Mataram started out as a vassal to the kingdom of Pajang—itself one of a number of short-lived polities that emerged from the disintegration of the Demak Sultanate—and gradually established itself as the dominant polity in central Java between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries.
[1]
The polity’s heyday coincided with the rule of Agung Hanyokrokusumo (1613-1645), whose marriage alliances and military campaigns resulted in the polity’s greatest territorial expansion, annexing the Sultanate of Cirebon in the West and the kingdoms of Surabaya and Blambangan in the East.
[2]
Mataram went in decline shortly after Hanyokrokusumo’s death, succumbing to the Dutch East India Company in the first half of the eighteenth century.
[1]
Population and political organization
The Sultan governed with the assistance of a number of functionaries, though the exact hierarchy of these functionaries remains unclear, as does their relationship to the bureaucratic systems in the polity’s administrative subdivisions, particularly its powerful trading centers on the coast.
[3]
It is worth noting, however, that Hanyokrokusumo enacted a sweeping reform of the judiciary system meant to integrate Islamic law into traditional customs.
[4]
No demographic estimates have been found in the specialist literature, with the exception of Reid’s
[5]
conjecture that the polity’s population density corresponded to about thirty people per squared kilometer.
[1]: (Ooi 2004 864-866)
[2]: (Achmad & Nurcholis 2016, 41)
[3]: (Schrieke 1957, 190-207)
[4]: (Achmad & Nurcholis 2016)
[5]: (Reid in Tarling 1993, 463)
Year Range | Mataram Sultanate (id_mataram_k) was in: |
---|---|
(1568 CE 1703 CE) | Central Java |
Kota Gede: 1587-1613; Karta: 1613-1645; Plered 1646-1680; Kartosuro: 1680-1755
[1]
[1]: (Santosa 2007, 4-10)
Kota Gede: 1587-1613; Karta: 1613-1645; Plered 1646-1680; Kartosuro: 1680-1755
[1]
[1]: (Santosa 2007, 4-10)
Kota Gede: 1587-1613; Karta: 1613-1645; Plered 1646-1680; Kartosuro: 1680-1755
[1]
[1]: (Santosa 2007, 4-10)
(gradual change) Gradual decline of Demak in the late sixteenth century allowed for the rise of other states including Mataram and Surabaya which emerged as the leading powers by 1600.
(gradual change) Gradual decline of Demak in the late sixteenth century allowed for the rise of other states including Mataram and Surabaya which emerged as the leading powers by 1600.
Generally there was a rule of autonomous financing for all parts of the administration - it was a state governed by the ideal of non-interference, which in turn was in accord with the self-sufficiency of the agrarian life. Not much differentiation of occupation nor contact with the outside world was required, and the state became the guardian against disturbance, interfering only when there was a threat to tranquility. The punggawa, or official, within his region wielded the power of administrator, judge, and commander of the local contingent of troops. [1] Amangkurat I (Sultan Agung’s son) attempted to consolidate the empire and to centralise its administration and finances. He hoped to turn an empire which Sultan Agung had based on military might into a unified kingdom where resources were monopolised for the benefit of the king. However communication, population and geographical factors proved impossible to overcome and Amangkurat I brought about the greatest rebellion in the seventeenth century and allowed for the intervention of the VOC. [2]
[1]: (Moertono 2009, 88)
[2]: (Ricklefs 1993, 91)
in squared kilometers
Estimated from map of Java.
[1]
[1]: Gunawan Kartapranata / Wikimedia Commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0
levels. Moertono says that generally the Islamic clergy did not have an organized hierarchical structure in the sense of the Christian church. However, once religious specialists began to be more intertwined with the state administration in later Mataram, some hierarchies of power did develop (see ’Administrative Levels’). [1]
[1]: (Moertono 2009, 84)
levels. Commander-in-chief; Subcommanders; Noble cavalry; Troops (composed of swordsman, archers and skirmishers).
[1]
Slaves used as auxiliaries.
[2]
Mataram often adopted fighting formations inspired by Indian astrological signs, including a huge crayfish. The feelers represented special troops of amok fighters, the body of the crayfish was the sovereign, preceded by sons and relatives, the commander and ministers, and other numbers represented troops of different nobles and officials.
[3]
1. King
2. Commander-in-chief3. Sub-commander4. Officers?5. Individual soldiers
[1]: (Gaukroger and Scott 2009, 134)
[2]: (Schrieke 1957, 128)
[3]: (Reid 1988, 126)
levels. 5 levels inferred continuity with previous polity in region.
1. King
_Central government_
2. Top functionaries
3.
4.
5.
_Provincial government_
2.powerful coastal regions, and administrative structures within these regions
[1]
3.
4.
Information on the administration of the Mataram Sultanate is very scarce. It seems that the Majapahit structure of the ruler and a few top functionaries with varying influence was retained. There were various different titles for functionaries, but it is unclear whether there was a particular hierarchical structure between them, and moreover the relationship of these functionaries to powerful coastal regions, and the administrative structures within these regions, is far from clear and there was probably much fluidity and development over time.
[1]
Moertono shows that in later Mataram (possibly after the VOC came to dominate) there was a ligion including rendering justice in disputes under the jurisdiction of Islamic law. Thseparate and more independent department, the reh pangulon, which was responsible for matters of ree institution of the penggulu (head of the clergy in the main mosque in the king’s capital) was gradually incorporated into the administrative system as head of a special division. The penggulu had his say about appointing lower penggulu naibs, who each administered the religious affairs of a certain number of villages. These lower officials were not thought of as belonging to the king’s administration, for unlike other royal officials they did not receive income from the king.
[2]
[1]: (Schrieke 1957, 190-207)
[2]: (Moertono 2009, 84)
Standing army fell at different points in the range between free and paid service. Indigenous guardsmen in Mataram did not represent a true stipendiary force, for they received income from land allotments and sustenance from the food grown on these lands, but were not paid directly by the court. Reliance on land allotments meant that the standing army was just as affected by drought and famine as the general population. [1] Only a minority of soldiers were professional. [2]
[1]: (Charney 2004, 231)
[2]: (Schrieke 1957, 127)
the babad-literature. Most are centred around and written for the benefit of a certain court or dynasty and may be considered to have a national character such as the Babad Tanah Djawi.
Introduced by the Dutch. What is the reference for this? Sultan Agung built a new capital at Plered which had "much greater walls" than the previous one. [1] The material the wall was made out of is not mentioned.
[1]: (Santosa 2007, 10) Revianto Budi Santosa. 2007. Kotagede: Life Between Walls. Penerbit PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Jakarta.
Historical records show "good quality Indian steel" was reaching Ethiopia in 200 BCE [1] - did they also export across the Bay of Bengal? Island South East Asia: ’Bronze and iron metallurgy appear to have arrived together, perhaps after 300 BC’. [2]
[1]: (Biggs et al. 2013 citing Tripathi and Upadhyay 2009, p. 123) Lynn Biggs. Berenice Bellina. Marcos Martinon-Torres. Thomas Oliver Pryce. January 2013. Prehistoric iron production technologies in the Upper Thai-Malay Peninsula: metallography and slag inclusion analyses of iron artefacts from Khao Sam Kaeo and Phu Khao Thong. Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences. Springer.
[2]: (Bellwood 2004, 36) Bellwood, Peter. The origins and dispersals of agricultural communities in Southeast Asia. Glover, Ian. Bellwood, Peter. eds. 2004. Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. RoutledgeCurzon. London.
Island South East Asia: ’Bronze and iron metallurgy appear to have arrived together, perhaps after 300 BC’. [1]
[1]: (Bellwood 2004, 36) Bellwood, Peter. The origins and dispersals of agricultural communities in Southeast Asia. Glover, Ian. Bellwood, Peter. eds. 2004. Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. RoutledgeCurzon. London.
Island South East Asia: ’Bronze and iron metallurgy appear to have arrived together, perhaps after 300 BC’. [1]
[1]: (Bellwood 2004, 36) Bellwood, Peter. The origins and dispersals of agricultural communities in Southeast Asia. Glover, Ian. Bellwood, Peter. eds. 2004. Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. RoutledgeCurzon. London.
“Bronze metallurgy was practiced in at least Southern Vietnam, the islands surrounding the Sulu and Sulawesi seas, West Malaysia, South Sumatra, and especially Java and Bali." [1] Island South East Asia: ’Bronze and iron metallurgy appear to have arrived together, perhaps after 300 BC’. [2]
[1]: (Bulbeck in Peregrine and Ember 2000, 85)
[2]: (Bellwood 2004, 36) Bellwood, Peter. The origins and dispersals of agricultural communities in Southeast Asia. Glover, Ian. Bellwood, Peter. eds. 2004. Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. RoutledgeCurzon. London.
By 1624 Mataram had 4000 musketeers comprising 10-13% of troops. [1] At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Javanese began to cast their own muskets, bases, and cannons, though according to Dutch observers in 1622, they were extremely bad at handling cannon and muskets. From 1726, they began to use firearms more frequently. [2]
[1]: (Charney 2004,67)
[2]: (Schrieke 1957, 122)
Cannon are present, but were not specifically used in siege warfare until the Mataram laid siege to Batavia. [1] At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Javanese began to cast their own muskets, bases, and cannons, though according to Dutch observers in 1622, they were extremely bad at handling cannon and muskets. [2]
[1]: (Charney 2004, 93)
[2]: (Schrieke 1957, 122)
Mataram controlled the horse-breeding districts of Java. In 1678 the Dutch encountered a force of 240 Javanese horsemen, and Trunajaya used hundred of cavalry at the siege of Kediri in 1678. The importance of cavalry grew due to the difficulties of using elephants in battle against improved firearms. [1]
[1]: (Charney 2004, 170)