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No evidence for military so one could infer that regularly paid professional military officers were absent.
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Full-time specialists. Sakha warriors and spies fought for their clans and tribes, and were not professionals in the conventional sense of the term: ’Yakut warriors ( säpi, säpi kisita ) were usually mounted horsemen ( minjär ), but there were also foot soldiers ( sat[unknown]ykisita ). Their weapons ( säp ) consisted of a light bent bow ( s[unknown]a ), a quiver ( käsäx, s[unknown]adax ), and arrows ( aya ) .’
[1]
’These warriors formed a chain of movable, vigilant pickets around the settlements. In case of war they formed the kernel of the fighting detachment -- sari Some of the bolder ones went to find their fortune, dzhol. They would go far into unknown territory, among foreigners, either by themselves or with companions. Such detachments would not take their cattle with them and often traveled on foot. They made their living exclusively by hunting, fishing, and looting. The Yakut kept these habits for a long time, until very recently. Khudiakov has a legend about Khaptagay-batyr and his son Khokhoe-batyr, and their three khosun: Sappy, Yngkabyl, and Batagyyan, who roamed about in the seventeen forties, during the time of Pavlutskii, in the north of the Yakutsk Oblast. In the Kolymsk Okrug (1882), I wrote down a legend about the two Yakut brothers who were the first to make their way into the kolymsk Krai. Their names have been forgotten. In the Namsk Ulus I was told a legend about the Vilyuysk Yakut Tangas-Boltongo who also wandered by himself somewhere in the little-known, remote regions of the Vilyuysk Okrug. He was called a bagatyr, just as the old epic heroes. Apparently he lived in the beginning of the present century; this is indicated by the name of a Yakut hunter of the Namsk Ulus, Betyunsk Nasleg, Chaky clan, whom he encountered: his name was Soldat. Soldiers appeared in the Yakutsk Oblast only in the last century, at the time of the Kamchatka campaigns of Pavlutskii. Then Middendorf mentions solitary Yakut hunters whom he encountered far from their native tribes in the mountains of the Amur Basin. Such bold fellows served their clans as a sort of voluntary spies, searching out new pastures suitable for settlement in case some sort of unpleasantness or inconvenience should arise in the homeland. They brought back word of new lands, of the peoples they had encountered, the details of the route, and the obstacles involved. Sometimes the clan would choose such people out of their own number and deliberately send them out on a searching party. The tales The Golden Eagle and the Teal, and The Flying Winged Creatures hint at this. These were chosen people and were also called bagatyr, baatyr, batyr, or batur; strictly speaking in the Yakut language this word means valorous, exceptionallymanly, bold, strong, and clever. But these people did not have any special rights in the clan besides the usual rights gained through personal superiority.’
[2]
Military operations were led by war-leaders, who formed a military aristocracy based on heredity and personal military success: ’Just as now, common matters were managed by the clan assembly. Matters of war and minor legal cases, which demanded quick settlement without any delays, were managed by a war leader -- toen -- acknowledged by the rest of the people. According to the Yakut this service was hereditary, on the strength of their belief that an eaglet is always an eagle; a young crow is always a crow. But this hereditary right was not strictly followed. Thus, the heir of the Borogon toen, Legey, was not his son, but a foreign adopted son who had been bought for money. Another saga relates, with full consciousness of the legality of such a matter, that the Tungus chose as their toen a Yakut, Khaptagay-batyr, because of his valor. The sago says: No Lamut (Tungus), no matter who, will kill you. Now you be our lord (toen). If a Lamut will not obey your word, let there be a sin upon him. The toen always had in addition the title of bagatyr (valorous) and in the popular conception his traits of character had to correspond with those demanded of a hero. But he would not wander by himself, nor look for adventures, but would always live where the clan was and only leave in time of war, at the head of the mounted and armed detachment.’
[3]
’We can judge how large these unions sometimes were by the fact that in 1634 600 Yakut warriors under the leadership of prince Mymak took part in a battle on the right bank of the Lena, in which the army of ataman Galkin was crushed and all his horses were lost.’
[4]
’At this period, however, the clan-tribal structure was already in a state of decomposition. The tribes and clans were headed by the military aristocracy-the toyons. These possessed large herds of cattle and employed the labor of slaves and dependent fellow clansmen on their farms; they were also the military leaders. Heading detachments of armed servants and junior fellow clansmen, the toyons raided each other’s territory, and frequently looted the farms of the free members of the community, seizing their cattle and destroying their economic independence. These toyon wars and raids were one of the factors which speeded up the decomposition of the clan commune. The ruined members of the commune were reduced to the status of “balyksyts” (poor people without cattle, or fishermen), or else became the indentured slaves of the toyons. Most of the slaves (kuluts or bokans) originated in this way.’
[5]
[1]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut", 172 [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 717 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 718 [4]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 760 [5]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts”, 270 |
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Full-time specialists. Sakha warriors and spies fought for their clans and tribes, and were not professionals in the conventional sense of the term: ’Yakut warriors ( säpi, säpi kisita ) were usually mounted horsemen ( minjär ), but there were also foot soldiers ( sat[unknown]ykisita ). Their weapons ( säp ) consisted of a light bent bow ( s[unknown]a ), a quiver ( käsäx, s[unknown]adax ), and arrows ( aya ) .’
[1]
’These warriors formed a chain of movable, vigilant pickets around the settlements. In case of war they formed the kernel of the fighting detachment -- sari Some of the bolder ones went to find their fortune, dzhol. They would go far into unknown territory, among foreigners, either by themselves or with companions. Such detachments would not take their cattle with them and often traveled on foot. They made their living exclusively by hunting, fishing, and looting. The Yakut kept these habits for a long time, until very recently. Khudiakov has a legend about Khaptagay-batyr and his son Khokhoe-batyr, and their three khosun: Sappy, Yngkabyl, and Batagyyan, who roamed about in the seventeen forties, during the time of Pavlutskii, in the north of the Yakutsk Oblast. In the Kolymsk Okrug (1882), I wrote down a legend about the two Yakut brothers who were the first to make their way into the kolymsk Krai. Their names have been forgotten. In the Namsk Ulus I was told a legend about the Vilyuysk Yakut Tangas-Boltongo who also wandered by himself somewhere in the little-known, remote regions of the Vilyuysk Okrug. He was called a bagatyr, just as the old epic heroes. Apparently he lived in the beginning of the present century; this is indicated by the name of a Yakut hunter of the Namsk Ulus, Betyunsk Nasleg, Chaky clan, whom he encountered: his name was Soldat. Soldiers appeared in the Yakutsk Oblast only in the last century, at the time of the Kamchatka campaigns of Pavlutskii. Then Middendorf mentions solitary Yakut hunters whom he encountered far from their native tribes in the mountains of the Amur Basin. Such bold fellows served their clans as a sort of voluntary spies, searching out new pastures suitable for settlement in case some sort of unpleasantness or inconvenience should arise in the homeland. They brought back word of new lands, of the peoples they had encountered, the details of the route, and the obstacles involved. Sometimes the clan would choose such people out of their own number and deliberately send them out on a searching party. The tales The Golden Eagle and the Teal, and The Flying Winged Creatures hint at this. These were chosen people and were also called bagatyr, baatyr, batyr, or batur; strictly speaking in the Yakut language this word means valorous, exceptionally manly, bold, strong, and clever. But these people did not have any special rights in the clan besides the usual rights gained through personal superiority.’
[2]
Military operations were lead by war-leaders, who formed a military aristocracy based on heredity and personal military success: ’Just as now, common matters were managed by the clan assembly. Matters of war and minor legal cases, which demanded quick settlement without any delays, were managed by a war leader -- toen -- acknowledged by the rest of the people. According to the Yakut this service was hereditary, on the strength of their belief that an eaglet is always an eagle; a young crow is always a crow. But this hereditary right was not strictly followed. Thus, the heir of the Borogon toen, Legey, was not his son, but a foreign adopted son who had been bought for money. Another saga relates, with full consciousness of the legality of such a matter, that the Tungus chose as their toen a Yakut, Khaptagay-batyr, because of his valor. The sago says: No Lamut (Tungus), no matter who, will kill you. Now you be our lord (toen). If a Lamut will not obey your word, let there be a sin upon him. The toen always had in addition the title of bagatyr (valorous) and in the popular conception his traits of character had to correspond with those demanded of a hero. But he would not wander by himself, nor look for adventures, but would always live where the clan was and only leave in time of war, at the head of the mounted and armed detachment.’
[3]
’We can judge how large these unions sometimes were by the fact that in 1634 600 Yakut warriors under the leadership of prince Mymak took part in a battle on the right bank of the Lena, in which the army of ataman Galkin was crushed and all his horses were lost.’
[4]
’At this period, however, the clan-tribal structure was already in a state of decomposition. The tribes and clans were headed by the military aristocracy-the toyons. These possessed large herds of cattle and employed the labor of slaves and dependent fellow clansmen on their farms; they were also the military leaders. Heading detachments of armed servants and junior fellow clansmen, the toyons raided each other’s territory, and frequently looted the farms of the free members of the community, seizing their cattle and destroying their economic independence. These toyon wars and raids were one of the factors which speeded up the decomposition of the clan commune. The ruined members of the commune were reduced to the status of “balyksyts” (poor people without cattle, or fishermen), or else became the indentured slaves of the toyons. Most of the slaves (kuluts or bokans) originated in this way.’
[5]
We need to confirm whether any Sakha warriors joined the Russian military at the time. Accordingly the code may be in need of re-evaluation.
[1]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut", 172 [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 717 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 718 [4]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 760 [5]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts”, 270 |
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Full-time specialists Blood-vengeance and warfare were organized by community members: ’The terrible custom demands ever new, ever more victims, all security must disappear, every individual constantly lives in danger of being ambushed; there is a general and permanent state of war. Hence the arrangement of the houses, one door of which can be used for flight, while the battle rages at the other; hence the customs mentioned at the beginning in connection with approaching a dwelling, for the protection of which, in addition, a pack of half-wild dogs are kept. A quarrel between two families must lead to battles between whole tribes; larger groups of tribes become hostile to one another; war and battle become customary, a man’s lifework. A longer period of quiet, of peace, must be unbearable for such a nation of warriors. Ambitious, bold leaders will easily find companions for joint war expeditions; the neighboring nations are attacked and plundered. Thus, these Indians are carrying on among themselves a war of annihilation which must gradually bring about their own downfall. Severe depopulation is already noticeable in the region of the Jívaros, and it is being accelerated by epidemics, of the diseases introduced by the Europeans, which appear with great violence at times.’
[1]
’The primary motivation for warfare is to secure as many human heads as possible from an alien tribe, and secondarily to capture women. The acquisition of territory had never been a motive for engaging in warfare. The war party, consisting of approximately thirty or forty men, is recruited from the community itself or from friendly neighborhoods nearby, and is usually led by the or as war leader or chief. Actual warfare consists of preliminary ceremonies involving ritualized chanting, surprise attacks against one or two enemy houses, the killing and decapitation of the inhabitants or the occasional capture of a girl or woman as an extra wife, and the preparation of the on the return to the home village. Unlike many of the warlike Amazon tribes captives are not tortured or sacrificed, nor is cannibalism practiced.’
[2]
’It therefore behooves any Achuarä contemplating revenge upon someone to discuss his plans with potential allies, aligning them in his camp in advance of his action. The recruitment of military support among the Achuarä and other Jivaroans (cf. Harner 1972:98) is a rather insecure business. This derives, in part, from the fact that social relations are organized within a framework of cognatic, bilateral kinship, in which the only people sharing the same personal kindreds, and the rights and obligations associated with them, are siblings. Furthermore, the only military support of which one truly can be assured, once a contemplated or actual homicide develops, comes from persons obligated by affinal ties-sons-in-law or brothers-in-law-who often reside together. Where branching kin ties are overridden by divergent affinal obligations, relatives may very likely be drawn into enemy camps.’
[3]
[1]: Reiss, W. (Wilhelm) 1880. “Visit Among The Jivaro Indians”, 13 [2]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [3]: Bennett Ross, Jane 1984. “Effects Of Contact On Revenge Hostilities Among The Achuará Jívaro”, 102 |
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Kenoyer writes that there is no evidence of the existence of an army during the period 2600 BCE 1900 BCE
[1]
, although it has been argued that the absence of evidence does not mean that the Harappan people lived peacefully throughout the period: "More significantly, our knowledge of warfare in Egypt and Mesopotamia is heavily dependent on textual evidence and art; but this simply does not exist to portray any aspect of life in the Indus Civilisation. The absence of artistic or textual reference to war in the Indus is therefore no more representative of a lack of war than a lack of trade, agriculture or urbanisation - none of which are in any doubt.”
[2]
[1]: Jonathan Mark Kenoyer. ’Uncovering the keys to the Lost Indus Cities’, Scientific American, vol. 15, no. 1, 2005, p. 29. [2]: Cork, E. (2005) Peaceful Harappans? Reviewing the evidence for the absence of warfare in the Indus Civilisation of north-west India and Pakistan (c. 2500-1900 BC). Antiquity (79): 411-423. p420 |
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Full-time specialists. The following quote suggests that there may have been conflict between the Proto-Yoruboid and the aboriginal populations of the lands they moved into, but the consulted literature does not otherwise provide information on military organization at this time, such as it may have been. "The landscape that these proto-Yoruboid ancestors were moving into, however, was not devoid of human populations. The Later Stone Age (LSA) populations had occupied the region as early as the ninth millennium BC as shown by the findings at Iwò Elérú, near Àkúré. [...] Nevertheless, the proto-Yorùbá migrants seem to have gained the upper hand in their southward radiation. They displaced, and also integrated, with these aboriginal LSA populations, who were already practicing a combination of agriculture, horticulture, and hunting, similar to what the proto-Yorùbá and their descendant migrants were familiar with in their Niger-Benue ancestral homeland."
[1]
[1]: (Ogundiran 2020: 44-45) |
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Transition from absent in JpJomo6 to present in JpYayoi
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Full-time specialists. Blood-vengeance and warfare were organized by community members: ’The terrible custom demands ever new, ever more victims, all security must disappear, every individual constantly lives in danger of being ambushed; there is a general and permanent state of war. Hence the arrangement of the houses, one door of which can be used for flight, while the battle rages at the other; hence the customs mentioned at the beginning in connection with approaching a dwelling, for the protection of which, in addition, a pack of half-wild dogs are kept. A quarrel between two families must lead to battles between whole tribes; larger groups of tribes become hostile to one another; war and battle become customary, a man’s lifework. A longer period of quiet, of peace, must be unbearable for such a nation of warriors. Ambitious, bold leaders will easily find companions for joint war expeditions; the neighboring nations are attacked and plundered. Thus, these Indians are carrying on among themselves a war of annihilation which must gradually bring about their own downfall. Severe depopulation is already noticeable in the region of the Jívaros, and it is being accelerated by epidemics, of the diseases introduced by the Europeans, which appear with great violence at times.’
[1]
’The primary motivation for warfare is to secure as many human heads as possible from an alien tribe, and secondarily to capture women. The acquisition of territory had never been a motive for engaging in warfare. The war party, consisting of approximately thirty or forty men, is recruited from the community itself or from friendly neighborhoods nearby, and is usually led by the or as war leader or chief. Actual warfare consists of preliminary ceremonies involving ritualized chanting, surprise attacks against one or two enemy houses, the killing and decapitation of the inhabitants or the occasional capture of a girl or woman as an extra wife, and the preparation of the on the return to the home village. Unlike many of the warlike Amazon tribes captives are not tortured or sacrificed, nor is cannibalism practiced.’
[2]
’It therefore behooves any Achuarä contemplating revenge upon someone to discuss his plans with potential allies, aligning them in his camp in advance of his action. The recruitment of military support among the Achuarä and other Jivaroans (cf. Harner 1972:98) is a rather insecure business. This derives, in part, from the fact that social relations are organized within a framework of cognatic, bilateral kinship, in which the only people sharing the same personal kindreds, and the rights and obligations associated with them, are siblings. Furthermore, the only military support of which one truly can be assured, once a contemplated or actual homicide develops, comes from persons obligated by affinal ties-sons-in-law or brothers-in-law-who often reside together. Where branching kin ties are overridden by divergent affinal obligations, relatives may very likely be drawn into enemy camps.’
[3]
[1]: Reiss, W. (Wilhelm) 1880. “Visit Among The Jivaro Indians”, 13 [2]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [3]: Bennett Ross, Jane 1984. “Effects Of Contact On Revenge Hostilities Among The Achuará Jívaro”, 102 |
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There is no convincing evidence for functioning of the warrior class. G. P. Gilbert made a suggestion of existence of " the „universal warrior” type, with each man being required to maintain their efficiency as a trained warrior and being willing to participiate in warfare when required" and made an assumption that in Naqada III period "there was a trend towards the development of a "warrior arictocracy” within the Egyptian society. However (...) the king worked together with the ideology (...)prevented the “warrior aristocracy” from gaining a strength"
[1]
.
[1]: Gilbert, G. P. 2004. Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in Early Egypt. Oxford: Archaeopress. pg: 86. |
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[1]
There is no convincing evidence for a functioning warrior class. G. P. Gilbert made a suggestion of existence of " the „universal warrior” type, with each man being required to maintain their efficiency as a trained warrior and being willing to participate in warfare when required"
[2]
.
[1]: Shaw, I. 1991 Egyptian Warfare and Weapons. Buckinghamshire: Shire Publications. pg: 26. [2]: Gilbert, G. P. 2004. Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in Early Egypt. Oxford: BAR International Series 1208. pg: 86. |
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Full-time specialists likely absent. If the various leadership and administrative functions of Great Zimbabwean society were concentrated in the hands of social leaders in a manner similar to the Karanga, as Chirikure suggests, and this was also true of military leadership, as seems likely in the absence of evidence, then it seems somewhat improbable (albeit not impossible) that a cadre of professional soldiers would exist in the society. “In general [in Karanga society], imba…, was the smallest and lowest level social unit. A collection of dzimba formed misha…. A group of misha formed dunhu…. A group of matunhu formed a state (nyika) under a chief (ishe/mambo/changamire)…. Each level performed administrative, economic, religious, and political roles consistent with rank.”
[1]
. “Great Zimbabwe is a ruined Shona city or guta which controlled a sizeable territory…. As a collection of homesteads and misha, the guta had no formalised bureaucracy, no formalised division of labour or occupational specialisations… // …In general [in Karanga society], imba…, was the smallest and lowest level social unit. A collection of dzimba formed misha…. A group of misha formed dunhu…. A group of matunhu formed a state (nyika) under a chief (ishe/mambo/changamire)…. Each level performed administrative, economic, religious, and political roles consistent with rank.”
[2]
.
[1]: (Chirikure 2021, 267) Shadreck Chirikure, Great Zimbabwe: Reclaiming a ‘Confiscated’ Past (Routledge, 2021). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/MWWKAGSJ/collection [2]: (Chirikure 2021, 258-267) Shadreck Chirikure, Great Zimbabwe: Reclaiming a ‘Confiscated’ Past (Routledge, 2021). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/MWWKAGSJ/collection |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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Inferred from the following quote. "In sum, we have not found unambiguous evidence of social complexity and the often suggested highly advanced social system of the Nok Culture. [...] As demonstrated by the uniformity of their material culture and their presumed belief system, most prominently reflected by the terracotta sculptures, external contacts within their culture must have existed. However, such a larger social network apparently was not organised and maintained in a way as to infer social inequality, social hierarchies or other signs of internal demarcation traceable by available archaeological data. None of the numerous excavations brought to light architectural remains of specified buildings or the spatial organisation of housing areas that might have been occupied by high-ranking members of the community. Further, among the admittedly few features interpreted as graves there is no evidence of any heterogeneity pointing to a difference between burials of elite members or commoners. Nowhere, an accumulation of valuable objects neither of iron nor any other materials signifying inequality in terms of property or prosperity was found."
[1]
[1]: (Breunig and Ruppe 2016: 252) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/ES4TRU7R. |
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The following reconstruction of small communities consisting of extended families based in autonomous homesteads suggests minimal social diffrentiation. ”For the first 400 years of the settlement’s history, Kirikongo was a single economically generalized social group (Figure 6). The occupants were self-sufficient farmers who cultivated grains and herded livestock, smelted and forged iron, opportunistically hunted, lived in puddled earthen structures with pounded clay floors, and fished in the seasonal drainages. [...] Since Kirikongo did not grow (at least not significantly) for over 400 years, it is likely that extra-community fissioning continually occurred to contribute to regional population growth, and it is also likely that Kirikongo itself was the result of budding from a previous homestead. However, with the small scale of settlement, the inhabitants of individual homesteads must have interacted with a wider community for social and demographic reasons. [...] It may be that generalized single-kin homesteads like Kirikongo were the societal model for a post-LSA expansion of farming peoples along the Nakambe (White Volta) and Mouhoun (Black Volta) River basins. A homestead settlement pattern would fit well with the transitional nature of early sedentary life, where societies are shifting from generalized reciprocity to more restricted and formalized group membership, and single-kin communities like Kirikongo’s house (Mound 4) would be roughly the size of a band.”
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 27, 32) |
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Full-time specialists The office of laskar was introduced even before British occupation, but this was not a military role in the strict sense of the term. ‘As stated earlier the institution of laskar was first introduced by David Scott in his Draft Regulation of 1819, for the effective administration of the Garos. The main duty was to report on killings and serious offences within their jurisdiction. The Act of 1874 gave this office a legal status. Laskar was assisted by sardar in his duties and acted on behalf of laskar in his absence. The Commissioner tried the Garo cases, where he had to consult laskars and sardars connected with the traditional customs and manners of the tribe and also their opinions as to the guilt or innocence had to be taken into consideration.’
[1]
The A’chik had no standing armies or professionalized armed corps. During the pre-colonial period, male villagers probably acted as war parties under the leadership of a nokma: ‘In the early days, the Garos used to wage many wars. Such an occasion arose once (perhaps the first of such warfare) when people of one village living under a certain Nokma went to work for their hadang (field for cultivation) beyond their area and entered another Nokma’s jurisdiction. This was a cause of conflict, and they started fighting. There were heavy casualties on both sides. Finally, both the parties ran away to their own area. Thus neither party gained or lost any land.’
[2]
The potential role of Zamindars remains to be confirmed (see above).
[1]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 54 [2]: Sinha, Tarunchandra 1966. “Psyche Of The Garos”, 65 |
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Archaeological evidence suggests a ranked society with only part-time specialization in burgeoning sociopolitical, religious, and/or military institutional roles.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[1]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [2]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [4]: Paul Tolstoy. (1989) "Coapexco and Tlatilco: sites with Olmec material in the Basin of Mexico", In Regional Perspectives on the Olmec, Robert J. Sharer & David C. Grove (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 87-121. [5]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. |
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Only reference to professional and standing army in early West Africa is Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) of the Songhai Empire who "created a professional full-time army"
[1]
and "standing army"
[2]
before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[3]
Distinction between people and army during Songhai period: "beginning with the reign of Askia Mohammad ... Instead of mass conscription, a permanent army was created; civilians who were not part of it could go about their business." [4] The fado aristocracy, clans articulated around the person of the king included: The Souba, a warrior class, also known as Magassouba, the kings’ warriors. The Ka-Goro, the elite ’village-breakers’ The Maga-Si, or kings’ horsemen. The famous cavalry of Ghana. [5] [1]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. [4]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [5]: (Niane 1975, 32-33) |
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Full-time specialists The Ashanti infantry mostly consisted of citizen-soldiers who were not specialists in their own right. There was also a nucleus of armed professionals not disbanded during times of peace, such as the standing body of the Ashanti Adontenhene: ’Bantama was, I am informed, chosen as the site of the royal mausoleum, and also of ‘the royal treasure-house of the ghosts’, because this place was the head-quarters of the Ashanti general and a standing body of about one thousand fighting-men. These served as a bodyguard of the skeletons and the treasure.’
[1]
Given the general outlook of the Ashanti military, these should be classified as officers (above) rather than soldiers. According to Mensa-Bonsu, there were no professional soldiers: ’The army had four ‘wings’ - the Van, Rear, Left and Right wings ( Adonten, Kyidom, Benkum and Nifa respectively). Every chief in Asante was a member of one of these ‘wings’. The ‘wing’ was under its own head who was in charge of maintaining discipline. The army had a commander-in-chief ( Krontihene). To date, when the chiefs sit in council, each chief joins the ‘wing’ to which he traditionally belonged. The fact of frequent wars notwithstanding, there were no professional fighters. Each man had his own occupation but could be called upon to fight any day.’
[2]
[1]: Rattray, R. S. (Robert Sutherland) 1927. “Religion And Art In Ashanti”, 120 [2]: Mensa-Bonsu, Henrietta J. 1989. “The Place Of ‘Oaths’ In The Constitutional Set-Up Of Asante”, 260 |
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Inferred from the following quote. "In sum, we have not found unambiguous evidence of social complexity and the often suggested highly advanced social system of the Nok Culture. [...] As demonstrated by the uniformity of their material culture and their presumed belief system, most prominently reflected by the terracotta sculptures, external contacts within their culture must have existed. However, such a larger social network apparently was not organised and maintained in a way as to infer social inequality, social hierarchies or other signs of internal demarcation traceable by available archaeological data. None of the numerous excavations brought to light architectural remains of specified buildings or the spatial organisation of housing areas that might have been occupied by high-ranking members of the community. Further, among the admittedly few features interpreted as graves there is no evidence of any heterogeneity pointing to a difference between burials of elite members or commoners. Nowhere, an accumulation of valuable objects neither of iron nor any other materials signifying inequality in terms of property or prosperity was found."
[1]
[1]: (Breunig and Ruppe 2016: 252) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/ES4TRU7R. |
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Full-time specialists The warriors were represented in their own council: ’Closely allied with the Council of Elders was the women’s council who brought the matters up before the council. Lafitau maintained: Separate from both the women’s and elder’s councils was the warriors’ council which sought to influence authority decisions of the council of elders because they were the soldiers or ‘police’ of the village. Their internal affairs idsally were limited to military raids, games, and carrying out the military policy of the council of elders or League Council. In addition to the various councils, asseciations of men and women possibly existed for curing. Lafitau noted “I have been told that they have several sorts of private associations like fraternities” (Ibdd.:476). Fenton speculated that these associations were procursers of the “medicine societies” (Lafitau, 1724, 1:476). However, these associations seem to be the actual medicine societies and as such would have been village groups that criss-cross lineage, clan and moiety statuses.’
[1]
Distinguished war-leaders were eligible for non-hereditary chieftainships: ’The powers and duties of the sachems and chiefs were entirely of a civil character, and confined, by their organic laws, to the affairs of peace. No sachem could go out to war in his official capacity, as a civil ruler. If disposed to take the war-path, he laid aside his civil office, for the time being, and became a common warrior. It becomes an important inquiry, therefore, to ascertain in whom the military power, was vested. The Iroquois had no distinct class of war-chiefs, raised up and set apart to command in time of war; neither do the sachems or chiefs appear to have possessed the power of appointing such persons as they considered suitable to the post of command. All military operations were left entirely to private enterprise, and to the system of voluntary service, the sachems seeking rather to repress and restrain, than to encourage the martial ardor of the people. Their principal war-captains were to be found among he class called chiefs, many of whom were elected to this office in reward for their military achievements. The singular method of warfare among the Iroquois renders it extremely difficult to obtain a complete and satisfactory explanation of the manner in which their varlike operations were conducted. Their whole civil policy was averse to the concentration of power in the hands of any single individual, but inclined to the opposite principle of division among a number of equals; and this policy they carried into their military as well as through their civil organization. Small bands were, in the first instance, organized by individual leaders, each of which, if they were afterwards united upon the same enterprise, continued under its own captain, and the whole force, as well as the conduct of the expedition, was under their joint management. They appointed no one of their number to absolute command, but the general direction was left open to the strongest will, or the most persuasive voice.’
[2]
’When the power of the Ho-de[unknown] -no-sau-nee began to develop, under the new system of oligarchies within an oligarchy, there sprang up around the sachems a class of warriors, distinguished for enterprise upon the war-path, and eloquence in council, who demanded some participation in the administration of public affairs. The serious objections to the enlargement of the number of rulers, involving, as it did, changes in the framework of the government, for a long period enabled the sachems to resist the encroachment. In the progress of events, this class became too powerful to be withstood, and the sachems were compelled to raise them up in the subordinate station of chiefs. The title was purely elective, and the reward of merit. Unlike the sachemships, the name was not hereditary in the tribe or family of the individual, but terminated with the chief himself; unless subsequently bestowed by the tribe upon some other person, to preserve it as one of their illustrious names. These chiefs were originally invested with very limited powers, their principal office being that of advisers and counsellors of the sachems. Having thus obtained a foothold in the government, this class, to the number of which there was no limit, gradually enlarged their influence, and from generation to generation drew nearer to an equality with the sachems themselves. By this innovation the government was liberalized, to the sensible diminution of the power of the sachems, which, at the institution of the League, was extremely arbitrary.’
[3]
Given Morgan’s remarks on personal enterprise as the source of military operations, the war-leaders should not be characterized as professional officers, and the warriors were likely citizen-soldiers rather than full-time specialists: ’Traditionally, men hunted and fished, built houses, cleared fields for planting, and were responsible for trade and warfare. In addition, men had the more visible roles in tribal and confederacy politics. Farming was the responsibility of women, whose work also included gathering wild foods, rearing children, preparing food, and making clothing and baskets and other utensils.’
[4]
[1]: Foley, Denis 1994. “Ethnohistoric And Ethnographic Analysis Of The Iroquois From The Aboriginal Era To The Present Suburban Era”, 24 [2]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 67 [3]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 94 [4]: Reid, Gerald: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Iroquois |
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Only reference to professional and standing army in early West Africa is Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) of the Songhai Empire who "created a professional full-time army"
[1]
and "standing army"
[2]
before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[3]
Distinction between people and army during Songhai period: "beginning with the reign of Askia Mohammad ... Instead of mass conscription, a permanent army was created; civilians who were not part of it could go about their business." [4] [1]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. [4]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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Manda Moussa I’s pilgrimage story mentions an imperial escort of 8700 men.
[1]
This is unconfirmed by historical/archaeological evidence, but hints at the existence of a professional army. Later Songhay Empire: Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "created a professional full-time army"
[2]
before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[3]
Distinction between people and army during Songhai period: "beginning with the reign of Askia Mohammad ... Instead of mass conscription, a permanent army was created; civilians who were not part of it could go about their business." [4] [1]: (Niane 1975, 37) [2]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. [4]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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"The hereditary military system was virtually dead by the 1570s, replaced by a paid army."
[1]
"While the army itself had changed from a mostly hereditary, financially independent force into a paid, professional force, now heavily dependent upon firearms, the officer corps remained dependent on hereditary leaders. These hereditary leaders were not the families of the early Ming..." [2] [1]: (Lorge 2005, 128) [2]: (Lorge 2005, 139) |
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Prior to ’pacification’, violent conflict played out in raids and battles between rival groups of armed men: ’Within districts, conflict arose over land, succession to chiefship, theft, adultery, and avenging homicide. Between districts, it arose over attentions to local women by outside men, the status of one district as subordinate to another, and rights of access to fishing areas. Formal procedures for terminating conflict between districts involved payments of valuables and land by the losing to the winning side. Fighting involved surprise raids and prearranged meetings on a field of battle. Principal weapons were slings, spears, and clubs. Firearms, introduced late in the nineteenth century, were confiscated by German authorities in 1903. Martial arts included an elaborate system of throws and holds by which an unarmed man could kill, maim or disarm an armed opponent.’
[1]
Competition between rival chiefs over the control of land and people was a major factor: ’Traditional Micronesian life was characterized by a belief in the stability of society and culture. People suffered occasional natural disasters, such as cyclones or droughts, but their goal after encountering one of these was to reconstitute the previous state of affairs. Wars occurred in most areas from time to time, mainly at the instigation of competing chiefs. At stake was the control of land—a limited resource—and followers, but there were usually few casualties. Living in small communities on small territories, Micronesians learned to adjust to their neighbours, to remain on good terms with most of them most of the time, and to develop techniques of reconciliation when fights did break out. Micronesians traditionally depended on the cultivation of plant crops and on fishing in shallow reef waters. Because arable land was in short supply for the relatively dense population, Micronesians had a strong practical basis for their attachment to locality and lands. Land rights were usually held through lineages or extended family groups, often backed up by traditions of ancestral origins on the land.’
[2]
[1]: Goodenough, Ward and Skoggard 1999) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/5IETI75E. [2]: (Kahn, Fischer and Kiste 2017) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XHZTEDKE. |
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unknown.
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"To counter the Rouran threat, the Wei rulers had established a dozen major garrisons during the first half of the fifth century."
[1]
"... begun during the Tang dynasty... The rise of religious professionals and soldiers as clearly separate groups was contrary to the previous normative view of society divided into knights (shi, the term that would later be applied to the literati or gentry), farmers, artisans and merchants." [2] [1]: (Graff 2002, 98) [2]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[1]
"The western borders of the state of Djenne, before the conquest of the city by Sonni Ali, were defended by the commanders of twelve army corps deployed in the country of Sana: they were specifically assigned to surveillence of the movements of Mali. The Sana-faran was their general-in-chief." [2] There were officers under his orders. [2] "Likewise, twelve commanders of army corps were assigned to the east of the Niger toward Titili. [2] However, no references to Jenne-Jeno using military force to conquer other peoples and demand tribute. Army that is referred to could have been late in period and intended for defence, to maintain its independence against the growing military power of the empires of Western Sudan. [1]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. [2]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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Full-time specialists During the colonial period, wage labour was mostly temporary and practiced during the seasonal labour migrations of Iban men: ’In the present day, these bejalai migrations have involved young Iban males (aged 15 to 34 in general) in the petroleum and natural gas industries of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and New Guinea, in the military forces of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and Malaya, and in timber industries throughout the archipelago. Iban working in the construction industries have been of great importance in the national development efforts of Brunei. All of these activities have permitted the Iban to continue ladang cultivation at their homes, while supplementing family income through outside employment.’
[1]
According to some sources, the White Rajahs employed Iban in their armed forces: ’Sir Charles Anthony Johnson Brooke (b. June 3, 1829, Berrow, Somerset, Eng.-d. May 17, 1917, Cirencester, Gloucestershire), who adopted the surname Brooke, became the second raja. The government of Charles Brooke has been described as a benevolent autocracy. Charles himself had spent much of his life among the Iban people of Sarawak, knew their language, and respected their beliefs and customs. He made extensive use of down-river Malay chiefs as administrators, and encouraged selective immigration of Chinese agriculturalists, while the dominant indigenous group, the Ibans, were employed in military service. In general, social and economic changes were limited in impact, shielding the inhabitants from both the benefits and the hardships of Western-style development.’
[2]
There was no armed corps organized for the Iban specifically, and according to the information provided above, most Iban fighters were not compensated on a regular basis. Military service was therefore probably of a non-permanent nature and functioned within the Iban system of seasonal labour migration. Some Iban may have joined the civil and military administration early on, but expert feedback is needed on the matter.
[1]: Austin, Robert Frederic 1978. “Iban Migration: Patterns Of Mobility And Employment In The 20Th Century”, 18 [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Brooke-Raj |
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Archaeological evidence suggests a ranked society with only part-time specialization in burgeoning sociopolitical, religious, and/or military institutional roles.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[1]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [2]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [4]: Paul Tolstoy. (1989) "Coapexco and Tlatilco: sites with Olmec material in the Basin of Mexico", In Regional Perspectives on the Olmec, Robert J. Sharer & David C. Grove (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 87-121. [5]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. |
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Full-time specialists Political and military leadership often coincided: ’The long, complex history of the Akan peoples is one of internecine conflicts and, since the eighteenth century, of opposition to the encroachment of various colonial powers: the Dutch, Portuguese, Danish, French, and English. In addition, there have been continual threats from the Islamic peoples of the southern Saharan fringe. Essentially all these conflicts have been over monopolies in trade, first across the Sahara with northern Africa and, in later centuries, across the Atlantic with the countries of Europe and the Americas. Warfare has historically been a central institution, a means of extending territory and controlling external trade. The Akan state was typically divided into five or six military formations or "wings," each under the authority of a wing chief. Beneath the wing chiefs, who are chosen by the king, are the chiefs of the main towns of a kingdom. The latter are from the town’s ruling line.’
[1]
’It must be admitted that the origin of our State government and the principles on which it was founded, being solely military in character, one should feel content to accept the fact that the whole structure of the civil government we enjoy to-day is the result of martial adventures. This being so, it is only natural that people whose powers are clearly labelled as “military commanders”, etc., should exercise civil powers when the fruit of their labours bring peace. In almost all the Akan institutions, from the lowest servant to the highest officer, there is scarcely any whose civil powers are not based on military appointments. It is, therefore, most natural to fall into the habit of merging a civil into a military power.’
[2]
’The Ohene of every district is the supreme commander of the fighting men. His orders are communicated through the captains (Asafuhenefu), or the Tufuhene, as the case may be. Whenever a council of war is convened he presides, and it is his duty to provide them with some powder and shot. Every male person able to bear arms is bound to serve his country, and each fighting man [Page 28] provides himself with arms and ammunitions, as well as provisions, at his own expense.’
[3]
According to Sarbah, imperial Ashanti military organization was more ’developed’ than that of smaller Akan predecessors: ’The common origin of the inhabitants of the Fanti districts, Asanti, and wherever the Akan language is spoken, has been already shown. † The Customary Laws of the inhabitants of these places are in the main identical, and the national constitutions resemble each other in many points, although Asanti military organization had been [Page 3] developed in a greater degree. In fact, while the Fanti communities were gradually bringing under their sway smaller states, the Asanti king by conquests was extending his power over many lands. At one time all countries from Cape Mount in Liberia to the western boundary of Dahomey were, with few exceptions, under Asanti jurisdiction.’
[4]
But the Omanhene was supported by a bodyguard even before Ashanti imperial expansion: ’Omanhene is the head of the national life, and naturally president of the rulers of the people assembled either as a court for deciding cases or for legislation. The district, taken as a whole, is likewise considered as a body, whereof the Omanhene supports the head, and the next man in authority to him carries the foot. By virtue of his office, Omanhene has the right to be carried by four men or more, and uses three or more canopy umbrellas. At his installation a small sword, the insignia of his office, is handed to him, and he enjoys several other privileges. He is the commander-in-chief of all the fighting men of the district. His bodyguard and the immediate fighting men are called Gyasi. He is almost invariably a member of the Domtsifu or Intsin Company. Tufuhene is the man whose duty it is to command the fighting-men (from tuu, “to throw, e.g., arrows, etc.;” hence etuo, itur, “a gun”); a fighting leader, or commander. In some districts, and especially in the coast towns, Tufuhene is the next man in authority after Ohene.’
[5]
’An Ohene is entitled to ride in a palanquin carried by two men and attended by two canopy umbrellas. An Odzikuro is the headman of a village. Penin is an elder, generally an old man of experience. Sahene is a man appointed to conduct war. A Safuhene is a captain of a company, and in some instances is a stoolholder. In fact, among the Akanfu, that is Asanti, Wassaw, Assin, Akim, and such like, each Ohene of the several towns and districts is referred to as the Safuhene of his Omanhene. The Gyasi are the bodyguard of an Ohene or Omanhene. They comprise, first, the blood relatives, especially the children and grandsons of the Ohene, and are called Bogyadom ( bogya, “blood”; dom, “troop”), who have the immediate custody of the stool; secondly, certain Asafuhenefu, with their men; thirdly, personal servants and domestic attendants (Gyasifu). The Gyasi perform the rites of the stool custom each year.’
[5]
’The immediate retinue and body-guard of the Omanhene are called Gyasi, and consist of three groups of persons. (1) His male blood relatives, e.g. brothers, uncles, nephews; also his sons, whether by free or bond women. These persons usually are captains of the other fighting men. (2) Servants, slaves, and pawns, and their descendants. (3) Those originally attached to him by commendation or adoption; and captains, with their forces, appointed by the community as such.’
[6]
Akan troops were organized in companies under the leadership of captains, but even on this level civil and military leadership were often united in one person: ’Supi is a company captain, who keeps the company’s flags, and especially their ammunition. The spokesman of an Ohene or village community is selected by the Ohene or Odzikuro. On his appointment it is usual in some districts for his family to give to the Ohene or councillors sua duma,that is, £2 9 s. 6 d. The councillors (Begwafu) are sometimes selected by the people on account of personal character and intelligence. Every councillor is not a stoolholder, nor is every stoolholder a councillor; but a great number of the councillors, however, are stoolholders. A stoolholder may be appointed a councillor, and his successor, when deemed a fit and proper person, follows him in his office. When a person becomes a councillor he is considered as promoted, therefore he severs his connection with his company, and must not take an active part in the management of the affairs of the company. A councillor must not be a partisan. Councillors who have not attained that position by right of inheritance are practically, and in truth, the direct representatives of the people, and voice public opinion. It is somewhat difficult to define the qualifications of such public men.’
[7]
’The male persons of each ward originally formed a [Page 27] company, having its distinctive flags, drums, and other equipments. The honour of the flag is the first consideration, and his service to his company is the most indispensable duty of the citizen. The organization of the town companies has been already described. * In some towns there are as many as seven companies, members of which reside not only in the town, but also in the neighbouring villages. Lands cleared by the companies belong to them. The lands of the companies do not belong to the Ohene, for there are town lands, family lands, and stool lands. The Ohene has no right to ordinary tribute, and the public-stool income is derived from fines, penalties, and court fees. In this also the jurisdiction is personal. The Tufuhene, the councillors, and captains of the companies take part in the election and installation of a new Ohene. Before them he takes his oath of office, and if any lands are attached to the town stool, he holds them in trust for the public. The succession generally follows the common rule, but in some places it is the son who succeeds, not the brother or nephew. The townspeople can pass over the person nominated by the family and elect some other suitable person instead. They may also remove the Ohene, if found unfit to rule them any longer; in either of which events the town sword and stool, with all the public property thereunto appurtenant, are vested in the town council, whose duty it is to take them from the deposed ruler or his family and give them to the person appointed as new ruler or manager during the interval.’
[8]
’Each subordinate ruler, correctly the captain-chief (Safuhene), of the Omanhene, owns a stool of his office, commands the fighting men of, and rules, his district. The lands of the district are attached to his stool. Like the Omanhene, he also has officers and captains under him, and with his linguist, councillors, and elders he sits as a magistrate, before whose tribunal his subjects and people in his district are bound to appear.’
[9]
This material suggests that troops were drawn from the male population rather than a trained corps of professional soldiers. The importance of blood-relatives of the ruler in his guard militates against its characterization as a corps of military specialists.
[1]: Gilbert, Michelle, Lagacé, Robert O. and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Akan [2]: Danquah, J. B. (Joseph Boakye) 1928. “Gold Coast: Akan Laws And Customs And The Akim Abuakwa Constitution”, 17 [3]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 27p [4]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 2p [5]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 9 [6]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 23 [7]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 10 [8]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 26p [9]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 22 |
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The introduction of coinage may have coincided with a shift to a more professional armed forces as the coinage could be used to pay the army. It would have been very hyperbolic for Mani (216-276 CE) in the Kephalaia to have called Aksum "one of the four greatest empires of the world"
[1]
if by his time it had not invented or could not sustain any professional soldiers. The successful invasion of south Arabia in the early 3rd century may have used some trained soldiers, albeit at this stage the majority may have been raised and trained by vassals of the Aksum king.
"The first Aksumite king to put his own coinage into circulation was Endybis (in the second half of the third century)." [2] King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [3] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. "high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include ... middle-ranking members of the army ..." [4] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [3]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [4]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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Following Higham’s text, it could be inferred that there was some degree of military organization that seem to imply the presence of different levels, but at the early stages these "officers" may have been part of the chief’s court and not part of a professionalized army. Similarly, it is unclear if what the chinese identified as army was a real professional army or villagers who were conscripted to fight for their chiefs. Hence it is best to assume that in the early stages of Funan there were no professional soldiers (RA’s guess). "His son, Pan Pan, had only a brief reign, and was succeeded by a leader of military prowess known to the Chinese as Fan Shiman. He undertook raids against his neighbours, and then mounted a water-borne expedition which subdued over ten chiefs traditionally situated along the shores of the Gulf of Siam."
[1]
The Funanese named with the title "Fan" in the Chinese texts were identified as generals.
[2]
[1]: (Higham 1989, pp. 247) [2]: (Vickery 2003, p. 108) |
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Following Higham’s text, it could be inferred that there was some degree of military organization that seem to imply the presence of different levels, but at the early stages these "officers" may have been part of the chief’s court and not part of a professionalized army. Similarly, it is unclear if what the chinese identified as army was a real professional army or villagers who were conscripted to fight for their chiefs. Hence it is best to assume that in the early stages of Funan there were no professional soldiers (RA’s guess). "His son, Pan Pan, had only a brief reign, and was succeeded by a leader of military prowess known to the Chinese as Fan Shiman. He undertook raids against his neighbours, and then mounted a water-borne expedition which subdued over ten chiefs traditionally situated along the shores of the Gulf of Siam."
[1]
The Funanese named with the title "Fan" in the Chinese texts were identified as generals.
[2]
[1]: (Higham 1989, pp. 247) [2]: (Vickery 2003, p. 108) |
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"An order promulgated by William III on 25 April 1701 specified that ’the captains ... [shall] be obliged to keep their companies complete and a soldier who comes to die or desert, the captain shall be obliged immediately to enlist another competent soldier in his place.’ It can therefore be stated without exaggeration that the Republic’s standing army was born under the captain-generalship of William III. The transformation of the Dutch army into a standing army of professional soldiers was also evident from the men’s clothing."
[1]
[1]: (Nimwengen 2010: 353-354) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/P4FWE8NE/collection. |
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Full-time specialists
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Full-time specialists Wage labour is mostly unskilled and temporary, supplementing subsistence agriculture rather than replacing it: ‘Opportunities for wage labor, though not plentiful, are available by the day for a few men. A few can work as porters for fellow villagers, or for men of neighboring villages who have a large amount of cotton to carry into market. Occasionally the ‘owner’ of the market, or a Bengali merchant, hires a few Garos to build a tea stall or other kind of market shed. In 1956 a new motor road was being cut through the hills in the neighborhood of Rengsanggri. It was divided into lengths of one-eighth to one-half mile, which were assigned to contractors, each of whom had to hire laborers to do the actual digging and carrying of earth. Some of the labor was paid for by the day, while some was subcontracted in small amounts, so that a worker would be paid a fixed sum for digging or filling a stretch of road no more than fifteen feet long; and a few of these subcontractors even hired a neighbor to help them dig. Wage labor most often brought a rupee per day, but heavy labor might be paid at one rupee eight annas or even two rupees per day.’
[1]
During the colonial period, the A’chik had no standing armies or professionalized armed corps. The offices of laskar and sardar are not connected to the military: ‘As stated earlier the institution of laskar was first introduced by David Scott in his Draft Regulation of 1819, for the effective administration of the Garos. The main duty was to report on killings and serious offences within their jurisdiction. The Act of 1874 gave this office a legal status. Laskar was assisted by sardar in his duties and acted on behalf of laskar in his absence. The Commissioner tried the Garo cases, where he had to consult laskars and sardars connected with the traditional customs and manners of the tribe and also their opinions as to the guilt or innocence had to be taken into consideration.’
[2]
During the early colonial period, male villagers probably acted as war parties under the leadership of a nokma: ‘In the early days, the Garos used to wage many wars. Such an occasion arose once (perhaps the first of such warfare) when people of one village living under a certain Nokma went to work for their hadang (field for cultivation) beyond their area and entered another Nokma’s jurisdiction. This was a cause of conflict, and they started fighting. There were heavy casualties on both sides. Finally, both the parties ran away to their own area. Thus neither party gained or lost any land.’
[3]
The code is provisional and does not reflect the presence of British colonial forces, as more information on their organizaton is still needed.
[1]: Burling, Robbins 1963. “Rengsanggri: Family And Kinship In A Garo Village”, 283 [2]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 54 [3]: Sinha, Tarunchandra 1966. “Psyche Of The Garos”, 65 |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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"... begun during the Tang dynasty... The rise of religious professionals and soldiers as clearly separate groups was contrary to the previous normative view of society divided into knights (shi, the term that would later be applied to the literati or gentry), farmers, artisans and merchants."
[1]
No reason to assume loss of professionalization after Erlitou, Erligang
[2]
[1]: (Lorge 2005, 7) [2]: (North China Workshop 2016) |
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All freemen were expected to carry out military service as and when their duke or king summoned them. However there does not seem to have been a standing professional army.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Christie 1998: 118. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/975BEGKF [2]: Clayton 2021: 162. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4N2ZFRX8 |
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Dates currently based on estimates.
Present: "By the first years of the 13th century the French king could maintain a virtual standing army on his frontier with English-ruled Normandy. [1] Absent: Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [2] [1]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 7) [2]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 35) |
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Full-time specialists Even during the colonial period, wage labour was mostly temporary and practiced during the seasonal labour migrations of Iban men: ’In the present day, these bejalai migrations have involved young Iban males (aged 15 to 34 in general) in the petroleum and natural gas industries of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and New Guinea, in the military forces of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and Malaya, and in timber industries throughout the archipelago. Iban working in the construction industries have been of great importance in the national development efforts of Brunei. All of these activities have permitted the Iban to continue ladang cultivation at their homes, while supplementing family income through outside employment.’
[1]
According to some sources, the White Rajahs employed Iban in their armed forces: ’Sir Charles Anthony Johnson Brooke (b. June 3, 1829, Berrow, Somerset, Eng.-d. May 17, 1917, Cirencester, Gloucestershire), who adopted the surname Brooke, became the second raja. The government of Charles Brooke has been described as a benevolent autocracy. Charles himself had spent much of his life among the Iban people of Sarawak, knew their language, and respected their beliefs and customs. He made extensive use of down-river Malay chiefs as administrators, and encouraged selective immigration of Chinese agriculturalists, while the dominant indigenous group, the Ibans, were employed in military service. In general, social and economic changes were limited in impact, shielding the inhabitants from both the benefits and the hardships of Western-style development.’
[2]
But there was no armed corps prior to Brooke Raj rule. Even then, military service was probably of a non-permanent nature and functioned within the Iban system of seasonal labour migration. When head-taking and piracy were practiced, war parties were staffed with male community members: ’The taking of enemy heads then, was the prescriptive act for Iban males an act through which an individual could win for himself prestige and status within the longhouse community, while at the same time enhancing his desirability as a potential suitor and husband in the eyes of the opposite sex. But, as we have indicated, headhunting also had a ritual dimension which was of the utmost significance. It is the latter aspect which chiefly concerns us here, being to do with Iban conceptions of male and female gender roles and relations of production and reproduction within Iban society.’
[3]
War parties were led by local war-leaders or village headmen: ’According to Sea Dayak custom, this feast, the fifth of the nine stages of the gawai burong , should be held only by an experienced war-leader. Linggir was undoubtedly a very brave man, but he was young, and certainly far less experienced than Uyut, his father. Linggir had already made a statue of the hornbill in preparation for his festival when the older people of the house warned him that it would be presumptuous for him to hold the feast while Uyut still lived. They said that such a rash action might anger Sengalang Burong.’
[4]
’Before the gawai diri may be held, the patron of the feast must lead his warriors against some enemy. So Uyut and his men set off to raid the Kantu Dayaks of Merakai, in what is now Indonesian Borneo, in order to get some fresh heads. But before they came back, all the food which had been gathered for the feast, including tuak wine and many different delicacies, began to go bad. So a brother-in-law of Uyut named Malang (Pengarah) decided to go ahead and hold the feast anyway, without the war-leader and his men. No sooner was it over than Uyut and his party returned from a victorious expedition. They were naturally outraged. Uyut and the others expelled Pengarah from the Anyut, and he retreated down river to live in the Serudit stream.’
[4]
Head-hunting persisted well into the 20th century: ’The persistence of headhunting as a living tradition, up until at least the Second World War, and even beyond (albeit in a drastically curtailed form), has meant that many of the details connected with the taking of heads are well documented. Moreover, the ritual significance of headhunting, and its attendant ceremonies, continue to play an important role in contemporary Iban society. We have already spoken of headhunting festivals ( gawai amat ) held as celebrations of male prestige and achievement, but the traditional role of the Iban warrior continues to survive elsewhere in Iban culture, most notably in connection with mortuary rites. A visit to a Saribas Iban festival for the dead ( Gawai Antu ), for instance, reveals a more than sufficient number of candidates to drink the sacred wine ( ai’ garong ) dedicated to those who have passed away. Previously, only those who had distinguished themselves as headhunters could partake in this sacred symposium with the dead; today the taking of a life - usually when on active service in the Sarawak Field Force - suffices. In this instance, and others of a similar nature, the warrior tradition of Iban society is maintained, and the ritual significance of headhunting preserved, as a major component in the Iban value system.’
[5]
[1]: Austin, Robert Frederic 1978. “Iban Migration: Patterns Of Mobility And Employment In The 20Th Century”, 18 [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Brooke-Raj [3]: Davison, Julian, and Vinson H. Sutlive 1991. “Children Of Nising: Images Of Headhunting And Male Sexuality In Iban Ritual And Oral Literature”, 157 [4]: Sandin, Benedict 1967. “Sea Dayaks Of Borneo: Before White Rajah Rule”, 39 [5]: Davison, Julian, and Vinson H. Sutlive 1991. “Children Of Nising: Images Of Headhunting And Male Sexuality In Iban Ritual And Oral Literature”, 169 |
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In the Predynastic period there is no proof of the existence of a professional army. There is probably also no hieroglyphic sign meaning "army" by Dynastic Period
[1]
. Moreover, in Ancient Egyptian unitary state, introduction of regular army took place during the New Kingdom
[2]
. There is no convincing evidence for a functioning warrior class. G. P. Gilbert made a suggestion of existence of " the „universal warrior” type, with each man being required to maintain their efficiency as a trained warrior and being willing to participiate in warfare when required"
[3]
.
[1]: Kahl, J. 1994. Das System der ägyptischen Hieroglyphenschrift in der 0.-3. Dynastie. Göttinger Orientforschungen IV: Ägypten 29. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. pg: 423. [2]: Shaw, I. 1991 Egyptian Warfare and Weapons. Buckinghamshire: Shire Publications. pg: 26. [3]: Gilbert, G. P. 2004. Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in Early Egypt. Oxford: BAR International Series 1208. pg: 86. |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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Knightly Class:
The Normans relied heavily on knights, Knights were landholders who owed military service in exchange for their fiefs. While knights were trained in warfare and served as elite warriors, their service was often limited to the feudal 40-day obligation, and their primary livelihood came from landholding. [R_Morillo 0]
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Full-time specialists The warriors were represented in their own council: ’Closely allied with the Council of Elders was the women’s council who brought the matters up before the council. Lafitau maintained: Separate from both the women’s and elder’s councils was the warriors’ council which sought to influence authority decisions of the council of elders because they were the soldiers or ‘police’ of the village. Their internal affairs idsally were limited to military raids, games, and carrying out the military policy of the council of elders or League Council. In addition to the various councils, asseciations of men and women possibly existed for curing. Lafitau noted “I have been told that they have several sorts of private associations like fraternities” (Ibdd.:476). Fenton speculated that these associations were procursers of the “medicine societies” (Lafitau, 1724, 1:476). However, these associations seem to be the actual medicine societies and as such would have been village groups that criss-cross lineage, clan and moiety statuses.’
[1]
Distinguished war-leaders were eligible for non-hereditary chieftainships: ’The powers and duties of the sachems and chiefs were entirely of a civil character, and confined, by their organic laws, to the affairs of peace. No sachem could go out to war in his official capacity, as a civil ruler. If disposed to take the war-path, he laid aside his civil office, for the time being, and became a common warrior. It becomes an important inquiry, therefore, to ascertain in whom the military power, was vested. The Iroquois had no distinct class of war-chiefs, raised up and set apart to command in time of war; neither do the sachems or chiefs appear to have possessed the power of appointing such persons as they considered suitable to the post of command. All military operations were left entirely to private enterprise, and to the system of voluntary service, the sachems seeking rather to repress and restrain, than to encourage the martial ardor of the people. Their principal war-captains were to be found among he class called chiefs, many of whom were elected to this office in reward for their military achievements. The singular method of warfare among the Iroquois renders it extremely difficult to obtain a complete and satisfactory explanation of the manner in which their varlike operations were conducted. Their whole civil policy was averse to the concentration of power in the hands of any single individual, but inclined to the opposite principle of division among a number of equals; and this policy they carried into their military as well as through their civil organization. Small bands were, in the first instance, organized by individual leaders, each of which, if they were afterwards united upon the same enterprise, continued under its own captain, and the whole force, as well as the conduct of the expedition, was under their joint management. They appointed no one of their number to absolute command, but the general direction was left open to the strongest will, or the most persuasive voice.’
[2]
’When the power of the Ho-de[unknown] -no-sau-nee began to develop, under the new system of oligarchies within an oligarchy, there sprang up around the sachems a class of warriors, distinguished for enterprise upon the war-path, and eloquence in council, who demanded some participation in the administration of public affairs. The serious objections to the enlargement of the number of rulers, involving, as it did, changes in the framework of the government, for a long period enabled the sachems to resist the encroachment. In the progress of events, this class became too powerful to be withstood, and the sachems were compelled to raise them up in the subordinate station of chiefs. The title was purely elective, and the reward of merit. Unlike the sachemships, the name was not hereditary in the tribe or family of the individual, but terminated with the chief himself; unless subsequently bestowed by the tribe upon some other person, to preserve it as one of their illustrious names. These chiefs were originally invested with very limited powers, their principal office being that of advisers and counsellors of the sachems. Having thus obtained a foothold in the government, this class, to the number of which there was no limit, gradually enlarged their influence, and from generation to generation drew nearer to an equality with the sachems themselves. By this innovation the government was liberalized, to the sensible diminution of the power of the sachems, which, at the institution of the League, was extremely arbitrary.’
[3]
Given Morgan’s remarks on personal enterprise as the source of military operations, the war-leaders should not be characterized as professional officers, and the warriors were likely citizen-soldiers rather than full-time specialists: ’Traditionally, men hunted and fished, built houses, cleared fields for planting, and were responsible for trade and warfare. In addition, men had the more visible roles in tribal and confederacy politics. Farming was the responsibility of women, whose work also included gathering wild foods, rearing children, preparing food, and making clothing and baskets and other utensils.’
[4]
[1]: Foley, Denis 1994. “Ethnohistoric And Ethnographic Analysis Of The Iroquois From The Aboriginal Era To The Present Suburban Era”, 24 [2]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 67 [3]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 94 [4]: Reid, Gerald: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Iroquois |
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unknown Houses for soldiers and their families would imply full-time warriors.
During this time, complex fortifications also started appear. They usually had huge entrance gates, thick walls and towers. It is also clear that some buildings were connected to the walls. Those are interpreted as houses for soldiers and their families or magazines for weapons. |
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Only at the time of Conquest? AD "Simón (1882-92, 5: 198) de- scribes a category of warriors “who had demonstrated their bravery on various occasions, and were allowed to wear their hair long, and tucked into their belts at the back,” a reminder that not all status symbols will be archaeologically identifiable."
[1]
There is no confirmation from Bray that these warriors were full-time soldiers."There is also the question concerning the social positioning of people living in these different residential areas. Were they full time attached specialists such as warriors, masons, featherworkers, bead manufacturers, goldsmiths, or religious specialists as Groot (1985) argues?"
[2]
[1]: (Bray 2003, 203) [2]: (Giraldo 2010, 304) |
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Administrative conventions developed in Uruk period c3800-3000 BCE so this period very low administrative complexity and presumably little capacity to pay and train full time officers and troops.
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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"There was never a regular Mossi army, although there were, of course, permanent military chiefs. All adult men were liable for military service and were mobilized in times of war. A small body of regular soldiers at the king’s court acted as his armed bodyguard (kambose), maintained order in the palace but never went to war."
[1]
[1]: (Zahan 1967: 171) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TVIRPGXD/collection. |
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Administrative conventions developed in Uruk period c3800-3000 BCE so this period very low administrative complexity and presumably little capacity to pay and train full time officers and troops.
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Full-time specialists
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Officers were permanently employed, but the rank-and-file had to report to duty and training at the capital on a rotation system, depending upon how far away they lived. ... the men supported themselves for most of the year by farming..."
[1]
"From 737 it was decided to replace the militia entirely with paid chien-erh regulars; they were recruited by calling for volunteers from the population in general." [2] [1]: (Peers 2002, 12) [2]: (Peers 2002, 14) |
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Seems to have been recruitment of mercenaries: “The town of Katsena Ala is said to have been founded by a colony of Hausas from Katsina some sixty to seventy years ago; they were originally recruited to act as a "gunmen guard" to the Chief of Wukari (Jukon) of that date, who objected to the " King-killing " ritual then in force as regards Jukon royalty, whose normal term of office was nine years. The Chief in question is said to have prolonged his term of office much beyond this owing to his guard.”
[1]
“When Abite was installed as an Aku-Uka, he took the title Awudunanu 1. The devastating effect of this episode compelled him after his installation as the Aku-Uka to forge a closer link with Muri particularly in the military field in order to guarantee the security of Wukari.”
[2]
[1]: Duggan, E. de C. (1932). Notes on the Munshi (‘Tivi’) Tribe of Northern Nigeria: Some Historical Outlines. Journal of the Royal African Society, 31(123), 173–182: 178. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/E8PDNFTI/collection [2]: Zhema, S. (2017). A History of the Social and Political Organization of the Jukun of Wukari Division, c.1596–1960 [Benue State University]:159. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/U667CC36/collection |
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People from certain social groups were drafted in as soldiers when needed. “H. L. M. Butcher has described the organisation of village production within the Otu system as follows: ‘Those in the lowest Otu ... are called Egbonughele, sweepers of the street. Under this name are classified all the youths of the clan [village].... They perform all the ordinary communal tasks, they hew wood and carry water.... The actual tasks are apportioned among themselves, the elder boys assisting the younger. Next come the Igele, the adults in the prime of their strength, most of them with homes and families. They are called out for work when it was beyond the power of the youths. The senior Igele only went to war in major conflict, leaving minor raids to the younger men.”
[1]
There was no standing army before Oba Ewedo, but there seem to at least have been people functioning as mercenaries, so it’s unclear whether some were effectively full-time soldiers. “Benin warriors played some part in the Ekiti wars, but on a freelance basis; they took advantage of the confused situation to raid for slaves and loot. They sent gifts to the Oba, for they were dependent on the Benin route for their supplies. In return he occasionally dispatched reinforcements to help them, but his control over them was minimal. In the 1880s the official Benin army, under the Ezɔmɔ, was occupied subduing rebellious villages on the very north-west borders of the kingdom itself, no more than fifty miles from the capital.”
[2]
Oba Ewedo (c. 1374–1401) established a standing army, but this drew from existing structures ie conscripted people based on social position, rather than having people remain as soldiers for their whole lives/careers. “The creation of a standing army by Oba Ewedo and the development of specialised artisan communities by Oba Oguola established a significant drain on Otu productivity. It would seem, therefore, that institutions such as the "Junior Elders," who had previously been exempted from communal labour, would have to contribute to the productive capacity of the vassal villages. […] The development of the military can also be seen as part of the state’s exploitative character. Service in the army for extended periods removed important labour requirements from the village Otu system; service became part of the recognised obligations of certain age sets.”
[3]
“The Ezɔmɔ’s military power could be an important factor in succession disputes, but he had no monopoly of physical force, for there was no standing army at his command; when warriors were needed they were recruited by the Oba through his fief-holders, most of whom were Eghaɛbho.”
[4]
A standing army was created at the very end of the Benin Empire, but the soldiers weren’t generally paid, so perhaps shouldn’t be considered ‘professional soldiers’. Also, this system never had time to be implemented fully before the fall of the Benin Empire. “[I]t was a significant development in the military history of Benin. For the first time, a military policy evolved which provided for both a standing army and training school. Until 1896, there was no standing army in Benin. In most pre-colonial African states and societies, there was no standing army; men were recruited from their peacetime occupations on the proclamation of war. // “ The emergence of a standing army with a training programme in 1896, marked a transformation process of the Benin army. Though it evolved as a state policy in manpower development of the army, it was influenced by the pressures of military necessity when Benin was in the last stages of decline. Details are not known of how the standing army was financed. The warriors were usually not paid by the state; for military service was a matter of honour, status and patriotism for the soldier. The organisational policy of the military school, and the programme of training were at infancy when in February 1897, Benin fell to the British.”
[5]
[1]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 403. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [2]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 7. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [3]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 409, 411 & 413. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [4]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 17. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [5]: Osadolor, O. B. (2001). The Military System of Benin Kingdom, c.1440–1897. University of Hamburg, Germany: 202. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4RZF5H5/collection |
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“The Kingdom of Nri (1043–1911) was the West African medieval state of the Nri Igbo, a subgroup of the Igbo people, and is the oldest kingdom in Nigeria. The Kingdom of Nri was unusual in the history of world government in that its leader exercised no military power over his subjects.”
[1]
“Although bloodshed is inherent in this historical charter, for many centuries the people of Nri have had a strong commitment to peace, rooted in the belief that it is an abomination to pollute the sacred Earth. “The white men that came started by killing those who did not agree with their rules. We Nri never did so”.”
[2]
[1]: Ngara, C. A. (n.d.). An Ethnohistorical Account Of Pre-Colonial Africa, African Kingdoms And African Historical States. 25:11. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/UJG3ED8W/collection [2]: Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press, 1997: 246. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection |
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Prior to ’pacification’, violent conflict played out in raids and battles between rival groups of armed men: ’Within districts, conflict arose over land, succession to chiefship, theft, adultery, and avenging homicide. Between districts, it arose over attentions to local women by outside men, the status of one district as subordinate to another, and rights of access to fishing areas. Formal procedures for terminating conflict between districts involved payments of valuables and land by the losing to the winning side. Fighting involved surprise raids and prearranged meetings on a field of battle. Principal weapons were slings, spears, and clubs. Firearms, introduced late in the nineteenth century, were confiscated by German authorities in 1903. Martial arts included an elaborate system of throws and holds by which an unarmed man could kill, maim or disarm an armed opponent.’
[1]
Competition between rival chiefs over the control of land and people was a major factor: ’Traditional Micronesian life was characterized by a belief in the stability of society and culture. People suffered occasional natural disasters, such as cyclones or droughts, but their goal after encountering one of these was to reconstitute the previous state of affairs. Wars occurred in most areas from time to time, mainly at the instigation of competing chiefs. At stake was the control of land—a limited resource—and followers, but there were usually few casualties. Living in small communities on small territories, Micronesians learned to adjust to their neighbours, to remain on good terms with most of them most of the time, and to develop techniques of reconciliation when fights did break out. Micronesians traditionally depended on the cultivation of plant crops and on fishing in shallow reef waters. Because arable land was in short supply for the relatively dense population, Micronesians had a strong practical basis for their attachment to locality and lands. Land rights were usually held through lineages or extended family groups, often backed up by traditions of ancestral origins on the land.’
[2]
[1]: Goodenough, Ward and Skoggard 1999) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/5IETI75E. [2]: (Kahn, Fischer and Kiste 2017) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XHZTEDKE. |
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From 1365
[1]
Nicolle 1991 "By the first years of the 13th century the French king could maintain a virtual standing army on his frontier with English-ruled Normandy. [2] Professional sergeants in the mid 12th century. [3] Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [4] Inferred absent under Philip IV: Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [4] [1]: (Turchin and Nefedov 2009, 128) [2]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 7) [3]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 6) [4]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 35) |
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[Only after 1200 CE the chieftains had retainers.] Some Icelanders joined foreign armies abroad: ’Isolated in the North Atlantic, Iceland had few external conflicts. Individual Icelanders were occasionally involved in conflict when outside the country and also sometimes served in foreign militaries. During the late tenth century, the Norwegian king was a champion of the Christian movement in Iceland and often attempted to assert his influence, although this was largely limited to Icelanders in Norway. Likewise, the ultimately successful attempts to incorporate Iceland under the Norwegian monarchy were mostly played out through alliances with individual Icelanders.’
[1]
Chieftains relied on an entourage of armed followers: ’Those who had access to sufficient resources to support a household were the tax paying farmers. Each of them had to be a follower of a chieftain from his own quarter, and only the tax paying farmers could make the decision as to which he would follow. All of his dependents - tenants and renters - went with him. However they got it, chieftains were dependent on farmers for support - to feed their increasingly large personal followings or armies, to support them at assemblies, and to accompany them on raids on other chieftains or their followers. As we have seen, without such support, without the ability to mass force, claims to ownership of land, which defined the class system as well as the forms of appropriation, had no force. Farmers had to rely on some chieftain to be able to defend their claims to property, though, as we have seen, this might often lead to the loss of the property. Chieftains had to rely on farmers to enforce their followers’ claims and their own, as well as to expand their territories into others’.’
[2]
Armed supporters were required to enforce legal and political claims: ’Claims of inheritance were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This follows from the fact that claims to ownership, property, were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This meant that to assert any claim to ownership, whether by inheritance or any other means, one had to back the claim with armed force. Chieftains were focal points for concentrating force to protect and to forward claims to property.’
[3]
Retainers emerged in the late Commonwealth: ’The warlords of the late Commonwealth usually kept a number of retainers, proabably around a dozen or so at least and sometimes perhaps around 40-50. We cannot rule out the possibility that these were sometimes employed in farmwork but their chief role was certainly military. These retainers were present after about 1200. The total number of professional warriors in Iceland - retainers in the service of lords and gentry - seems to have been at least 300 at the hight of the Sturlung wars (ca. 1235-1255) or about 0.5% of the population. These were the core of a warlord’s army and could be very instrumental in the outcome of battles (eg. Haugsnes 1246).’
[4]
Chieftains also relied on farmers willing to support them economically and militarily: ’Relations between chieftains and farmers were not, however, smooth. Chieftains had their “own” estates to support their establishments, and some maintained followings of armed men, but this was a difficult proposition, since it added consumers to the household without adding production. The chieftains had to rely on their following of farmers to support them with both arms and supplies. This was one component of any farmer’s household fund, his “rent” so to speak, his expenditures for travel and support for his chieftain, without which his chieftain or another would take his land and livestock. In addition, expeditions took labor from the farm and put the farmer’s life at risk. Even so, a farmer’s claims to land were not secure, since his chieftain might abandon him, another more powerful chieftain might claim his land, or simply take it, or a farmer might lose his land in a re-alignment of alliances among chieftains, which were frequent.’
[3]
The interests of chieftains and farmers were often in conflict: ’There was a basic conflict between chieftains’ increasing demands for demonstrations of force in support of claims to ownership and the subsistence demands, the economic roles, of farmers. Chieftains were not beyond using coercion to insure support as the following incident relates. [...] In spite of this contradiction, farmers had to rely on some chieftain in order to maintain their claims to land. While the inheritance customs codified in Grágás seem quite orderly in Hastrup’s (1985) analysis, inheritance of land is often hotly disputed in the Saga of the Icelanders. One who wanted another’s land could often find a third party with some inheritance claim, and acquire the claim on which to base a legitimation for taking the land.’
[5]
[1]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders [2]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 256 [3]: Durrenberger, Paul E. 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 258 [4]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [5]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth”, 256 |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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“Apart from the officers, the army was not a standing one but always raised ad hoc.”
[1]
“It will have been seen from the above discussion of the organization of the Oyo army that the Oyo disposed of no permanent standing force of soldiers. Even the specialist warriors such as the Eso and the military ilari in the capital served on a part-time basis, and would normally expect to return to their homes once a campaign was concluded.”
[2]
[1]: Atanda, J. A. ‘The Fall of the Old Ọyọ Empire: A Re-Consideration of its Cause’. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria vol.5, no.4 (June 1971): 479. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NR9MAEAE/collection [2]: Law, R. (1977). The Oyo Empire c. 1600 – c. 1836: A West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade. Oxford University Press: 197. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SB32ZPCF/collection |
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"There was no standing army in pre-colonial Buganda, although as we shall see, there was by the nineteenth century a class of chiefs associated with military duties, while a measure of what we might call ‘part-time professionalism’ lay at the heart of the Ganda military ethos."
[1]
[1]: (Reid 2010: 51) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2H64W34U/collection. |
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The following refers to Ancient Hawaiki, not Hawaii. The former is the ancestral Polynesian homeland, in the first millennium BCE. It’s not entirely clear how much of their ancestral heritage the earliest Hawaiians might have retained. Expert guidance needed. Some linguistic evidence for the existence of a war chief, *sau
[1]
.
[1]: (Kirch & Green 2001, 234) |
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"There was no standing army in pre-colonial Buganda, although as we shall see, there was by the nineteenth century a class of chiefs associated with military duties, while a measure of what we might call ‘part-time professionalism’ lay at the heart of the Ganda military ethos."
[1]
[1]: (Reid 2010: 51) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2H64W34U/collection. |
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"For a ’conquest state’, Ankole was singularly lacking in even a defensive military capacity and clearly had never developed the organized force for carrying out any but the most casual of raiding operations. The absence of a military system for the defense of the territorial integrity of Ankole further attests to the nature of the society as a congeries of pastoral clans with only the most rudimentary institutions of chieftainship down through the reign of Ntare IV."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 138) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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Based on the following, seems likely that any adult male of a certain age could be called on to engage in military conflict. “The Shiwei, in the periods of the Sui and Tang, were relatively weak in the northwestern Manchuria. Their form of social organization appeared fairly loose and still remained at tribal level. Clans and tribes were the basic social patterns. The productive activities were organized by the tribal leaders, as described in the Xin Tangshu, "in hunting (the tribes) were banded together, and dispersed afterward; the tribes did not rule over one another or submitted to one another".”
[1]
[1]: (Xu 2005, 180) |
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Mid-11th century (after conquest of Baghdad?) "the Turkmen began to be supplemented, but never wholly supplanted, as a military force by mamluks."
[1]
According to ’Imad al-Din al-Isfahani: "The custom was that taxes were collected from the land and spent on the army; previously no one had held a land-grant [iqta]. Nizam al-Mulk realised that taxes were no being collected from the land owing to its poor condition, nor was revenue being realised for the same reason. He distributed land grants [iqta’s] to the soldiers and made them a source of income and revenue for them." However, al-Isfahani was wrong in saying that Nizam al-Mulk was the first to introduce the Iqta as they were used during the Buyid period. [2] "Under the Seljuqs there were large and small iqtas that were granted to members of the dynasty, to various members of the military and official class and to ordinary soldiers." [3] The first armies "were not ’professional armies’ in the sense of the Abbasid or Samanid mamluk corps, but warfare was a way of life for most adult male Turkmen; only women and children were exempted from fighting." [1] Mamluks were "a standing army paid both in cash and by iqta’s" [1] [1]: (Peacock 2015, 218) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [2]: (Peacock 2015, 69-70) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [3]: (Davidovich 1997, 144) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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Warfare consisted of small-scale raiding during this period, and sources do not suggest there is evidence for professional or permanent military officers or soldiers.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London. [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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"Payment for service might have arisen because of the vast income from silver mines, among other sources."
[1]
Before the reforms of Khusrau I (later Sassanid period) "all nobles, great and small, had been obliged to equip themselves and their followers and serve in the army without pay, but Khusrau issued equipment to the poorer nobles and paid a salary for their services. Consequently, the power of the great nobles - who frequently had their own private armies - was reduced." [2] [1]: (Mitterauer 2010, 106) Mitterauer, M. 2010. Why Europe?: The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path. University of Chicago Press. [2]: (Chegini 1996, 57) Chegini, N. N. Political History, Economy and Society. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.40-58. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf |
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"By 1400, therefore, most of the troops in the Ottoman army served on a contractual basis, allowing the sultan to levy a predictable number of reliable troops year after year."
[1]
Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges." [2] Janissaries were paid a monthly salary. [3] The Janissary organization is believed to have started during the reign of Murat I. [4] [1]: (Imber 2002, 256-257) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [2]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) [3]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) [4]: (Cosgel, Metin. Personal Communication to Peter Turchin. April 2020) |
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Kenoyer writes that there is no evidence of the existence of an army during the period 2600 BCE 1900 BCE
[1]
, although it has been argued that the absence of evidence does not mean that the Harappan people lived peacefully throughout the period: "More significantly, our knowledge of warfare in Egypt and Mesopotamia is heavily dependent on textual evidence and art; but this simply does not exist to portray any aspect of life in the Indus Civilisation. The absence of artistic or textual reference to war in the Indus is therefore no more representative of a lack of war than a lack of trade, agriculture or urbanisation - none of which are in any doubt.”
[2]
[1]: Jonathan Mark Kenoyer. ’Uncovering the keys to the Lost Indus Cities’, Scientific American, vol. 15, no. 1, 2005, p. 29. [2]: Cork, E. (2005) Peaceful Harappans? Reviewing the evidence for the absence of warfare in the Indus Civilisation of north-west India and Pakistan (c. 2500-1900 BC). Antiquity (79): 411-423. p420 |
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absent: 1467-1476 CE
"At the time of the Onin War the samurai were still the elite troops, the officer corps, the aristocracy, while the foot soldiers were lower class warriors recruited from the daimyo’s estate workers." [1] uncertain_absent_present: 1476-1568 CE Later: "men casually recruited into an army, enticed by the prospect of loot. These men were called ashigaru (light feet)." [1] Some daimyo disciplined and trained their ashigaru and organised them into squads. [1] [1]: (Turnbull 2002) |
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Unlikely at this time since administrative complexity was so low. "The social structure of these communities was thus characterised by few heads of households (elders), marked gender, age and provenance barriers, but few socio-political differences. Consequently, burials do not display any significant diffferences in status."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 42) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Full-time specialists Chinese administrators installed military garrisons in the Hmong area long before the onset of the republican period: ’From the middle of the Ming period up to the beginning of the Ch’ing period, soldiers were sent into the Miao area. The most important duty of the military garrisons was to keep the communication lines open for troops and food supplies. So the construction of roads and bridges in the area appears monumental. There are four kinds of land routes: the main road connecting Yunnan with Kweichow is the official road; the roads connecting the various military posts are military roads; the roads traversed by the Chinese people are civilian roads; and the small winding paths leading to Miao settlements are Miao roads. Taking Feng-huang as the center, the official road leads to Ch’en-chou, Mo-yang, and Chih-chiang; the military roads lead to Kan-ch’eng, Yung-sui, and T’ung-jen; the civilian roads lead to P’u-shih and Kan-ch’eng; and the Miao roads are on both sides of the military routes, threading out in all directions so numerous that they defy enumeration. The official and the military roads are all paved with stone slabs (Illus. 20), requiring considerable construction work. The civilian roads were not constructed in a uniform way, those passing prosperous areas being much better than others. The Miao paths generally follow the contours of the mountains and require very little human labor. As to the means of transportation, travelers /Illustrations 18-26 occur on pp. 45-52/ generally ride horses or ride in sedan chairs (Illus. 21), while cargo is carried by carriers on their backs.’
[1]
The military administration was organized bureaucratically, as evidenced in primary sources and clerical documents: ’2. Regulations for the organization and administration of the T’un Bureau from the headquarters of the newly organized Thirty-Fourth Division of the Army. Article 1. The said Bureau is to be organized on the order of Divisional Commander Ch’en of the newly organized Thirty-Fourth Division. Article 2. The said Bureau shall set up, according to the temporary organization regulations of the Division, a chief and a deputy chief, three department heads, a number of departmental staff, clerks, and copyists. Article 3. The chief of the Bureau will receive orders from the Commander of the Division, and will have general superintendence over the t’un army west of the Hsiang River, and Miao defense officials and soldiers, t’un grain supplies, and the keeping in order of t’un properties, and coordinate everything, with the authority to direct and supervise all the Bureau’s personnel. Article 4. The said Bureau shall have three departments, Departments One, Two, and Three. Each department head shall receive his orders from the chief of the Bureau, to assist him by dividing control over military matters, t’un matters, and general matters, with the responsibility to direct and manage his particular department’s responsibilities.’
[2]
Chinese officers and Hmong staff in lower-ranking or intermediate roles were salaried officials or otherwise compensated in the form of produce or arable land, which was also rented out to tenants in order to generate government income: ’The t’un fields in the Miao frontier were divided into people’s /i.e. Chinese/ t’uns and Miao t’uns, the two being entirely different in nature. The t’un males working on the Chinese t’uns were also divided into t’un men and fighting men. The t’un men received fields to cultivate, and guarded the t’un guard houses. The fighting men, also called home guards, were solely trained for military operations, and did not farm. In the five sub-prefectures and hsiens of the Miao frontier there are 7,000 t’un men, from among whom are appointed hsiao-ch’i, tsung-ch’i, and pe-tsung to facilitate control. The distribution of fields was as follows: the men /san ting/ are each given 4.5 mu; the hsiao-ch’i, 5.5 mu; the tsung-ch’i, 6.5 mu; and the pe-tsung, 7.5 mu. There are 1,000 fighting men, each being given 3 shih, 6 tou of rice per year. The non-fighting men are also each given annually 10.8 liang of silver for salt and vegetables. The hsiao-ch’i receives each year 12 liang of silver; the tsung-ch’i, 13.2 liang of silver; the pe-tsung, 16.8 liang of silver. Therefore, in the Chinese t’un, the fields and land left over after the t’un men have received their fields to plant and care for are leased out for the collection of rent. Granaries (Illus. 57) have been built to store the grain, and general t’un leaders are set up to manage these matters. There are no t’un men in the Miao t’uns, and the t’un fields are allotted to people to cultivate /Illus. 57 and 58 on pages 124 and 125/ for the collection of rent, in order to feed the Miao soldiers, under the control of the Miao officials. The t’un fields in the Miao frontier region, at the inception of the system, totaled 150,000 mu of arable land, of which barely a third was directly cultivated by t’un personnel, the rest being allotted out as rented fields. Today, the t’un army in the Miao frontier region is about 1,000 strong. The maintainance of the Black Flag Battalion of the Miao troops (Illus. 58) largely comes from the rented fields. T’un fields were set up to support troops on the spot as a defense against the Miao. Today, the Miao have been largely acculturated by the Chinese and the boundary line between the Miao and the Chinese is gradually becoming obliterated. There is no longer the need for this kind of system of t’un defense against the Miao. In fact, unrest in the Miao area today is often due to the maladministration of the t’un fields system. The Miao petty officers and the t’un leaders often are oppressive in collecting rent and sometimes are corrupt in their methods, thus causing dissatisfaction and disturbances. In the twenty-sixth year of the Republic /1937/ the Miao rebellion in western Hunan arose because of the t’un land system. It resulted in the burning of t’un granaries and killing of t’un officers. Although the rebellion was pacified only after bloody and expensive campaigns, it is imperative to change the t’un and enter the newly opened or reclaimed land as available for taxation, so as to reach a fundamental solution.’
[3]
Hmong communities also had their own informal village security: ’The drum tower is also the post for the night watch. Every night three or four able-bodied men, bearing arms, hunting rifles, ammunition, etc., would keep vigil at the drum tower, crying every hour /lit., several tens of minutes/: “Bandits are coming - do not fall asleep.” All through the night one hears these intermittent strange calls, the idea being to prevent the guards themselves from falling asleep, and the bandits, from coming if they should hear such calls and know that the whole village is on the alert. This is like beating the grass with a stick to scare the snakes away. But if the bandits actually come, the watchmen would then climb up the tower to beat the drum, awaking all the able-bodied men in the village to give the bandits a good fight.’
[4]
We have assumed that these observations are true for the A-Hmao as well, despite of historical differences. [The A-Hmao group doesn’t appear to have been directly involved in the more eastern Hmong rebellions, but it appears to have been increasingly subsumed by the Late Qing/Early Chinese in the aftermath of these rebellions.]
[1]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 70 [2]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 177 [3]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 182 [4]: Che-lin, Wu, Chen Kuo-chün, and Lien-en Tsao 1942. “Studies Of Miao-I Societies In Kweichow”, 110 |
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Professional cavalry
’Knights’ given allowances of land for equipping troops at expense of a magnate. They may have been "specially trained professional warrior slaves". [1] Non-professional infantry "The mass of lesser nobles and their retainers were traditional horse archers, mounted on tough steppe ponies and armed with the reflex bow." [2] [1]: Lukonin, V.G., ‘Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade’, in The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2, ed. by Ehsan Yar-Shater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. III, p.700 . [2]: (Penrose 2008, 221) Penrose, Jane. 2008. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. Osprey Publishing. |
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Warfare consisted of small-scale raiding during this period, and sources do not suggest there is evidence for professional military officers or soldiers.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London. [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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“The Igala kingdom had no standing army but there was initiation preparedness where adults were initiated and weapons were amassed awaiting any eventuality. Weapons such as arrows, bows, cutlasses, spears, shields and charms were abundantly stored in the armory. In the absence of standing army, servants, attendants, slaves and a large number of local farmers were mobilized and deployed for operation during wars. In the Igala political kingdom, Attah’s chief were at the head of those local armies but in serious wars such as the one between the Igalas and Jukuns, Attah himself would lead the battle.”
[1]
“Igala (with its capital at Idah) was another major political and commercial power in the Lower Niger. Igala’s importance in the Niger trading system was based on its control of the Niger-Benue confluence. Consequently, it was the meeting-point of trade from the upper reaches of both rivers and, in the case of the Benue, this was specifically through Adda Kuddu which was its vassal. In addition, Igala had the military strength to enforce order on the Niger. In 1832, the Ata of Igala sent his gunboats to punish the Kakanda for disrupting trade; Budon was paying a tribute of one horse a year to Idah, and the Ata’s word was law at Ikiri.”
[2]
[1]: Jacob, Audu. “Pre-Colonial Political Administration in the North Central Nigeria: a Study of the Igala Political Kingdom.” European Scientific Journal, vol. 10, no. 19, 2014, pp. 392–402: 399. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5AN8R7UW/collection [2]: Nwaubani, Ebere. “The Political Economy of Aboh, 1830-1857.” African Economic History, no. 27, 1999, pp. 93–116: 108. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/FZIM9AVA/collection |
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Warfare consisted of small-scale raiding during this period, and sources do not suggest there is evidence for professional military officers or soldiers.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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“The same could not be said for the troops of the Caliphate. The emirates had no standing armies, and the troops they raised were not professional soldiers. Although some emirates had troops armed with guns, their numbers were too small and their expertise in handling their weapons too low to have any significant effect on the outcome of the engagements in which they were used. Smaldone is quite right to point out that the firearms found in the arsenals of some emirates such as Nupe and Ilorin, which did not make much use of guns in their resistance to the British invasion, probably indicated that they did not have men trained in their use. Even when firearms were used, they were not employed to good effect. The British officers who led the assaults on Nupe, Ilorin, Kano and Sokoto all reported that the defenders were poor marksmen and lacked fire discipline. Accurate fire and the efficient use of firearms required skills which could only be acquired through regular training, and this the defenders did not have.”
[1]
[1]: Ubah, Chinedu N. “The British Occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Military Dimension, 1897-1906.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 81–97: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SQX8BRCP/collection |
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Not present for previous period and read nothing to suggest major change, such as warrior burials (although that alone would not mean professionalism). In previous period a general reference was: "The social structure of these communities was thus characterised by few heads of households (elders), marked gender, age and provenance barriers, but few socio-political differences. Consequently, burials do not display any significant diffferences in status."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 42) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Not present for earlier periods and read nothing to suggest major change, such as warrior burials (although that alone would not mean professionalism). In 7000-6000 BCE period a general reference was: "The social structure of these communities was thus characterised by few heads of households (elders), marked gender, age and provenance barriers, but few socio-political differences. Consequently, burials do not display any significant diffferences in status."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 42) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for full-time professional military personnel.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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Originally the Ilkhanid army was a branch of the Mongol army, organised on a tribal basis. The Ilkhans did not adopt the slave-soldier system; instead maintain "large armies of mounted horse archers (supplemented by infantry and cavalry auxiliaries" from local rulers.
[1]
After "the Ilkhanate was no longer expanding and the supply of plunder could not be relied upon" Ghazan the Reformer introduced the iqta system of land grants to pay soldiers. [2] [3] However, it is uncertain "to what extent the distribution of iqtas was actually implemented, for this particular edict was issued only very shortly before Ghazan’s early death in 703/1304." [2] More so because our source for the Ilkhanate’s apparently successful use of the itqa system is Rashid al-Din who was Ghazan’s great minister and the individual responsible for implementing the policy. [4] In any case, Ghazan’s reforms may have put the financing of the army on a better footing, so that eventually warriors were being allocated iqtas [grants of land holding] to provide revenues with which to equip themselves. [5] [1]: Reuven Amitai, ‘Armies and Their Economic Basis in Iran and the Surrounding Lands, c.1000-1500’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.557. [2]: (Morgan 2015, 75) Morgan, David. 2015. Medieval Persia 1040-1797. Routledge. [3]: Reuven Amitai, ‘Armies and Their Economic Basis in Iran and the Surrounding Lands, c.1000-1500’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), P.555, 557. [4]: (Morgan 2015, 75-76) Morgan, David. 2015. Medieval Persia 1040-1797. Routledge. [5]: Morgan, David. The Mongols. 2nd ed. The Peoples of Europe. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p.148 |
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Professional cavalry
’Knights’ given allowances of land for equipping troops at expense of a magnate. They may have been "specially trained professional warrior slaves". [1] Non-professional infantry "The mass of lesser nobles and their retainers were traditional horse archers, mounted on tough steppe ponies and armed with the reflex bow." [2] [1]: Lukonin, V.G., ‘Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade’, in The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2, ed. by Ehsan Yar-Shater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. III, p.700 . [2]: (Penrose 2008, 221) Penrose, Jane. 2008. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. Osprey Publishing. |
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Possibility of this in Uruk phase: "hypothetical." Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE "monopoly of defence forces to protect internal cohesion. The wealth and technical knowledge accumulated in cities had to be defended against foreign attacks, both from other city-states and other enemies (for instance, nomadic tribes). This defence system then turned into an offensive tactic. ... Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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This passage points to a lack of a bureaucratic justice system, which would include lawyers: "The power of chanyu, highest commanders and tribal chiefs at local places was supported by strict but simple traditional ways. As the Xiongnu laws were estimated by the Chinese chronicles, the Xiongnu’s punishments were generally “simple and easily realizable” and were mainly reduced to strokes, exile, and death penalty. It provided an opportunity to quickly resolve conflict situations at different levels of the hierarchical pyramid and to maintain the stability of the political system as a whole. It is no mere chance that for the Chinese, accustomed from childhood to an unwieldy and clumsy bureaucratic machine, the management system of the Xiongnu confederation seemed to be extremely simple: “management of the whole state is similar to that of one’s body” (Sima Qian 1959, ch. 110; Zhongyang 1958, 17)."
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2011, 92) |
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Before the reforms of Khusrau I (later Sassanid period) "all nobles, great and small, had been obliged to equip themselves and their followers and serve in the army without pay, but Khusrau issued equipment to the poorer nobles and paid a salary for their services. Consequently, the power of the great nobles - who frequently had their own private armies - was reduced."
[1]
"Payment for service might have arisen because of the vast income from silver mines, among other sources." [2] [1]: (Chegini 1996, 57) Chegini, N. N. Political History, Economy and Society. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.40-58. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf [2]: (Mitterauer 2010, 106) Mitterauer, M. 2010. Why Europe?: The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path. University of Chicago Press. |
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Possibility of this in Uruk phase: "hypothetical." Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE "monopoly of defence forces to protect internal cohesion. The wealth and technical knowledge accumulated in cities had to be defended against foreign attacks, both from other city-states and other enemies (for instance, nomadic tribes). This defence system then turned into an offensive tactic. ... Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Administrative conventions developed in Uruk period c3800-3000 BCE so this period very low administrative complexity and presumably little capacity to pay and train full time officers and troops.
[1]
First possibility of this was army of Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE: "Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[2]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Full-time specialists The Orokaiva did not employ professional military officers in interclan warfare, relying on residential and kin ties as well as informal leadership: ’In interclan warfare, the Binandere organised a division of fighting labour. The first group, the scouts, were sent ahead to kill the scouts of the enemy’s main body. Then there were the front-line fighters, experienced men armed with clubs/spears and shields, forming the vanguard. Then there was a group of young people and men who had not killed. They beat drums, blew conch shells, sang war songs and generally used sound to frighten the enemy. Full-scale tribal warfare required the addition of two more groups. Firstly, sorcerers were carried on roofed litters from which they attempted to ward off enemy spirits. Being ritually pure they could have no contact with water. They ate only baked taro or bananas with coconut juice as well as much ginger. The second additional group were the strategists who were vital for long-drawn-out battles. This small group planned tactics, directed the front line and organised ambush killings and so on (1972:13-25).’
[1]
’Kinship and local affiliation together were the basic principles by which subgroups of the raiding party seem to have been drawn up during attack and on which leaders within the party based their rights to command specific combatants.’
[2]
’Waiko (1972) describes in detail the warfare of the Binandere, a society which like the ancient Spartans was reputed to practise infanticide on weak or deformed sons (Monckton 1922:130). Training for warfare began at an early age for boys. At about 12 years old they began living together in a men’s house and learning to dodge spears and to hold shields. Eventually they were required to prove themselves by killing a person in a raid (Waiko 1972:21). Part of the education imparted to the youths in the house was their primary duty to take revenge for the death of a clan member. A clan victim represented the clan and failure to avenge his death badly weakened their prestige and status. Killings had up to two generations delayed payback (1972:24-5).’
[3]
’Prior to European contact, aggression against the members of another tribe took the form of organized, often cannibalistic raids.’
[4]
[1]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 490 [2]: Rimoldi, Max, Cromwell Burau, and Robert Ferraris 1966. “Land Tenure And Land Use Among The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 30 [3]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 489 [4]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva |
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"... begun during the Tang dynasty... The rise of religious professionals and soldiers as clearly separate groups was contrary to the previous normative view of society divided into knights (shi, the term that would later be applied to the literati or gentry), farmers, artisans and merchants."
[1]
No reason to assume loss of professionalization after Erlitou, Erligang
[2]
[1]: (Lorge 2005, 7) [2]: (North China Workshop 2016) |
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’The state the Qasimis formed in the midst of this was none the less impressive (for the rulers’ genealogy see Fig. 6.1). Al-Qasim himself, who early in his fight against the Turks had wept over his children starving at Barat, was wealthy when the truce was signed. He built the mosque at Shaharah, then built houses for himself and his followers, planted coffee in al-Ahnum, and amassed more land than the public treasury (Nubdhah: 258, 334-6). The court expanded with the southern conquests. Al-Mutawakkil received an embassy from Ethiopia and exchanged gifts of fine horses with Aurangzib of India (Serjeant 1983: 80-1), while his relatives expressed concern about his monthly demands for funds from Lower Yemen. Further criticism of his taxation policy came from Muhammad al-Ghurbani at Barat, but in 1675 the levies on Lower Yemen were redoubled (ibid. 82). Under Muhammad Ahmad, ’He of al-Mawahib’" (1687-1718), the exactions became more severe still, in support of a grandiose court and a large standing army complete with slave soldiers (ibid., Zabarah 1958: 451, 457; alShawkani 1929: ii. 98).’
[1]
[1]: Dresch, Paul 1989. "Tribes, Government and History in Yemen", 200 |
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"Following the Nyoro invasion, Ntare also began to engage in military innovation, organizing the first regiments (emitwe) of trained warriors rather than relying upon a hasty call-up of able-bodied men. [...] The system of standing regiments (emitwe) under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under Mugabe Mutambuka (1839-67) a century later."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 138, 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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e.g. in the Khan’s personal guard.
[1]
Professional: "By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times." [2] However: "The problem Chinese statesmen had with the standing army was how to keep it out of politics and isolate its functions to a static, reliable instrument of dynastic stability ...The answer for the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties was to fuedalize much of the army into a hereditary class with attached lands that would support them in peacetime." [3] [1]: Bira, Sh. “THE MONGOLS AND THEIR STATE IN THE TWELFTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Vol. IV: The Age of Achievement A.D. 750 to the End of the Fifteenth Century. Part I The Historical, Social and Economic Setting, edited by C. E. Bosworth, Muhammad S. Asimov, and Yar Muhammad Khan, Paris: Unesco, 1998. 255-256 [2]: (Lorge 2005, 7) [3]: (Lorge 2005, 8) |
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Only at the time of Conquest? AD "Simón (1882-92, 5: 198) de- scribes a category of warriors “who had demonstrated their bravery on various occasions, and were allowed to wear their hair long, and tucked into their belts at the back,” a reminder that not all status symbols will be archaeologically identifiable."
[1]
There is no confirmation from Bray that these warriors were full-time soldiers."There is also the question concerning the social positioning of people living in these different residential areas. Were they full time attached specialists such as warriors, masons, featherworkers, bead manufacturers, goldsmiths, or religious specialists as Groot (1985) argues?"
[2]
[1]: (Bray 2003, 203) [2]: (Giraldo 2010, 304) |
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Troops paid with cash salaries included "Kurds, mamluks and free Turkish regulars", who received the best pay, "Arabs of the Kinanah federation .. the asaqilah and other former Fatimid troops received half this; naval troops, probably one quarter; and the remaining Arab auxiliaries, one eighth."
[1]
"To understand the Mamluk army one must first understand the fragmented Ayyubid armies from which it emerged. ... The ‘askar of an Ayyubid ruler, however, consisted of professional, full-time ‘askaris. The most highly regarded of them were by this time largely of mamluk origin, though their numbers could still be remarkably small." [2] "Those Muslim archers and javelin-throwers who opened the battle of Arsuf in 1191 may have included trained professional infranty." [3] [1]: (Nicolle 1986, 20) Nicolle, D. 1986. Saladin and the Saracens. Osprey Publishing Ltd. Oxford. [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. [3]: (Nicolle 1986, 19) Nicolle, D. 1986. Saladin and the Saracens. Osprey Publishing Ltd. Oxford. |
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Under the rule of Peter I, a significant transformation in the Russian military was initiated, leading to the establishment of a modern, regular army modeled after the German system. A key feature of this new military structure was the implementation of conscription, a system of compulsory enlistment drawing predominantly from the peasant and townspeople populations. The conscription system was organized based on quotas determined by the number of households or population figures within settlements and districts. This approach marked a departure from traditional military recruitment and played a pivotal role in shaping the composition and size of the Russian army during this period.
[1]
[1]: Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century, Paperback ed., 2. print. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972). Zotero link: G9K39WS5 |
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Garrisoned forces.
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"The suffix gulma in the name Vatsagulma is also interesting. Manu regards gulma as a station where an army unit was posted for protection of the kingdom (Misra 1987: 645-647)."
[1]
[1]: (Sawant 2009) Reshma Sawant. 2008. ‘State Formation Process In The Vidarbha During The Vakataka Period’. Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute 68-69: 137-162.< |
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Standing army fell at different points in the range between free and paid service. Indigenous guardsmen in Mataram did not represent a true stipendiary force, for they received income from land allotments and sustenance from the food grown on these lands, but were not paid directly by the court. Reliance on land allotments meant that the standing army was just as affected by drought and famine as the general population.
[1]
Only a minority of soldiers were professional.
[2]
[1]: (Charney 2004, 231) [2]: (Schrieke 1957, 127) |
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"The standing army ... was made up of professional soldiers stationed in garrisons and cleruchic troops serving, in turn, presumably for only part of the year, in garrisons. All cleruchic troops were mobilized simultaneously only in case of war. In addition, the existence of a mixed group, the misthophoroi klerouchoi, shows that the system was flexible."
[1]
"professional or mercenary soldiers received cash (opsonion or misthos) and food, whereas cleruchs were granted plots of land (kleroi)." [2] [1]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 118-119) [2]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 118) |
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"The standing army ... was made up of professional soldiers stationed in garrisons and cleruchic troops serving, in turn, presumably for only part of the year, in garrisons. All cleruchic troops were mobilized simultaneously only in case of war. In addition, the existence of a mixed group, the misthophoroi klerouchoi, shows that the system was flexible."
[1]
"professional or mercenary soldiers received cash (opsonion or misthos) and food, whereas cleruchs were granted plots of land (kleroi)." [2] [1]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 118-119) [2]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 118) |
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[1]
"To understand the Mamluk army one must first understand the fragmented Ayyubid armies from which it emerged. The term ‘askar could refer to the unit garrisoning, or paid, by a town, as it would have done for centuries, and these early ‘askaris would not normally be considered part of the military elite. The ‘askar of an Ayyubid ruler, however, consisted of professional, full-time ‘askaris. The most highly regarded of them were by this time largely of mamluk origin, though their numbers could still be remarkably small.
[2]
"For rank-and-file mamluks, military salaries were their main sources of income and it is clear that throughout the medieval period, military wages were almost always above those earned by skilled craftsmen." [2] "‘Iqta fiefs were allocated to those of senior or sometimes middle rank. These men were called muqtas. In the Mamluk Sultanate a muqta maintained a certain number of soldiers, his own mamluks and sometimes other lesser troops. He and his military household then owed military service to the sultan. The muqta also paid his troops’ expenses from the revenues of his ‘iqta. The men would then purchase what they required on campaign from the suq al-‘askar ‘soldiers’ market’. Each regular soldier was also paid, either by his muqta or by the sultan." [2] [1]: (Oliver 1977, 41) [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. |
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The Bolsheviks’ new army, which they called the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Raboche Krest’ianskaia Krasnaia Armiia, RKKA) did, surprisingly enough, start out nearly as Lenin had envisioned. Based on Red Guard detachments the Bolsheviks’ first military force was completely voluntary, drawn from the working class, and determined to defend the revolution. It soon became apparent to even the most idealistic of revolutionaries, however, that groupings of Red Guards did not constitute an army. The civilian leadership also quickly realized that the tasks at hand, such as preserving an empire threatened by independence movements and defending their fledgling Bolshevik government from a counterrevolutionary civil war and foreign intervention, required a real army and all it entailed. In March 1918 Lenin assigned Leon Trotsky the task of creating a true army.
Trotsky wisely dropped most of his Marxist utopian preconceptions of what an army ought to look like and immediately began forming an army along traditional lines. This included creation of a hierarchy of officers and enlisted men and provisions for military discipline and organization. [1] [1]: Roger Reese, The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (Routledge, 1999). Zotero link: G9K39WS5 |
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"The tribal home guard has formed a part of the military organization side by side with the professional army divisions of emperor and a number of eminent aristocrats and armed forces of vassal people. It is not accidental that in Laio shi it is mentioned that a banner is a distinctive attribute of a tribe (LS 49: 1b-2a)."
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2014, 156) |
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Cretan mercenaries were especially valued in armies.
[1]
The difficult economic conditions forced many young men to found employment as mercenaries in foreign armies especially after the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE). They were employed in the armies of Sparta and Athens, in the armies of Cyrus (404 BCE), Amirtaios king of Egypt (end of 5th century BCE), and Alexander the Great. Cretan mercenaries were exclusively citizens who could provide their own arms.
[1]: Willetts, R. F. 1965. Ancient Crete. A Social History, London and Toronto, 145-48. |
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Lynn notes that armies of the fifteenth, sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were assembled for particular campaigns from a combination of native French units, foreign hired mercenary bands (usually Swiss) and the private armies of major nobles who offered their services in exchange for money or favor. This is known an “aggregate contract army” rather than a standing army composed of professional officers and soldiers. “The quality of the foreign mercenaries was much higher than the far less professional French.”
[1]
According to historian Henrico Davila, Henry IV was the General of a volunteer army
[2]
in addition to the hired mercenaries. Lynn notes that “the French army, particularly its infantry, had once been an aggregate of temporary mercenary units and private forces raised by grandees, but by the mid-1600s, it had become the province of the King alone, a royal instrument with a large permanent establishment directly commanded by the monarch,” and yet, “ostensibly voluntary enlistment provided most of the recruits.”
[3]
“The state never mastered the ability to pay for its own army.”
[4]
According to Mears, it was not until later that professionalism came under regular control. “In 1670, a uniform scale of pay was laid down for each branch of the service, and what was more important, the pay was actually forthcoming.”
[5]
[1]: (Lynn 1997, 6-7) [2]: (Davila p.534) [3]: (Lynn 1997, xvi-xvii, 7-8) [4]: (Lynn 1997, xvii, 8) [5]: (Mears 1969, 113) |
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“Another feature of Ajuran rule was a powerful armed, mounted army that policed the state and collected taxes, or ‘tributes,’ of cereal and livestock.”
[1]
[1]: (Mukhtar 2003, 35) Mukhtar, Mohamed H. 2003. Historical Dictionary of Somalia. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Mukhtar/titleCreatorYear/items/J8WZB6VI/item-list |
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In the nineteenth century, conflict broke out between Baardheere Jamaaca jihadists and the Geledi Sultanate. “The ensuing violence disrupted the peace on which the seaborne trade prospered; hence sultan Ibrahim of Gobroon decided to intervene in the war with a show of force involving 40,000 soldiers and comprising both professionals and volunteers.”
[1]
[1]: (Njoku 2013, 41) Njoku, Raphael C. 2013. The History of Somalia. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/U9FHBPZF/library |
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Dates currently based on estimates.
Present: "By the first years of the 13th century the French king could maintain a virtual standing army on his frontier with English-ruled Normandy. [1] Absent: Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [2] [1]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 7) [2]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 35) |
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There were full-time elite warriors
[1]
. Kalani’ōpu’u of the Big Island had a large standing army
[2]
[1]: Kirch, P. V. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pg. 71. [2]: Kirch, P. V. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pg. 75. |
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Full-time specialists. We can infer the presence of a well-organized military. There is evidence for armour
[1]
and noble cavalry
[2]
which suggest specialization, and a military campaign was launched against Srivijaya.
[3]
Elephants were used in warfare
[2]
and their riders were called maliman.
[4]
[1]: (Draeger 1972, 23) [2]: (Gaukroger and Scott 2009, 134) [3]: (Muljana 2006, 246) [4]: Hall 2000, 65) |
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e.g. jandars (king bodyguards).
[1]
Under Alauddin Khilji "a regular muster of armed forces was maintained."
[2]
Payment of soldiers in cash was a measure adopted by Alauddin Khilji. [2] [1]: Habibullah, A. B. M. (1961). The foundation of Muslim rule in India. Central Book Depot, pp 217. [2]: (Ahmed 2011, 98) Ahmed, Farooqui Salma. 2011. A Comprehensive History of Medieval India: Twelfth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century. Pearson Education India. |
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[1]
The Ksatriya were a hereditary warrior class that formed the backbone of the army. They were supported by auxiliary forces made up of mercenaries, freelance soldiers, subordinate allies, deserters and forest and hill tribesmen. "a complex war office with six subsidiary departments administered and provisioned a paid standing army of nearly 700,000 men and thousands of elephants." [2] "The army was to be recruited from ’robbers, mountain men, gangs, forest people, and warrior clans’. Soldiers were to receive a regular salary and their equipment". [3] "By the time of the Mauryas, whatever sort of conscription had once existed earlier had disappeared, and the imperial armies were armies of professional warrior aristocrats and other professionals fed, equipped, trained, paid, and otherwise maintained at great cost to the state." [4] [1]: Gabriel, Richard A. The great armies of antiquity. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. p. 217 [2]: (McClellan III and Dorn 2015, 164) McClellan III, James E. Dorn, Harold. 2015. Science and Technology in World History: An Introduction. JHU Press. [3]: (Bradford and Bradford 2001, 126) Bradford, Alfred S. Bradford, Pamela, M. 2001. With Arrow, Sword, and Spear: A History of Warfare in the Ancient World. Greenwood Publishing Group. [4]: (Gabriel 2002, 218) Gabriel, Richard A. 2002. The Great Armies of Antiquity. Greenwood Publishing Group. |
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“The military administration was efficiently organized and a regular army was associated with each ruler.”
[1]
[1]: (Jankiraman, 2020) Jankiraman, M. 2020. Perspectives in Indian History: From the Origins to AD 1857. Chennai: Notion Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/N3D88RXF/collection |
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"Following the Nyoro invasion, Ntare also began to engage in military innovation, organizing the first regiments (emitwe) of trained warriors rather than relying upon a hasty call-up of able-bodied men. [...] The system of standing regiments (emitwe) under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under Mugabe Mutambuka (1839-67) a century later."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 138, 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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Only at the time of Conquest? AD "Simón (1882-92, 5: 198) de- scribes a category of warriors “who had demonstrated their bravery on various occasions, and were allowed to wear their hair long, and tucked into their belts at the back,” a reminder that not all status symbols will be archaeologically identifiable."
[1]
There is no confirmation from Bray that these warriors were full-time soldiers."There is also the question concerning the social positioning of people living in these different residential areas. Were they full time attached specialists such as warriors, masons, featherworkers, bead manufacturers, goldsmiths, or religious specialists as Groot (1985) argues?"
[2]
[1]: (Bray 2003, 203) [2]: (Giraldo 2010, 304) |
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[1]
"Hymns refer to warriors, priests, cattle-rearers, farmers, hunters, barbers, and vintners."
[2]
[1]: J Duncan M. Derrett, ‘Social and Political Thought and Institutions’, in A. L Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp.128-129; Burjor Avari, India: The Ancient Past: a History of the Indian Sub-continent from c. 7000 BC to AD 1200 (London: Routledge, 2007), p.73. [2]: Singh, U. (2008) A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India, From the Stone Age to the 12th Century. Dorling Kindersley: Delhi. p190 |
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"decentralized administration of the iqta type".
[1]
Iqta system of land revenue grants used to pay military in late Abbasid times.
[2]
Recruited mercenaries "from across ethnic and tribal communities that they hoped would be more loyal."
[3]
[1]: (Roberts 1973, 529) Roberts, J. 1973. Civilization: The emergence of man in society. CRM Books. [2]: (Lapidus 2014, 286) Lapidus, Ira M. 2014. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge University Press. [3]: (Volk 2015) Volk, Lucia ed. 2015. The Middle East in the World: An Introduction. Routledge. |
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[1]
"The Akkadian professional army, Diakonoff suggested, gave individual citizens another path to personal advancement, further undermining local community self-government."
[2]
[1]: Hamblin 2006, 97 [2]: (Foster 2016, 45) Foster, Benjamin R. 2016. The Age of Agade. Inventing Empire In Ancient Mesopotamia. Routledge. London. |
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The following quote--though not entirely reliable--suggests the possible existence of a standing army, which implies the existence of full-time professional soldiers. "Labat’s account was published in 1725, but refers to events at around 1700, and though clearly drawing on second-hand information is worth citing: ’[In Kaabu] at the start of this century there was a king called Biram Mansaté who lived more splendidly and magnificently than all the other kings of the region. He [...] always had six or seven thousand soldiers well armed and ready for war, through which means he harrassed all of his neighbours, making them pay regular tributes and punishing those who refused to pay with military executions, or again making them pay double. He had such a powerful control of his States, and everything was so well controlled, that merchants could easily leave their goods on the main roads without fear that anyone would touch them”."
[1]
[1]: Green 2009: 94) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. |
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Clan and tribal organizations traditional to nomadic peoples were likely "reflected in the administrative structure of the state and in the organization of the army".
[1]
Presumably a military aristocracy. inferred present for full-time and trained.
[1]: (Zeimal 1996, 136) Zeimal, E. V. The Kidarite Kingdom In Central Asia. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.123-137. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf |
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Copied from IqUrIII. "Many records clearly show the aga-uš in specifically military activities (...), particularly in the entourage of the king and of the army’s leadership (...). His life was that of a soldier (...); he was provided with weapons, for the use of which a regular regime of training was necessary (...) and he clearly served under a military chain of command".
[1]
[1]: Lafont 2009,9-10 |
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"Many records clearly show the aga-uš in specifically military activities (...), particularly in the entourage of the king and of the army’s leadership (...). His life was that of a soldier (...); he was provided with weapons, for the use of which a regular regime of training was necessary (...) and he clearly served under a military chain of command".
[1]
[1]: Lafont 2009,9-10 |
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Soldiers were paid through a type of feudal system governed by military officers.
[1]
"It has been estimated that in the early fourth/tenth century foot soldiers were being paid about six dinars a month while the cavalry received forty. This meant that the cavalry became a privileged class, anxious to preserve their position, and the conflict was made worse by the fact that the cavalry were Turks while the infantry were almost entirely Daylamites." [2] [1]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran under the Būyids. In Frye, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuq’s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.252 [2]: (Kennedy 2004, 220) Kennedy, Hugh N. 2004. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates. Second edition. Pearson Longman. Harlow. |
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“Written sources refer to powerful clan groups and their leaders, to many kinds of lesser titled officials, to guilds and corporations of artists, fishers, farmers and soldiers attached to the clans.”
[1]
[1]: (Aikens, C. Melvin and Takayasu Higuhi. 1982. Prehistory of Japan. New York: Academic Press, 253.) |
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Possibly present, as comments by Mazarire clearly imply a military organization of some kind – though not necessarily a fully specialized one. Comments from Portuguese primary records analysed by Livneh seem to more clearly imply specialization, but the European pre-conceptions of the Portuguese documents these perceptions are sourced from may be distorting the reality of the situation. “Mutapa Gatsi Rusere, who succeeded to the throne in 1586, suffered a number of setbacks, among them the Maravi invasions led by Kapambo and Chikanda. These had fuelled divisions in the Mutapa army and subsequently led to a revolt by its high-ranking staff, including the general, or mukomohasha.”
[1]
“When the Mutapa planned a military expedition, the account goes, he gathered his ‘mutumbus’, who are like dukes, marquises and barons, for a war council. The European titles would denote control over land, and high standing. These, accompanied by the ‘priest’, Simboti (Cimbote), and ‘war counsellors’ decided on the plan of the coming war. Then it was delivered into the hands of the three ‘generals’, who were responsible for carrying out the decisions.”
[2]
[1]: (Mazarire 2009, 16) Gerald C. Mazarire, “Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe, c. 850-1880s,” in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulos & A.S. Mlambo (Harare, Weaver: 2009). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/B9TK7GP8/item-details [2]: (Livneh 1976, 112) “Pre-Colonial Polities in Southern Zambesia and their Political Communications,” Doctoral Dissertation, University of London, 1976. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/CWC584VN/item-details |
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“There seems to be no doubt now that the new Walasma rulers of the Harar plateau began to annex extensive Somali tribal areas to the east and south-east. The Somali interior of the Horn was used by them as an inexhaustible source of manpower for their growing army, which was always kept active in the perennial frontier clashes with the Christian empire.”
[1]
[1]: (Tamrat 2008, 153) Tamrat, Taddesse. 2008. ‘Ethiopia, the Red Sea and the Horn’ In the Cambridge History of Africa: c. 1050 – c.1600 vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp 98-182. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Tamrat/titleCreatorYear/items/A68FCWWI/item-list |
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"the sultan maintained a force of paid personal guards (ḵawaṣṣ) who were recruited from several different nomadic and semi-nomadic groups."
[1]
"land grant system practiced since Saljuq times" (Iqta system) used to pay soldiers. [1] [1]: (Quiring-Zoche 2011) Quiring-Zoche, R. 2011. Aq Qoyunlu. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aq-qoyunlu-confederation |
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[1]
"For rank-and-file mamluks, military salaries were their main sources of income and it is clear that throughout the medieval period, military wages were almost always above those earned by skilled craftsmen." [2] "‘Iqta fiefs were allocated to those of senior or sometimes middle rank. These men were called muqtas. In the Mamluk Sultanate a muqta maintained a certain number of soldiers, his own mamluks and sometimes other lesser troops. He and his military household then owed military service to the sultan. The muqta also paid his troops’ expenses from the revenues of his ‘iqta. The men would then purchase what they required on campaign from the suq al-‘askar ‘soldiers’ market’. Each regular soldier was also paid, either by his muqta or by the sultan." [2] [1]: (Oliver 1977, 41) [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. |
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[1]
Difficult to say that the Elamite soldiers were employed full time, but they were known in Mesopotamia for being good bowmen, which might imply professionalism.
[1]: Potts, D.T. 1999. The Archaeology of Elam: Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.268 |
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Professional cavalry
’Knights’ given allowances of land for equipping troops at expense of a magnate. They may have been "specially trained professional warrior slaves". [1] Non-professional infantry "The mass of lesser nobles and their retainers were traditional horse archers, mounted on tough steppe ponies and armed with the reflex bow." [2] [1]: Lukonin, V.G., ‘Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade’, in The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2, ed. by Ehsan Yar-Shater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. III, p.700 . [2]: (Penrose 2008, 221) Penrose, Jane. 2008. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. Osprey Publishing. |
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Paid soldiers.
[1]
"Iran had not had a national military force since the days of Naser al Din Shah. In 1878, on his second trip abroad, Naser al Din Shah had seen a parade by Cossack soldiers in Russia. Greatly impressed, he asked the Czar whether a similar force could be established in Iran. in 1879 under a 40-year agreement the Russians established a Cossack Brigaded manned by Iranians and commanded by Russian officiers. The brigade thereafter was always a tool of Russian imperialist designs and Persian autocracy, serving primarily as a bodyguard for the Shah." [2] [1]: (Ghani 2000, 13) Cyrus Ghani. 2000. Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah. From Qaja Collapse to Pahlavi Power. I B Tauris. London. [2]: (Ghani 2000, 15) Cyrus Ghani. 2000. Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah. From Qaja Collapse to Pahlavi Power. I B Tauris. London. |
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A regular force of soldiers and mercenaries were employed by the Seleucid kings.
[1]
This included up to 30,000 regular soldiers, 8,000 cavalry and 16,000 mercenary soldiers for various major campaigns.
[2]
[1]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p197 [2]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p191 |
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Unclear whether they were full-time specialists, but there was certainly an officially defined force of warriors. “We noted earlier that the creation of Odibo-Odionwere in Benin villages in the premonarchical period was the beginning of military thought for purposes of government. When the institution of monarchy was established, Igodo created Odibo-Ogiso, as a kind of military institution, apparently for fear of the threat to internal security. The idea was to ensure that a loyal fighting force will always be available to defend the king and his kingdom. The Odibo-Ogiso may not have constituted an effective fighting force, but probably suited to perform the task of internal defence and protection of the Ogiso rulers. Rather than consolidate the Odibo-Ogiso as an effective fighting force, Ogiso Ere created the Avbiogbe as a special squad within the Odibo-Ogiso with the same common task: the personal security of the king, the announcement and enforcement of royal proclamations, and the supervision of land allocation.”
[1]
“The semblance of a military institution began to evolve during the reign of Ogiso Odoligie, the twenty-fourth king of the dynasty. He is reputed to have organised the first group of Benin warriors called Ivbiyokuo. Initially, the fighting force was restricted to the Avbiogbe but it was expanded to include all the Ighele age group, and this marked the beginning of a civic militia in Benin history. Thus, Odoligie became the first ruler in Benin to succeed in organising an army of his subjects. He was not a warrior king nor did he assign himself the responsibility of being the war commander of the army, nor was the Ezomo given the responsibility to be the commander of the Benin army. Rather, he created two new war chieftaincy titles, the Esagho ‘as the greatest war chief’ and the Olou as another ‘great war chief.’ They had the responsibility to co-ordinate and command the war leaders who were called Okakuo, and to also lead the militia in war. This was, indeed the birth of a really fighting force, although the extent in which they were trained in military discipline is not well known.”
[2]
[1]: Osadolor, O. B. (2001). The Military System of Benin Kingdom, c.1440–1897. University of Hamburg, Germany: 68. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4RZF5H5/collection [2]: Osadolor, O. B. (2001). The Military System of Benin Kingdom, c.1440–1897. University of Hamburg, Germany: 69. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4RZF5H5/collection |
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Professional soldiers were present, usually as mercenaries, but the Patrimony did not have a full-time, standing army during this period.
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Sultan’s army at the attack on San’a "The sultan took to the field and marched to the said city of San’ a with his army, in which there were three thousand horsemen, sons of Christians, as black as Moors [ie Ethiopians]. They were those of Prester John, whom they purchased at the age of eight or nine years, and had them trained to arms. These constituted his own guard, because they were worth more than the rest"
[1]
[1]: Porter, Venetia Ann (1992) The history and monuments of the Tahirid dynasty of the Yemen 858-923/1454-1517, Durham theses, Durham University, pp. 111-113, Available at Durham E-Theses Online: |
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"The fubing system had originally preserved the Chinese ideal of the farmer-soldier, but after the early Tang soldiers became increasingly a separate, professional class. By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times."
[1]
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"The military potential of Elymais was definitely greater (an army of 15,000 is attested for it in 124 bc), but the Arsakids forfeited the country intermittently."
[1]
Between this information and likely continuity with the Seleucids, it seems reasonable to infer the existence of a well-organised army with likely professional soldiers and officers. A regular force of soldiers and mercenaries were employed by the Seleucid kings. [2] [1]: (Olbrycht 2016. 309) Olbrycht, M. J. 2016. MANPOWER RESOURCES AND ARMY ORGANISATION IN THE ARSAKID EMPIRE. Ancient Society 46: 291-338. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/MANPOWER%20RESOURCES%20AND%20ARMY%20ORGANISATION%20IN%20THE%20ARSAKID%20EMPIRE/titleCreatorYear/items/3HUSBQ3E/item-list [2]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p197 |
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"By the end of the Eastern Han the system of universal military service, developed during the Warring States period and maintained into Western Han, had been abandoned, as China’s rulers found smaller, more professional forces to be of greater utility in guarding the steppe frontier and also less of a threat to the central authority (they were, for example, less susceptible to being suborned by local elites). These forces included highly effective cavalry contingents recruited from among steppe peoples, such as the Wuhuan of the Northeast. The trend toward the creation of a long-serving, professional soldiery culminated during the multi-cornered civil wars at the end of the second century and crystallized in the form of new military institutions during the Three Kingdoms period."
[1]
"Another significant financial burden of this period was military service. Under the Cao-Wei, the military consisted mainly of professional soldiers of hereditary military households, and military service had minimal impact on freehold subjects. Under the Western Jin, the practice con- tinued, but for a variety of reasons the sources of troops dried up. Consequently, the government had to conscript and enlist freeholders and to convert bondservants, servile clients (tongke), and criminals to become professional soldiers. Because of the extremely low social status of military households and professional soldiers, the social and financial costs to the individuals involved were extremely high." [2] [1]: (Graff 2019: 294) Graff, D. A. 2019. The Art of War. In Dien and Knapp (eds) The Cambridge History of China Volume 2: The Six Dynasties, 220–589 pp. 275-295. Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/8I4JZ4PC/library [2]: (Xiong 2019: 316) Xiong, V. C. 2019. The Northern Economy. In Dien and Knapp (eds) The Cambridge History of China Volume 2: The Six Dynasties 220-589 pp. 309-329. Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/KZB84M8U/library |
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"Another significant financial burden of this period was military service. Under the Cao-Wei, the military consisted mainly of professional soldiers of hereditary military households, and military service had minimal impact on freehold subjects. Under the Western Jin, the practice con- tinued, but for a variety of reasons the sources of troops dried up. Consequently, the government had to conscript and enlist freeholders and to convert bondservants, servile clients (tongke), and criminals to become professional soldiers. Because of the extremely low social status of military households and professional soldiers, the social and financial costs to the individuals involved were extremely high."
[1]
[1]: (Xiong 2019: 316) Xiong, V. C. 2019. The Northern Economy. In Dien and Knapp (eds) The Cambridge History of China Volume 2: The Six Dynasties 220-589 pp. 309-329. Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/KZB84M8U/library |
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Khan’s special guard. inferred continuity from the Mongol Empire.
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Full-time specialists ’Soldiers were present in the form of retainers (sveinar) of powerful men (bishops, governors, sheriffs).’
[1]
In the Norwegian period, the system of chieftains and other prominent figures, such as royal officials, supported by groups of armed followers continued, despite of the general decline of feuding: ’During the first years following the establishment of the union conditions in Iceland remained quite unchanged. The godords were still in the hands of the leading chieftains. Gizur, who was to exercise the highest authority as jarl, was unpopular, and his power was very limited. Royal commissioners were sent to Iceland to exercise control with or without his consent, and and he had to share his nominal authority with the powerful Oddaverjar chieftains of southern Iceland, Hrafn Oddsson of the Borgarfjord district, and Orm Ormsson of eastern Iceland. The king regarded him with suspicion; the chieftains hated him because of his rank and title; opposition and difficulties confronted him everywhere. Even his own character and previous record rendered him unfit to maintain peace and order, which was his principal official duty. He was unable to see the need of any change in the general régime, and the last chapter of his stormy life formed a fitting close to the drama of bloody feuds in which he had played so conspicuous a part. Shortly after the meeting of the Althing of 1264, while visiting in southern Iceland, he was suddenly attacked by Thord Andrisson, the head of the Oddaverjar family. With great difficulty he escaped from his assailants, and after gathering an army of 750 men he cruelly ravged the Rangarvalla district, where the Oddaverjar chieftains were dwelling.’
[2]
No standing armies were stationed on the island, and Norwegian efforts to raise armed support from Icelanders were generally unsuccessful: ’Nor did Iceland become a part of Norway’s system of national defence. No measures for defence of the country were taken, and it was only on rare occasions that the king attempted to induce the Icelanders to contribute forces or money for the defence of the kingdom, generally with little success.’
[3]
’Strained relations with Denmark and the Hanseatic cities also gave cause for uneasiness and inclined them to favor an adjustment of domestic difficulties. Jarl Alf Erlingsson of Thornberg, who was now the most influential member of the Council, even turned to Iceland to secure military aid for the realm. It was decided that for the defense of the kingdom 240 men should be sent from Iceland, together with those who were otherwise bound to the king’s service. [...] The plan was soon abandoned by the Council, but Arni had earned the king’s good-will by his loyal attitude.’
[4]
[1]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [2]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 211p [3]: Karlsson, Gunnar 2000. "A Brief History of Iceland", 19 [4]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 222p |
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Officers were permanently employed, but the rank-and-file had to report to duty and training at the capital on a rotation system, depending upon how far away they lived. ... the men supported themselves for most of the year by farming..."
[1]
"From 737 it was decided to replace the militia entirely with paid chien-erh regulars; they were recruited by calling for volunteers from the population in general." [2] [1]: (Peers 2002, 12) [2]: (Peers 2002, 14) |
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Mercenaries.
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Soldiers were posted across the empire. In 1881 British India had an imperial army of 63,000.
[1]
[1]: (Smith 1881: 4, 9) Smith, George. 1882. The Geography of British India, Political & Physical. London: J. Murray. http://archive.org/details/geographybritis00smitgoog. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/AW5H8NPI |
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“In order to understand the nature and significance of these changes, one must first examine the Western Han military system carried forward, in modified form, from the Qin. Every adult male between the ages of 23 […] and 56 was required to give two full years of military service, one in the capital or at the frontier and one as a regular soldier in his own commandery. Selected individuals were trained as ‘Skilled Soldiers’ (cai guan) who were expert in using the crossbow, ‘Cavalrymen’ (ji shi), or sailors on a ‘Towered Warship’ (lou chuan), all of whom received higher status and better treatment. […] Each year in the eighth month every commandery was supposed to hold an inspection in which the commandery troops under the direction of the Commandant (du wei), the local military official, demonstrated their skills to the Grand Administrator (tai shou), the head of local government.
“There are two essential features in this system that must be noted. First, while all free adult males were obligated to provide military service, campaign armies were based on the three categories of elite troops: the ‘Skilled Soldiers’, ‘Cavalrymen’ and ‘Towered Warships’. Other soldiers served as porters, guards, and (literally) spear carriers, but the burden of combat against substantial, armed enemies was born by the elite categories of warriors. The division of armed forces—well-trained, crack units who were responsible for significant combat as opposed to partially-trained conscripts who provided support and the weight of massed bodies—was inherited from the Warring States period. Second, for local government the key feature was the annual training session and inspection under the supervision of a specialist military official.” [1] Conscripts spent a year of service in training [2] However, "... begun during the Tang dynasty... The rise of religious professionals and soldiers as clearly separate groups was contrary to the previous normative view of society divided into knights (shi, the term that would later be applied to the literati or gentry), farmers, artisans and merchants." [3] [1]: (Lewis 2000, 34-36) Lewis, M. E. 2000. The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service. In H. J. Van De Ven (ed.) Warfare in Chinese History pp. 33-76. Brill. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/the%20han%20abolition/titleCreatorYear/items/UKM7G8B8/item-list [2]: (Peers 1995, 13) [3]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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"By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times."
[1]
[1]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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"The enrollment of Greek mercenaries increased again under the last Egyptian pharaohs, who used both Greek mercenaries and Egyptian soldiers for military expeditions, for example when Teo attacked the Persians in the late 360s BC. But they also stationed them together in their garrisons, as during the second Persian invasion."
[1]
[1]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 24) |
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In Theban Egypt:
"The continuing military ethos of the time is illustrated by the popularity of military titles such as "commander of the crew of the ruler" and "commander of the town regiment." They show a defensive grouping of military resources around the king and confirm the importance of local militias based on towns." [1] [1]: (Bourriau 2003, 192) |
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Nubian mercenaries would have been paid.
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"Between 1655 and 1675 the royal army was transformed from a motley collection of privately raised forces, with only a small core of permanent royal troops, into a passably well disciplined and organized body of nearly 100,000 men even in peacetime. The soldiers were still mercenaries, and an element of private enterprise remained, but in essentials the War Ministry had achieved a degree of control unprecedented in early modern Europe."
[1]
[1]: (Briggs 1998, 141) |
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absent but with the exception of bodyguards
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absent but with the exception of bodyguards
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“Forbes, the English traveller, estimated in 1845 that the army consisted of twelve thousand soldiers, five thousand of whom were women.”
[1]
“The first kings had led their own armies to war. In the nineteenth century they were content to follow in the wake of the main body with their retinues, spurring on their officers from the rear. Firearms were first introduced towards the end of the seventeenth century; in the eighteenth century the army even possessed a few cannon. Rapidly a gun became the indispensable part of a Dahomean soldier’s equipment, replacing the bow and arrowentirely except for one or two companies. In the second half of the nineteenth century there were two armies: a standing army of male and female warriors, and a reserve army of all adult men and women capable of bearing arms. They were mobilized by the king in time of war. The regular army consisted of fourteen regiments of about eight hundred men strong, and three brigades of Amazons amounting altogether to three thousand. Two officers, ranked as councillors, commanded the army. The Gau, the commander-in-chief, led the right wing. During the campaign he shared the prerogatives of the king. The Kposu, second-in-command, led the left wing. In peace-time the Gau came under the Migan, on the king’s right; the Kposu came under the Meu, on the king’s left.Regular soldiers wore blue-and-white tunics and were organized into regiments and companies, under the command of an officer, each with its own drums and standard. Veterans wore indigo tunics and were called atchi. Among the others, the more numerous were the fusiliers, who fought with bayonets, and the blunderbussmen, or agbaraya. The Ashanti company was the élite corps, formed of the king’s hunters. Lastly, there were companies of archers, armed with poisoned arrows, a cavalry company, and a few artillerymen.The Amazons were organized into two separate corps: a permanent army and a reserve. The reserve company guarded the capital, and especially the palace, in war-time. In the nineteenth century the Amazons were highly organized. They wore uniforms similar to the men’s: sleeveless tunics, with blue-and-white stripes, reached to the knees; baggy breeches were held in at the waist by a cartridge belt. Members of the king’s bodyguard wore a band of white ribbon about the forehead, embroidered with a blue crocodile. Amazons lived at the palace and belonged to the king, who recruited them from free Dahomeans and captives. They were celibate and were forbidden to marry until they reached middle age, when they still needed the king’s consent. In peace-time they saw to their own needs by manufacturing pots or carving calabashes; both crafts were their exclusive monopoly.During the campaign the Amazon army was organized into three groups: the Fanti company - royal bodyguard - constituted the main body, and the left and right wings came under female officers who corresponded to the Gau and Kposu of the male army. Individual companies were distinguished by the arms they carried: bayonets, muskets (each musketeer was accompanied by a carrier), and bows and arrows (borne by the youngest recruits). The élite corps, the Fanti company, consisted of the famed elephant huntresses, the boldest and toughest of the Amazons.”
[2]
[1]: Lombard, J. (1976). The Kingdom of Dahomey. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 70–92). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 86. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/T6WTVSHZ/collection [2]: Lombard, J. (1976). The Kingdom of Dahomey. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 70–92). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press; 86–88. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/T6WTVSHZ/collection |
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"As in Maurya times, the maula (hereditary soldiers who were Kshartiyas) constituted the core personnel of the Gupta Army. The next best were the mercenaries who were hired on a temporary basis."
[1]
[1]: (Roy 2016, 21) Kaushik Roy. 2016. Military Manpower, Armies and Warfare in South Asia. Routledge. Abingdon. |
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A kind of professional soldiers were present: since campaigning was seasonal, soldiers fought for part of the year and then acted as a kind of police force. Alternatively they might spend their off period farming the land given to them in payment for military service as described by the soldier Ubarrum.
[1]
[1]: Oates, J. Babylon. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson. p.72 |
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[Only after 1200 CE the chieftains had retainers.] Some Icelanders joined foreign armies abroad: ’Isolated in the North Atlantic, Iceland had few external conflicts. Individual Icelanders were occasionally involved in conflict when outside the country and also sometimes served in foreign militaries. During the late tenth century, the Norwegian king was a champion of the Christian movement in Iceland and often attempted to assert his influence, although this was largely limited to Icelanders in Norway. Likewise, the ultimately successful attempts to incorporate Iceland under the Norwegian monarchy were mostly played out through alliances with individual Icelanders.’
[1]
Chieftains relied on an entourage of armed followers: ’Those who had access to sufficient resources to support a household were the tax paying farmers. Each of them had to be a follower of a chieftain from his own quarter, and only the tax paying farmers could make the decision as to which he would follow. All of his dependents - tenants and renters - went with him. However they got it, chieftains were dependent on farmers for support - to feed their increasingly large personal followings or armies, to support them at assemblies, and to accompany them on raids on other chieftains or their followers. As we have seen, without such support, without the ability to mass force, claims to ownership of land, which defined the class system as well as the forms of appropriation, had no force. Farmers had to rely on some chieftain to be able to defend their claims to property, though, as we have seen, this might often lead to the loss of the property. Chieftains had to rely on farmers to enforce their followers’ claims and their own, as well as to expand their territories into others’.’
[2]
Armed supporters were required to enforce legal and political claims: ’Claims of inheritance were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This follows from the fact that claims to ownership, property, were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This meant that to assert any claim to ownership, whether by inheritance or any other means, one had to back the claim with armed force. Chieftains were focal points for concentrating force to protect and to forward claims to property.’
[3]
Retainers emerged in the late Commonwealth: ’The warlords of the late Commonwealth usually kept a number of retainers, proabably around a dozen or so at least and sometimes perhaps around 40-50. We cannot rule out the possibility that these were sometimes employed in farmwork but their chief role was certainly military. These retainers were present after about 1200. The total number of professional warriors in Iceland - retainers in the service of lords and gentry - seems to have been at least 300 at the hight of the Sturlung wars (ca. 1235-1255) or about 0.5% of the population. These were the core of a warlord’s army and could be very instrumental in the outcome of battles (eg. Haugsnes 1246).’
[4]
Chieftains also relied on farmers willing to support them economically and militarily: ’Relations between chieftains and farmers were not, however, smooth. Chieftains had their “own” estates to support their establishments, and some maintained followings of armed men, but this was a difficult proposition, since it added consumers to the household without adding production. The chieftains had to rely on their following of farmers to support them with both arms and supplies. This was one component of any farmer’s household fund, his “rent” so to speak, his expenditures for travel and support for his chieftain, without which his chieftain or another would take his land and livestock. In addition, expeditions took labor from the farm and put the farmer’s life at risk. Even so, a farmer’s claims to land were not secure, since his chieftain might abandon him, another more powerful chieftain might claim his land, or simply take it, or a farmer might lose his land in a re-alignment of alliances among chieftains, which were frequent.’
[3]
The interests of chieftains and farmers were often in conflict: ’There was a basic conflict between chieftains’ increasing demands for demonstrations of force in support of claims to ownership and the subsistence demands, the economic roles, of farmers. Chieftains were not beyond using coercion to insure support as the following incident relates. [...] In spite of this contradiction, farmers had to rely on some chieftain in order to maintain their claims to land. While the inheritance customs codified in Grágás seem quite orderly in Hastrup’s (1985) analysis, inheritance of land is often hotly disputed in the Saga of the Icelanders. One who wanted another’s land could often find a third party with some inheritance claim, and acquire the claim on which to base a legitimation for taking the land.’
[5]
[1]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders [2]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 256 [3]: Durrenberger, Paul E. 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 258 [4]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [5]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth”, 256 |
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Professional soldiers were present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." "Augustus’ professionalization of the army entailed creating regular, empire-wide terms of service. In theory, at least, soldiers signed up for a fixed length of service, received regular pay at standard rates set by the state and retired with a bonus provided by the state."
[1]
Becoming a legionary involved a choice for a professional career. There were professional auxiliaries and ’fleet personnel’.
[2]
[1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 34) [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) |
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Transition from absent in JpJomo6 to present in JpYayoi
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Nomadic warriors are full-time.
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Presumably, the mercenary troops that the Phoenicians relied on (see below) would be considered full-time.
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Soldiers and officers were employed by Dukes in their territories and for the King’s army.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Coss 2019: 40-42) Coss, Peter. ‘Andrew Ayton, the Military Community and the Evolution of the Gentry in Fourteenth-Century England’, in Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton, ed. Craig L. Lambert, David Simpkin, and Gary P. Baker, vol. 44 (Boydell & Brewer, 2018), 31–50, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781787442221.007. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/WIE6TS8M [2]: (Simpkin 2018: 50-60) Simpkin, David. 2018. ‘Knights Banneret, Military Recruitment and Social Status, c. 1270–c. 1420: A View from the Reign of Edward I’, in Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton, ed. Craig L. Lambert, David Simpkin, and Gary P. Baker, vol. 44 (Boydell & Brewer, 2018), 51–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781787442221.008. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4V56P62M |
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Thegns were permanent warriors who were paid and housed at the palace by the King in exchange for their pledge of loyalty.
[1]
[1]: (Yorke 1990: 17) York, Barbara. 1990. Kings and Kingdoms of Early Anglo-Saxon England. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203447307. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/YXTNCWJN |
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Professional soldiers are known by Teotihuacan (ca. 250-550 CE). The information for this code is based primarily on art and are less secure than what we know from the Aztec Period (1450-1521).
[1]
[1]: (Carballo, David. Personal Communication to Jill Levine and Peter Turchin. Email. April 23, 2020) |
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Professional soldiers are known by Teotihuacan (ca. 250-550 CE). The information for this code is based primarily on art and are less secure than what we know from the Aztec Period (1450-1521).
[1]
[1]: (Carballo, David. Personal Communication to Jill Levine and Peter Turchin. Email. April 23, 2020) |
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The Orokaiva did not employ professional military officers in interclan warfare, relying on residential and kin ties as well as informal leadership: ’In interclan warfare, the Binandere organised a division of fighting labour. The first group, the scouts, were sent ahead to kill the scouts of the enemy’s main body. Then there were the front-line fighters, experienced men armed with clubs/spears and shields, forming the vanguard. Then there was a group of young people and men who had not killed. They beat drums, blew conch shells, sang war songs and generally used sound to frighten the enemy. Full-scale tribal warfare required the addition of two more groups. Firstly, sorcerers were carried on roofed litters from which they attempted to ward off enemy spirits. Being ritually pure they could have no contact with water. They ate only baked taro or bananas with coconut juice as well as much ginger. The second additional group were the strategists who were vital for long-drawn-out battles. This small group planned tactics, directed the front line and organised ambush killings and so on (1972:13-25).’
[1]
’Kinship and local affiliation together were the basic principles by which subgroups of the raiding party seem to have been drawn up during attack and on which leaders within the party based their rights to command specific combatants.’
[2]
’Waiko (1972) describes in detail the warfare of the Binandere, a society which like the ancient Spartans was reputed to practise infanticide on weak or deformed sons (Monckton 1922:130). Training for warfare began at an early age for boys. At about 12 years old they began living together in a men’s house and learning to dodge spears and to hold shields. Eventually they were required to prove themselves by killing a person in a raid (Waiko 1972:21). Part of the education imparted to the youths in the house was their primary duty to take revenge for the death of a clan member. A clan victim represented the clan and failure to avenge his death badly weakened their prestige and status. Killings had up to two generations delayed payback (1972:24-5).’
[3]
During the colonial period, the Royal Papuan Constabulary was formed. [The constabulary was not Orokaiva specifically, but Orokaiva men were drawn into the Royal Papuan Constabulary, where they often served alongside men from elsewhere in the Territory. There they received training from colonial authorities.] ’Thus, in the initial contact period, there were two major influences on the Orokaivan social order. First, the narrow moral universe of pre-contact days was widened. Orokaivans united in attempts to repulse the European intruders and also began to modify their traditional magic to improve taro. New spiritual rationale and ritual for these taro cults quickly spread through the Division after pacification. Some Orokaivans united with Europeans as armed constabulary or as friends and defenders of the missionaries.’
[4]
The development of the constabulary can be sketched as follows: ’During the first phase, no legislation allowed for a police force in either possession, a situation that ended in Papua in 1890 and in New Guinea in 1896. The second phase, which lasted until 1910, saw the establishment of police forces and was characterized by haphazard training and punitive expeditions. In the third phase, from 1910 to 1940, the police forces were consolidated and a coordinated and systematic training program was inaugurated. The disruption and trauma of World War II characterized the fourth phase, from 1940 to 1946. The fifth phase, which began after the war and continued into the 1960s, was marked by changes in structure and organization to accommodate changing conditions.’
[5]
’In New Guinea in 1888, the New Guinea Company took over the responsibility for the formation of a “peace keeping” force for the maintenance of law and order wherever the Germans had established jurisdiction. [...] However, very few Papuans and New Guineans were included in the early forces, which were composed mainly of foreigners: Australians, British, Germans, Malays, and South Sea Islanders (Dutton 1987, 62-63; Sinclair 1972, 918).’
[6]
Training was initially on an ad hoc basis, but became more formalized later on: ’In Papua the annual reports for the period between 1890 and 1910 indicated that the training of new recruits was at best haphazard and at worst nonexistent. [...] In my assessment, the third phase, from 1911 of 1940 was the most significant. It not only marked the beginning of a coordinated and systematic police training program, but also set a pattern that continued to be influential after the war.’
[7]
’The fourth phase, 1940 to 1946, spanned the dramatic era of World War II. Because of the exigencies of the situation, policemen of both forces underwent short but intensive military training in Port Moresby before being deployed wherever they were most needed. The nature of the training received has no parallel in pre- or postwar forces of either territory.’
[8]
Drill-sergeants (aka their equivalents among the colonial forces) worked from a training manual adopted in 1911 that was ’historically linked to British armies and the Royal Irish Constabulary. It proved attractive initially to the Papuan force, and later to the combined force’
[9]
Training involved mostly military-style drills, giving the Constabulary a para-military character. In the 1930s, some elementary-level schooling was added: ’During the 1930s young men in Rabaul learned simple arithmetic, simple English, to tell the time of day by observing changes in the daily routine, and, for those selected for the police band, to read music. During 1933-1934, recruits with particular technical skills were accepted for the first time.’
[10]
[Janice Newton (pers. comm.): After official British annexation in 1884 and Crown colony status in 1888, in 1890 a police force was formed and a Resident Magistrate appointed for each administrative division. It seems there was not much training. The early constabulary were taught a little English and some of the rules for living like the white man (latrines, cleanliness etc). The British administration appointed village officials, village constables and armed constabulary. Often the Orokaivans were captured, taken back to stations taught some English and some of the English ways and laws. Imprisonment of villagers for offences was another way of imparting British principles of law. By 1924 many adult males had passed through the Armed Constabulary and hardly an adult male had not worked for Europeans (Cyndi Banks Women in Transition: Social Control in PNG Australian Institute of Criminology 1993).] A clear-cut distinction between law enforcement and military is hard to draw in this context. In World War II, Orokaiva men were drafted into the Australian colonial army: ’The war of 1939-1945 affected the Yega in several important ways. Their territory became one of the major battlefields of the Pacific War. Every person migrated from the area with the exception of one old crippled woman who somehow managed to survive for eighteen months in the bush. Almost all able-bodied men served in the army or labour corps and the women and children lived at another Anglican mission about thirty miles to the north. When they returned, they found all buildings, and any belongings that they had left behind, destroyed and most of their coconut palms cut down or damaged by gunfire. There were some compensations. The Australian Government paid thousands of dollars in war-damage compensation for all trees and property but, more important, the stimulus of travel, and meeting and working with Australian and American soldiers, gave the younger men in particular a broader view of life which triggered off changes in their traditional economy. In addition, the transfer of the Administrative headquarters from Buna to Higaturu resulted in the construction of a major road to the port of Cape Killerton and brought the Yega into closer touch with the outside world than ever before. As a result, between 1945 and 1950, about twenty families left their re-built villages and moved east to found the new village of Surilai at Cape Killerton (Fig. 9).’
[11]
Orokaiva men also worked as carriers, although their loyalties as a group were at times ambiguous: ’Those in the Northern Division saw the Japanese invasion, bloody fighting and occupation by Allied forces. This led to the peculiar position where the Orokaivans were seen as ‘fuzzy wuzzy angels’ as well as traitors and murderers. ‘Fuzzy wuzzy angel’ was a nickname given to conscripted carriers who demonstrated remarkable solicitude for the wounded whom they carried during the battle on the Kokoda Trail, and who showed considerable endurance in carrying both men and supplies for the Allies over the four months from July until October 1942. The Japanese presence in Northern Division did, however, lead to a reassessment of loyalties on the part of the Orokaivans and the consequent betrayal of some Allied personnel.’
[12]
Orokaivas were conscripted into many non-combat roles as well: ’During the heavy fighting, most villagers had fled to garden houses where they could hide safely. However, in June 1942, there was an order made that ‘any native might be conscripted to serve anywhere in the Territories or Papua or New Guinea, more or less on any conditions imposed by the District Officers’. Carriers had worked so well during the Kokoda campaign that officials of the Australian New Guinea Army Unit (ANGAU) were keen to recruit more (Army File 285/1/680A; Benson 1957:18; Ryan 1969). Those men who were able to avoid the physical confrontations of the war by hiding in rough garden shelters for the duration could not avoid the consequences of the war. They became subject to conscription for work on plantations, for carrying, for malaria control and for clearing and construction work until the war was over (Army File 5/3/147).’
[13]
The code takes into account the presence of colonial armed forces and the recruitment of native men to armed bodies. [Jonathan Ritchie (pers. comm.): On the military, I think pre-War this means the Police… and during the War, we’re looking at the Papuan Infantry Battalion - perhaps either Jim Sinclair’s To Find a Path - The Life and Times of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment or G.M. Byrnes’ Green Shadows will help? The first recruits for the PIB were 70 from the Buna area - who I think were all drawn from the Royal Papuan Constabulary - who came in July 1940, supplemented by another 62 in May 1941. ’Military training was carried out until August 28, 1940 when everybody was put on road construction. During November, 24-hour guard duty was ordered at key points in the Port area [of Port Moresby]…. Until the end of August 1941 the guarding of vulnerable points, together with working parties on roads and wharves and training were the duties of the battalion. During September the battalion was allotted the defence area from Napa Napa to Jolers Bay. Recce (Reconnaissance) parties covered this area and the two companies moved out to positions in the allotted areas and began constructing tactical roads and defence positions. Working parties were practically discontinued as guard duties and intensive training were the order of the day.’ (from Byrnes, pp. 5-6).]
[1]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 490 [2]: Rimoldi, Max, Cromwell Burau, and Robert Ferraris 1966. “Land Tenure And Land Use Among The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 30 [3]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 489 [4]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 34 [5]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 85 [6]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 85p [7]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 86p [8]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 87 [9]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 109 [10]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 98 [11]: Dakeyne, R. B. 1969. “Village And Town In New Guinea”, 13 [12]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 43 [13]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 46 |
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Not known for Old Kingdom, present in the New Kingdom.
[1]
"the core of the defence force was a full-time, professional standing army. ... They lived together in military barracks, so that they could be mobilized at a moment’s notice."
[2]
[1]: Bryce T. (2002) Life and Society in the Hittite World. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 111 [2]: (Bryce 2007, 11) |
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Present for Macedonian Empire.
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Rasulids had slave troops.
[1]
"Slaves only in a limited sense, the soldiers had to be paid to fight."
[2]
[1]: (Bosworth 2014) Clifford Edmund Bosworth. 2014. The New Islamic Dynasties. Edinburgh University Press. Edinburgh. [2]: (Stookey 1978, 104) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. |
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Full-time specialists
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[1]
As a nomadic people, every male member of the tribe was expected to be a professional fighter. The Hepthalites are described as having inspired dread in those tasked with facing them in battle, a testimony to their effectiveness. [1]: Litvinsky B.A.,Guang-da Zhang , and Shabani Samghabadi R. (eds)History of Civilizations of Central Asia p. 142 |
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There is some evidence that professional guilds provided soldiers who protected guild property in peace-time, were placed at the disposal of the state during war.
[1]
[1]: http://en.unesco.org/silkroad/sites/silkroad/files/knowledge-bank-article/vol_II%20silk%20road_cities%20and%20urban%20life%20in%20the%20kushan%20kingdom.pdf p. 304 |
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As with Mongols.
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The ghulam slave soldiers.
[1]
Both officers and soldiers were employed by the polity on a full time basis. [2] [1]: David Nicolle, Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era, 1050-1350: Islam, Eastern Europe and Asia, rev. and updated ed (London : Mechanicsburg, Pa: Greenhill Books ; Stackpole Books, 1999). p.208 [2]: Fodor, Pal. “Ottoman Warfare, 1300-1453.” In The Cambridge History of Turkey, edited by Kate Fleet, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Reşat Kasaba, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P.193. |
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There were full-time elite warriors
[1]
. Kalani’ōpu’u of the Big Island had a large standing army
[2]
[1]: Kirch, P. V. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pg. 71. [2]: Kirch, P. V. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pg. 75. |
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" Middle-and lower-ranking members of the military and official class and simple soldiers received fixed payments in cash from the treasury."
[1]
"Available information indicates that the over-all budget of the Samanid state amounted to some 45 million dirhams, of which about 20 million dirhams were spent on maintaining the army and state officials." [2] [1]: (Davidovich 1997, 144) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. [2]: (Negmatov 1997, 87) Negmatov, N N. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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The soldier settler was awarded land and a hereditary obligation to serve in the army under a system known as Kleros. The size of the land grant varied with the rank of the soldier-settler, called a kleruch.
[1]
[1]: Holt, Frank L. Thundering Zeus: The Making of Hellenistic Bactria. Vol. 32. University of California Pr, 1999. pp. 118-119 |
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Garrisons in earlier period, and under the subsequent Zhou.
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“In 1748, immediately following the War of the Austrian Succession, Maria Theresa implemented a barrage of administrative reforms to strengthen her military and to create a more effective and centralized state. Her state chancellor, Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz (1702–1765), forced the diets of the Hereditary Lands to increase their tax contributions to the military bud get, while creating a standing army of some 108,000 men.”
[1]
“Higher incomes naturally gave the state more resources for expanding its competencies, a development easily traceable with the military. The monarchy could field around 150,000 men in 1740 and some 300,000 in 1790. Military expenditures at the end of Joseph’s reign accounted for 65 percent of the total state budget, though characteristically for Habsburg history there was never enough money to pay for it all.15 Nonetheless, the reforms undertaken in Maria Theresia’s and Joseph’s reigns made the Habsburg army the second largest in Europe after Russia’s. The increased tax revenues in turn supported massively larger conscription. That conscription itself symbolizes the augmented institutions of the dynasty’s rule, since it depended on the bureaucracy to keep track of the population eligible for military service. The army was also one of the most successful engines of centralization. More than ever before, the central state was responsible for recruiting, training, and financing the military, sidelining the estates’ former authority in those activities. The military grew to perform the crucial integrative role within the heterogeneous realms that it would fulfill until the monarchy’s end. An example is that after the 1740s Hungarian generals started rising through the ranks of the army, and Hungarian soldiers began fighting for the monarchy outside the borders of Hungary. In this way one of the least integrated parts of the monarchy became more tightly bound to the center.”
[2]
[1]: (Judson 2016: 28) Judson, Pieter M. 2016. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Cambridge, USA; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/BN5TQZBW [2]: (Curtis 2013: 243) Curtis, Benjamin. 2013. The Habsburgs: The History of a Dynasty. London; New York: Bloomsbury. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/TRKUBP92 |
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"The hereditary military system was virtually dead by the 1570s, replaced by a paid army."
[1]
"While the army itself had changed from a mostly hereditary, financially independent force into a paid, professional force, now heavily dependent upon firearms, the officer corps remained dependent on hereditary leaders. These hereditary leaders were not the families of the early Ming..." [2] [1]: (Lorge 2005, 128) [2]: (Lorge 2005, 139) |
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"Unlike other dynasties that had relied on civilian militias conscripted from the peasant population, the Sung maintained paid professional armies."
[1]
"The rank-and-file were mercenaries, serving for pay and rations, and recruited from among the lower orders of society - including petty criminals, vagabonds and amnestied bandits." [2] "By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times." [3] [1]: (Hartman 2015, 28) [2]: (Peers 2002, 33) [3]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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“The rulers and great merchants also maintained personal retinues or guards called Cakirs (Chin. Che-chieh, Arab. sâ.kariyya). In these guards, who, perhaps, were drawn from the sons of the aristocracy, one may see a possible source for the later gulam/mamluk system of the lslamic world (see below).4
[1]
[1]: (Golden 1992, 190) |
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Professional soldiers were present in the different nation states and could be raised to an army by the monarch/lord when needed as most rulers did not have a standing army, but they were not employed directly by the HRE which did not have a specific army of its own.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Wilson 2016: 321. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/N5M9R9XA [2]: Power 2006: 21. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4V4WE3ZK |
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“Criers announced in the markets, in the cities, and in the countryside that the slaves who wanted to serve the sultan [as a soldier] should come forward. This initial call brought the sultan five thousand men from the streets (‘abid az-zanqa) who were given clothes, horses, weapons, and a salary. This particular group of people appeared voluntarily to join the army likely because the offer was more promising than living in hardship on the margins of society.”
[1]
“Such is the history of the formation of the Bawäkhir militia - in concise form, admittedly, but based on unique and important documents. This militia initially helped a great deal to maintain peace and security in the unified country. Mawlây Ismail had established forts and citadels (kasabas) in all parts of Morocco, from the frontier with Algeria to the southernmost limits of the Sahara. These forts were garrisoned by soldiers who lived with their families and whose sons received special training, an account of which is called for here.”
[2]
[1]: (El Hamel 2014: 161) El Hamel, Chouki. 2014. Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/T9JFH8AS [2]: (Ogot 1992: 229) Ogot, B. A. 1992. ed., General History of Africa: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century., vol. V, VII vols. Oxford: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/24QPFDVP |
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“The years between 1902 and 1904 were marked by an on-again, off-again return to obstruction by the Czechs, but Koerber was able to get a regular budget passed in 1902, the first in four years’ time, and in February 1903 he persuaded the major parties to approve legislation to raise the number of new recruits for the army by 22,000 men, thus meeting an essential demand of military leaders who found the current levels of conscription inadequate to sustain normal troop levels.”
[1]
[1]: (Boyer 2022: 342) Boyer, John W. 2022. Austria, 1867–1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/CG3P4KKD |
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Soldiers stationed in Panlongchen - so far from Zhengzhou core, these would have to be professional?
"Bagley has described Panlongchen, which was located in eastern Hubei on a tributary of the Yangtze River, 450 km to the south of Erligang, as a "site of Erligang civilization" where the "indigenous population was ruled by an intrusive Erligang elite." The reason for this intrusion so far from home appears to have been the desire to provide security for the trade routes that brought copper from even further south - the closest being about 100 km to the south of Panlongchen. Panlongchen itself developed into a center of bronze making, indicating that artisans from the bronze making centers of Erligang Culture to the north probably settled in the city along with Erligang elites and soldiers." [1] Professional soldiers can be inferred present in Erligang and Erlitou. [2] [1]: (Howard 2012, 111) Howard, Michael C. 2012. Transnationalism in Ancient and Medieval Societies: The Role of Cross-Border Trade and Travel. McFarland. [2]: (Mair, Victor. North China Workshop 2016) |
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"The fubing system had originally preserved the Chinese ideal of the farmer-soldier, but after the early Tang soldiers became increasingly a separate, professional class. By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times."
[1]
"From 737 it was decided to replace the militia entirely with paid chien-erh regulars; they were recruited by calling for volunteers from the population in general." [2] [1]: (Lorge 2005, 7) [2]: (Peers 2002, 14) |
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"the king owned six troops, the dukes or princes of a bigger state owned three, those of a medium size owned two, and those of a small size owned one."
[1]
"Under the Western Zhou (about 1027-770 BC), the feudal lords each had armies of one to three jun, while the kings had at least 14, the Six Armies and the Eight Yin Armies. The strength of a jun is not certain, but a later commentator put it at 12,500 men." [2] [1]: (Zhang 2014, 156) Zhang, Jinfan. 2014. The Tradition and Modern Transition of Chinese Law. Springer Science & Business Media. [2]: (Bennett 1998, 171) Bennett, Matthew. 1998. The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient & Medieval Warfare. Taylor & Francis. |
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Large standing army.
[1]
Under Ibn Tulunid’s early rule in Egypt: "A revolt that broke out in nearby Palestine and Syria, however, offered a pretext for building a new army in Egypt composed primarily of Turkish, Nubia, and Greek slaves and mercenaries. To pay for this army, Ibn Tulun took control of the revenue of the country, arranging for Ibn al-Muddabir’s [financial director of Egypt] transfer to Syria in 871."
[1]
[1]: (Sundelin 2013, 430-431) Shillington, K. 2013. Encyclopedia of African History: Volume 3. Routledge. |
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Comitatus were permanent warriors who were paid and housed at the palace by the King in exchange for their pledge of loyalty.
[1]
[1]: (Yorke 1990: 17) York, Barbara. 1990. Kings and Kingdoms of Early Anglo-Saxon England. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203447307. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/YXTNCWJN |
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e.g. in the Khan’s personal guard.
[1]
[1]: Bira, Sh. “THE MONGOLS AND THEIR STATE IN THE TWELFTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Vol. IV: The Age of Achievement A.D. 750 to the End of the Fifteenth Century. Part I The Historical, Social and Economic Setting, edited by C. E. Bosworth, Muhammad S. Asimov, and Yar Muhammad Khan, Paris: Unesco, 1998. 255-256 |
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Nukers (members of the chief’s military retinue) were full-time military specialists.
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"The Wei shu reports that early in the 5th century, Shelun introduced the so-called decimal system: "For the first time, military laws were established according to which 1000 people formed a detachment (run), and at the head of a detachment a military leader was placed. 100 people formed a banner (zhuang) and a chief stood at the head of a banner" (WS 103: 3a; Taskin 1984, p. 269). A term run can be translated as ’military head’, while shawu as ’leader or commander’."
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2005, 155) |
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Inferred present because the Elamites had a powerful army - TO BE CONFIRMED. "Durante el transcurso del siglo XII a.c., Elam pasará nuevamente al primer plano internacional como la mayor potencia militar del Próximo Oriente. »
[1]
During the 12th century BCE, Elam rose to prominence as the strongest military faction in the Near East.
[1]: (Quintana 2007, 57) |
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"The attempt to create a kind of second currency by using manufactured goods or foodstuffs is a mark of the difficult economic situation in which the East Roman state found itself in the sixth century. Not only were the high officials of the Empire now given part of their remuneration in the form of luxury clothes; even the pay of the ordinary soldier was changed into this new form of payment. The proportion of a soldier’s pay that took the form of cash became increasingly smaller and smaller. It was not just that he received extra allowances in the form of rations of grain; even clothing and equipment were issued to him and reckoned as part of his pay."
[1]
[1]: (Haussig 1971, 100) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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A permanent army is inferred to have been present based on evidence for Zapotec territorial expansion during this period. Evidence from the Cuicatlan Canada suggests that the Zapotec had enough force to destroy whole settlements and maintain a tributary relationship with the Zapotec centre.
[1]
[1]: Spencer, C. S. (1982) The Cuicatlán Cañada and Monte Albán: A study of primary state formation. Studies in Archaeology. Academic Press, New York. p243-4 |
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[1]
"For rank-and-file mamluks, military salaries were their main sources of income and it is clear that throughout the medieval period, military wages were almost always above those earned by skilled craftsmen." [2] "‘Iqta fiefs were allocated to those of senior or sometimes middle rank. These men were called muqtas. In the Mamluk Sultanate a muqta maintained a certain number of soldiers, his own mamluks and sometimes other lesser troops. He and his military household then owed military service to the sultan. The muqta also paid his troops’ expenses from the revenues of his ‘iqta. The men would then purchase what they required on campaign from the suq al-‘askar ‘soldiers’ market’. Each regular soldier was also paid, either by his muqta or by the sultan." [2] [1]: (Oliver 1977, 41) [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. |
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A permanent army is inferred to have been present based on evidence for Zapotec territorial expansion during this period. Evidence from the Cuicatlan Canada suggests that the Zapotec had enough force to destroy whole settlements and maintain a tributary relationship with the Zapotec centre.
[1]
[1]: Spencer, C. S. (1982) The Cuicatlán Cañada and Monte Albán: A study of primary state formation. Studies in Archaeology. Academic Press, New York. p243-4 |
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Inferred present from the descriptions of military officers and armies in the Spanish relaciones at the end of the subsequent MA V period.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1976). "Formative Oaxaca and Zapotec Cosmos." American Scientist 64(4): 374-383, p376 [2]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p217-8 |
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Inferred present from the descriptions of military officers and armies in the Spanish relaciones.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1976). "Formative Oaxaca and Zapotec Cosmos." American Scientist 64(4): 374-383, p376 [2]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p217-8 |
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Professional soldiers are known by Teotihuacan (ca. 250-550 CE). The information for this code is based primarily on art and are less secure than what we know from the Aztec Period (1450-1521).
[1]
[1]: (Carballo, David. Personal Communication to Jill Levine and Peter Turchin. Email. April 23, 2020) |
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Majority of army was not professional. Garrisoned soldiers at border outposts the exception.
[1]
"The fighting men were drawn from the masses of the hatun runa and participated as part of their labor tax obligation."
[2]
Alan Covey: More comprehensive sources include Samuel Connell and colleagues, or Sonia Alconini. John Murra’s 1986 chapter on Inca armies addresses this, too
[3]
[4]
[1]: (Kaufmann and Kaufmann 2012) [2]: (McEwan 2006, 127) [3]: John Murra. 1986. “The Expansion of the Inka State: Armies, War, and Rebellions.” In Anthropo- logical History of Andean Polities, edited by John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, 49-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [4]: (Covey 2015, personal communication) |
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[1]
EWA: changed code "The army was well organized and in the 12th dynasty it had a core of professional soldiers. They served for prolonged periods of time and were regularly stationed abroad." [2] Instruction for Merikare: "Enrich the young men who follow you, provide with goods, endow with fields, reward them with herds." [3] [1]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007, 5) [2]: (Van De Mieroop, M. 2011. A History of Ancient Egypt. Wiley) [3]: Instruction for Merikare. www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/wsrp/information/REL499_2011/Instruction for Merikare.pdf |
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"The Faitimid military was a standing professional army."
[1]
"The Fatimid army included a professional officer corps and many permanent regular and elite regiments stationed in Cairo or in garrisons throughout Egypt. The army was administered by the Army Ministry (diwan al-jaysh), which oversaw salaries and land grants (iqta’)." [2] Kutama and ghilman paid salaries. [3] Imam al-Aziz (975-996) and his vizier Ya’qub ibn Killis introduced the system of patronage (istina) to recruit Turkish slaves and freemen, who were specialist cavalry and archers. [4] "The Fatimid army was paid in cash, apparently in several installments over the year. My information is derived from a single account describing the arrangement reached between the Kutama and Ibn ’Ammar at the time of al-Hakim’s coronation ceremony." [5] al-Mustansir civil war as turning point to Iqta system for military "In the period prior to al-Mustansir, qadis, administrative personnel, and members of the royal family received grants of iqta in lieu of their salaries or as a part of their remuneration.’ In a previous study, I presented a few examples showing that during al-Hakim’s reign the circle of those receiving iqta was enlarged to include soldiers (junud) and ’abid al-shira’. Since then, I have gathered these further examples ..." Examples includes generals and soldiers. [5] [1]: (Qutbuddin 2011, 39) Qutbuddin, Tahera. Fatimids. Ramsamy, Edward. ed. 2011. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Volume 2. Africa. Sage. Los Angeles. [2]: (Hamblin 2005, 749) Shillington, K. ed. 2005. Encyclopedia of African History: A - G.. 1. Taylor & Francis. [3]: (Lev 1987, 345) [4]: (Lev 1987, 337) [5]: (Lev 1987, 355) |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"Major military and fiscal reforms under the emperors of the Komnenian dynasty after 1081 re-established a properly paid and trained regular army."
[2]
[1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haldon 2008, 557) Jeffreys E, Haldon J and Cormack R eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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unknown Houses for soldiers and their families would imply full-time warriors.
During this time, complex fortifications also started appear. They usually had huge entrance gates, thick walls and towers. It is also clear that some buildings were connected to the walls. Those are interpreted as houses for soldiers and their families or magazines for weapons. |
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“The creation of a new army and navy was an impressive achievement. During the centuries of world predominance the nation, like others in Europe, had no permanent military forces and recruited armies only when required. Now, for the first time in its history, it began to maintain a powerful standing army. The new Bourbon army, recruited with great difficulty because of the objections everywhere (especially in the Crown of Aragon) to military service, inevitably involved important administrative and fiscal reforms. We have seen that the poor condition of the Spanish forces in the War of Succession made it necessary at every stage to have the support of foreign troops and foreign generals. Philip had decreed a few limited reforms during the war, mainly in order to obtain recruits. But the problem of securing a good standing army remained unresolved. Fortunately, many of the foreign soldiers and officers who had served in the war continued their career under the Spanish crown. As a result, in the 1720s up to one third of the infantry of Spain consisted of foreigners who chose to continue the old tradition of serving the Spanish crown. In 1734 there were thirty thousand foreigners in service, mainly Belgians, followed in number by Swiss and then by Irish. In effect, the astonishing number of Belgians serving in the Spanish army meant that the famous Army of Flanders had reconstituted itself in the peninsula. The annual cost of the army in 1725 was nearly five and a half million escudos, a massive sum that had no precedent in the history of the Spanish treasury.”(Kamen 2003: 451) Kamen, Henry. 2003. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763. New York: Harper Collins. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/YRK2VXUS “American defense had long been entrusted to the navy and to colonial militias commanded for the most part by Creole officers. The new orders increased the size of the militias but also created a standing army of full-time soldiers officered by professionals from Spain. New Spain eventually supported more than 6000 of these troops. A further 2000 were stationed in Peru while smaller garrisons protected the chokepoints of the American trade: Havana, San Juan, Cartagena, Portobello, and Vera Cruz. The new force proved to be both expensive and relatively ineffective. As was often the case with eighteenth-century armies, only the desperate were drawn to the low wages and harsh discipline offered by the king. Their peninsular commanders, rarely the cream of the Spanish officer corps, were resented by Creoles who wanted the commands for themselves. The expanded militias remained largely under local control, but often lacked training or decent weapons. Although colonial troops could display extraordinary courage and proved effective in suppressing colonial rebellions, they would remain vulnerable to better-trained, better-equipped forces from Europe in the event of a major crisis.”(Maltby 2009: 84) Maltby, William S. 2009. The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/SUSVXWVH
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inferred present
"Even though most military historians confidently assert that the Hsia did not maintain a standing army, it would be highly unlikely for the ruler not to have been protected by a body of men with pronounced martial abilities who would form the core of any broader combat effort." [1] "Warriors were probably dressed in the finest of silk clothing." [2] Regiments of 100-125 men. [3] Professional soldiers can be inferred present in Erlitou [4] unknown "While the Erlitou ceramic tradition was widespread, the mechanisms of this expansion are probably only indirectly related to political activity (if pots don’t equal people, they are even less representative of conquering armies or “state” administrators). The degree of centralization, mechanisms of political control, and social organization can only be guessed at or extrapolated through comparison with Zhengzhou and Anyang." [5] [1]: (Sawyer 2011, 149) [2]: (Otterbein 2004, 165) Otterbein, Keith. 2004. How War Began. University of Texas A&M Press. [3]: (Sawyer 2011, 151) [4]: (Mair, Victor. North China Workshop 2016) [5]: (Campbell 2014, 62) |
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From 1365
[1]
Nicolle 1991 "By the first years of the 13th century the French king could maintain a virtual standing army on his frontier with English-ruled Normandy. [2] Professional sergeants in the mid 12th century. [3] Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [4] Inferred absent under Philip IV: Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [4] [1]: (Turchin and Nefedov 2009, 128) [2]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 7) [3]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 6) [4]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 35) |
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"By 1400, therefore, most of the troops in the Ottoman army served on a contractual basis, allowing the sultan to levy a predictable number of reliable troops year after year."
[1]
Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges." [2] "Both [yaya] and the müsellems were gradually relegated to second-line duties late in the 14th century, and by 1600 such units had either been abolished or reduced to non-military functions." [2] Janissaries were paid a monthly salary. [3] [1]: (Imber 2002, 256-257) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [2]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) [3]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) |
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Professional soldiers were present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." "Augustus’ professionalization of the army entailed creating regular, empire-wide terms of service. In theory, at least, soldiers signed up for a fixed length of service, received regular pay at standard rates set by the state and retired with a bonus provided by the state."
[1]
Becoming a legionary involved a choice for a professional career. There were professional auxiliaries and ’fleet personnel’.
[2]
[1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 34) [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) |
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"An order promulgated by William III on 25 April 1701 specified that ’the captains ... [shall] be obliged to keep their companies complete and a soldier who comes to die or desert, the captain shall be obliged immediately to enlist another competent soldier in his place.’ It can therefore be stated without exaggeration that the Republic’s standing army was born under the captain-generalship of William III. The transformation of the Dutch army into a standing army of professional soldiers was also evident from the men’s clothing."
[1]
[1]: (Nimwengen 2010: 353-354) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/P4FWE8NE/collection. |
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Infantrymen "received specific training during maneuvers held in camps ... very probably under the supervision of instructor officers like the directors of young army recruits."
[1]
Mercenaries, "notably from the eastern part of the Greek world, because of their technological sophistication, including their use of elaborate bronze armor and new military tactics."
[2]
In the "Late period ... part of the army, perhaps 10 percent, was also made up of Egyptian professional soldiers. ... under the Saite dynasty Egyptian troops fought sometimes on the same side as foreign mercenaries, at other times against them. As to the garrisons, rulers did not rely only on mercenaries but also on Egyptian soldiers, for example in Elephantine, where mercenaries speaking Semetic languages later joined them." [3] [1]: (Agut-Labordere 2013, 987) [2]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 16) [3]: (Fischer-Bovet 2014, 40) |
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The introduction of coinage may have coincided with a shift to a more professional armed forces as the coinage could be used to pay the army. It would have been very hyperbolic for Mani (216-276 CE) in the Kephalaia to have called Aksum "one of the four greatest empires of the world"
[1]
if by his time it had not invented or could not sustain any professional soldiers. The successful invasion of south Arabia in the early 3rd century may have used some trained soldiers, albeit at this stage the majority may have been raised and trained by vassals of the Aksum king.
"The first Aksumite king to put his own coinage into circulation was Endybis (in the second half of the third century)." [2] King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [3] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. "high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include ... middle-ranking members of the army ..." [4] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [3]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [4]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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The introduction of coinage may have coincided with a shift to a more professional armed forces as the coinage could be used to pay the army. It would have been very hyperbolic for Mani (216-276 CE) in the Kephalaia to have called Aksum "one of the four greatest empires of the world"
[1]
if by his time it had not invented or could not sustain any professional soldiers. The successful invasion of south Arabia in the early 3rd century may have used some trained soldiers, albeit at this stage the majority may have been raised and trained by vassals of the Aksum king.
"The first Aksumite king to put his own coinage into circulation was Endybis (in the second half of the third century)." [2] King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [3] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. "high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include ... middle-ranking members of the army ..." [4] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [3]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [4]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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Professional cavalry
’Knights’ given allowances of land for equipping troops at expense of a magnate. They may have been "specially trained professional warrior slaves". [1] Non-professional infantry "The mass of lesser nobles and their retainers were traditional horse archers, mounted on tough steppe ponies and armed with the reflex bow." [2] [1]: Lukonin, V.G., ‘Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade’, in The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2, ed. by Ehsan Yar-Shater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. III, p.700 . [2]: (Penrose 2008, 221) Penrose, Jane. 2008. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. Osprey Publishing. |
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Dates currently based on estimates.
Present: "By the first years of the 13th century the French king could maintain a virtual standing army on his frontier with English-ruled Normandy. [1] Absent: Permanent command structure under Philip IV (reign 1284-1314 CE) but no permanent army [2] [1]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 7) [2]: (Nicolle and McBridge 1991, 35) |
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Cretan mercenaries were especially valued in foreign armies.
[1]
[2]
Cretan soldiers were remarkably well-trained in ambushes, raids, surprise attacks and nigh fighting. The difficult economic conditions forced many young men to found employment as mercenaries in foreign armies especially during the Hellenistic period. They were exclusively citizens who could provide their own arms. Recruiting campaigns organized by the foreign states were regularly conducted in the Cretan cities. Negotiations had to be managed by the governments of the city-states. Cretan mercenaries were hired in the armies of Egypt, Syria, Sparta, the Achaen League, Pergamon, Macedonia, Syracuse and Rome. The number of hired mercenaries sometimes was very high; Perseus forces, for instance, during the Third Macedonia War (171 BCE) included 3,000 Cretans. Apart from the economic benefits, Cretan mercenaries brought new ideas that changed the conservative communities of the Cretan cities considerably. Cretans were also widely recognized as the best archers.
[3]
According to the tradition, it was Apollo who taught archery to Cretans. Diodorus Siculus in his Bibliotheca Historica said that "as the discoverer of the bow he [Apollo] taught the people of the land all about the use of the bow, this being the reason why the art of archery is especially cultivated by the Cretans and the bow is called ’Cretan’. "
[4]
They fight exclusively for the profit. A Cretan archer said to Julius Caesar "Profit is our target, and every one of our arrows is short for money, both on land and sea."
[5]
[1]: Griffith, G. T. 1935. The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic Wolrd, Cambridge [2]: Willetts, R. F. 1965. Ancient Crete. A Social History, London and Toronto, 145-48. [3]: McLeod, W. 1968. "The ancient Cretan bow," Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries 11, 30-31. [4]: Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, V.74. [5]: Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, .... |
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"Distinguishing elite from part-time warriors by different military gear is not an absolute matter. It must be judged separately for each culture and based on the relative distribution and amounts of various types of weaponry. For the MBII period, we have good evidence for elite warriors in the shape of rare ‘gadgets’ like belts, equid burials, etc."
[1]
[1]: Klettner/Levi (2016:10). |
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e.g. jandars (king bodyguards).
[1]
Under Alauddin Khilji "a regular muster of armed forces was maintained."
[2]
Payment of soldiers in cash was a measure adopted by Alauddin Khilji. [2] [1]: Habibullah, A. B. M. (1961). The foundation of Muslim rule in India. Central Book Depot, pp 217. [2]: (Ahmed 2011, 98) Ahmed, Farooqui Salma. 2011. A Comprehensive History of Medieval India: Twelfth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century. Pearson Education India. |
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The Mughal Empire relied largely on the military force employed from the ’Indian military labor market’, which included the ’highly talented, movable warlords and their mounted following’ in India.
[1]
The skills of these soldiers ranged from the part-time peasant to the professional warlord or jamadar.
[2]
[1]: J.J.L. Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire 1500-1700 (2004), p.67 [2]: J.J.L. Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire 1500-1700 (2004), p.68 |
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Before the reforms of Khusrau I (later Sassanid period) "all nobles, great and small, had been obliged to equip themselves and their followers and serve in the army without pay, but Khusrau issued equipment to the poorer nobles and paid a salary for their services. Consequently, the power of the great nobles - who frequently had their own private armies - was reduced."
[1]
"Payment for service might have arisen because of the vast income from silver mines, among other sources." [2] [1]: (Chegini 1996, 57) Chegini, N. N. Political History, Economy and Society. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.40-58. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf [2]: (Mitterauer 2010, 106) Mitterauer, M. 2010. Why Europe?: The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path. University of Chicago Press. |
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|
[1]
"The armies of the Umayyad and early ’Abbasid period were paid stipends in minted coin. At the beginning of this period, these stipends could be thought of as the hereditary right of those whose names appeared in the diwan registers. During the course of the second/eighth century, the Caliphs and their representatives forced a transformation so that the stipend became a true salary, a payment for work done. Unlike their contemporaries in the West, the soldiers of the Caliphs were never given land grants in lieu of salaries. Sometimes they might be given houses or plots of land on which to build, but not to provide an alternative income. One the rare occasions when larger land grants were given to soldiers it was as a reward for past services, rather than payment for continuing and future ones. Both Umayyads and ’Abbasids normally maintained the separation of the military from tax-collecting: apart from dire emergencies, soldiers were never given the right to collect taxes with which to pay themselves. This was always done by the government diwans." [2] [1]: Kennedy, Hugh, The Armies of the Caliphate pp. 18-118 [2]: (Kennedy 2001, 88) Kennedy, H. 2001. The Armies of the Caliphs. Routledge. London. |
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"Elam was a worthy rival of the Akkadian empire."
[1]
-- if so, surely must have had full-time, trained soldiers. Earlier Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE "monopoly of defence forces to protect internal cohesion. The wealth and technical knowledge accumulated in cities had to be defended against foreign attacks, both from other city-states and other enemies (for instance, nomadic tribes). This defence system then turned into an offensive tactic. ... Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[2]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 135) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Originally the Ilkhanid army was a branch of the Mongol army, organised on a tribal basis. The Ilkhans did not adopt the slave-soldier system; instead maintain "large armies of mounted horse archers (supplemented by infantry and cavalry auxiliaries" from local rulers.
[1]
After "the Ilkhanate was no longer expanding and the supply of plunder could not be relied upon" Ghazan the Reformer introduced the iqta system of land grants to pay soldiers. [2] [3] However, it is uncertain "to what extent the distribution of iqtas was actually implemented, for this particular edict was issued only very shortly before Ghazan’s early death in 703/1304." [2] More so because our source for the Ilkhanate’s apparently successful use of the itqa system is Rashid al-Din who was Ghazan’s great minister and the individual responsible for implementing the policy. [4] In any case, Ghazan’s reforms may have put the financing of the army on a better footing, so that eventually warriors were being allocated iqtas [grants of land holding] to provide revenues with which to equip themselves. [5] [1]: Reuven Amitai, ‘Armies and Their Economic Basis in Iran and the Surrounding Lands, c.1000-1500’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.557. [2]: (Morgan 2015, 75) Morgan, David. 2015. Medieval Persia 1040-1797. Routledge. [3]: Reuven Amitai, ‘Armies and Their Economic Basis in Iran and the Surrounding Lands, c.1000-1500’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), P.555, 557. [4]: (Morgan 2015, 75-76) Morgan, David. 2015. Medieval Persia 1040-1797. Routledge. [5]: Morgan, David. The Mongols. 2nd ed. The Peoples of Europe. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. p.148 |
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Mid-11th century (after conquest of Baghdad?) "the Turkmen began to be supplemented, but never wholly supplanted, as a military force by mamluks."
[1]
According to ’Imad al-Din al-Isfahani: "The custom was that taxes were collected from the land and spent on the army; previously no one had held a land-grant [iqta]. Nizam al-Mulk realised that taxes were no being collected from the land owing to its poor condition, nor was revenue being realised for the same reason. He distributed land grants [iqta’s] to the soldiers and made them a source of income and revenue for them." However, al-Isfahani was wrong in saying that Nizam al-Mulk was the first to introduce the Iqta as they were used during the Buyid period. [2] "Under the Seljuqs there were large and small iqtas that were granted to members of the dynasty, to various members of the military and official class and to ordinary soldiers." [3] The first armies "were not ’professional armies’ in the sense of the Abbasid or Samanid mamluk corps, but warfare was a way of life for most adult male Turkmen; only women and children were exempted from fighting." [1] Mamluks were "a standing army paid both in cash and by iqta’s" [1] [1]: (Peacock 2015, 218) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [2]: (Peacock 2015, 69-70) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [3]: (Davidovich 1997, 144) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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Possibility of this in Uruk phase: "hypothetical." Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE "monopoly of defence forces to protect internal cohesion. The wealth and technical knowledge accumulated in cities had to be defended against foreign attacks, both from other city-states and other enemies (for instance, nomadic tribes). This defence system then turned into an offensive tactic. ... Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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|
Possibility of this in Uruk phase: "hypothetical." Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE "monopoly of defence forces to protect internal cohesion. The wealth and technical knowledge accumulated in cities had to be defended against foreign attacks, both from other city-states and other enemies (for instance, nomadic tribes). This defence system then turned into an offensive tactic. ... Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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"The Gothic nobleman could exercise many options concerning the fate of the laborers, but he probably kept most of them himself, since he personally, and also the specialized warriors in his following, had no desire to revert to being plowmen but demanded productive sources of revenue."
[1]
A garrison commander at Syracuse "was instructed to look after his garrison’s regular provisioning so that they would be less likely to plunder the neighboring farms." [2] "The various comites Gothorum and other high Gothic officials may have employed their traditional associations of warriors as buccellarii, as was common in the East. ... Unfortunately, the sources are inadequate to prove their widespread existence among the Ostrogoths, although the actions of the nobility and the official holders are more understandable if we accept that the coercive power of the followers was close at hand. Oppas, who was executed following his personal rebellion against Theodoric, was perhaps a buccellarius of the monarch. The use of buccellarii would have been an acceptable redirection of the energies of the warbands into more defined government under the primary direction of the monarchy." [2] How was the Gothic army paid? "the limited evidence that we have ... suggests a combination of tax-based salaries and the redistribution of land, both of which would have resulted in a process of administrative decentralization. This matter is of obvious importance for how we imagine the distribution of power and wealth between the Roman landowners and the Gothic military elite." [3] [1]: (Burns 1991, 81-82) [2]: (Burns 1991, 176) [3]: (Heydemann 2016, 26) Heydemann, Gerda. The Ostrogothic Kingdom: Ideologies and Transitions. in Arnold, Jonathan J. Bjornlie, Shane M. Sessa, Kristina. eds. 2016. A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy. BRILL. Leiden. |
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Although the papal armies contained feudal levies from allies, mercenaries comprised the greater part of most papal armies. These mercenaries, the condottieri, were notorious for changing sides, sometimes on the battlefield. During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, papal armies were supplemented by French and Spanish troops, following the 1494 invasion of Italy.
From 1378 until the end of the Great Schism in 1417, mercenary warbands, the condottieri, were often in control of the papal states. [1] Composed of foreign and Italian mercenaries, these companies refined extortion and betrayal to an art form. [2] Some of the most successful of these mercenaries set themselves up as lords (signori) in the Papal State, in particular in the Romagna. [3] [1]: Partner, 393: "All real power [in the first two decades of the fifteenth century] rested with the condottieri " [2]: On the mercenaries and their social and demographic impact on the Senese, bordering the Papal State, see Caferro. [3]: Larner remains the only study of these lords of the Romagna |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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"Since professional soldiers were rather expensive to maintain, Venice embarked from the 1520s onward on a systematic organization of civil militias (cernide, ordinanze), mostly peasant militias, in its overseas territories, on the model of a similar organization that had already been established in the Venetian terraferma."
[1]
[1]: (Arbel 2013: 205) Benjamin Arbel. Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2013. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. |
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[1]
‘First and foremost, the samurai was a professional soldier, and thus was expected to perform martial duties at the request of his lord in exchange for remuneration in the form of land, subvassals who worked samurai fields and served in his military unit, and other tangible rewards, such as protection.’
[2]
[1]: Sansom, George Bailey. 1976. Japan: A Short Cultural History. Barrie & Jenkins [Revised 2nd ed].p.464. [2]: Deal, William E. 2005. Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan. Oxford University Press.p.142. |
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Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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|
Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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|
Army pay introduced at the start of a campaign against Veii 406 CE: "According to Livy (4.9.11), the Senate introduced army pay (stipendium) to compensate the men serving in this struggle for the labor they lost on their family farms." For the same reason it is widely agreed that pay was introduced due to prolonged campaigns "from the later fourth century onwards, during the wars against the Samnites, the Etruscans, and Gauls." The tributum tax, which is mentioned "from roughly 400 BC onwards" is thought to have been introduced for citizens to pay for soldiers.
[1]
Professional soldiers were certainly present from the beginning of the Roman Principate. "Augustus’ main military reforms had the effect of turning the army into a standing force of long-service professionals, instead of the part-time citizen force of the Republic." [2] It is also argued that a professional corps developed from the reforms of Marius in 105 BCE. Some further maintain that the pre-existing citizen militia was "essentially professional" by 220 BCE. [3] [1]: (Erdkamp 2011, 105) Erdkamp, P. 2011. A Companion to the Roman Army. John Wiley & Sons. [2]: (Fields, 2006, 35) [3]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007) |
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’It was everyone’s ambition to be "rescued from the mud", but very few were. Most of those were placed, in Angkorean times, into various varna, or caste groupings, which made up perhaps a tenth of society as a whole. These people included clerks, artisans, concubines, artists, high officials, and priests, as well as royal servants, relatives, and soldiers.’
[1]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[2]
[1]: (Chandler 2008, pp. 28-29) [2]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "supported by Mande clans ... created a standing army"
[1]
Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "created a professional full-time army"
[2]
before Askia Muhammad "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[3]
Distinction between people and army "beginning with the reign of Askia Mohammad ... Instead of mass conscription, a permanent army was created; civilians who were not part of it could go about their business." [4] Previously,uUnder Sonni Ali, "all able-bodied nationals were subject to enlistment." [4] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [2]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. [4]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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"By 1400, therefore, most of the troops in the Ottoman army served on a contractual basis, allowing the sultan to levy a predictable number of reliable troops year after year."
[1]
Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges." [2] Janissaries were paid a monthly salary. [3] The Janissary organization is believed to have started during the reign of Murat I. [4] [1]: (Imber 2002, 256-257) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [2]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) [3]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) [4]: (Cosgel, Metin. Personal Communication to Peter Turchin. April 2020) |
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"The armies of the Umayyad and early ’Abbasid period were paid stipends in minted coin. At the beginning of this period, these stipends could be thought of as the hereditary right of those whose names appeared in the diwan registers. During the course of the second/eighth century, the Caliphs and their representatives forced a transformation so that the stipend became a true salary, a payment for work done. Unlike their contemporaries in the West, the soldiers of the Caliphs were never given land grants in lieu of salaries. Sometimes they might be given houses or plots of land on which to build, but not to provide an alternative income. One the rare occasions when larger land grants were given to soldiers it was as a reward for past services, rather than payment for continuing and future ones. Both Umayyads and ’Abbasids normally maintained the separation of the military from tax-collecting: apart from dire emergencies, soldiers were never given the right to collect taxes with which to pay themselves. This was always done by the government diwans."
[1]
The Muqatila, translated as fighting men, were the cornerstone of the Umayyad Caliphates armed forces. They in term were registered in Diwans that were based on where the tribes had been garrisoned. The actual number of men who could or would muster during a campaign varied considerably. [2] "The Arab armies which overran Sasanid Iraq and Iran in the middle decades of the 7th century A.D. comprised essentially the levée en masse of the male, free Muslim Arab cavalrymen (the moqātela), receiving stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) from the dīvān". [3] [1]: (Kennedy 2001, 88) Kennedy, H. 2001. The Armies of the Caliphs. Routledge. London. [2]: (Kennedy ????, 19-23) [3]: (Bosworth 2011) Bosworth, C E. 2011. ARMY ii. Islamic, to the Mongol period. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/army-ii |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"Every military unit of the imperial army had its own muster roll which provided information about date of entry into the service, arms and equipment. These had been used earlier on by the legions in the early imperial era. Pay was issued on the strength of information in the muster roll. After entry on the muster roll each soldier received a document, the probatoria, which attested his enrolment in the service." [2] "...the armies of the later eighth century and after consisted of several categories of soldier: regular professionals (the core of the thematic forces), the militia-like majority, full-time ’professional’ regiments (imperial units or tagmata) at Constantinople, foreign mercenaries (Khazars, Kurds, Turks, and others)." [3] [1]: (Johannes Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 92) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. [3]: (Haldon 2008, 555) Jeffreys E, Haldon J and Cormack R eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"...the armies of the later eighth century and after consisted of several categories of soldier: regular professionals (the core of the thematic forces), the militia-like majority, full-time ’professional’ regiments (imperial units or tagmata) at Constantinople, foreign mercenaries (Khazars, Kurds, Turks, and others)."
[2]
"The thematic militias were not suitable for offensive operations, and so regular field armies with a more complex tactical structure, specialized fighting skills and weapons, and more offensive spirit began to evolve, partly under the direction of a developing elite of provincial landed military officers. Full-time professional units played a growing role as the state began to commute thematic military service for cash payments, which were then used to hire mercenaries. The result was a colourful and international army—remarked on by outside observers— consisting of both indigenous mercenary units as well as Russians, Normans, Turks, and Franks, both infantry and cavalry. Perhaps best-known among these are the famous Varangians (Russian and Scandinavian adventurers and mercenaries), first recruited during the reign of Basil II." [3] [1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haldon 2008, 555) Jeffreys E, Haldon J and Cormack R eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies. Oxford University Press. Oxford. [3]: (Haldon 2008, 556) Jeffreys E, Haldon J and Cormack R eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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"Croesus asked a rich Lydian, Sadyattes, for money to hire mercenaries." Account by Nicolas of Damascus.
[1]
"The Bronze Age army was an army of specialists and corvee soldiers. The army of the Early Iron Age was a ’military population’ charged with enthusiasm, guided by the decisions of kin-based groups united in council and not by impositions from the state administration. Moreover, this army chose its charismatic leaders, who would return to their previous occupation once the danger was overcome."
[2]
One hypothesis for Lydian coinage "is that these coins were intended for issuing pay to mercenaries, and for spending internally." [3] [1]: Pedley, J.G. 1972. Ancient Literary Sources on Sardis. Achaeological Exploration of Sardis. Monograph 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p.25 [2]: (Leverani 2014, 400) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [3]: (Broodbank 2015, 556) Broodbank, Cyprian. 2015. The Making of the Middle Sea. Thames & Hudson. London. |
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Salaried personnel increased from about 24,000 in 1527 CE to just under 100,000 in 1660 CE.
[1]
"By 1400, therefore, most of the troops in the Ottoman army served on a contractual basis, allowing the sultan to levy a predictable number of reliable troops year after year." [2] Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges." [3] "Both [yaya] and the müsellems were gradually relegated to second-line duties late in the 14th century, and by 1600 such units had either been abolished or reduced to non-military functions." [3] Janissaries were paid a monthly salary. [4] In Egypt, "janissaries and the azab drew a large part of their income ... from urban tax-farms (muqata’at) and from the payment they received for the protection of artisans and shopkeepers in the city." [5] [1]: (Murphey 1999, 16) Murphey, Rhoads. 1999. Ottoman warfare 1500-1700. UCL Press. Taylor & Francis Group. [2]: (Imber 2002, 256-257) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [3]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) [4]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) [5]: (Raymond 2000, 204) |
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In 1660 CE just under 100,000 salaried personnel.
[1]
"By 1400, therefore, most of the troops in the Ottoman army served on a contractual basis, allowing the sultan to levy a predictable number of reliable troops year after year." [2] Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges." [3] "Both [yaya] and the müsellems were gradually relegated to second-line duties late in the 14th century, and by 1600 such units had either been abolished or reduced to non-military functions." [3] Janissaries were paid a monthly salary. [4] In Egypt, "janissaries and the azab drew a large part of their income ... from urban tax-farms (muqata’at) and from the payment they received for the protection of artisans and shopkeepers in the city." [5] [1]: (Murphey 1999, 16) Murphey, Rhoads. 1999. Ottoman warfare 1500-1700. UCL Press. Taylor & Francis Group. [2]: (Imber 2002, 256-257) Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power. PalgraveMacmillan. Basingstoke. [3]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) [4]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) [5]: (Raymond 2000, 204) |
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The only professional soldiers were employed in the king’s personal bodyguard.
"The ancient Yemeni military structure consisted of four different elements: 1) the national troops called the Khamis under the king, or one of his generals; 2) levied troops from the highland communities; 3) cavalry (light and heavy); and 4) Bedouin allies/mercenaries. It is not known whether the Khamis consisted of professional soldiers or peasant conscripts, but the king’s bodyguards certainly did consist of professionals." [1] Sabaean Kingdom Middle Period (whilst not associated with Himyar but considered a less centralized polity): "There are certain grounds to suppose that there were certain lands, most probably in the areas of Marib, San’a, Nashq and Nashan, which were granted on lease by special royal officials; and the rent received from these lands is most likely to have been used for the maintenance of the regular army (hms). This appears very probably to be the way in which the royal power managed to cover effectively what was apparently the most significant item of its expenses." [2] [1]: (Syvanne 2015, 134) Ilkka Syvanne. 2015. Military History of Late Rome 284-361. Pen and Sword. Barnsley. [2]: (Korotayev 1996, 148-149) Andrey Vitalyevhich Korotayev. 1996. Pre-Islamic Yemen. Socio-political Organization of the Sabaean Cultural Area in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries AD. Harrassowitz Verlag. Wiesbaden. |
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The only professional soldiers were employed in the king’s personal bodyguard.
"The ancient Yemeni military structure consisted of four different elements: 1) the national troops called the Khamis under the king, or one of his generals; 2) levied troops from the highland communities; 3) cavalry (light and heavy); and 4) Bedouin allies/mercenaries. It is not known whether the Khamis consisted of professional soldiers or peasant conscripts, but the king’s bodyguards certainly did consist of professionals." [1] Sabaean Kingdom Middle Period (whilst not associated with Himyar but considered a less centralized polity): "There are certain grounds to suppose that there were certain lands, most probably in the areas of Marib, San’a, Nashq and Nashan, which were granted on lease by special royal officials; and the rent received from these lands is most likely to have been used for the maintenance of the regular army (hms). This appears very probably to be the way in which the royal power managed to cover effectively what was apparently the most significant item of its expenses." [2] [1]: (Syvanne 2015, 134) Ilkka Syvanne. 2015. Military History of Late Rome 284-361. Pen and Sword. Barnsley. [2]: (Korotayev 1996, 148-149) Andrey Vitalyevhich Korotayev. 1996. Pre-Islamic Yemen. Socio-political Organization of the Sabaean Cultural Area in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries AD. Harrassowitz Verlag. Wiesbaden. |
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Standing armies.
"The feudal levies due from subordinates to the Gurjara king were supplemented by standing armies garrisoned on the frontiers." [1] [1]: (Deyell 2001) Deyell, J. 2001. The Gurjara-Pratiharas. In R. Chakravarti (ed) Trade in Early India. OUP. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/MF59EW5P/library |
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Reference to a “national army”: “The governors exercised an independent local judicial authority in minor cases, acted as spokesmen before the king on behalf of those under their government, and transmitted their tribute to him. They also raised contingents of soldiers for the national army, and commanded them in battle.”
[1]
“Snelgrave’s explanation of the unexpected defeat of the Whydahs was essentially their cowardice, which he attributed to the enervating effects of their involvement in the Atlantic trade: ‘Trade having likewise flourished for a long time, had greatly enriched the People; which, with the Fertility of their Country, had unhappily made them so proud, effeminate, and luxurious, that tho’ they could have brought at least one hundred thousand Men into the Field, yet so great were their fears, that they were driven out of their Principal City, by two hundred of their Enemies...’”
[2]
[1]: Law, Robin. “‘The Common People Were Divided’: Monarchy, Aristocracy and Political Factionalism in the Kingdom of Whydah, 1671-1727.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, 1990, pp. 201–29: 209. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/8JKAH2V5/collection [2]: Law, Robin. “A Neglected Account of the Dahomian Conquest of Whydah (1727): The ‘Relation de La Guerre de Juda’ of the Sieur Ringard of Nantes.” History in Africa, vol. 15, 1988, pp. 321–38: 322. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/U957EGQV/collection |
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Various references to mercenaries and to military traditions. “Basden further claimed that: The chief disturbers of the peace were certain bands of raiders who either acted on their own account or, more frequently, were hired by the men of one town to help them fight against another. Such men were the dreaded Abams on the eastern side of the Niger. The way in which the Aro used warriors who were collectively called the Abam to expand in the Igbo hinterland, has engaged the attention of modern historians.”
[1]
“Warfare and military training were institutionalized among the Abam. Their young men were from childhood, drilled in guerrila warfare. They were expected when they became adolescents, to behead a man in battle and return home with his head before they were granted full rights of citizenship. The youths were then called Ufiem (heros) and permitted: To don the eagle’s plume and red tail feathers of the parrot in token of (their) prowess in battle. In life (they) enjoy special privileges, and in death (are) accorded the dignity of a warrior’s funeral with the special dance known as okerenkwa.”
[2]
“Some Abiriba elders stated that the people of Arochukwu came under attack by the belligerent Ibibio sometime in the late 17th century. This time the Ibibio people used masquerades (Ekpo Ibibio) to frighten and wage a guerrilla war against the Aro. Probably due to the agelong cordial relationship that had existed between Abiriba and Aro, they (Aro) asked for assistance from Abiriba to deal with the Ibibio menace and the request was granted. Abiriba sent seven warriors to fight the Ibibio masquerades called in Abiriba parlance “okiri-Ibibio”. The seven warriors were Nkuma Agbaike (leader), Owom Upko, Gbagbali Ohunnunu, Alawara Adimaribonkwu, Okoronta Agwuocha and two others whose names we cannot immediately ascertain (Chief Ejim Akuma, 1996). The seven warriors fought and defeated the Ibibio masquerades that had laid siege on Aro land. As the victorious Abiriba warriors were returning home, they were given a gift of a mirror by the Eze Aro. […] According to late Chief Ejim Akuma (a local historian), Abiriba warriors did not fight as mercenaries but fought for glory, blood heroism, to secure their homeland and protect their movement outside Abiriba and their business interest as long-distance travellers and traders. They also fought to liberate communities under siege, especially communities that share historical link or affinity with them or simply on request.”
[3]
[1]: Oriji, J. N. (1987). THE SLAVE TRADE, WARFARE AND ARO EXPANSION IN THE IGBO HINTERLAND. Transafrican Journal of History, 16, 151–166; 152. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/MDDKHGKD/collection [2]: Oriji, J. N. (1987). THE SLAVE TRADE, WARFARE AND ARO EXPANSION IN THE IGBO HINTERLAND. Transafrican Journal of History, 16, 151–166; 154. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/MDDKHGKD/collection [3]: Chidume, C., & Nmaju, U. (2019). The Aro Hegemony: Dissecting The Myth And Reality. 8, 76–87: 80. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/WJ5NDV5U/collection |
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Turkish mercenaries. “As the promised military aid of Sultan Murad III remained a mere pledge on paper, the question arises as to how Mai Idris obtained the services of Turks who served in his entourage (for which there are various pieces of contemporary evidence). An interesting passage in a contemporary Neapolitan source throws some light on this matter: the Turks were largely adventurers and soldiers of fortune who were recruited by the Kanuri king. Because of their better discipline and superior firepower, the possession of Turkish mercenaries must have tipped the military balance very decisively in Idris’s favour. One might guess that the opponents of the Kanuri rulers at this time had hand-weapons and bows and arrows, but few if any firearms, which must have been expensive and hard to obtain. Mai Idris’s use of firearms in some quantity preceded by more than a decade the Moroccan invasion of Songhay under the Spanish renegade Judar Pasha. On that occasion large numbers of muskets and some artillery were employed by the conquerors.”
[1]
There was a significant military force present, including cavalry, but it’s not clear whether these were full-time specialists. “The categories of officials which the inscriptio mentions are the umara (amirs), shurta (guards), hukama (governors), "ulama (scholars), ummal (officers), qudat (judges), wuzara (viziers), fursan (horsemen, warriors), ra’aya (subjects) and ma’shar al-muslimln (the generality of Muslims).”
[2]
“In 1866 at the time of Rohlfs’ visit, Shehu Umar, the son of the Shehu Laminu of Denham’s time, was two thirds through his long reign of 46 years. The two men got on very well, and in accordance with precedent Rohlfs was given a Muhammadan name, Idris. He gives us a careful description of Kuka, coinciding with and amplifying that of Barth. […] He went on to note that the military power, totalling 25-30,000 soldiers, was contributed on a feudal basis by the chiefs throughout the kingdom. About 1,000 foot and 1,000 horsemen were armed with flint guns and, surprisingly, there were 20 cannon of undetermined calibre which Rohlfs states were cast in Kuka.”
[3]
[1]: Martin, B. G. (1969). Kanem, Bornu, and the Fazzan: Notes on the Political History of a Trade Route. The Journal of African History, 10(1), 15–27: 25-26. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/PFENZUSB/collection [2]: Bobboyi, H. (1993). RELATIONS OF THE BORNO ʿULAMĀʾ WITH THE SAYFAWA RULERS: THE ROLE OF THE MAḤRAMS. Sudanic Africa, 4, 175–204: 189–190. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/JE5VQ8NI/collection [3]: Ellison, R. E. (1959). Three Forgotten Explorers of the Latter Half of the 19th Century With Special Reference to Their Journeys to Bornu. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 1(4), 322–330: 323. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/R84SSEKK/collection |
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The following quote refers to Great Lakes in the immediate precolonial period generally. "Thousands of people flooded the periphery of the sovereign’s enclosure, as did delegations from remote regions, which added to the daily traffic of persons in the environs. Some basic huts housed many young people wanting to try their luck in the government’s entourage: in this case, the "process" might last years because the time waiting for a favor from the king (a cow, land, or protection) was spent doing military exercises. It was from among these that elite warriors, who formed a sort of permanent guard, were recruited."
[1]
[1]: (Chrétien 2006: 168-169) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/FXCVWDRI/collection. |
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" In time, Ndori’s army became greater than that of his enemies and ended up including from four to six times more well trained warriors than the armies of other chiefs. Moreover, younger and stronger warriors were inducted into it whenever a new company was created. Each new company was instructed by one composed of veterans and learned from their experience so that after a few years the last recruits became the shock troops. Thanks to this organization, Ndori’s army surpassed by far the intore companies of its adversaries. Even royal security and military discipline benefited from the new organization, since it was no longer possible for a company to wield more than a small parcel of military power. True, every company maintained its internal esprit-decorps, but the size of the army reduced the effects of any indiscipline. Moreover, that size encouraged the appearance of an esprit-de-corps that expressed itself through its allegiance to the commander-in-chief. And finally, a first step toward a permanent army was taken when Ndori’s successor formed his new army from the last company of the preceding one)."
[1]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 61) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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The following quote refers to Great Lakes in the immediate precolonial period generally. "Thousands of people flooded the periphery of the sovereign’s enclosure, as did delegations from remote regions, which added to the daily traffic of persons in the environs. Some basic huts housed many young people wanting to try their luck in the government’s entourage: in this case, the "process" might last years because the time waiting for a favor from the king (a cow, land, or protection) was spent doing military exercises. It was from among these that elite warriors, who formed a sort of permanent guard, were recruited."
[1]
[1]: (Chrétien 2006: 168-169) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/FXCVWDRI/collection. |
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’The professional warriors were private fighters who at first fought entirely in their own interests and for their own ends. They later entered the personal retainerships of court nobles or, more commonly, military lords’
[1]
"The Heian period (794-1185) saw the rise of the professional warrior class, the bushi, as the main military service providers of the imperial court. This marked a shift of the court away from reliance on conscript peasant soldiers, toward, or more precisely, back to, the militarized provincial gentry."
[2]
[1]: Shively, Donald H. and McCullough, William H. 2008. The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 2: Heian Japan. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press.p.644 [2]: (Lorge 2011, 47) |
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’It must be emphasized that this army changed over time... It relied more and more on the specialists and warrior elites from the Kanto and less and less on the conscripted infantry’
[1]
[1]: Kuehn, John T. 2014. A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the Samurai to the 21st Century. ABC-CLIO.p.18 |
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"Since professional soldiers were rather expensive to maintain, Venice embarked from the 1520s onward on a systematic organization of civil militias (cernide, ordinanze), mostly peasant militias, in its overseas territories, on the model of a similar organization that had already been established in the Venetian terraferma."
[1]
[1]: (Arbel 2014, 205) Benjamin Arbel. Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2014. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. |
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’It was everyone’s ambition to be "rescued from the mud", but very few were. Most of those were placed, in Angkorean times, into various varna, or caste groupings, which made up perhaps a tenth of society as a whole. These people included clerks, artisans, concubines, artists, high officials, and priests, as well as royal servants, relatives, and soldiers.’
[1]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[2]
[1]: (Chandler 2008, pp. 28-29) [2]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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’It was everyone’s ambition to be "rescued from the mud", but very few were. Most of those were placed, in Angkorean times, into various varna, or caste groupings, which made up perhaps a tenth of society as a whole. These people included clerks, artisans, concubines, artists, high officials, and priests, as well as royal servants, relatives, and soldiers.’
[1]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[2]
[1]: (Chandler 2008, pp. 28-29) [2]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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"The inscriptions on the coins cannot tell us whether, under the Karakhanids, small grants were made to ordinary soldiers and to minor and middle-ranking members of the army and the civilian bureaucracy; consequently, there are simply no data available for the purposes of comparison with the Seljuq system. On the other hand, we may confidently conclude that there are no similarities between the Ghaznavid and Karakhanid systems during the first period."
[1]
[1]: (Davidovich 1997, 146) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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’It was everyone’s ambition to be "rescued from the mud", but very few were. Most of those were placed, in Angkorean times, into various varna, or caste groupings, which made up perhaps a tenth of society as a whole. These people included clerks, artisans, concubines, artists, high officials, and priests, as well as royal servants, relatives, and soldiers.’
[1]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[2]
[1]: (Chandler 2008, pp. 28-29) [2]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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Following Higham’s text, it could be inferred that there was some degree of military organization that seem to imply the presence of different levels, but at the early stages these "officers" may have been part of the chief’s court and not part of a professionalized army. Similarly, it is unclear if what the chinese identified as army was a real professional army or villagers who were conscripted to fight for their chiefs. Hence it is best to assume that in the early stages of Funan there were no professional soldiers (RA’s guess). "His son, Pan Pan, had only a brief reign, and was succeeded by a leader of military prowess known to the Chinese as Fan Shiman. He undertook raids against his neighbours, and then mounted a water-borne expedition which subdued over ten chiefs traditionally situated along the shores of the Gulf of Siam."
[1]
The Funanese named with the title "Fan" in the Chinese texts were identified as generals.
[2]
[1]: (Higham 1989, pp. 247) [2]: (Vickery 2003, p. 108) |
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The soldier-settler, or kleruch, was awarded land and a hereditary obligation to serve in the army under a system known as Kleros. The size of the land grant varied with the rank of the soldier-settler. In addition, soldiers were recruited from native people, especially in the light cavalry.
[1]
Amphipolis skin text "a brief receipt concerning payments for Scythian soldiers" of unclear origin which could be dated 157/6 B.C.E. [2] [1]: Holt, Frank L. Thundering Zeus: The Making of Hellenistic Bactria. Vol. 32. University of California Pr, 1999. pp. 118-119 [2]: (Jakobsson 2009) Jakobsson, Jens. Who Founded the Indo-Greek Era of 186/5 B.C.E.? Dec 2009. The Classical Quarterly. New Series. Vol. 59. No.2. pp. 505-510. |
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The Assyrians in 836 BCE found the local settlements fortified "so it is likely that fortifications were built in response to local conditions, rather than foreign invasion."
[1]
[2]
The armed forces, likewise, might equally have been well-organized, albeit on a small scale, but the evidence is not conclusive.
[1]: (Melville 2010, 87-109) Melville, Sarah. "Kings of Tabal: Politics [2]: Competition, and Conflict in a Contested Periphery." in Richardson, Seth. ed. 2010. Rebellions and Peripheries in the Mesopotamian World. American Oriental Series 91. Eisenbrauns. Winona Lake. |
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There is no information regarding the presence of any army or soldiers, etc. in the Ubaid.
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Not enough data, though perhaps it would be reasonable to infer absence.
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unknown. Present for the New Kingdom Hatti which preceded the Neo-Hittite Kingdoms: "the core of the defence force was a full-time, professional standing army. ... They lived together in military barracks, so that they could be mobilized at a moment’s notice."
[1]
According to H. Genz "So far not a single burial from the Early Iron Age is known from Central Anatolia"
[2]
which makes it difficult tell whether professionalism was maintained.
[1]: (Bryce 2007, 11) [2]: Genz H. "The Iron Age in Central Anatolia".In: Tsetskhladze G. R. (2011) The Black Sea, Greece, Anatolia and Europe in the first millenium BC. Paris. Pg: 343. |
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The introduction of coinage may have coincided with a shift to a more professional armed forces as the coinage could be used to pay the army. It would have been very hyperbolic for Mani (216-276 CE) in the Kephalaia to have called Aksum "one of the four greatest empires of the world"
[1]
if by his time it had not invented or could not sustain any professional soldiers. The successful invasion of south Arabia in the early 3rd century may have used some trained soldiers, albeit at this stage the majority may have been raised and trained by vassals of the Aksum king.
"The first Aksumite king to put his own coinage into circulation was Endybis (in the second half of the third century)." [2] King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [3] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. "high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include ... middle-ranking members of the army ..." [4] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [3]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [4]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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Lawsuits were one of the many responsibilities held by bu chiefs. "The chiefs of bu, tribes or simple chiefdoms, fulfilled the following functions: [...] Judicial: the settlement of disputes concerning the territories where nomads live, stealing of livestock, violation of customs, mutilation, murders, etc. When Tanshihuai came to power he laid out ‘law rules for disposition of cases between innocent and guilty and nobody dared to break them’ (Ibid.: 75, 330). The same duties are also mentioned with respect to his son, Helian (Ibid.: 80). One of the reasons for Kebineng’s election as a chief was his equitable investigation of lawsuits (Ibid.: 324). However, it is unlikely that these actions were based on written law; "
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2011, 199) |
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There is little direct evidence for Zapotec military organisation during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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No information found in sources so far.
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unknown
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The following quote suggests the emergence of social differentiation in this period, but little appears to be understood about this phenomenon apart from the appearance of specialised smiths and the formation of senior and cadet social segments. "During Yellow II, the inhabitants of Mound 4 began a process that eventually led to centralization of iron production, as described in detail above. Iron ore extraction involves profound digging in the earth, the realm of spirits, and historically in Bwa society the practice is reserved solely for specialized smiths, who also excavate burials (see discussions below). The mid first millennium A.D. therefore witnessed a transformation from redundant social and economic roles for houses to specialization in at least one craft activity. While houses were still highly independent, even producing their own pottery, a formalized village structure was likely present with both cadet and senior social segments, founded upon common descent with a common ancestor."
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 28) |
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"Contexts that could shed light on the dynamics of social structure and hierarchies in the metropolis, such as the royal burial site of Oyo monarchs and the residences of the elite population, have not been investigated. The mapping of the palace structures has not been followed by systematic excavations (Soper, 1992); and questions of the economy, military system, and ideology of the empire have not been addressed archaeologically, although their general patterns are known from historical studies (e.g, Johnson, 1921; Law, 1977)."
[1]
Regarding this period, however, one of the historical studies mentioned in this quote also notes: "Of the earliestperiod of Oyo history, before the sixteenth century, very little is known."
[2]
Law does not then go on to provide specific information directly relevant to this variable.
[1]: (Ogundiran 2005: 151-152) [2]: (Law 1977: 33) |
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Unknown. No evidence for military so one could infer that regularly paid professional soldiers were absent. Would there have been a full-time trained and paid personal retainer/bodyguard to a king?
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present for Greco-Bactrians in 200 BCE but the invading Tocharian tribes may not have been, at least not initially.
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