this does not seem to have been the case in any practical sense. It is therefore difficult to settle firmly on levels within the caliphate as a whole. “The armies of the Caliphate and its emirates were organised in a completely different fashion. There was no single army and no commander-in-chief who enjoyed respect on the basis of his seniority, experience and expertise. The armies of the emirates were also far from being neatly structured and lacked the cohesion of their enemies. Each emirate had its general and a more or less numerous corps of military commanders, but the commanders did not co-ordinate their movements and never had as much control over their troops as did their British counterparts. Lack of co-ordination and a clear chain of command was a crucial reason for the extremely poor performance of most emirate troops against the British. Differences in training were equally important.” ^[1] “The same could not be said for the troops of the Caliphate. The emirates had no standing armies, and the troops they raised were not professional soldiers. Although some emirates had troops armed with guns, their numbers were too small and their expertise in handling their weapons too low to have any significant effect on the outcome of the engagements in which they were used. Smaldone is quite right to point out that the firearms found in the arsenals of some emirates such as Nupe and Ilorin, which did not make much use of guns in their resistance to the British invasion, probably indicated that they did not have men trained in their use. Even when firearms were used, they were not employed to good effect. The British officers who led the assaults on Nupe, Ilorin, Kano and Sokoto all reported that the defenders were poor marksmen and lacked fire discipline. Accurate fire and the efficient use of firearms required skills which could only be acquired through regular training, and this the defenders did not have.” ^[1]

[1]: Ubah, Chinedu N. “The British Occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Military Dimension, 1897-1906.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 81–97: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SQX8BRCP/collection

There are several clearly distinct roles, but it’s unlikely the hierarchy is entirely vertical, especially given the emirate system. 1) Caliph (amir al-muminin – Commander of the Faithful); 2) wazirai (viziers/advisers); 3) alkalai (judges); 4) muhtasib (the officer charged with upholding morals); 5) sa’i (in charge of the markets); 6) wali al-shurta (police chief); 7) Limamai (imams); 8) military commanders; 9) mamluk (royal (caliphal) slaves); 10) nuwab (the Caliph’s officials in the metropolitan districts and the emirs of the various emirates); 11) Village heads; 12) Council of village elders.“Within the Sokoto Caliphate, emirs used royal slaves to expand political control over their territory. Royal slaves—numbering between 2,000 and 5,000 in Kano, for example—were prominent and were organized into slave households, which served as a system of recruitment and training. These slaves were usually war captives, with the emir retaining about half, bought using cowry shells as currency. There was a significant amount of trust between emirs and their appointed slaves. The royal slaves (those kept by the emir) in Kano had a great deal of power because they controlled the distribution of agricultural products as well as holding key positions in the government and military. For example, senior royal slaves of the caliph had influence in the appointing of emirs. They were able to obtain new rights, moving them closer to freedom. The use of royal slaves in the Sokoto Caliphate emerged out of governmental necessity, as opposed to Islamic doctrine. Most slaves in the Sokoto Caliphate worked on labor-intensive plantations.” ^[1] “MAMLUK. An Arabic-derived term that refers to powerful slaves and literally means “owned” (person or thing). It is part of an Islamic political system that incorporates the institution of slavery. Prior to the colonial era in northern Nigeria, the military and government were partially run by slaves. In 19th-century Kano, for example, slaves commanded armies, managed plantations, and collected taxes. Each emirate within the Sokoto Caliphate ran his mamluk system differently.” ^[2] “The Sokoto Caliphate system was based squarely on the strength of its ideals and programmes, which the mujahhidun articulated within an Islamic religious framework. In the course of their attacks on the Hausa kingdoms, the leaders of the jihad offered an alternative set of political, economic and social principles which they called the "structures of Muslim government" as opposed to what they termed the "structures of non-Muslim government".” ^[3] “The political programmes of the Sokoto Caliphate are set out in a number of works written by the Shehu, Abdullahi dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello. One of their most important features was to outline the political structures of caliphal administration. The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders. Although the leadership of the Caliphate did not specify all the offices to be filled, it is clear that the Shehu categorically rejected the proliferation of political titles characteristic of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and planned to abolish parasitic sarauta titles in favour of a more streamlined political system consonant with the Islamic theory of political administration drawn largely from the Maliki school of jurisprudence. The Shehu was also vehemently opposed to the hereditary traditions of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and emphasised scholarship and unquestioned morality as the principal criteria for office.” ^[4] “In his policy guidelines, Muhammad Bello called on the nuwab (his officials in the metropolitan districts and the emirs of the various emirates) to: ‘... encourage the artisans and those who practise trades which are indispensable to the people: farmers and smiths, tailors and dyers, physicians and grocers, butchers and carpenters, and all sorts of trades which contribute to the proper order of this world. The ruler must allocate these tradesmen to every village and every localilty.’” ^[5] “A village head has long been an integral part of effective governance in Nigeria, particularly before and during the colonial period. The role of a village head in the Sokoto Caliphate during the 19th century, for example, included supplying labor and collecting annual taxes for the emirs. The Nupe also had a village head, or zitsu, for every town (and incorporated satellite villages). The zitsu’s authority may have extended to figuratively “owning” the land and possessing the community. For this reason, the zitsu of Jebba Island on the Niger River has the title gebba. The village head ruled over his community with the assistance of elders, who represented their families (broadly defined) in a council.” ^[6]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 328–329. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[2]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 220. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[3]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 100–101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[4]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[5]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 102. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[6]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 357. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

“The same could not be said for the troops of the Caliphate. The emirates had no standing armies, and the troops they raised were not professional soldiers. Although some emirates had troops armed with guns, their numbers were too small and their expertise in handling their weapons too low to have any significant effect on the outcome of the engagements in which they were used. Smaldone is quite right to point out that the firearms found in the arsenals of some emirates such as Nupe and Ilorin, which did not make much use of guns in their resistance to the British invasion, probably indicated that they did not have men trained in their use. Even when firearms were used, they were not employed to good effect. The British officers who led the assaults on Nupe, Ilorin, Kano and Sokoto all reported that the defenders were poor marksmen and lacked fire discipline. Accurate fire and the efficient use of firearms required skills which could only be acquired through regular training, and this the defenders did not have.” ^[1]

[1]: Ubah, Chinedu N. “The British Occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Military Dimension, 1897-1906.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 81–97: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SQX8BRCP/collection

There were religious roles in the administration of the caliphate, which must therefore have had other aspects than the purely religious. However, the state was founded through a jihad and on Islamic principles, so it seems likely from looking at other caliphates to infer the presence of professional priests. “The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.” ^[1]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

Though there were military commanders, these were part of the administration of the caliphate, so their role wasn’t purely military. “The political programmes of the Sokoto Caliphate are set out in a number of works written by the Shehu, Abdullahi dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello. One of their most important features was to outline the political structures of caliphal administration. The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.” ^[1] “The Shaykh had neither a standing army nor an organized structurally based military. Every able bodied was a contingent.” ^[2] “The armies of the Caliphate and its emirates were organised in a completely different fashion. There was no single army and no commander-in-chief who enjoyed respect on the basis of his seniority, experience and expertise. The armies of the emirates were also far from being neatly structured and lacked the cohesion of their enemies. Each emirate had its general and a more or less numerous corps of military commanders, but the commanders did not co-ordinate their movements and never had as much control over their troops as did their British counterparts. Lack of co-ordination and a clear chain of command was a crucial reason for the extremely poor performance of most emirate troops against the British. Differences in training were equally important.” ^[3]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection

[3]: Ubah, Chinedu N. “The British Occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Military Dimension, 1897-1906.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 81–97: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SQX8BRCP/collection

“Although the leadership of the Caliphate did not specify all the offices to be filled, it is clear that the Shehu categorically rejected the proliferation of political titles characteristic of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and planned to abolish parasitic sarauta titles in favour of a more streamlined political system consonant with the Islamic theory of political administration drawn largely from the Maliki school of jurisprudence. The Shehu was also vehemently opposed to the hereditary traditions of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and emphasised scholarship and unquestioned morality as the principal criteria for office.” ^[1] “The Caliphate thus fell far short of achieving its ideals. It did transform the political map of the Central Sudan and brought hitherto antagonistic communities together within the confines of a popular ideological framework. But it continued to operate largely within the structures of the old order against which the jihad had been waged in the first place. Political office was still based on hereditary principles rather than competence and piety. Many elements of the sarauta system survived as the new aristocracy appropriated vast tracts of land which it worked with slave and unpaid peasant labour. Both agricultural and handicraft production increased, but the condition of the producers and their relationship to production remained largely unchanged. So too did the Caliphate’s class structure in general, though it was now constructed on a different ideological basis.” ^[2]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 105-106. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

“Although the leadership of the Caliphate did not specify all the offices to be filled, it is clear that the Shehu categorically rejected the proliferation of political titles characteristic of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and planned to abolish parasitic sarauta titles in favour of a more streamlined political system consonant with the Islamic theory of political administration drawn largely from the Maliki school of jurisprudence. The Shehu was also vehemently opposed to the hereditary traditions of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and emphasised scholarship and unquestioned morality as the principal criteria for office.” ^[1] “The Caliphate thus fell far short of achieving its ideals. It did transform the political map of the Central Sudan and brought hitherto antagonistic communities together within the confines of a popular ideological framework. But it continued to operate largely within the structures of the old order against which the jihad had been waged in the first place. Political office was still based on hereditary principles rather than competence and piety. Many elements of the sarauta system survived as the new aristocracy appropriated vast tracts of land which it worked with slave and unpaid peasant labour. Both agricultural and handicraft production increased, but the condition of the producers and their relationship to production remained largely unchanged. So too did the Caliphate’s class structure in general, though it was now constructed on a different ideological basis.” ^[2]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 105-106. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

“In the city of Sokoto there was a small bureaucracy headed by the vizier who in his own house had some scribes to receive and write short (one-page) letters in classical Arabic to those emirs he was in charge of overseeing (Last 1967:190–97). Imported paper and local ink were used, and letters from the Amir al-mu’minin had his personal stamp on them (the vizier and the emirs had no stamp of their own). The letters were never dated, but they were folded in a precise way and carried in a pouch by a messenger; it could take a week or more for a letter to reach the addressee, since fifteen miles a day was a good speed and distances were huge.” ^[1]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 6. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“Judges were learned and in order to maintain checks and balances, judgments at emirate level were appealed at the Caliphal headquarters; judgments in some cases were nullified by the Caliph at Sokoto. No one was allowed to operate above the law as the rules of law were upheld.” ^[1] “The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.” ^[2]

[1]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

This appears to be based on the Shariah. “Though the taxation system was regularized by the Caliphate from being extortionist and overburdening as it used to be by sanctioning only those taxes which were legislated by the Shariah, the mode of assessment, collection and administration also became flawed as time went by.” ^[1]

[1]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 88. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection

“As is clear from Bello’s instructions, the leaders of the Caliphate tried to encourage trade as well as production. Detailed commercial regulations were issued, including the introduction of standard weights and measures to be used in the sale of grain, fruit and meat. Profiteering, hoarding and the creation of artificial shortages were all declared illegal, with persistent offenders expelled from the Caliphate. In addition, the rulers of the emirates were expected to visit the markets in their territory regularly, investigate conditions and correct abuses, on the basis of the Shehu’s injunction that "the report of a thing is not the same as actual observation". More generally, the principles governing commercial transactions were to be honesty, fair dealing and mutual agreement. Third parties were required to witness sales involving personal property, such as houses.” ^[1] “The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.” ^[2]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 102–103. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

“And fires were a real hazard to grain stores and the city’s food reserves; there was no way of controlling a conflagration - no tanks of water, or pumps, or hoses - -just pottery urns in washrooms and deep wells.” ^[1]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 13. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

Markets: “As is clear from Bello’s instructions, the leaders of the Caliphate tried to encourage trade as well as production. Detailed commercial regulations were issued, including the introduction of standard weights and measures to be used in the sale of grain, fruit and meat. Profiteering, hoarding and the creation of artificial shortages were all declared illegal, with persistent offenders expelled from the Caliphate. In addition, the rulers of the emirates were expected to visit the markets in their territory regularly, investigate conditions and correct abuses, on the basis of the Shehu’s injunction that "the report of a thing is not the same as actual observation". More generally, the principles governing commercial transactions were to be honesty, fair dealing and mutual agreement. Third parties were required to witness sales involving personal property, such as houses.” ^[1] “The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.” ^[2] Food storage sites: If food hoarding was punishable by law, it must have been possible. “As is clear from Bello’s instructions, the leaders of the Caliphate tried to encourage trade as well as production. Detailed commercial regulations were issued, including the introduction of standard weights and measures to be used in the sale of grain, fruit and meat. Profiteering, hoarding and the creation of artificial shortages were all declared illegal, with persistent offenders expelled from the Caliphate.” ^[1] “And fires were a real hazard to grain stores and the city’s food reserves; there was no way of controlling a conflagration - no tanks of water, or pumps, or hoses - -just pottery urns in washrooms and deep wells.” ^[3]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 102–103. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[3]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 13. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“There were no public baths or fountains, no fine gardens - nothing to compare with the famous edifices of the Maghreb or Andalusia: no public hospitals, libraries, schools - nothing built in stone. For Sokoto lacked sources of stone (Timbuktu’s builders could bring stone in from distant quarries).” ^[1]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 13. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

Not clear from this source, but it seems not to view the two-foot wide paths as meeting the definition of roads: “Practical administrative details such as communications and transport, routes, refuges, and dangerous "hot spots" have not been mapped. We know that some main "roads" were sometimes scarcely two-feet wide in places - so how did large bodies of troops or traders pass?” ^[1]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 2. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“One of the most striking features of the caliphal system was the emergence of new political centres, many of which also became centres of agricultural production, manufacturing and trade. Sokoto itself was transformed from a small hamlet in 1809 into one of the largest cities in the Central Sudan, with a population of about 100,000 by the end of the century. The city became noted for its heterogeneous wards and its many celebrated artisans, traders and scholars.30 Many other cities such as Gusau, Kaura-Namoda, Gwadabawa and Illela grew up in the metropolitan region, all with substantial populations drawn from all parts of Western and Central Sudan and Sahel. Outside the Rima Basin, several new towns were built, Bauchi, Ja-lingo and Yola to name but three, all of which grew into large cosmopolitan settlements which drew traders, artisans and peasant cultivators from all over their respective regions.” ^[1]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 104. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

Burial sites: Given the intimate connection between Islam and daily life in the Sokoto Caliphate, one would assume that the burial practices common across the Islamic world would have been followed. No source reviewed specifically mentions this in detail, but graveyards and at least one tomb are mentioned. “In this Sokoto was very different from the situation in Kano, Katsina, or Zaria where the capital city existed with well-built houses and a "palace," great long walls and political institutions. Title-holders had their large houses and areas of responsibility, Islamic courts were in place, as were great mosques, saints’ tombs, and burial sites; marketplaces were already in operation (see Moody 1969). The new jihadi authorities in the great cities thus had simply to take over the relevant offices and even move into the official residences. New clan mosques might be built locally within the city, but otherwise everything was already in place (Zahradeen 1983:57-66): only the conquered population had to be persuaded, perhaps intimidated, into accepting the new regime - and that, the shaikh in Sokoto had suggested, could if necessary be done with force or threats of force: symbolically he sent his new commander in Kano a knife (Palmer 1928:128).” ^[1] “The trees in a house’s graveyard may house cattle egrets whose droppings make excellent fertilizer for onions; small fire finches (known as bayin Allah , "slaves of Allah") come into rooms where students sit studying Islamic texts, and doves nest under the edges of thatch roofs.” ^[2] “In short, Sokoto city may have been the capital of a great polity but it was also a rural town. It lacked monuments or monumental architecture, and it was short of ceremonial space; its layout was not designed to impress or intimidate, though the streets were regularly laid out and well built - unusually so, said Clapperton (1828,ii:377). The shaikh’s tomb (hubbare) is his old, originally suburban house in which he also had a tent (laima); his mosque was nearby - low, plain, and many-pillared, so unlike the splendid mosque built in 1836 for the emir in Zaria, or the huge ancient mosque in Rano with its high, bulky minaret.” ^[3] Possibly trading emporia: “One of the most striking features of the caliphal system was the emergence of new political centres, many of which also became centres of agricultural production, manufacturing and trade. Sokoto itself was transformed from a small hamlet in 1809 into one of the largest cities in the Central Sudan, with a population of about 100,000 by the end of the century. The city became noted for its heterogeneous wards and its many celebrated artisans, traders and scholars.30 Many other cities such as Gusau, Kaura-Namoda, Gwadabawa and Illela grew up in the metropolitan region, all with substantial populations drawn from all parts of Western and Central Sudan and Sahel. Outside the Rima Basin, several new towns were built, Bauchi, Ja-lingo and Yola to name but three, all of which grew into large cosmopolitan settlements which drew traders, artisans and peasant cultivators from all over their respective regions.” ^[4]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 11–12. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 12. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

[3]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 12–13. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

[4]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 104. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

Given the intimate connection between Islam and daily life in the Sokoto Caliphate, one would assume that the burial practices common across the Islamic world would have been followed. No source reviewed specifically mentions this in detail, but graveyards and at least one tomb are mentioned. “In this Sokoto was very different from the situation in Kano, Katsina, or Zaria where the capital city existed with well-built houses and a "palace," great long walls and political institutions. Title-holders had their large houses and areas of responsibility, Islamic courts were in place, as were great mosques, saints’ tombs, and burial sites; marketplaces were already in operation (see Moody 1969). The new jihadi authorities in the great cities thus had simply to take over the relevant offices and even move into the official residences. New clan mosques might be built locally within the city, but otherwise everything was already in place (Zahradeen 1983:57-66): only the conquered population had to be persuaded, perhaps intimidated, into accepting the new regime - and that, the shaikh in Sokoto had suggested, could if necessary be done with force or threats of force: symbolically he sent his new commander in Kano a knife (Palmer 1928:128).” ^[1] “The trees in a house’s graveyard may house cattle egrets whose droppings make excellent fertilizer for onions; small fire finches (known as bayin Allah , "slaves of Allah") come into rooms where students sit studying Islamic texts, and doves nest under the edges of thatch roofs.” ^[2] “In short, Sokoto city may have been the capital of a great polity but it was also a rural town. It lacked monuments or monumental architecture, and it was short of ceremonial space; its layout was not designed to impress or intimidate, though the streets were regularly laid out and well built - unusually so, said Clapperton (1828,ii:377). The shaikh’s tomb (hubbare) is his old, originally suburban house in which he also had a tent (laima); his mosque was nearby - low, plain, and many-pillared, so unlike the splendid mosque built in 1836 for the emir in Zaria, or the huge ancient mosque in Rano with its high, bulky minaret.” ^[3]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 11–12. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 12. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

[3]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 12–13. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“The Sokoto Caliphate was certainly the largest, most territorially extensive and literate state in African History.” ^[1] “In the city of Sokoto there was a small bureaucracy headed by the vizier who in his own house had some scribes to receive and write short (one-page) letters in classical Arabic to those emirs he was in charge of overseeing (Last 1967:190-97) . Imported paper and local ink were used, and letters from the Amir al-mu’minin had his personal stamp on them (the vizier and the emirs had no stamp of their own). The letters were never dated, but they were folded in a precise way and carried in a pouch by a messenger; it could take a week or more for a letter to reach the addressee, since fifteen miles a day was a good speed and distances were huge.” ^[2]

[1]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 81. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 6. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“Since the 17th century, Hausa has been written in a version of Arabic script called ajami that, like Arabic, is written and read left to right. Hausa is a tonal language, signifying that the meaning of a word depends on the high, medium, or low tone assigned to the vowels. The spellings of words, however, have not been standardized, and variations exist. Many of the written works in Hausa, especially prior to the mid-20th century, are based on Islamic themes.” ^[1] “In the city of Sokoto there was a small bureaucracy headed by the vizier who in his own house had some scribes to receive and write short (one-page) letters in classical Arabic to those emirs he was in charge of overseeing (Last 1967:190-97) . Imported paper and local ink were used, and letters from the Amir al-mu’minin had his personal stamp on them (the vizier and the emirs had no stamp of their own). The letters were never dated, but they were folded in a precise way and carried in a pouch by a messenger; it could take a week or more for a letter to reach the addressee, since fifteen miles a day was a good speed and distances were huge.” ^[2]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 149. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 6. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

Arabic and Ajami. “Since the 17th century, Hausa has been written in a version of Arabic script called ajami that, like Arabic, is written and read left to right. Hausa is a tonal language, signifying that the meaning of a word depends on the high, medium, or low tone assigned to the vowels. The spellings of words, however, have not been standardized, and variations exist. Many of the written works in Hausa, especially prior to the mid-20th century, are based on Islamic themes.” ^[1] “In the city of Sokoto there was a small bureaucracy headed by the vizier who in his own house had some scribes to receive and write short (one-page) letters in classical Arabic to those emirs he was in charge of overseeing (Last 1967:190-97) . Imported paper and local ink were used, and letters from the Amir al-mu’minin had his personal stamp on them (the vizier and the emirs had no stamp of their own). The letters were never dated, but they were folded in a precise way and carried in a pouch by a messenger; it could take a week or more for a letter to reach the addressee, since fifteen miles a day was a good speed and distances were huge.” ^[2]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 149. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 6. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“Since the 17th century, Hausa has been written in a version of Arabic script called ajami that, like Arabic, is written and read left to right. Hausa is a tonal language, signifying that the meaning of a word depends on the high, medium, or low tone assigned to the vowels. The spellings of words, however, have not been standardized, and variations exist. Many of the written works in Hausa, especially prior to the mid-20th century, are based on Islamic themes.” ^[1]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 149. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

As an Islamic state, the Qu’ran was the Holy Book. “In the Sokoto Caliphate, palace Koranic schools were attended by slaves, women, and children. The Koranic schools were the first type of formal education in Nigeria.” ^[1]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 199. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

“The capital of Sokoto State, with a population of approximately 500,000. It is historically significant for the Hausa and Fulani as the seat of the great Sokoto Caliphate between 1804 and 1903. Today, it is the home of the University of Sokoto, the sultan’s palace, and the Shehu Mosque. Of interest to historians are the Centre for Islamic Studies in Sokoto and the Waziri Junaidu History and Culture Bureau, which house manuscripts from Islamic scholars in Nigeria dating back to at least the 17th century.” ^[1] “The shaikh’s brother, ’Abdullahi dan Fodio, had opted out earlier (ca. 1806) in disgust at what was happening and headed toward Mecca, only to be persuaded in Kano to turn back.8 Once back, he set up his own community at Gwandu, where many of the poets and Sufis joined him as he set about composing long works of scholarship and versifying them for easier memorization.” ^[2]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 331. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 9. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

Poetry: “Nana Asma’u is a well-known Fulani poet from the Sokoto Caliphate who wrote in the 19th century.” ^[1] “The shaikh’s brother, ’Abdullahi dan Fodio, had opted out earlier (ca. 1806) in disgust at what was happening and headed toward Mecca, only to be persuaded in Kano to turn back.8 Once back, he set up his own community at Gwandu, where many of the poets and Sufis joined him as he set about composing long works of scholarship and versifying them for easier memorization.” ^[2]

[1]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 212. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

[2]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 9. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

Islamic calendar.

Cowries: “The cowrie currency of the Caliphate was admirably suited to the low-value transactions that made up most of the day-to-day market activity of that area. At a time when a British penny was worth about 125 cowries and when a person’s food supply for a whole day cost perhaps eighty cowries, buying just a single banana would have posed insuperable difficulty if other moneys were used.” ^[1] “Within the Sokoto Caliphate, emirs used royal slaves to expand political control over their territory. Royal slaves—numbering between 2,000 and 5,000 in Kano, for example—were prominent and were organized into slave households, which served as a system of recruitment and training. These slaves were usually war captives, with the emir retaining about half, bought using cowry shells as currency.” ^[2]

[1]: Stiansen, Endre, and Jane I. Guyer, editors. Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999: 63. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/A9F557EW/collection

[2]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 328. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection

“Maria Theresa dollars could have served as a high denomination currency, and to some extent they did, but they were in short supply. Though they had had a presence in the Caliphate since at least the start of the nineteenth century, they were scarce, and often those that did circulate were melted down as a source of silver jewelry.” ^[1]

[1]: Stiansen, Endre, and Jane I. Guyer, editors. Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999: 66. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/A9F557EW/collection

“New supplies were regularly available and reasonably controllable as part of the Caliphate’s slave acquisitions. (When there was reluctance to sell household slaves considered part of the family, such slaves would be far less liable to transfer.) Most households capable of dealing in large sums of money owned slaves, sometimes many, and there were at least a million people in bondange, perhaps as many as two-and-a-half million. So accomodating payments in slaves would not pose special difficulties or require any unusual arrangements.” ^[1]

[1]: Stiansen, Endre, and Jane I. Guyer, editors. Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999: 68. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/A9F557EW/collection

If the accumulation of private wealth was forbidden, it must have been physically possible: “When determining the Caliphate’s fiscal policies, its leaders abolished all the exploitative taxes, levies and seizures which had characterised the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms. Instead, state revenues were restricted to those sanctioned by the shari’a: the fifth, the tithe, poll tax, land tax, booty taken in war and unclaimed property. All the revenues constituting the Public Treasury were to be spent on promoting the common welfare of the Community. Officials were strictly forbidden to use their positions for the accumulation of private wealth, and it was illegal to offer them gifts.” ^[1] “The Caliphate thus fell far short of achieving its ideals. It did transform the political map of the Central Sudan and brought hitherto antagonistic communities together within the confines of a popular ideological framework. But it continued to operate largely within the structures of the old order against which the jihad had been waged in the first place. Political office was still based on hereditary principles rather than competence and piety. Many elements of the sarauta system survived as the new aristocracy appropriated vast tracts of land which it worked with slave and unpaid peasant labour. Both agricultural and handicraft production increased, but the condition of the producers and their relationship to production remained largely unchanged. So too did the Caliphate’s class structure in general, though it was now constructed on a different ideological basis.” ^[2]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 103. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

[2]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 105-106. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

“Institutions in states such as Dahomey, Sokoto, and in frontier zones, were more vulnerable to change. In his contribution to the present volume, Webb argues that practices and monies on the borderlands of major political-financial systems were considerably more ephemeral than some anthropological writing might imply. He goes so far as to suggest that new money goods (such as cowry shells, guinée cloth, and glassware) only remained in monetized circuits for a limited period before being converted to some other use. Merchant relations depended on personal trust, and credit appears to have been practiced mainly through advances of goods, due to the volatility of currency values.” ^[1] “By the nineteenth century, such promissory notes were evidently common in the Islamic interior of West Africa. The British explorer Clapperton, for example, was able in Kano in 1826 to settle a liability by writing a “bill of exchange” (apparently drawn on the British Consulate in Tripoli) for $500; and in Sokoto the following year his assistant Lander received in exchange for goods an “order” for 245,000 cowries drawn upon a merchant of Kano.” ^[2]

[1]: Stiansen, Endre, and Jane I. Guyer, editors. Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999: 15-16. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/A9F557EW/collection

[2]: Stiansen, Endre, and Jane I. Guyer, editors. Credit, Currencies, and Culture: African Financial Institutions in Historical Perspective. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999: 34-35. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/A9F557EW/collection

“In the city of Sokoto there was a small bureaucracy headed by the vizier who in his own house had some scribes to receive and write short (one-page) letters in classical Arabic to those emirs he was in charge of overseeing (Last 1967:190–97). Imported paper and local ink were used, and letters from the Amir al-mu’minin had his personal stamp on them (the vizier and the emirs had no stamp of their own). The letters were never dated, but they were folded in a precise way and carried in a pouch by a messenger; it could take a week or more for a letter to reach the addressee, since fifteen miles a day was a good speed and distances were huge.” ^[1] “A reason for the decentralization was the sheer scale of the caliphate which, in nineteenth-century terms, required a journey of two months from north to south (say, from Agades to beyond llorín) and four months from west to east (from Dori in what is now Burkina Faso to eastern Adamawa, beyond Tibati and Rei Buba in Cameroon today).” ^[1]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 6. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection

“As is clear from Bello’s instructions, the leaders of the Caliphate tried to encourage trade as well as production. Detailed commercial regulations were issued, including the introduction of standard weights and measures to be used in the sale of grain, fruit and meat.” ^[1]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 102-103. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

“As is clear from Bello’s instructions, the leaders of the Caliphate tried to encourage trade as well as production. Detailed commercial regulations were issued, including the introduction of standard weights and measures to be used in the sale of grain, fruit and meat.” ^[1]

[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 102-103. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection

“Hence the regular calls to prayer were not even given from a lofty minaret but rather from a small dais a few feet high, usually by a blind man. A sighted person could tell him the right time from the stars or the sun’s shadow.” ^[1]

[1]: Last, Murray. “Contradictions in Creating a Jihadi Capital: Sokoto in the Nineteenth Century and Its Legacy.” African Studies Review, vol. 56, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1–20: 13. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5RUPN5VI/collection