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Archaeological evidence suggests a ranked society with only part-time specialization in burgeoning sociopolitical, religious, and/or military institutional roles.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[1]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [2]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [4]: Paul Tolstoy. (1989) "Coapexco and Tlatilco: sites with Olmec material in the Basin of Mexico", In Regional Perspectives on the Olmec, Robert J. Sharer & David C. Grove (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 87-121. [5]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. |
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Archaeological evidence suggests a ranked society with only part-time specialization in burgeoning sociopolitical, religious, and/or military institutional roles.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[1]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [2]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [4]: Paul Tolstoy. (1989) "Coapexco and Tlatilco: sites with Olmec material in the Basin of Mexico", In Regional Perspectives on the Olmec, Robert J. Sharer & David C. Grove (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 87-121. [5]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. |
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Professional military officers are known by Teotihuacan (ca. 250-550 CE). The information for this code is based primarily on art and are less secure than what we know from the Aztec Period (1450-1521).
[1]
[1]: (Carballo, David. Personal Communication to Jill Levine and Peter Turchin. Email. April 23, 2020) |
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Professional military officers are known by Teotihuacan (ca. 250-550 CE). The information for this code is based primarily on art and are less secure than what we know from the Aztec Period (1450-1521).
[1]
[1]: (Carballo, David. Personal Communication to Jill Levine and Peter Turchin. Email. April 23, 2020) |
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Professional military officers are known by Teotihuacan (ca. 250-550 CE). The information for this code is based primarily on art and are less secure than what we know from the Aztec Period (1450-1521).
[1]
[1]: (Carballo, David. Personal Communication to Jill Levine and Peter Turchin. Email. April 23, 2020) |
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The following refers to Ancient Hawaiki, not Hawaii. The former is the ancestral Polynesian homeland, in the first millennium BCE. It’s not entirely clear how much of their ancestral heritage the earliest Hawaiians might have retained. Expert guidance needed. Some linguistic evidence for the existence of a war chief, *sau
[1]
.
[1]: (Kirch & Green 2001, 234) |
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Following Higham’s text, it could be inferred that there was some degree of military organization that seem to imply the presence of different levels, but at the early stages these "officers" may have been part of the chief’s court and not part of a professionalized army (RA’s guess). "His son, Pan Pan, had only a brief reign, and was succeeded by a leader of military prowess known to the Chinese as Fan Shiman. He undertook raids against his neighbours, and then mounted a water-borne expedition which subdued over ten chiefs traditionally situated along the shores of the Gulf of Siam."
[1]
The Funanese named with the title "Fan" in the Chinese texts were identified as generals.
[2]
[1]: (Higham 1989, pp. 247) [2]: (Vickery 2003, p. 108) |
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Following Higham’s text, it could be inferred that there was some degree of military organization that seem to imply the presence of different levels, but at the early stages these "officers" may have been part of the chief’s court and not part of a professionalized army "His son, Pan Pan, had only a brief reign, and was succeeded by a leader of military prowess known to the Chinese as Fan Shiman. He undertook raids against his neighbours, and then mounted a water-borne expedition which subdued over ten chiefs traditionally situated along the shores of the Gulf of Siam."
[1]
The Funanese named with the title "Fan" in the Chinese texts were identified as generals.
[2]
[1]: (Higham 1989, pp. 247) [2]: (Vickery 2003, p. 108) |
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’One more text which is relevant, and probably belongs in [H] though possibly south of it in [K]-the exact provenance is unknown-is k.155, by a technical official, dhanyakarapati, "chief of the grain stocks", and one of only eight or nine such specialized functions mentioned in the pre-Angkor corpus, [Footnote 143: There are seven inscriptions by, or referring to, such technical or administrative specialists. The others are K.133 [I], a "chief ship pilot", mahanauvaha, in K.140 [K] a "master of all elephants," or "vassal king", samantagajapati; in K.765 [T] a mahanukrtavi-khyata, "celebrated for his great following"; in K725 three such titles or names of functions, samantanauvaha, "chief of the naval forces", mahasvaptai, "great chief of horse", sahasravargadhiptai, "chief of a group of a thousand"; in K726 yuddhapramukha, military officer; and the latest in date a certain mahavikrantakesari, a name meaning "great bold lion", probably indicating a military person, who is mentioned 4 times in K1029 [R].]’
[1]
’Jayavarman I was the great-grandson of Ishanavarman. His inscriptions indicate the tightening of central power and control over a considerable area, the creation of new titles and admin- istrators, and the availability of an army, the means of defense and destruction. A text described how King Jayavarman’s commands were obeyed by “innumerable vassal kings.” Jayavarman also strengthened the legal code: “Those who levy an annual tax, those who seize carts, boats, slaves, cattle, buffaloes, those who contest the king’s orders, will be punished.” New titles were accorded highly ranked retainers who fulfilled important posts in government. One lineage held the priestly position of hotar. Another functionary was a samantagajapadi, chief of the royal elephants, and a military leader; the dhanyakarapati would have controlled the grain stores. The king also appointed officials known as a mratan and pon to a sabha, or council of state. Another inscription prescribes the quantities of salt to be distributed by barge to various foundations and prohibits any tax on the vessels going up- or downriver. Thus Jayavarman I intensified royal control over dependent fiefs begun by his great-grandfather, Ishanavarman. Thereafter this dynasty loses visibility, although the king’s daughter, Jayadevi, ruled from a center in the vicinity of ANGKOR.
[2]
’Their contents inform us on two vital issues. The first is the use of official titles, such as President of the Royal Court, which was located at a centre called Purandarapura. Another prescribed punishment for those who disobey a royal order. Two brothers of high social standing were appointed to a variety of posts: officer of the royal guard, chief of rowers, military chief, and governor of Dhruvapura. Another highly-ranked courtier became chief of elephants, reminding us of the traditional role of elephants in warfare. A further text mentions a chief of the royal grain store. These high officials were rewarded with honorific symbols, such as a parasol embellished with gold. The trends already evident under Ishanavarman were greatly strengthened under his great grandson: with Jayavarman I, we can identify the establishment of a state. It was, however, ephemeral. Only one inscription of his daughter Jayadevi survives. Thereafter, the dynasty disappears from the historic record.’
[3]
[1]: (Vickery 1998, 125) [2]: (Higham 2004, 75) [3]: (Higham 2014b, 294) |
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’There was a chief of corvee labour, inspectors of quality and defaults, chief of the warehouse, and vrah guru, a guardian of the bedchamber in the third category. On inscription mentions a court of justice. Mratan Sri Narendrasimha was a senapati, or military general.’
[1]
’Inscriptions help us to identify some of the generals and contingents. Thus, units from Lavo are commanded by Prince Sri Jayasmhavarman, and at the right-end of the parade we see a Thai contingent. Significantly, they are represented as a motley, ill-drilled bunch, marking out of step in contrast to the nearby Khmers.’
[2]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[3]
[1]: (Higham 2014b, p. 368) [2]: (Mabbet and Chandler 1995, p. 105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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’We have glimpses of Khmer warfare, once scene showing Jayasinhavarman, general of the troops of Lopburi, seated on the back of a great war elephant.’
[1]
’Thus, units from Lavo are commanded by Prince Sri Jayasmhavarman, and at the right-end of the parade we see a Thai contingent. Significantly, they are represented as a motley, ill-drilled bunch, marking out of step in contrast to the nearby Khmers.’
[2]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[3]
[1]: (Higham 2014b, p. 379) [2]: (Mabbet and Chandler 1995, p. 105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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According to Coe
[1]
, Post-Classical period professional military officers included a Naval Chief (krahlahom) and a Minister of War and Ground Transport (chakri). ’Inscriptions help us to identify some of the generals and contingents. Thus, units from Lavo are commanded by Prince Sri Jayasmhavarman, and at the right-end of the parade we see a Thai contingent. Significantly, they are represented as a motley, ill-drilled bunch, marking out of step in contrast to the nearby Khmers.’
[2]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[3]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 217) [2]: (Mabbet and Chandler 1995, p. 105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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According to Coe
[1]
, Post-Classical period professional military officers included a Naval Chief (krahlahom) and a Minister of War and Ground Transport (chakri). ’Inscriptions help us to identify some of the generals and contingents. Thus, units from Lavo are commanded by Prince Sri Jayasmhavarman, and at the right-end of the parade we see a Thai contingent. Significantly, they are represented as a motley, ill-drilled bunch, marking out of step in contrast to the nearby Khmers.’
[2]
’The ordinary Khmer soldiers as well as officers might carry a lance; or a bow, with the arrows being held in a quiver; or sabres of different length; or various sizes of knives and daggers; or a kind of halberd known as a phka’h. The latter was basically an iron axe mounted on a long handle curved at one end. At Angkor Wat, the phka’k is held in the hands of high-ranking warriors mounted on elephants or horses; it is still in use in the twentieth century for hunting or work in the forest. Crossbows were known, but are extremely rare in the reliefs.’
[3]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 217) [2]: (Mabbet and Chandler 1995, p. 105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 185) |
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"Contemporary European accounts also sometimes refer to what appear to be highly organized command hierarchies. The Siamese army command in the 1680s, for example, was described by Gervaise as consisting of a ’commander-in-chief, a deputy general, several captains with their lieutenants and some subalterns.’ In actuality, members of the nobility through ad hoc appointments led Southeast Asian armies. These men were usually personal favorites of the ruler or one of his relatives, or were outlying lords obligated to bring local levies to participate in campaigns. One reason for this was the concern that otherwise a regular officer class on a permanent footing would become part of the court and ministerial politics that plagued early modern Southeast Asian states."
[1]
[1]: (Charney 2004, p. 237) |
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Referring to the early modern period, Charney
[1]
writes that "[c]ontemporary European accounts also sometimes refer to what appear to be highly organized command hierarchies. The Siamese army command in the 1680s, for example, was described by Gervaise as consisting of a ’commander-in-chief, a deputy general, several captains with their lieutenants and some subalterns.’ In actuality, members of the nobility through ad hoc appointments led Southeast Asian armies. These men were usually personal favorites of the ruler or one of his relatives, or were outlying lords obligated to bring local levies to participate in campaigns. One reason for this was the concern that otherwise a regular officer class on a permanent footing would become part of the court and ministerial politics that plagued early modern Southeast Asian states." Because the Thai army was reformed only in the early twentieth century
[2]
, it is reasonable to infer that there were no professional military officers throughout the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.
[1]: (Charney 2004, p. 237) [2]: (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009, p. 62) |
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Full-time specialists. We can infer the presence of a well-organized military. There is evidence for armour
[1]
and noble cavalry
[2]
which suggest specialization, and a military campaign was launched against Srivijaya.
[3]
[1]: (Draeger 1972, 23) [2]: (Gaukroger and Scott 2009, 134) [3]: (Muljana 2006, 246) |
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Warrior elite class.
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Prior to ’pacification’, violent conflict played out in raids and battles between rival groups of armed men: ’Within districts, conflict arose over land, succession to chiefship, theft, adultery, and avenging homicide. Between districts, it arose over attentions to local women by outside men, the status of one district as subordinate to another, and rights of access to fishing areas. Formal procedures for terminating conflict between districts involved payments of valuables and land by the losing to the winning side. Fighting involved surprise raids and prearranged meetings on a field of battle. Principal weapons were slings, spears, and clubs. Firearms, introduced late in the nineteenth century, were confiscated by German authorities in 1903. Martial arts included an elaborate system of throws and holds by which an unarmed man could kill, maim or disarm an armed opponent.’
[1]
Competition between rival chiefs over the control of land and people was a major factor: ’Traditional Micronesian life was characterized by a belief in the stability of society and culture. People suffered occasional natural disasters, such as cyclones or droughts, but their goal after encountering one of these was to reconstitute the previous state of affairs. Wars occurred in most areas from time to time, mainly at the instigation of competing chiefs. At stake was the control of land—a limited resource—and followers, but there were usually few casualties. Living in small communities on small territories, Micronesians learned to adjust to their neighbours, to remain on good terms with most of them most of the time, and to develop techniques of reconciliation when fights did break out. Micronesians traditionally depended on the cultivation of plant crops and on fishing in shallow reef waters. Because arable land was in short supply for the relatively dense population, Micronesians had a strong practical basis for their attachment to locality and lands. Land rights were usually held through lineages or extended family groups, often backed up by traditions of ancestral origins on the land.’
[2]
[1]: Goodenough, Ward and Skoggard 1999) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/5IETI75E. [2]: (Kahn, Fischer and Kiste 2017) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XHZTEDKE. |
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Prior to ’pacification’, violent conflict played out in raids and battles between rival groups of armed men: ’Within districts, conflict arose over land, succession to chiefship, theft, adultery, and avenging homicide. Between districts, it arose over attentions to local women by outside men, the status of one district as subordinate to another, and rights of access to fishing areas. Formal procedures for terminating conflict between districts involved payments of valuables and land by the losing to the winning side. Fighting involved surprise raids and prearranged meetings on a field of battle. Principal weapons were slings, spears, and clubs. Firearms, introduced late in the nineteenth century, were confiscated by German authorities in 1903. Martial arts included an elaborate system of throws and holds by which an unarmed man could kill, maim or disarm an armed opponent.’
[1]
Competition between rival chiefs over the control of land and people was a major factor: ’Traditional Micronesian life was characterized by a belief in the stability of society and culture. People suffered occasional natural disasters, such as cyclones or droughts, but their goal after encountering one of these was to reconstitute the previous state of affairs. Wars occurred in most areas from time to time, mainly at the instigation of competing chiefs. At stake was the control of land—a limited resource—and followers, but there were usually few casualties. Living in small communities on small territories, Micronesians learned to adjust to their neighbours, to remain on good terms with most of them most of the time, and to develop techniques of reconciliation when fights did break out. Micronesians traditionally depended on the cultivation of plant crops and on fishing in shallow reef waters. Because arable land was in short supply for the relatively dense population, Micronesians had a strong practical basis for their attachment to locality and lands. Land rights were usually held through lineages or extended family groups, often backed up by traditions of ancestral origins on the land.’
[2]
[1]: Goodenough, Ward and Skoggard 1999) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/5IETI75E. [2]: (Kahn, Fischer and Kiste 2017) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XHZTEDKE. |
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The lawagetas was the supreme military leader. Officers, called hequetai (followers) accompanied military continents.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Shelmerdine, C. W. and Bennet, J. 2008. "12: Mycenaean states. 12A: Economy and administration," in Shelmerdine, C. W. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Aegean Bronze Age, Cambridge, 292-95. [2]: Nikoloudis, S. 2008. "The role of the ra-wa-ke-ta: insights from PY Un718," in Sacconi, A, del Freo, M., Godart, L., and Negri, M. (eds), Colloquium Romanum: Atti del XII Colloquio Internazionale de Micenologia. Roma 20-15 febbraio 2006, vol. 2, Rome, 587-94. |
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The lawagetas was the supreme military leader in Mycenaean states. Officers, called hequetai (followers) accompanied military continents.
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Μilitary control in city-states was exercised by the Kosmoi , a board of 3 to 10 nobles, annually elected by the Ecclesia, the body of free male citizens. One of them was the president of the board (he was called πρωτόκοσμος, στραταγέτας, κόσμος ο επί πόλεως).
[1]
[2]
[1]: Willetts, R. F. 1965. Ancient Crete. A Social History, London and Toronto, 56-75 [2]: Lembesi, A. 1987. "Η Κρητών Πολιτεία," in Panagiotakis, N. (ed.), Κρήτη: Ιστορία και Πολιτισμός, Heraklion, 166-72. |
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Μilitary and religious control in city-states was exercised by the Kosmoi (Κόσμοι), a board of 3 to 10 nobles, annually elected by the Ecclesia (Εκκλησία), the body of free male citizens. One of them was the president of the board (he was called πρωτόκοσμος, στραταγέτας, κόσμος ο επί πόλεως).
[1]
[2]
[1]: Willetts, R. F. 1965. Ancient Crete. A Social History, London and Toronto, 56-75 [2]: Chaniotis, A. 1897. "Κλασική και Ελληνιστική Κρήτη," in Panagiotakis, N. (ed.), Κρήτη: Ιστορία και Πολιτισμός, Heraklion, 196-99. |
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Μilitary and religious control in city-states was exercised by the Kosmoi (Κόσμοι), a board of 3 to 10 nobles, annually elected by the Ecclesia (Εκκλησία), the body of free male citizens. One of them was the president of the board (he was called πρωτόκοσμος, στραταγέτας, κόσμος ο επί πόλεως).
[1]
[1]: Chaniotis, A. 1897. "Κλασική και Ελληνιστική Κρήτη," in Panagiotakis, N. (ed.), Κρήτη: Ιστορία και Πολιτισμός, Heraklion, 236-46. |
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The highest officers in the Roman military system were usually senators not professionals. There were, however, professional junior officers at least from the Roman Principate.
"Typically the men who commanded armies and legions were senators. There were no military specialists in Roman government and no imperial high command. All senators alternated brief periods of military command with administrative posts, participation in domestic politics and careers as legal advocates. As military commanders they were, to a great extent, amateurs, even though most did a brief spell as a junior officer (tribune) in a legion. They would have depended on the professional junior officers (tribunes and centurions) as well as the training and discipline of the legionaries themselves to win battles."" [1] "Tribunes, like the legionary legate (commander), were drawn from Rome’s social and political elite, the senatorial and equestrian orders, and were not professional soldiers. They alternated military service with political, judicial and administrative duties." [2] [1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 38) [2]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 39) |
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The highest officers in the Roman military system were usually senators not professionals. There were, however, professional junior officers at least from the Roman Principate.
"Typically the men who commanded armies and legions were senators. There were no military specialists in Roman government and no imperial high command. All senators alternated brief periods of military command with administrative posts, participation in domestic politics and careers as legal advocates. As military commanders they were, to a great extent, amateurs, even though most did a brief spell as a junior officer (tribune) in a legion. They would have depended on the professional junior officers (tribunes and centurions) as well as the training and discipline of the legionaries themselves to win battles."" [1] "Tribunes, like the legionary legate (commander), were drawn from Rome’s social and political elite, the senatorial and equestrian orders, and were not professional soldiers. They alternated military service with political, judicial and administrative duties." [2] [1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 38) [2]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 39) |
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[1]
"An officer’s pay was so high that even the lower commissions had large sums of gold at their disposal. They also had a very substantial share in war booty, which was theirs by law."
[2]
"As far as salaries went the military were generally better off than civil servants. Officers were exceedingly well paid. And an ordinary soldier also received more pay than an artisan could earn."
[3]
"According to Arabic sources every soldier received a year’s wage of one nomisma. ... a soldier received maintenance and equipment for the duration of the campaign as well as his military grant of land (soldier’s farm). ... He might also add to his cash remuneration by selling his share of war booty. ... According to the same Arabic source the group of officers including comites, pentekontarchs and dekarchs were paid from one to three gold pounds annually, that is, between 72 and 216 nomismata. In contrast to this, an ordinary soldier after twelve years service was only paid 12 nomismata a year (his pay was raised by one nomisma for each year of service." [3] [1]: (Johannes Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 98) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. [3]: (Haussig 1971, 171) Haussig, H W.trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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Full-time specialists
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"An officer’s pay was so high that even the lower commissions had large sums of gold at their disposal. They also had a very substantial share in war booty, which was theirs by law."
[2]
"As far as salaries went the military were generally better off than civil servants. Officers were exceedingly well paid. And an ordinary soldier also received more pay than an artisan could earn."
[3]
[1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 98) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. [3]: (Haussig 1971, 171) Haussig, H W.trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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Preiser-Kapeller says present.
[1]
"An officer’s pay was so high that even the lower commissions had large sums of gold at their disposal. They also had a very substantial share in war booty, which was theirs by law."
[2]
"As far as salaries went the military were generally better off than civil servants. Officers were exceedingly well paid. And an ordinary soldier also received more pay than an artisan could earn."
[3]
[1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences) [2]: (Haussig 1971, 98) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. [3]: (Haussig 1971, 171) Haussig, H W.trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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"The delegation of military authority extended to more distant relatives as the Inka state formed and began to engage in more distant and sustained campaigns."
[1]
"Inka rulers began to appoint close relatives to religious, administrative, and military positions." [2] Commander of a pukara fortress usually a nobleman from Cuzco (orejon) appointed by the king, whilst the garrison was locally recruited. [3] "I don’t think I would expect "professional" military officers--of the sort that the Romans developed under Marius, after centuries of trying to use municipal offices to do the trick--but I think it is fair to say that both societies had military commanders. For Wari, this can be inferred iconographically in warrior imagery on ceramics, and maybe from an uptick in elite trauma that Tiffiny Tung has noted for later Wari populations. For the Incas, we have ethnohistory. In the Inca case, the northern frontier (Ecuador) saw a transformation of military command in the last 50 years of Inca expansion. As territorial growth slowed in placed very far from Cuzco, the emperor moved up to the frontier and fought with Cuzco nobles and special troops that served more or less full-time. By the time the Spanish. arrived, I think it would be hard to deny that there were military professionals--low-born captains such as Quizquiz and Chalcochima--whose only work was leading troops, and who were well-versed in campaign logistics and battle tactics." [4] [1]: (Covey 2003, 347) [2]: (Covey 2003, 353) [3]: (Kaufmann and Kaufmann 2012) [4]: Alan Covey 2017, pers. comm. |
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’During the sixteenth century, the regular army became a popular institution, and even younger sons of the gentry sometimes served brief periods in the ranks. The officers were almost exclusively Spanishsubjects, until the latter part of the century, and these professionals provided the best leadership to befound in their time."
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Military officers were present as a caste of individuals also used in civil governance, supported by a much larger group of individuals working the land under a developing caste system. The political treatise Arthasastra provided circumstantial evidence of the presence of military officers tasked with training the common soliders, referred to as Dhanurveda.
[1]
[1]: Gabriel, Richard A. The ancient world. Vol. 1. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007. p. 120 |
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"The imperial army was commanded by a dandanayaka or mahadandanayaka. Their subordinates must have also had similar dandanayakas under them, as their administration was more or less akin to that of their superiors"
[1]
[1]: N.S. Ramachandra Murthy, Military Administration of the Rashtrakutas in the Telugu Country, in B.R. Gopal, The Rashtrakutas of Malkhed (1994), p. 116 |
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The "military administration of the Chalukyas resembled [that] of their ancestors"
[1]
: therefore, the Chalukyas of Kalyani likely had mahabaladihktras or mahasandhivigrahikas, like the Chalukyas of Badami
[2]
.
[1]: H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy and R. Ramakrishnan, A History of Karnataka (1978), p. 91 [2]: D.P. Dikshit, Political History of the Chalukyas (1980), p. 267 |
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It is clear that during Ballala II’s time the soldiers were professional
[1]
Ministers in the government also held military office,
[2]
which might suggest the officers - or at least some of them - were non-specialist.
[1]: J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Hoysalas (1957), p. 105 [2]: Suryanath U. Kamath, A concise history of Karnataka (1980), p. 137 |
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It is clear that during Ballala II’s time the soldiers were professional
[1]
Ministers in the government also held military office,
[2]
which might suggest the officers - or at least some of them - were non-specialist.
[1]: J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Hoysalas (1957), p. 105 [2]: Suryanath U. Kamath, A concise history of Karnataka (1980), p. 137 |
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During the Hoysala Kingdom, of which this polity was initially a fuedatory, the soldiers were professional under Ballala II
[1]
however ministers of the government could also be military officers which would imply at least some of them were non-specialist.
[2]
"several scholars have suggested that the reputed founders of Vijayanagara, the Sangama brothers, had been officers in the Kampili military."
[3]
[1]: J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Hoysalas (1957), p. 105 [2]: Suryanath U. Kamath, A concise history of Karnataka (1980), p. 137 [3]: (Sinopoli 2003, 74-75) |
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During the Hoysala Kingdom, of which this polity was initially a fuedatory, the soldiers were professional under Ballala II
[1]
however ministers of the government could also be military officers which would imply at least some of them were non-specialist.
[2]
"several scholars have suggested that the reputed founders of Vijayanagara, the Sangama brothers, had been officers in the Kampili military."
[3]
[1]: J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Hoysalas (1957), p. 105 [2]: Suryanath U. Kamath, A concise history of Karnataka (1980), p. 137 [3]: (Sinopoli 2003, 74-75) |
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Full-time specialists The warriors were represented in their own council: ’Closely allied with the Council of Elders was the women’s council who brought the matters up before the council. Lafitau maintained: Separate from both the women’s and elder’s councils was the warriors’ council which sought to influence authority decisions of the council of elders because they were the soldiers or ‘police’ of the village. Their internal affairs idsally were limited to military raids, games, and carrying out the military policy of the council of elders or League Council. In addition to the various councils, asseciations of men and women possibly existed for curing. Lafitau noted “I have been told that they have several sorts of private associations like fraternities” (Ibdd.:476). Fenton speculated that these associations were procursers of the “medicine societies” (Lafitau, 1724, 1:476). However, these associations seem to be the actual medicine societies and as such would have been village groups that criss-cross lineage, clan and moiety statuses.’
[1]
Distinguished war-leaders were eligible for non-hereditary chieftainships: ’The powers and duties of the sachems and chiefs were entirely of a civil character, and confined, by their organic laws, to the affairs of peace. No sachem could go out to war in his official capacity, as a civil ruler. If disposed to take the war-path, he laid aside his civil office, for the time being, and became a common warrior. It becomes an important inquiry, therefore, to ascertain in whom the military power, was vested. The Iroquois had no distinct class of war-chiefs, raised up and set apart to command in time of war; neither do the sachems or chiefs appear to have possessed the power of appointing such persons as they considered suitable to the post of command. All military operations were left entirely to private enterprise, and to the system of voluntary service, the sachems seeking rather to repress and restrain, than to encourage the martial ardor of the people. Their principal war-captains were to be found among he class called chiefs, many of whom were elected to this office in reward for their military achievements. The singular method of warfare among the Iroquois renders it extremely difficult to obtain a complete and satisfactory explanation of the manner in which their varlike operations were conducted. Their whole civil policy was averse to the concentration of power in the hands of any single individual, but inclined to the opposite principle of division among a number of equals; and this policy they carried into their military as well as through their civil organization. Small bands were, in the first instance, organized by individual leaders, each of which, if they were afterwards united upon the same enterprise, continued under its own captain, and the whole force, as well as the conduct of the expedition, was under their joint management. They appointed no one of their number to absolute command, but the general direction was left open to the strongest will, or the most persuasive voice.’
[2]
’When the power of the Ho-de[unknown] -no-sau-nee began to develop, under the new system of oligarchies within an oligarchy, there sprang up around the sachems a class of warriors, distinguished for enterprise upon the war-path, and eloquence in council, who demanded some participation in the administration of public affairs. The serious objections to the enlargement of the number of rulers, involving, as it did, changes in the framework of the government, for a long period enabled the sachems to resist the encroachment. In the progress of events, this class became too powerful to be withstood, and the sachems were compelled to raise them up in the subordinate station of chiefs. The title was purely elective, and the reward of merit. Unlike the sachemships, the name was not hereditary in the tribe or family of the individual, but terminated with the chief himself; unless subsequently bestowed by the tribe upon some other person, to preserve it as one of their illustrious names. These chiefs were originally invested with very limited powers, their principal office being that of advisers and counsellors of the sachems. Having thus obtained a foothold in the government, this class, to the number of which there was no limit, gradually enlarged their influence, and from generation to generation drew nearer to an equality with the sachems themselves. By this innovation the government was liberalized, to the sensible diminution of the power of the sachems, which, at the institution of the League, was extremely arbitrary.’
[3]
Given Morgan’s remarks on personal enterprise as the source of military operations, the war-leaders should not be characterized as professional officers.
[1]: Foley, Denis 1994. “Ethnohistoric And Ethnographic Analysis Of The Iroquois From The Aboriginal Era To The Present Suburban Era”, 24 [2]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 67 [3]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 94 |
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Full-time specialists The warriors were represented in their own council: ’Closely allied with the Council of Elders was the women’s council who brought the matters up before the council. Lafitau maintained: Separate from both the women’s and elder’s councils was the warriors’ council which sought to influence authority decisions of the council of elders because they were the soldiers or ‘police’ of the village. Their internal affairs idsally were limited to military raids, games, and carrying out the military policy of the council of elders or League Council. In addition to the various councils, asseciations of men and women possibly existed for curing. Lafitau noted “I have been told that they have several sorts of private associations like fraternities” (Ibdd.:476). Fenton speculated that these associations were procursers of the “medicine societies” (Lafitau, 1724, 1:476). However, these associations seem to be the actual medicine societies and as such would have been village groups that criss-cross lineage, clan and moiety statuses.’
[1]
Distinguished war-leaders were eligible for non-hereditary chieftainships: ’The powers and duties of the sachems and chiefs were entirely of a civil character, and confined, by their organic laws, to the affairs of peace. No sachem could go out to war in his official capacity, as a civil ruler. If disposed to take the war-path, he laid aside his civil office, for the time being, and became a common warrior. It becomes an important inquiry, therefore, to ascertain in whom the military power, was vested. The Iroquois had no distinct class of war-chiefs, raised up and set apart to command in time of war; neither do the sachems or chiefs appear to have possessed the power of appointing such persons as they considered suitable to the post of command. All military operations were left entirely to private enterprise, and to the system of voluntary service, the sachems seeking rather to repress and restrain, than to encourage the martial ardor of the people. Their principal war-captains were to be found among he class called chiefs, many of whom were elected to this office in reward for their military achievements. The singular method of warfare among the Iroquois renders it extremely difficult to obtain a complete and satisfactory explanation of the manner in which their varlike operations were conducted. Their whole civil policy was averse to the concentration of power in the hands of any single individual, but inclined to the opposite principle of division among a number of equals; and this policy they carried into their military as well as through their civil organization. Small bands were, in the first instance, organized by individual leaders, each of which, if they were afterwards united upon the same enterprise, continued under its own captain, and the whole force, as well as the conduct of the expedition, was under their joint management. They appointed no one of their number to absolute command, but the general direction was left open to the strongest will, or the most persuasive voice.’
[2]
’When the power of the Ho-de[unknown] -no-sau-nee began to develop, under the new system of oligarchies within an oligarchy, there sprang up around the sachems a class of warriors, distinguished for enterprise upon the war-path, and eloquence in council, who demanded some participation in the administration of public affairs. The serious objections to the enlargement of the number of rulers, involving, as it did, changes in the framework of the government, for a long period enabled the sachems to resist the encroachment. In the progress of events, this class became too powerful to be withstood, and the sachems were compelled to raise them up in the subordinate station of chiefs. The title was purely elective, and the reward of merit. Unlike the sachemships, the name was not hereditary in the tribe or family of the individual, but terminated with the chief himself; unless subsequently bestowed by the tribe upon some other person, to preserve it as one of their illustrious names. These chiefs were originally invested with very limited powers, their principal office being that of advisers and counsellors of the sachems. Having thus obtained a foothold in the government, this class, to the number of which there was no limit, gradually enlarged their influence, and from generation to generation drew nearer to an equality with the sachems themselves. By this innovation the government was liberalized, to the sensible diminution of the power of the sachems, which, at the institution of the League, was extremely arbitrary.’
[3]
Given Morgan’s remarks on personal enterprise as the source of military operations, the war-leaders should not be characterized as professional officers.
[1]: Foley, Denis 1994. “Ethnohistoric And Ethnographic Analysis Of The Iroquois From The Aboriginal Era To The Present Suburban Era”, 24 [2]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 67 [3]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 94 |
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[1]
[2]
According to one military historian (data needs to be checked by an expert for this polity) "The Assyrian army as well as the Persians always retained a large corps of loyal professionals as the centerpiece of their military establishments and ensured that loyal professionals remained in control of key logistics and supply functions of the various national units under imperial command." [3] [2]: (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2011, [16]) [3]: (Richard, Gabriel, Metz 1991, 20) |
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Salaried officers, who were members of both the Greek and Egyptian elites, and mercenaries were prevalent in Ptolemaic Egypt. Their salaries reflected the rank they held. The higher officers (who were friends of the king) were professionals in the sense that they held no other functions. These higher officers were dispersed over the settlement towns and garrison towns.
[1]
[1]: A possible reference: (Fischer-Bovet 2007, [2]) |
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Full-time specialists The office of laskar was introduced even before British occupation, but this was not a military role in the strict sense of the term. ‘As stated earlier the institution of laskar was first introduced by David Scott in his Draft Regulation of 1819, for the effective administration of the Garos. The main duty was to report on killings and serious offences within their jurisdiction. The Act of 1874 gave this office a legal status. Laskar was assisted by sardar in his duties and acted on behalf of laskar in his absence. The Commissioner tried the Garo cases, where he had to consult laskars and sardars connected with the traditional customs and manners of the tribe and also their opinions as to the guilt or innocence had to be taken into consideration.’
[1]
The A’chik had no standing armies or professionalized armed corps. During the pre-colonial period, male villagers probably acted as war parties under the leadership of a nokma: ‘In the early days, the Garos used to wage many wars. Such an occasion arose once (perhaps the first of such warfare) when people of one village living under a certain Nokma went to work for their hadang (field for cultivation) beyond their area and entered another Nokma’s jurisdiction. This was a cause of conflict, and they started fighting. There were heavy casualties on both sides. Finally, both the parties ran away to their own area. Thus neither party gained or lost any land.’
[2]
The potential role of Zamindars remains to be confirmed (see above).
[1]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 54 [2]: Sinha, Tarunchandra 1966. “Psyche Of The Garos”, 65 |
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Full-time specialists Wage labour is mostly unskilled and temporary, supplementing subsistence agriculture rather than replacing it: ‘Opportunities for wage labor, though not plentiful, are available by the day for a few men. A few can work as porters for fellow villagers, or for men of neighboring villages who have a large amount of cotton to carry into market. Occasionally the ‘owner’ of the market, or a Bengali merchant, hires a few Garos to build a tea stall or other kind of market shed. In 1956 a new motor road was being cut through the hills in the neighborhood of Rengsanggri. It was divided into lengths of one-eighth to one-half mile, which were assigned to contractors, each of whom had to hire laborers to do the actual digging and carrying of earth. Some of the labor was paid for by the day, while some was subcontracted in small amounts, so that a worker would be paid a fixed sum for digging or filling a stretch of road no more than fifteen feet long; and a few of these subcontractors even hired a neighbor to help them dig. Wage labor most often brought a rupee per day, but heavy labor might be paid at one rupee eight annas or even two rupees per day.’
[1]
During the colonial period, the A’chik had no standing armies or professionalized armed corps. The offices of laskar and sardar are not connected to the military: ‘As stated earlier the institution of laskar was first introduced by David Scott in his Draft Regulation of 1819, for the effective administration of the Garos. The main duty was to report on killings and serious offences within their jurisdiction. The Act of 1874 gave this office a legal status. Laskar was assisted by sardar in his duties and acted on behalf of laskar in his absence. The Commissioner tried the Garo cases, where he had to consult laskars and sardars connected with the traditional customs and manners of the tribe and also their opinions as to the guilt or innocence had to be taken into consideration.’
[2]
During the early colonial period, male villagers probably acted as war parties under the leadership of a nokma: ‘In the early days, the Garos used to wage many wars. Such an occasion arose once (perhaps the first of such warfare) when people of one village living under a certain Nokma went to work for their hadang (field for cultivation) beyond their area and entered another Nokma’s jurisdiction. This was a cause of conflict, and they started fighting. There were heavy casualties on both sides. Finally, both the parties ran away to their own area. Thus neither party gained or lost any land.’
[3]
The code is provisional and does not reflect the presence of British colonial forces, as more information on their organizaton is still needed.
[1]: Burling, Robbins 1963. “Rengsanggri: Family And Kinship In A Garo Village”, 283 [2]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 54 [3]: Sinha, Tarunchandra 1966. “Psyche Of The Garos”, 65 |
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Full-time specialists Political and military leadership often coincided: ’The long, complex history of the Akan peoples is one of internecine conflicts and, since the eighteenth century, of opposition to the encroachment of various colonial powers: the Dutch, Portuguese, Danish, French, and English. In addition, there have been continual threats from the Islamic peoples of the southern Saharan fringe. Essentially all these conflicts have been over monopolies in trade, first across the Sahara with northern Africa and, in later centuries, across the Atlantic with the countries of Europe and the Americas. Warfare has historically been a central institution, a means of extending territory and controlling external trade. The Akan state was typically divided into five or six military formations or "wings," each under the authority of a wing chief. Beneath the wing chiefs, who are chosen by the king, are the chiefs of the main towns of a kingdom. The latter are from the town’s ruling line.’
[1]
’It must be admitted that the origin of our State government and the principles on which it was founded, being solely military in character, one should feel content to accept the fact that the whole structure of the civil government we enjoy to-day is the result of martial adventures. This being so, it is only natural that people whose powers are clearly labelled as “military commanders”, etc., should exercise civil powers when the fruit of their labours bring peace. In almost all the Akan institutions, from the lowest servant to the highest officer, there is scarcely any whose civil powers are not based on military appointments. It is, therefore, most natural to fall into the habit of merging a civil into a military power.’
[2]
’The Ohene of every district is the supreme commander of the fighting men. His orders are communicated through the captains (Asafuhenefu), or the Tufuhene, as the case may be. Whenever a council of war is convened he presides, and it is his duty to provide them with some powder and shot. Every male person able to bear arms is bound to serve his country, and each fighting man [Page 28] provides himself with arms and ammunitions, as well as provisions, at his own expense.’
[3]
According to Sarbah, imperial Ashanti military organization was more ’developed’ than that of smaller Akan predecessors: ’The common origin of the inhabitants of the Fanti districts, Asanti, and wherever the Akan language is spoken, has been already shown. † The Customary Laws of the inhabitants of these places are in the main identical, and the national constitutions resemble each other in many points, although Asanti military organization had been [Page 3] developed in a greater degree. In fact, while the Fanti communities were gradually bringing under their sway smaller states, the Asanti king by conquests was extending his power over many lands. At one time all countries from Cape Mount in Liberia to the western boundary of Dahomey were, with few exceptions, under Asanti jurisdiction.’
[4]
But the Omanhene was supported by a bodyguard even before Ashanti imperial expansion: ’Omanhene is the head of the national life, and naturally president of the rulers of the people assembled either as a court for deciding cases or for legislation. The district, taken as a whole, is likewise considered as a body, whereof the Omanhene supports the head, and the next man in authority to him carries the foot. By virtue of his office, Omanhene has the right to be carried by four men or more, and uses three or more canopy umbrellas. At his installation a small sword, the insignia of his office, is handed to him, and he enjoys several other privileges. He is the commander-in-chief of all the fighting men of the district. His bodyguard and the immediate fighting men are called Gyasi. He is almost invariably a member of the Domtsifu or Intsin Company. Tufuhene is the man whose duty it is to command the fighting-men (from tuu, “to throw, e.g., arrows, etc.;” hence etuo, itur, “a gun”); a fighting leader, or commander. In some districts, and especially in the coast towns, Tufuhene is the next man in authority after Ohene.’
[5]
’An Ohene is entitled to ride in a palanquin carried by two men and attended by two canopy umbrellas. An Odzikuro is the headman of a village. Penin is an elder, generally an old man of experience. Sahene is a man appointed to conduct war. A Safuhene is a captain of a company, and in some instances is a stoolholder. In fact, among the Akanfu, that is Asanti, Wassaw, Assin, Akim, and such like, each Ohene of the several towns and districts is referred to as the Safuhene of his Omanhene. The Gyasi are the bodyguard of an Ohene or Omanhene. They comprise, first, the blood relatives, especially the children and grandsons of the Ohene, and are called Bogyadom ( bogya, “blood”; dom, “troop”), who have the immediate custody of the stool; secondly, certain Asafuhenefu, with their men; thirdly, personal servants and domestic attendants (Gyasifu). The Gyasi perform the rites of the stool custom each year.’
[5]
’The immediate retinue and body-guard of the Omanhene are called Gyasi, and consist of three groups of persons. (1) His male blood relatives, e.g. brothers, uncles, nephews; also his sons, whether by free or bond women. These persons usually are captains of the other fighting men. (2) Servants, slaves, and pawns, and their descendants. (3) Those originally attached to him by commendation or adoption; and captains, with their forces, appointed by the community as such.’
[6]
Akan troops were organized in companies under the leadership of captains, but even on this level civil and military leadership were often united in one person: ’Supi is a company captain, who keeps the company’s flags, and especially their ammunition. The spokesman of an Ohene or village community is selected by the Ohene or Odzikuro. On his appointment it is usual in some districts for his family to give to the Ohene or councillors sua duma,that is, £2 9 s. 6 d. The councillors (Begwafu) are sometimes selected by the people on account of personal character and intelligence. Every councillor is not a stoolholder, nor is every stoolholder a councillor; but a great number of the councillors, however, are stoolholders. A stoolholder may be appointed a councillor, and his successor, when deemed a fit and proper person, follows him in his office. When a person becomes a councillor he is considered as promoted, therefore he severs his connection with his company, and must not take an active part in the management of the affairs of the company. A councillor must not be a partisan. Councillors who have not attained that position by right of inheritance are practically, and in truth, the direct representatives of the people, and voice public opinion. It is somewhat difficult to define the qualifications of such public men.’
[7]
’The male persons of each ward originally formed a [Page 27] company, having its distinctive flags, drums, and other equipments. The honour of the flag is the first consideration, and his service to his company is the most indispensable duty of the citizen. The organization of the town companies has been already described. * In some towns there are as many as seven companies, members of which reside not only in the town, but also in the neighbouring villages. Lands cleared by the companies belong to them. The lands of the companies do not belong to the Ohene, for there are town lands, family lands, and stool lands. The Ohene has no right to ordinary tribute, and the public-stool income is derived from fines, penalties, and court fees. In this also the jurisdiction is personal. The Tufuhene, the councillors, and captains of the companies take part in the election and installation of a new Ohene. Before them he takes his oath of office, and if any lands are attached to the town stool, he holds them in trust for the public. The succession generally follows the common rule, but in some places it is the son who succeeds, not the brother or nephew. The townspeople can pass over the person nominated by the family and elect some other suitable person instead. They may also remove the Ohene, if found unfit to rule them any longer; in either of which events the town sword and stool, with all the public property thereunto appurtenant, are vested in the town council, whose duty it is to take them from the deposed ruler or his family and give them to the person appointed as new ruler or manager during the interval.’
[8]
’Each subordinate ruler, correctly the captain-chief (Safuhene), of the Omanhene, owns a stool of his office, commands the fighting men of, and rules, his district. The lands of the district are attached to his stool. Like the Omanhene, he also has officers and captains under him, and with his linguist, councillors, and elders he sits as a magistrate, before whose tribunal his subjects and people in his district are bound to appear.’
[9]
This material suggests that troops were drawn from the male population rather than a trained corps of professional soldiers. The importance of blood-relatives of the ruler in his guard militates against its characterization as a corps of military specialists.
[1]: Gilbert, Michelle, Lagacé, Robert O. and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Akan [2]: Danquah, J. B. (Joseph Boakye) 1928. “Gold Coast: Akan Laws And Customs And The Akim Abuakwa Constitution”, 17 [3]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 27p [4]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 2p [5]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 9 [6]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 23 [7]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 10 [8]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 26p [9]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 22 |
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Full-time specialists While the Ashanti infantry mostly consisted of citizen-soldiers who were not specialists in their own right, there was also a nucleus of armed professionals not disbanded during times of peace: ’The local government of Kumasi was in the hands of the Kwaintsirs, a body of men who were the keepers of the golden stool. They formed the Department of War, and the great General Amankwatsia was formerly their Chief. The fact that the Department of War held in its keeping the royal stool illustrates vividly the origin of the kingly office in the Native State, which will be explained later on.’
[1]
The King was assisted in his military duties by secondary commanders and generals:’The King is the Chief Military Officer of his forces. In time of war, he directs the operations; and if he is a man of capacity, he has the leading place in the councils of war. There is generally a Tufu Hin, or Captain-General, of the forces; but his authority is subordinate to that of the King, and he is, in every essential, an officer of the King.’
[2]
During annual military drills, armed commoners gathered in the capital, where they paraded through the streets with specialists: ’Meanwhile the different regiments, under their several Head-Captains, and all commanded by the Captain-General, are preparing to go through their manoeuvres. To avoid disputes, the several regiments parade through the town one after the other, pouring forth thunderous volleys from their long flint Dane guns. After the parade each regiment presents to the King its flags and emblems, new and old, as an act of homage, which the King returns with suitable words. The several Head-Chiefs next renew their allegiance to the King; and, after more dancing and popular rejoicing, thè King retires to his “compound,” where his vassals subsequently take leave of him, each vassal receiving a suitable present.’
[3]
[1]: Hayford, J. E. Casely (Joseph Ephraim Casely) 1970. “Gold Coast Native Institutions With Thoughts Upon A Healthy Imperial Policy For The Gold Coast And Ashanti”, 26p [2]: Hayford, J. E. Casely (Joseph Ephraim Casely) 1970. “Gold Coast Native Institutions With Thoughts Upon A Healthy Imperial Policy For The Gold Coast And Ashanti”, 42p [3]: Hayford, J. E. Casely (Joseph Ephraim Casely) 1970. “Gold Coast Native Institutions With Thoughts Upon A Healthy Imperial Policy For The Gold Coast And Ashanti”, 89p |
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Some Icelanders joined foreign armies abroad: ’Isolated in the North Atlantic, Iceland had few external conflicts. Individual Icelanders were occasionally involved in conflict when outside the country and also sometimes served in foreign militaries. During the late tenth century, the Norwegian king was a champion of the Christian movement in Iceland and often attempted to assert his influence, although this was largely limited to Icelanders in Norway. Likewise, the ultimately successful attempts to incorporate Iceland under the Norwegian monarchy were mostly played out through alliances with individual Icelanders.’
[1]
Chieftains relied on an entourage of armed followers: ’Those who had access to sufficient resources to support a household were the tax paying farmers. Each of them had to be a follower of a chieftain from his own quarter, and only the tax paying farmers could make the decision as to which he would follow. All of his dependents - tenants and renters-went with him. However they got it, chieftains were dependent on farmers for support - to feed their increasingly large personal followings or armies, to support them at assemblies, and to accompany them on raids on other chieftains or their followers. As we have seen, without such support, without the ability to mass force, claims to ownership of land, which defined the class system as well as the forms of appropriation, had no force. Farmers had to rely on some chieftain to be able to defend their claims to property, though, as we have seen, this might often lead to the loss of the property. Chieftains had to rely on farmers to enforce their followers’ claims and their own, as well as to expand their territories into others’.’
[2]
Armed supporters were required to enforce legal and political claims: ’Claims of inheritance were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This follows from the fact that claims to ownership, property, were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This meant that to assert any claim to ownership, whether by inheritance or any other means, one had to back the claim with armed force. Chieftains were focal points for concentrating force to protect and to forward claims to property.’
[3]
Chieftains also relied on farmers willing to support them economically and militarily: ’Relations between chieftains and farmers were not, however, smooth. Chieftains had their “own” estates to support their establishments, and some maintained followings of armed men, but this was a difficult proposition, since it added consumers to the household without adding production. The chieftains had to rely on their following of farmers to support them with both arms and supplies. This was one component of any farmer’s household fund, his “rent” so to speak, his expenditures for travel and support for his chieftain, without which his chieftain or another would take his land and livestock. In addition, expeditions took labor from the farm and put the farmer’s life at risk. Even so, a farmer’s claims to land were not secure, since his chieftain might abandon him, another more powerful chieftain might claim his land, or simply take it, or a farmer might lose his land in a re-alignment of alliances among chieftains, which were frequent.’
[3]
The interests of chieftains and farmers were often in conflict: ’There was a basic conflict between chieftains’ increasing demands for demonstrations of force in support of claims to ownership and the subsistence demands, the economic roles, of farmers. Chieftains were not beyond using coercion to insure support as the following incident relates. [...] In spite of this contradiction, farmers had to rely on some chieftain in order to maintain their claims to land. While the inheritance customs codified in Grágás seem quite orderly in Hastrup’s (1985) analysis, inheritance of land is often hotly disputed in the Saga of the Icelanders. One who wanted another’s land could often find a third party with some inheritance claim, and acquire the claim on which to base a legitimation for taking the land.’
[4]
However, professional officers or lieutenants emerged in the late Commonwealth period: ’In the late Commonwealth there were professional military officers in service of the warlords (in the territorial lordships). These commanded groups of retainers or conscripted warrior-farmers. An example would be Ásbjörn Guðmundarson, an officer of the warlord Þórður kakali (see Þórðar saga kakala). Lieutenants could thus be considered ’officers’.’
[5]
[1]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders [2]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 256 [3]: Durrenberger, Paul E. 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 258 [4]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth”, 256 [5]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins |
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Some Icelanders joined foreign armies abroad: ’Isolated in the North Atlantic, Iceland had few external conflicts. Individual Icelanders were occasionally involved in conflict when outside the country and also sometimes served in foreign militaries. During the late tenth century, the Norwegian king was a champion of the Christian movement in Iceland and often attempted to assert his influence, although this was largely limited to Icelanders in Norway. Likewise, the ultimately successful attempts to incorporate Iceland under the Norwegian monarchy were mostly played out through alliances with individual Icelanders.’
[1]
Chieftains relied on an entourage of armed followers: ’Those who had access to sufficient resources to support a household were the tax paying farmers. Each of them had to be a follower of a chieftain from his own quarter, and only the tax paying farmers could make the decision as to which he would follow. All of his dependents - tenants and renters-went with him. However they got it, chieftains were dependent on farmers for support - to feed their increasingly large personal followings or armies, to support them at assemblies, and to accompany them on raids on other chieftains or their followers. As we have seen, without such support, without the ability to mass force, claims to ownership of land, which defined the class system as well as the forms of appropriation, had no force. Farmers had to rely on some chieftain to be able to defend their claims to property, though, as we have seen, this might often lead to the loss of the property. Chieftains had to rely on farmers to enforce their followers’ claims and their own, as well as to expand their territories into others’.’
[2]
Armed supporters were required to enforce legal and political claims: ’Claims of inheritance were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This follows from the fact that claims to ownership, property, were only worth as much as the armed support behind them. This meant that to assert any claim to ownership, whether by inheritance or any other means, one had to back the claim with armed force. Chieftains were focal points for concentrating force to protect and to forward claims to property.’
[3]
Chieftains also relied on farmers willing to support them economically and militarily: ’Relations between chieftains and farmers were not, however, smooth. Chieftains had their “own” estates to support their establishments, and some maintained followings of armed men, but this was a difficult proposition, since it added consumers to the household without adding production. The chieftains had to rely on their following of farmers to support them with both arms and supplies. This was one component of any farmer’s household fund, his “rent” so to speak, his expenditures for travel and support for his chieftain, without which his chieftain or another would take his land and livestock. In addition, expeditions took labor from the farm and put the farmer’s life at risk. Even so, a farmer’s claims to land were not secure, since his chieftain might abandon him, another more powerful chieftain might claim his land, or simply take it, or a farmer might lose his land in a re-alignment of alliances among chieftains, which were frequent.’
[3]
The interests of chieftains and farmers were often in conflict: ’There was a basic conflict between chieftains’ increasing demands for demonstrations of force in support of claims to ownership and the subsistence demands, the economic roles, of farmers. Chieftains were not beyond using coercion to insure support as the following incident relates. [...] In spite of this contradiction, farmers had to rely on some chieftain in order to maintain their claims to land. While the inheritance customs codified in Grágás seem quite orderly in Hastrup’s (1985) analysis, inheritance of land is often hotly disputed in the Saga of the Icelanders. One who wanted another’s land could often find a third party with some inheritance claim, and acquire the claim on which to base a legitimation for taking the land.’
[4]
However, professional officers or lieutenants emerged in the late Commonwealth period: ’In the late Commonwealth there were professional military officers in service of the warlords (in the territorial lordships). These commanded groups of retainers or conscripted warrior-farmers. An example would be Ásbjörn Guðmundarson, an officer of the warlord Þórður kakali (see Þórðar saga kakala). Lieutenants could thus be considered ’officers’.’
[5]
[1]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders [2]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 256 [3]: Durrenberger, Paul E. 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth", 258 [4]: Durrenberger, E. Paul 1988. “Stratification Without A State: The Collapse Of The Icelandic Commonwealth”, 256 [5]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins |
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Full-time specialists ’Soldiers were present in the form of retainers (sveinar) of powerful men (bishops, governors, sheriffs).’
[1]
In the Norwegian period, the system of chieftains and other prominent figures, such as royal officials, supported by groups of armed followers continued, despite of the general decline of feuding: ’During the first years following the establishment of the union conditions in Iceland remained quite unchanged. The godords were still in the hands of the leading chieftains. Gizur, who was to exercise the highest authority as jarl, was unpopular, and his power was very limited. Royal commissioners were sent to Iceland to exercise control with or without his consent, and and he had to share his nominal authority with the powerful Oddaverjar chieftains of southern Iceland, Hrafn Oddsson of the Borgarfjord district, and Orm Ormsson of eastern Iceland. The king regarded him with suspicion; the chieftains hated him because of his rank and title; opposition and difficulties confronted him everywhere. Even his own character and previous record rendered him unfit to maintain peace and order, which was his principal official duty. He was unable to see the need of any change in the general régime, and the last chapter of his stormy life formed a fitting close to the drama of bloody feuds in which he had played so conspicuous a part. Shortly after the meeting of the Althing of 1264, while visiting in southern Iceland, he was suddenly attacked by Thord Andrisson, the head of the Oddaverjar family. With great difficulty he escaped from his assailants, and after gathering an army of 750 men he cruelly ravged the Rangarvalla district, where the Oddaverjar chieftains were dwelling.’
[2]
No standing armies were stationed on the island, and Norwegian efforts to raise armed support from Icelanders were generally unsuccessful: ’Nor did Iceland become a part of Norway’s system of national defence. No measures for defence of the country were taken, and it was only on rare occasions that the king attempted to induce the Icelanders to contribute forces or money for the defence of the kingdom, generally with little success.’
[3]
’Strained relations with Denmark and the Hanseatic cities also gave cause for uneasiness and inclined them to favor an adjustment of domestic difficulties. Jarl Alf Erlingsson of Thornberg, who was now the most influential member of the Council, even turned to Iceland to secure military aid for the realm. It was decided that for the defense of the kingdom 240 men should be sent from Iceland, together with those who were otherwise bound to the king’s service. [...] The plan was soon abandoned by the Council, but Arni had earned the king’s good-will by his loyal attitude.’
[4]
[1]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [2]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 211p [3]: Karlsson, Gunnar 2000. "A Brief History of Iceland", 19 [4]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 222p |
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Kenoyer writes that there is no evidence of the existence of an army during the period 2600 BCE 1900 BCE
[1]
, although it has been argued that the absence of evidence does not mean that the Harappan people lived peacefully throughout the period: "More significantly, our knowledge of warfare in Egypt and Mesopotamia is heavily dependent on textual evidence and art; but this simply does not exist to portray any aspect of life in the Indus Civilisation. The absence of artistic or textual reference to war in the Indus is therefore no more representative of a lack of war than a lack of trade, agriculture or urbanisation - none of which are in any doubt.”
[2]
[1]: Jonathan Mark Kenoyer. ’Uncovering the keys to the Lost Indus Cities’, Scientific American, vol. 15, no. 1, 2005, p. 29. [2]: Cork, E. (2005) Peaceful Harappans? Reviewing the evidence for the absence of warfare in the Indus Civilisation of north-west India and Pakistan (c. 2500-1900 BC). Antiquity (79): 411-423. p420 |
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Kenoyer writes that there is no evidence of the existence of an army during the period 2600 BCE 1900 BCE
[1]
, although it has been argued that the absence of evidence does not mean that the Harappan people lived peacefully throughout the period: "More significantly, our knowledge of warfare in Egypt and Mesopotamia is heavily dependent on textual evidence and art; but this simply does not exist to portray any aspect of life in the Indus Civilisation. The absence of artistic or textual reference to war in the Indus is therefore no more representative of a lack of war than a lack of trade, agriculture or urbanisation - none of which are in any doubt.”
[2]
[1]: Jonathan Mark Kenoyer. ’Uncovering the keys to the Lost Indus Cities’, Scientific American, vol. 15, no. 1, 2005, p. 29. [2]: Cork, E. (2005) Peaceful Harappans? Reviewing the evidence for the absence of warfare in the Indus Civilisation of north-west India and Pakistan (c. 2500-1900 BC). Antiquity (79): 411-423. p420 |
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The commanders would have been formed out of a warrior aristocracy who had inherited the position of leading forces and land which they used to support themselves and their troops. AD: coded inferred present as officers in the lower hierarchical ranks might have been more specialised (eg. leader of 10 horsemen).
"The Parthians were a warrior people. Though possessing armoured knights mounted on weight-carrying chargers." [1] no regular army they were superb horsemen and and archers, and in time of war the nobility provided heavily a "The division between grand and petty nobility was reflected in the structure of the Parthian army. Both provided the cavalry - indeed, during the first century BC the Persian infantry almost completely disappeared - but this was made up of two distinct types of horsemen. On the one hand, there were the mounted archers, lightly armed on nimble mounts, who were supplied by the lesser estate holders. Most of these were from Eastern Iran where they lived in small castles and block-houses, and evolved a typical feudal culture centered round jousting, hunting, war, and a chivalric code that emphasized the virtues of personal honour and the protection of women. The grandees, on the other hand, supplied a new type of horseman, a development of the Sarmatian and the Saka knight, who encased both himself and his horse in mail armour and armed himself with a great bow, lance and sword." [2] "We may suppose that the Arsacids thus preserved the original nomadic nobility, rewarded them for their services by gifts of land which would provide a base for future political and military power." [3] [1]: (Penrose 2008, 221) Penrose, Jane. 2008. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. Osprey Publishing. [2]: (Ellis 2004, 36-37) Ellis, John. 2004. Cavalry: History of Mounted Warfare. Pen and Sword. [3]: (Neusner 2008, 17) Neusner, Jacob. 2008. A History of the Jews in Babylonia. 1. The Parthian Period. Wipf & Stock. Eugene. |
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In the Greco-Bactrian Kingdoms, Iranian aristocrats were members of a permanent elite cavalry. The military officers seem to have been recruited from both native and Greek settlers. As the Indo-Greeks were originally from the Greco-Batrians, the same structure could have been present.
[1]
[1]: Daryaee, Touraj, The Oxford handbook of Iranian history. p. 158 |
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Sasanid society had four classes: warriors, scribes, priests, and commoners. The warriors (Arteshtaran) were an hereditary elite.
[1]
Seven aristocratic families dominated the military and government leadership positions. All except the Sassans were Parthian in origin. [1] House of Sassan, Aspahbad-Pahlav (Gurgan), Karin-Pahlav (Shiraz), Suren-Pahlav (Seistan), Spandiyadh (Nihavand), Mihram (Rayy), Guiw Before the reforms of Khusrau I (later Sassanid period) "all nobles, great and small, had been obliged to equip themselves and their followers and serve in the army without pay, but Khusrau issued equipment to the poorer nobles and paid a salary for their services. Consequently, the power of the great nobles - who frequently had their own private armies - was reduced." [2] [1]: (Farrokh 2005, 3-27) Farrokh, Kevah. 2005. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642. Osprey Publishing. [2]: (Chegini 1996, 57) Chegini, N. N. Political History, Economy and Society. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.40-58. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf |
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Before the reforms of Khusrau I (later Sassanid period) "all nobles, great and small, had been obliged to equip themselves and their followers and serve in the army without pay, but Khusrau issued equipment to the poorer nobles and paid a salary for their services. Consequently, the power of the great nobles - who frequently had their own private armies - was reduced."
[1]
Central registry for military created by Khosrau I (531-579 CE) [2] , who also began to pay Saravan state officials a regular salary. [3] Sasanid society had been divided into four classes: warriors, scribes, priests, and commoners, with the warriors (Arteshtaran) comprising an hereditary elite. Khosrau I (531-579 CE) broke the tradition and admitted a large number of lower nobility called Dehkans into the army. [3] Seven aristocratic families that had dominated the military and government leadership positions were: House of Sassan Aspahbad-Pahlav (Gurgan) Karin-Pahlav (Shiraz) Suren-Pahlav (Seistan) Spandiyadh (Nihavand) Mihram (Rayy) Guiw All except the Sassans were Parthian in origin. [3] [1]: (Chegini 1996, 57) Chegini, N. N. Political History, Economy and Society. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.40-58. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf [2]: (Daryaee 2009, 27-37) Daryaee, Touraj. 2009. Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. I.B. Tauris. London. [3]: (Farrokh 2005, 3-27) Farrokh, Kevah. 2005. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642. Osprey Publishing. |
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Before the reforms of Khusrau I (later Sassanid period) "all nobles, great and small, had been obliged to equip themselves and their followers and serve in the army without pay, but Khusrau issued equipment to the poorer nobles and paid a salary for their services. Consequently, the power of the great nobles - who frequently had their own private armies - was reduced."
[1]
Central registry for military created by Khosrau I (531-579 CE) [2] , who also began to pay Saravan state officials a regular salary. [3] Sasanid society had been divided into four classes: warriors, scribes, priests, and commoners, with the warriors (Arteshtaran) comprising an hereditary elite. Khosrau I (531-579 CE) broke the tradition and admitted a large number of lower nobility called Dehkans into the army. [3] Seven aristocratic families that had dominated the military and government leadership positions were: House of Sassan Aspahbad-Pahlav (Gurgan) Karin-Pahlav (Shiraz) Suren-Pahlav (Seistan) Spandiyadh (Nihavand) Mihram (Rayy) Guiw All except the Sassans were Parthian in origin. [3] [1]: (Chegini 1996, 57) Chegini, N. N. Political History, Economy and Society. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.40-58. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf [2]: (Daryaee 2009, 27-37) Daryaee, Touraj. 2009. Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. I.B. Tauris. London. [3]: (Farrokh 2005, 3-27) Farrokh, Kevah. 2005. Sassanian Elite Cavalry AD 224-642. Osprey Publishing. |
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Military commanders were selected from the tribal nobility, called the Ashraf. The state could shift the ri’asa, or headship of tribes from one family to another, a sort of half formed precursor to professional military commanders. Internally, the structure of command was very fluid.
[1]
"Men were appointed to command armies for different reasons: they were loyal to the regime, they could recruit followers and attract men to their service, they could organise the collection and payment of revenues and they were effective and knowledgeable commanders in battle. ... In the main, however, it is unhelpful to think of a hierarchy, of generals, or of an officer class." [2] [1]: (Kennedy ????, 19-23) [2]: (Kennedy 2001, 21) Kennedy, H. 2001. The Armies of the Caliphs. Routledge. London. |
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Military commanders were selected from the tribal nobility, called the Ashraf. The state could shift the ri’asa, or headship of tribes from one family to another, a sort of half formed precursor to professional military commanders. Internally, the structure of command was very fluid.
[1]
"Men were appointed to command armies for different reasons: they were loyal to the regime, they could recruit followers and attract men to their service, they could organise the collection and payment of revenues and they were effective and knowledgeable commanders in battle. ... In the main, however, it is unhelpful to think of a hierarchy, of generals, or of an officer class." [2] [1]: (Kennedy ????, 19-23) [2]: (Kennedy 2001, 21) Kennedy, H. 2001. The Armies of the Caliphs. Routledge. London. |
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e.g. ariz-i-mamalik, the head of the army department (diwan-i-arz).
[1]
Payment of soldiers in cash was a measure adopted by Alauddin Khilji. [2] [1]: Habibullah, A. B. M. (1961). The foundation of Muslim rule in India. Central Book Depot, pp 197. [2]: (Ahmed 2011, 98) Ahmed, Farooqui Salma. 2011. A Comprehensive History of Medieval India: Twelfth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century. Pearson Education India. |
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The founder of the Dynasty himself had originally been the head officer of Nadir Shah’s personal bodyguard and took the four thousand-strong horse cavalry he had commanded with him when he defected to Afghanistan. He also had access to the Turkish Shiite Qizilbash.
[1]
[1]: Barfield, Thomas, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History pp. 98-99 |
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Transition from absent in JpJomo6 to present in JpYayoi
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Transition from absent in JpJomo6 to present in JpYayoi
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“Written sources refer to powerful clan groups and their leaders, to many kinds of lesser titled officials, to guilds and corporations of artists, fishers, farmers and soldiers attached to the clans.”
[1]
[1]: (Aikens, C. Melvin and Takayasu Higuhi. 1982. Prehistory of Japan. New York: Academic Press, 253.) |
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’Predominant among the professional fighters were relatives of district magistrates and other prominent provincial families. Only those in this class had the resources to maintain the horses, saddles, armor, and weapons that distinguished them as professional warriors. Descended from regional uji, these mounted archers, skilled in hunting, had been the effective forces in the campaigns to the northeast.’
[1]
[1]: Shively, Donald H. and McCullough, William H. 2008. The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 2: Heian Japan. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press.p.18 |
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Full-time specialists Even during the colonial period, wage labour was mostly temporary and practiced during the seasonal labour migrations of Iban men: ’In the present day, these bejalai migrations have involved young Iban males (aged 15 to 34 in general) in the petroleum and natural gas industries of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and New Guinea, in the military forces of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and Malaya, and in timber industries throughout the archipelago. Iban working in the construction industries have been of great importance in the national development efforts of Brunei. All of these activities have permitted the Iban to continue ladang cultivation at their homes, while supplementing family income through outside employment.’
[1]
According to some sources, the White Rajahs employed Iban in their armed forces: ’Sir Charles Anthony Johnson Brooke (b. June 3, 1829, Berrow, Somerset, Eng.-d. May 17, 1917, Cirencester, Gloucestershire), who adopted the surname Brooke, became the second raja. The government of Charles Brooke has been described as a benevolent autocracy. Charles himself had spent much of his life among the Iban people of Sarawak, knew their language, and respected their beliefs and customs. He made extensive use of down-river Malay chiefs as administrators, and encouraged selective immigration of Chinese agriculturalists, while the dominant indigenous group, the Ibans, were employed in military service. In general, social and economic changes were limited in impact, shielding the inhabitants from both the benefits and the hardships of Western-style development.’
[2]
But there was no armed corps prior to Brooke Raj rule. Even then, military service was probably of a non-permanent nature and functioned within the Iban system of seasonal labour migration. When head-taking and piracy were practiced, war parties were staffed with male community members: ’The taking of enemy heads then, was the prescriptive act for Iban males an act through which an individual could win for himself prestige and status within the longhouse community, while at the same time enhancing his desirability as a potential suitor and husband in the eyes of the opposite sex. But, as we have indicated, headhunting also had a ritual dimension which was of the utmost significance. It is the latter aspect which chiefly concerns us here, being to do with Iban conceptions of male and female gender roles and relations of production and reproduction within Iban society.’
[3]
War parties were led by local war-leaders or village headmen: ’According to Sea Dayak custom, this feast, the fifth of the nine stages of the gawai burong , should be held only by an experienced war-leader. Linggir was undoubtedly a very brave man, but he was young, and certainly far less experienced than Uyut, his father. Linggir had already made a statue of the hornbill in preparation for his festival when the older people of the house warned him that it would be presumptuous for him to hold the feast while Uyut still lived. They said that such a rash action might anger Sengalang Burong.’
[4]
’Before the gawai diri may be held, the patron of the feast must lead his warriors against some enemy. So Uyut and his men set off to raid the Kantu Dayaks of Merakai, in what is now Indonesian Borneo, in order to get some fresh heads. But before they came back, all the food which had been gathered for the feast, including tuak wine and many different delicacies, began to go bad. So a brother-in-law of Uyut named Malang (Pengarah) decided to go ahead and hold the feast anyway, without the war-leader and his men. No sooner was it over than Uyut and his party returned from a victorious expedition. They were naturally outraged. Uyut and the others expelled Pengarah from the Anyut, and he retreated down river to live in the Serudit stream.’
[4]
Head-hunting persisted well into the 20th century: ’The persistence of headhunting as a living tradition, up until at least the Second World War, and even beyond (albeit in a drastically curtailed form), has meant that many of the details connected with the taking of heads are well documented. Moreover, the ritual significance of headhunting, and its attendant ceremonies, continue to play an important role in contemporary Iban society. We have already spoken of headhunting festivals ( gawai amat ) held as celebrations of male prestige and achievement, but the traditional role of the Iban warrior continues to survive elsewhere in Iban culture, most notably in connection with mortuary rites. A visit to a Saribas Iban festival for the dead ( Gawai Antu ), for instance, reveals a more than sufficient number of candidates to drink the sacred wine ( ai’ garong ) dedicated to those who have passed away. Previously, only those who had distinguished themselves as headhunters could partake in this sacred symposium with the dead; today the taking of a life - usually when on active service in the Sarawak Field Force - suffices. In this instance, and others of a similar nature, the warrior tradition of Iban society is maintained, and the ritual significance of headhunting preserved, as a major component in the Iban value system.’
[5]
[1]: Austin, Robert Frederic 1978. “Iban Migration: Patterns Of Mobility And Employment In The 20Th Century”, 18 [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Brooke-Raj [3]: Davison, Julian, and Vinson H. Sutlive 1991. “Children Of Nising: Images Of Headhunting And Male Sexuality In Iban Ritual And Oral Literature”, 157 [4]: Sandin, Benedict 1967. “Sea Dayaks Of Borneo: Before White Rajah Rule”, 39 [5]: Davison, Julian, and Vinson H. Sutlive 1991. “Children Of Nising: Images Of Headhunting And Male Sexuality In Iban Ritual And Oral Literature”, 169 |
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Full-time specialists During the colonial period, wage labour was mostly temporary and practiced during the seasonal labour migrations of Iban men: ’In the present day, these bejalai migrations have involved young Iban males (aged 15 to 34 in general) in the petroleum and natural gas industries of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and New Guinea, in the military forces of Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah and Malaya, and in timber industries throughout the archipelago. Iban working in the construction industries have been of great importance in the national development efforts of Brunei. All of these activities have permitted the Iban to continue ladang cultivation at their homes, while supplementing family income through outside employment.’
[1]
According to some sources, the White Rajahs employed Iban in their armed forces: ’Sir Charles Anthony Johnson Brooke (b. June 3, 1829, Berrow, Somerset, Eng.-d. May 17, 1917, Cirencester, Gloucestershire), who adopted the surname Brooke, became the second raja. The government of Charles Brooke has been described as a benevolent autocracy. Charles himself had spent much of his life among the Iban people of Sarawak, knew their language, and respected their beliefs and customs. He made extensive use of down-river Malay chiefs as administrators, and encouraged selective immigration of Chinese agriculturalists, while the dominant indigenous group, the Ibans, were employed in military service. In general, social and economic changes were limited in impact, shielding the inhabitants from both the benefits and the hardships of Western-style development.’
[2]
There was no armed corps organized for the Iban specifically, and according to the information provided above, most Iban fighters were not compensated on a regular basis. Military service was therefore probably of a non-permanent nature and functioned within the Iban system of seasonal labour migration. Some Iban may have joined the civil and military administration early on, but expert feedback is needed on the matter.
[1]: Austin, Robert Frederic 1978. “Iban Migration: Patterns Of Mobility And Employment In The 20Th Century”, 18 [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Brooke-Raj |
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Houses for soldiers and their families would imply full-time warriors.
During this time, complex fortifications also started appear. They usually had huge entrance gates, thick walls and towers. It is also clear that some buildings were connected to the walls. Those are interpreted as houses for soldiers and their families or magazines for weapons. |
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The only thing we have is a position of ’chief of man’ called rabi şabim, who is thought to have been responsible for workforce in harvesting and building, and it is assumed also in military force.
[1]
[1]: Dercksen J. G. 2004. Some Elements of Old Anatolian Sofiety in Kaniš. [in:] J. G. Dercksen (ed.) Assyria and beyond: studies presented to Mogens Trolle Larsen. Leiden: NINO, pg. 151-153 |
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unknown. Present for the New Kingdom Hatti which preceded the Neo-Hittite Kingdoms: "the core of the defence force was a full-time, professional standing army. ... They lived together in military barracks, so that they could be mobilized at a moment’s notice."
[1]
According to H. Genz "So far not a single burial from the Early Iron Age is known from Central Anatolia"
[2]
which makes it difficult tell whether professionalism was maintained.
[1]: (Bryce 2007, 11) [2]: Genz H. "The Iron Age in Central Anatolia".In: Tsetskhladze G. R. (2011) The Black Sea, Greece, Anatolia and Europe in the first millenium BC. Paris. Pg: 343. |
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unknown. The Assyrians in 836 BCE found the local settlements fortified "so it is likely that fortifications were built in response to local conditions, rather than foreign invasion."
[1]
[2]
The armed forces, likewise, might equally have been well-organized, albeit on a small scale. However, this does not mean the chief officers were full-time, specialist military officers, who did not also have other jobs.
[1]: (Melville 2010, 87-109) Melville, Sarah. "Kings of Tabal: Politics [2]: Competition, and Conflict in a Contested Periphery." in Richardson, Seth. ed. 2010. Rebellions and Peripheries in the Mesopotamian World. American Oriental Series 91. Eisenbrauns. Winona Lake. |
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"When Alyattes, father of Croesus the king of Lydians, was campaigning against Caria, he instructed his generals to bring their forces to Sardis on a day which he appointed." Account by Nicolas of Damascus.
[1]
"The Bronze Age army was an army of specialists and corvee soldiers. The army of the Early Iron Age was a ’military population’ charged with enthusiasm, guided by the decisions of kin-based groups united in council and not by impositions from the state administration. Moreover, this army chose its charismatic leaders, who would return to their previous occupation once the danger was overcome."
[2]
[1]: Pedley, J.G. 1972. Ancient Literary Sources on Sardis. Achaeological Exploration of Sardis. Monograph 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p.25 [2]: (Leverani 2014, 400) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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"When Alyattes, father of Croesus the king of Lydians, was campaigning against Caria, he instructed his generals to bring their forces to Sardis on a day which he appointed." Account by Nicolas of Damascus.
[1]
"The Bronze Age army was an army of specialists and corvee soldiers. The army of the Early Iron Age was a ’military population’ charged with enthusiasm, guided by the decisions of kin-based groups united in council and not by impositions from the state administration. Moreover, this army chose its charismatic leaders, who would return to their previous occupation once the danger was overcome."
[2]
[1]: Pedley, J.G. 1972. Ancient Literary Sources on Sardis. Achaeological Exploration of Sardis. Monograph 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p.25 [2]: (Leverani 2014, 400) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Present for Macedonian Empire.
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Senior soldiers within the sultan’s military retinue and the military governors.
[1]
Both officers and soldiers were employed by the polity on a full time basis. [1] A full time Islamic priesthood worked in the mosques. [1]: Fodor, Pal. “Ottoman Warfare, 1300-1453.” In The Cambridge History of Turkey, edited by Kate Fleet, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Reşat Kasaba, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P.193. |
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original code: absent: 1256-1303 CE; disputed_present_absent: 1304-1335 CE Changed on the basis of this: There were full time officers and soldiers within the Khan’s military retinue and those warriors who held iqtas [land grants] in return for military service.
[1]
absent "the Ilkhan Ghazan decided to give a modest level of pay to low-ranking soliders, while the high-ranking Mongol officers remained unpaid." [2] In 1303 an officer captured by the Mamluks reportedly said: "The Mongol is the slave of his sovereign, He is never free. His sovereign is his benefactor: he does not serve him for money. Although I was the least of Ghazan’s servants I never needed anything." [2] present Senior warriors within the Khan’s retinue. [1] There were full time officers and soldiers within the Khan’s military retinue and those warriors who held iqtas [land grants] in return for military service. [1] There were full time Muslim priests. [1]: Reuven Amitai, ‘Armies and Their Economic Basis in Iran and the Surrounding Lands, c.1000-1500’, in David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (eds), The New Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 3. The Eastern Islamic World, Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), P.555, 557. [2]: (Turnball 2003, 11) Turnball, Stephen R. 2003. Mongol Warrior 1200-1350. Osprey Publishing. |
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Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges."
[1]
[1]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) |
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Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges."
[1]
[1]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) |
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Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges."
[1]
[1]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) |
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Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges."
[1]
"Both [yaya] and the müsellems were gradually relegated to second-line duties late in the 14th century, and by 1600 such units had either been abolished or reduced to non-military functions."
[1]
[1]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) |
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Emir Orhan: "A regularly paid force of Muslim and Christian cavalry and infantry was created by his vizier, Allah al Din. The horsemen were known as müsellems (tax-free men) and were organised under the overall command of sancak beys into hundreds, under subaşis, and thousands, under binbaşis. The foot-soldiers, or yaya, were comparably divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. These infantry archers occasionally fought for Byzantium, where they were known as mourtatoi. Müsellems and yayas were at first paid wages, but by the time of Murat I (1359) they were normally given lands or fiefs in return for military service, the yayas also having special responsibility for the protection of roads and bridges."
[1]
"Both [yaya] and the müsellems were gradually relegated to second-line duties late in the 14th century, and by 1600 such units had either been abolished or reduced to non-military functions."
[1]
[1]: (Nicolle 1983, 9) |
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In Copper Age Latium there was evidence for the emergence of an elite warrior culture
[1]
, though there did not appear to be enough evidence to speak of "professional soldiers" in a modern sense. Coded absent because professional military officers were not present in subsequent periods.
[1]: R. Whitehouse, Underground Religion (1992), p. 21 |
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The highest officers in the Roman military system were not professionals.
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The highest officers in the Roman military system were not professionals.
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The highest officers in the Roman military system were usually senators not professionals. There were, however, professional junior officers at least from the Roman Principate.
"Typically the men who commanded armies and legions were senators. There were no military specialists in Roman government and no imperial high command. All senators alternated brief periods of military command with administrative posts, participation in domestic politics and careers as legal advocates. As military commanders they were, to a great extent, amateurs, even though most did a brief spell as a junior officer (tribune) in a legion. They would have depended on the professional junior officers (tribunes and centurions) as well as the training and discipline of the legionaries themselves to win battles."" [1] "Tribunes, like the legionary legate (commander), were drawn from Rome’s social and political elite, the senatorial and equestrian orders, and were not professional soldiers. They alternated military service with political, judicial and administrative duties." [2] [1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 38) [2]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 39) |
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The highest officers in the Roman military system were usually senators not professionals. There were, however, professional junior officers at least from the Roman Principate.
"Typically the men who commanded armies and legions were senators. There were no military specialists in Roman government and no imperial high command. All senators alternated brief periods of military command with administrative posts, participation in domestic politics and careers as legal advocates. As military commanders they were, to a great extent, amateurs, even though most did a brief spell as a junior officer (tribune) in a legion. They would have depended on the professional junior officers (tribunes and centurions) as well as the training and discipline of the legionaries themselves to win battles."" [1] "Tribunes, like the legionary legate (commander), were drawn from Rome’s social and political elite, the senatorial and equestrian orders, and were not professional soldiers. They alternated military service with political, judicial and administrative duties." [2] [1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 38) [2]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 39) |
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|
The highest officers in the Roman military system were usually senators not professionals. There were, however, professional junior officers at least from the Roman Principate.
"Typically the men who commanded armies and legions were senators. There were no military specialists in Roman government and no imperial high command. All senators alternated brief periods of military command with administrative posts, participation in domestic politics and careers as legal advocates. As military commanders they were, to a great extent, amateurs, even though most did a brief spell as a junior officer (tribune) in a legion. They would have depended on the professional junior officers (tribunes and centurions) as well as the training and discipline of the legionaries themselves to win battles."" [1] "Tribunes, like the legionary legate (commander), were drawn from Rome’s social and political elite, the senatorial and equestrian orders, and were not professional soldiers. They alternated military service with political, judicial and administrative duties." [2] [1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 38) [2]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 39) |
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|
The highest officers in the Roman military system were usually senators not professionals. There were, however, professional junior officers at least from the Roman Principate.
"Typically the men who commanded armies and legions were senators. There were no military specialists in Roman government and no imperial high command. All senators alternated brief periods of military command with administrative posts, participation in domestic politics and careers as legal advocates. As military commanders they were, to a great extent, amateurs, even though most did a brief spell as a junior officer (tribune) in a legion. They would have depended on the professional junior officers (tribunes and centurions) as well as the training and discipline of the legionaries themselves to win battles."" [1] "Tribunes, like the legionary legate (commander), were drawn from Rome’s social and political elite, the senatorial and equestrian orders, and were not professional soldiers. They alternated military service with political, judicial and administrative duties." [2] [1]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 38) [2]: (Pollard and Berry 2012, 39) |
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"In the West, as time passed the command of the army moved away from the emperor and devolved upon the newly created magister peditum (’master of the infantry’) and magister equitum (’master of the cavalry’). In the course of time the magister peditum became the more senior of the two posts."
[1]
[1]: (Hughes 2012) Hughes, Iran. 2012. Aetius: Attila’s Nemesis. Casemate Publishers. |
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Noblemen.
[1]
How was the Gothic army paid? "the limited evidence that we have ... suggests a combination of tax-based salaries and the redistribution of land, both of which would have resulted in a process of administrative decentralization. This matter is of obvious importance for how we imagine the distribution of power and wealth between the Roman landowners and the Gothic military elite." [2] [2]: (Heydemann 2016, 26) Heydemann, Gerda. The Ostrogothic Kingdom: Ideologies and Transitions. in Arnold, Jonathan J. Bjornlie, Shane M. Sessa, Kristina. eds. 2016. A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy. BRILL. Leiden. |
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The commanders were Dukes.
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The commanders were aristocrats.
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There are references to what appear to be full-time military officials from the mid-10th century: the magister militum, a prefect of the navy, and a protospatharios ("sword-bearer").
[1]
During the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, papal armies would have been commanded by full-time mercenary captains.
[1]: Partner, 97 |
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Although the papal armies during this period were usually under the overall command of papal rectors or legates, battlefield command was usually done by professionals, the condottieri: "...the Papal State [in 1378-80] was ruled by French officials and bishops and served largely by German mercenaries...."
[1]
Scions of the Roman baronial families were active on both sides in the Italian Wars.
[2]
[1]: Partner, 340. [2]: Mallett & Shaw, 76-77 |
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Professional military officers served the papacy and were stationed in the Papal States.
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Full-time specialists. Sakha warriors and spies fought for their clans and tribes, and were not professionals in the conventional sense of the term: ’Yakut warriors ( säpi, säpi kisita ) were usually mounted horsemen ( minjär ), but there were also foot soldiers ( sat[unknown]ykisita ). Their weapons ( säp ) consisted of a light bent bow ( s[unknown]a ), a quiver ( käsäx, s[unknown]adax ), and arrows ( aya ) .’
[1]
’These warriors formed a chain of movable, vigilant pickets around the settlements. In case of war they formed the kernel of the fighting detachment -- sari Some of the bolder ones went to find their fortune, dzhol. They would go far into unknown territory, among foreigners, either by themselves or with companions. Such detachments would not take their cattle with them and often traveled on foot. They made their living exclusively by hunting, fishing, and looting. The Yakut kept these habits for a long time, until very recently. Khudiakov has a legend about Khaptagay-batyr and his son Khokhoe-batyr, and their three khosun: Sappy, Yngkabyl, and Batagyyan, who roamed about in the seventeen forties, during the time of Pavlutskii, in the north of the Yakutsk Oblast. In the Kolymsk Okrug (1882), I wrote down a legend about the two Yakut brothers who were the first to make their way into the kolymsk Krai. Their names have been forgotten. In the Namsk Ulus I was told a legend about the Vilyuysk Yakut Tangas-Boltongo who also wandered by himself somewhere in the little-known, remote regions of the Vilyuysk Okrug. He was called a bagatyr, just as the old epic heroes. Apparently he lived in the beginning of the present century; this is indicated by the name of a Yakut hunter of the Namsk Ulus, Betyunsk Nasleg, Chaky clan, whom he encountered: his name was Soldat. Soldiers appeared in the Yakutsk Oblast only in the last century, at the time of the Kamchatka campaigns of Pavlutskii. Then Middendorf mentions solitary Yakut hunters whom he encountered far from their native tribes in the mountains of the Amur Basin. Such bold fellows served their clans as a sort of voluntary spies, searching out new pastures suitable for settlement in case some sort of unpleasantness or inconvenience should arise in the homeland. They brought back word of new lands, of the peoples they had encountered, the details of the route, and the obstacles involved. Sometimes the clan would choose such people out of their own number and deliberately send them out on a searching party. The tales The Golden Eagle and the Teal, and The Flying Winged Creatures hint at this. These were chosen people and were also called bagatyr, baatyr, batyr, or batur; strictly speaking in the Yakut language this word means valorous, exceptionally manly, bold, strong, and clever. But these people did not have any special rights in the clan besides the usual rights gained through personal superiority.’
[2]
Military operations were led by war-leaders, who formed a military aristocracy based on heredity and personal military success: ’Just as now, common matters were managed by the clan assembly. Matters of war and minor legal cases, which demanded quick settlement without any delays, were managed by a war leader -- toen -- acknowledged by the rest of the people. According to the Yakut this service was hereditary, on the strength of their belief that an eaglet is always an eagle; a young crow is always a crow. But this hereditary right was not strictly followed. Thus, the heir of the Borogon toen, Legey, was not his son, but a foreign adopted son who had been bought for money. Another saga relates, with full consciousness of the legality of such a matter, that the Tungus chose as their toen a Yakut, Khaptagay-batyr, because of his valor. The sago says: No Lamut (Tungus), no matter who, will kill you. Now you be our lord (toen). If a Lamut will not obey your word, let there be a sin upon him. The toen always had in addition the title of bagatyr (valorous) and in the popular conception his traits of character had to correspond with those demanded of a hero. But he would not wander by himself, nor look for adventures, but would always live where the clan was and only leave in time of war, at the head of the mounted and armed detachment.’
[3]
’We can judge how large these unions sometimes were by the fact that in 1634 600 Yakut warriors under the leadership of prince Mymak took part in a battle on the right bank of the Lena, in which the army of ataman Galkin was crushed and all his horses were lost.’
[4]
’At this period, however, the clan-tribal structure was already in a state of decomposition. The tribes and clans were headed by the military aristocracy-the toyons. These possessed large herds of cattle and employed the labor of slaves and dependent fellow clansmen on their farms; they were also the military leaders. Heading detachments of armed servants and junior fellow clansmen, the toyons raided each other’s territory, and frequently looted the farms of the free members of the community, seizing their cattle and destroying their economic independence. These toyon wars and raids were one of the factors which speeded up the decomposition of the clan commune. The ruined members of the commune were reduced to the status of “balyksyts” (poor people without cattle, or fishermen), or else became the indentured slaves of the toyons. Most of the slaves (kuluts or bokans) originated in this way.’
[5]
[1]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut", 172 [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 717 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 718 [4]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 760 [5]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts”, 270 |
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Full-time specialists. Sakha warriors and spies fought for their clans and tribes, and were not professionals in the conventional sense of the term: ’Yakut warriors ( säpi, säpi kisita ) were usually mounted horsemen ( minjär ), but there were also foot soldiers ( sat[unknown]ykisita ). Their weapons ( säp ) consisted of a light bent bow ( s[unknown]a ), a quiver ( käsäx, s[unknown]adax ), and arrows ( aya ) .’
[1]
’These warriors formed a chain of movable, vigilant pickets around the settlements. In case of war they formed the kernel of the fighting detachment -- sari Some of the bolder ones went to find their fortune, dzhol. They would go far into unknown territory, among foreigners, either by themselves or with companions. Such detachments would not take their cattle with them and often traveled on foot. They made their living exclusively by hunting, fishing, and looting. The Yakut kept these habits for a long time, until very recently. Khudiakov has a legend about Khaptagay-batyr and his son Khokhoe-batyr, and their three khosun: Sappy, Yngkabyl, and Batagyyan, who roamed about in the seventeen forties, during the time of Pavlutskii, in the north of the Yakutsk Oblast. In the Kolymsk Okrug (1882), I wrote down a legend about the two Yakut brothers who were the first to make their way into the kolymsk Krai. Their names have been forgotten. In the Namsk Ulus I was told a legend about the Vilyuysk Yakut Tangas-Boltongo who also wandered by himself somewhere in the little-known, remote regions of the Vilyuysk Okrug. He was called a bagatyr, just as the old epic heroes. Apparently he lived in the beginning of the present century; this is indicated by the name of a Yakut hunter of the Namsk Ulus, Betyunsk Nasleg, Chaky clan, whom he encountered: his name was Soldat. Soldiers appeared in the Yakutsk Oblast only in the last century, at the time of the Kamchatka campaigns of Pavlutskii. Then Middendorf mentions solitary Yakut hunters whom he encountered far from their native tribes in the mountains of the Amur Basin. Such bold fellows served their clans as a sort of voluntary spies, searching out new pastures suitable for settlement in case some sort of unpleasantness or inconvenience should arise in the homeland. They brought back word of new lands, of the peoples they had encountered, the details of the route, and the obstacles involved. Sometimes the clan would choose such people out of their own number and deliberately send them out on a searching party. The tales The Golden Eagle and the Teal, and The Flying Winged Creatures hint at this. These were chosen people and were also called bagatyr, baatyr, batyr, or batur; strictly speaking in the Yakut language this word means valorous, exceptionall ymanly, bold, strong, and clever. But these people did not have any special rights in the clan besides the usual rights gained through personal superiority.’
[2]
Military operations were lead by war-leaders, who formed a military aristocracy based on heredity and personal military success: ’Just as now, common matters were managed by the clan assembly. Matters of war and minor legal cases, which demanded quick settlement without any delays, were managed by a war leader -- toen -- acknowledged by the rest of the people. According to the Yakut this service was hereditary, on the strength of their belief that an eaglet is always an eagle; a young crow is always a crow. But this hereditary right was not strictly followed. Thus, the heir of the Borogon toen, Legey, was not his son, but a foreign adopted son who had been bought for money. Another saga relates, with full consciousness of the legality of such a matter, that the Tungus chose as their toen a Yakut, Khaptagay-batyr, because of his valor. The sago says: No Lamut (Tungus), no matter who, will kill you. Now you be our lord (toen). If a Lamut will not obey your word, let there be a sin upon him. The toen always had in addition the title of bagatyr (valorous) and in the popular conception his traits of character had to correspond with those demanded of a hero. But he would not wander by himself, nor look for adventures, but would always live where the clan was and only leave in time of war, at the head of the mounted and armed detachment.’
[3]
’We can judge how large these unions sometimes were by the fact that in 1634 600 Yakut warriors under the leadership of prince Mymak took part in a battle on the right bank of the Lena, in which the army of ataman Galkin was crushed and all his horses were lost.’
[4]
’At this period, however, the clan-tribal structure was already in a state of decomposition. The tribes and clans were headed by the military aristocracy-the toyons. These possessed large herds of cattle and employed the labor of slaves and dependent fellow clansmen on their farms; they were also the military leaders. Heading detachments of armed servants and junior fellow clansmen, the toyons raided each other’s territory, and frequently looted the farms of the free members of the community, seizing their cattle and destroying their economic independence. These toyon wars and raids were one of the factors which speeded up the decomposition of the clan commune. The ruined members of the commune were reduced to the status of “balyksyts” (poor people without cattle, or fishermen), or else became the indentured slaves of the toyons. Most of the slaves (kuluts or bokans) originated in this way.’
[5]
We need to confirm whether any Sakha warriors joined the Russian military at the time. Accordingly the code may be in need of re-evaluation.
[1]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut", 172 [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 717 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 718 [4]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 760 [5]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts”, 270 |
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Full-time specialists Blood-vengeance and warfare were organized by community members: ’The terrible custom demands ever new, ever more victims, all security must disappear, every individual constantly lives in danger of being ambushed; there is a general and permanent state of war. Hence the arrangement of the houses, one door of which can be used for flight, while the battle rages at the other; hence the customs mentioned at the beginning in connection with approaching a dwelling, for the protection of which, in addition, a pack of half-wild dogs are kept. A quarrel between two families must lead to battles between whole tribes; larger groups of tribes become hostile to one another; war and battle become customary, a man’s lifework. A longer period of quiet, of peace, must be unbearable for such a nation of warriors. Ambitious, bold leaders will easily find companions for joint war expeditions; the neighboring nations are attacked and plundered. Thus, these Indians are carrying on among themselves a war of annihilation which must gradually bring about their own downfall. Severe depopulation is already noticeable in the region of the Jívaros, and it is being accelerated by epidemics, of the diseases introduced by the Europeans, which appear with great violence at times.’
[1]
’The primary motivation for warfare is to secure as many human heads as possible from an alien tribe, and secondarily to capture women. The acquisition of territory had never been a motive for engaging in warfare. The war party, consisting of approximately thirty or forty men, is recruited from the community itself or from friendly neighborhoods nearby, and is usually led by the or as war leader or chief. Actual warfare consists of preliminary ceremonies involving ritualized chanting, surprise attacks against one or two enemy houses, the killing and decapitation of the inhabitants or the occasional capture of a girl or woman as an extra wife, and the preparation of the on the return to the home village. Unlike many of the warlike Amazon tribes captives are not tortured or sacrificed, nor is cannibalism practiced.’
[2]
’It therefore behooves any Achuarä contemplating revenge upon someone to discuss his plans with potential allies, aligning them in his camp in advance of his action. The recruitment of military support among the Achuarä and other Jivaroans (cf. Harner 1972:98) is a rather insecure business. This derives, in part, from the fact that social relations are organized within a framework of cognatic, bilateral kinship, in which the only people sharing the same personal kindreds, and the rights and obligations associated with them, are siblings. Furthermore, the only military support of which one truly can be assured, once a contemplated or actual homicide develops, comes from persons obligated by affinal ties-sons-in-law or brothers-in-law-who often reside together. Where branching kin ties are overridden by divergent affinal obligations, relatives may very likely be drawn into enemy camps.’
[3]
[1]: Reiss, W. (Wilhelm) 1880. “Visit Among The Jivaro Indians”, 13 [2]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [3]: Bennett Ross, Jane 1984. “Effects Of Contact On Revenge Hostilities Among The Achuará Jívaro”, 102 |
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Full-time specialists. Blood-vengeance and warfare were organized by community members: ’The terrible custom demands ever new, ever more victims, all security must disappear, every individual constantly lives in danger of being ambushed; there is a general and permanent state of war. Hence the arrangement of the houses, one door of which can be used for flight, while the battle rages at the other; hence the customs mentioned at the beginning in connection with approaching a dwelling, for the protection of which, in addition, a pack of half-wild dogs are kept. A quarrel between two families must lead to battles between whole tribes; larger groups of tribes become hostile to one another; war and battle become customary, a man’s lifework. A longer period of quiet, of peace, must be unbearable for such a nation of warriors. Ambitious, bold leaders will easily find companions for joint war expeditions; the neighboring nations are attacked and plundered. Thus, these Indians are carrying on among themselves a war of annihilation which must gradually bring about their own downfall. Severe depopulation is already noticeable in the region of the Jívaros, and it is being accelerated by epidemics, of the diseases introduced by the Europeans, which appear with great violence at times.’
[1]
’The primary motivation for warfare is to secure as many human heads as possible from an alien tribe, and secondarily to capture women. The acquisition of territory had never been a motive for engaging in warfare. The war party, consisting of approximately thirty or forty men, is recruited from the community itself or from friendly neighborhoods nearby, and is usually led by the or as war leader or chief. Actual warfare consists of preliminary ceremonies involving ritualized chanting, surprise attacks against one or two enemy houses, the killing and decapitation of the inhabitants or the occasional capture of a girl or woman as an extra wife, and the preparation of the on the return to the home village. Unlike many of the warlike Amazon tribes captives are not tortured or sacrificed, nor is cannibalism practiced.’
[2]
’It therefore behooves any Achuarä contemplating revenge upon someone to discuss his plans with potential allies, aligning them in his camp in advance of his action. The recruitment of military support among the Achuarä and other Jivaroans (cf. Harner 1972:98) is a rather insecure business. This derives, in part, from the fact that social relations are organized within a framework of cognatic, bilateral kinship, in which the only people sharing the same personal kindreds, and the rights and obligations associated with them, are siblings. Furthermore, the only military support of which one truly can be assured, once a contemplated or actual homicide develops, comes from persons obligated by affinal ties-sons-in-law or brothers-in-law-who often reside together. Where branching kin ties are overridden by divergent affinal obligations, relatives may very likely be drawn into enemy camps.’
[3]
[1]: Reiss, W. (Wilhelm) 1880. “Visit Among The Jivaro Indians”, 13 [2]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [3]: Bennett Ross, Jane 1984. “Effects Of Contact On Revenge Hostilities Among The Achuará Jívaro”, 102 |
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Salaried officers, who were members of both the Greek and Egyptian elites, and mercenaries were prevalent in Ptolemaic Egypt. Their salaries reflected the rank they held. The higher officers (who were friends of the king) were professionals in the sense that they held no other functions. These higher officers were dispersed over the settlement towns and garrison towns.
[1]
[1]: A possible reference: (Fischer-Bovet 2007, [1]) |
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"high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include ... middle-ranking members of the army ..."
[1]
Military expeditions lead by the king’s brother or other kinsmen. [2] This does not mean there were no professional officers. "The first Aksumite king to put his own coinage into circulation was Endybis (in the second half of the third century)." [3] The introduction of coinage may have coincided with a shift to a more professional armed forces as the coinage could be used to pay the army. [1]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [2]: (Kobishanov 1981, 385) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [3]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. |
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"high-quality grave goods, have been interpreted as those of ’middle-class’ Aksumites ... It might be expected that such a class would include ... middle-ranking members of the army ..."
[1]
Military expeditions lead by the king’s brother or other kinsmen. [2] This does not mean there were no professional officers. "The first Aksumite king to put his own coinage into circulation was Endybis (in the second half of the third century)." [3] The introduction of coinage may have coincided with a shift to a more professional armed forces as the coinage could be used to pay the army. [1]: (Connah 2016, 141) Graham Connah. 2016. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective. Third Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [2]: (Kobishanov 1981, 385) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [3]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. |
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Only reference to professional and standing army in early West Africa is Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) of the Songhai Empire who "created a professional full-time army"
[1]
and "standing army"
[2]
before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[3]
[1]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. |
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"The Faitimid military was a standing professional army."
[1]
"The Fatimid army included a professional officer corps and many permanent regular and elite regiments stationed in Cairo or in garrisons throughout Egypt. The army was administered by the Army Ministry (diwan al-jaysh), which oversaw salaries and land grants (iqta’)." [2] Complex military administration maintained by Christian scribes. [3] "The Fatimid army was paid in cash, apparently in several installments over the year. My information is derived from a single account describing the arrangement reached between the Kutama and Ibn ’Ammar at the time of al-Hakim’s coronation ceremony." [4] al-Mustansir civil war as turning point to Iqta system for military "In the period prior to al-Mustansir, qadis, administrative personnel, and members of the royal family received grants of iqta in lieu of their salaries or as a part of their remuneration.’ In a previous study, I presented a few examples showing that during al-Hakim’s reign the circle of those receiving iqta was enlarged to include soldiers (junud) and ’abid al-shira’. Since then, I have gathered these further examples ..." Examples includes generals and soldiers. [4] [1]: (Qutbuddin 2011, 39) Qutbuddin, Tahera. Fatimids. Ramsamy, Edward. ed. 2011. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Volume 2. Africa. Sage. Los Angeles. [2]: (Hamblin 2005, 749) [3]: (Nicolle 1996, 65-69) [4]: (Lev 1987, 355) |
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Only reference to professional and standing army in early West Africa is Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) of the Songhai Empire who "created a professional full-time army"
[1]
and "standing army"
[2]
before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[3]
[1]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. |
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Manda Moussa I’s pilgrimage story mentions an imperial escort of 8700 men.
[1]
This is unconfirmed by historical/archaeological evidence, but hints at the existence of a professional army. Later Songhay Empire: Askia Muhammad had a full time general called dyini-koy or balama.
[2]
"commanders"
[3]
At a later time Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "created a professional full-time army"
[4]
before Askia Muhammad of Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[2]
King of Mali had two generals, one responsible for the Mossi border, other northern desert border." [5] [1]: (Niane 1975, 37) [2]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. [3]: (Conrad 2010, 46) [4]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [5]: (Diop 1987, 115-116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. |
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Army funded by Mamluk elite through their iqta (estates). These iqta holders formed an aristocracy, and they usually lived in Cairo or Damascus (rather than on their estates).
[1]
"‘Iqta fiefs were allocated to those of senior or sometimes middle rank. These men were called muqtas. In the Mamluk Sultanate a muqta maintained a certain number of soldiers, his own mamluks and sometimes other lesser troops. He and his military household then owed military service to the sultan. The muqta also paid his troops’ expenses from the revenues of his ‘iqta. The men would then purchase what they required on campaign from the suq al-‘askar ‘soldiers’ market’. Each regular soldier was also paid, either by his muqta or by the sultan." [2] "Army officers came from the Mamluk ranks." [3] [1]: (Nicolle 1996,135-181) [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. [3]: (Raymond 2000, 113) |
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Army funded by Mamluk elite through their iqta (estates). These iqta holders formed an aristocracy, and they usually lived in Cairo or Damascus (rather than on their estates).
[1]
"‘Iqta fiefs were allocated to those of senior or sometimes middle rank. These men were called muqtas. In the Mamluk Sultanate a muqta maintained a certain number of soldiers, his own mamluks and sometimes other lesser troops. He and his military household then owed military service to the sultan. The muqta also paid his troops’ expenses from the revenues of his ‘iqta. The men would then purchase what they required on campaign from the suq al-‘askar ‘soldiers’ market’. Each regular soldier was also paid, either by his muqta or by the sultan." [2] "Army officers came from the Mamluk ranks." [3] [1]: (Nicolle 1996,135-181) [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. [3]: (Raymond 2000, 113) |
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Army funded by Mamluk elite through their iqta (estates). These iqta holders formed an aristocracy, and they usually lived in Cairo or Damascus (rather than on their estates).
[1]
"‘Iqta fiefs were allocated to those of senior or sometimes middle rank. These men were called muqtas. In the Mamluk Sultanate a muqta maintained a certain number of soldiers, his own mamluks and sometimes other lesser troops. He and his military household then owed military service to the sultan. The muqta also paid his troops’ expenses from the revenues of his ‘iqta. The men would then purchase what they required on campaign from the suq al-‘askar ‘soldiers’ market’. Each regular soldier was also paid, either by his muqta or by the sultan." [2] "Army officers came from the Mamluk ranks." [3] [1]: (Nicolle 1996,135-181) [2]: (Nicolle 2014) Nicolle, D. 2014 Mamluk Askar 1250-1517. Osprey Publishing Ltd. [3]: (Raymond 2000, 113) |
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Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "supported by Mande clans ... created a standing army"
[1]
Askia Muhammed Toure (r.1493-1529 CE) "created a professional full-time army"
[2]
General of the armies: Djima koï. Head of cavalry in the event of conflict: governor of Dirma (one of his many duties).
[3]
before Askia Muhammad "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one."
[4]
[1]: (Lapidus 2012, 593) [2]: (Conrad 2010, 66) [3]: (Niane 1975, 105) [4]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. |
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"Chariots allowed commanders to supervise their troops efficiently and across great distances."
[1]
[1]: (The Shang Dynasty, 1600 to 1050 BCE. Spice Digest, Fall 2007. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/117/ShangDynasty.pdf) |
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“In order to understand the nature and significance of these changes, one must first examine the Western Han military system carried forward, in modified form, from the Qin. Every adult male between the ages of 23 […] and 56 was required to give two full years of military service, one in the capital or at the frontier and one as a regular soldier in his own commandery. Selected individuals were trained as ‘Skilled Soldiers’ (cai guan) who were expert in using the crossbow, ‘Cavalrymen’ (ji shi), or sailors on a ‘Towered Warship’ (lou chuan), all of whom received higher status and better treatment. […] Each year in the eighth month every commandery was supposed to hold an inspection in which the commandery troops under the direction of the Commandant (du wei), the local military official, demonstrated their skills to the Grand Administrator (tai shou), the head of local government.
“There are two essential features in this system that must be noted. First, while all free adult males were obligated to provide military service, campaign armies were based on the three categories of elite troops: the ‘Skilled Soldiers’, ‘Cavalrymen’ and ‘Towered Warships’. Other soldiers served as porters, guards, and (literally) spear carriers, but the burden of combat against substantial, armed enemies was born by the elite categories of warriors. The division of armed forces—well-trained, crack units who were responsible for significant combat as opposed to partially-trained conscripts who provided support and the weight of massed bodies—was inherited from the Warring States period. Second, for local government the key feature was the annual training session and inspection under the supervision of a specialist military official.” [1] [1]: (Lewis 2000, 34-36) Lewis, M. E. 2000. The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service. In H. J. Van De Ven (ed.) Warfare in Chinese History pp. 33-76. Brill. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/the%20han%20abolition/titleCreatorYear/items/UKM7G8B8/item-list |
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Less senior officers may have been professionals who were full-time specialists.
army run by aristocrats and members of the ruling family "The Ts’in inherited the Wei system after AD 265, until Ssu-ma Yen deliberately abandoned the centralised system of command and placed members of his family in control of private armies." [1] from 290 CE "dudu were once again allowed to hold provincial governorships concurrently with their military offices, giving them full control of both civil and military affairs in their assigned regions" [2] "The military was constituted from a Capital Army that was garrisoned in and around the capital, the armies of the princedoms and imperial clansmen, and private armies (buqu) of the magnates that were scattered throughout the empire and often represented a challenge for the central government in cases of rebellion." [3] "... begun during the Tang dynasty... The rise of religious professionals and soldiers as clearly separate groups was contrary to the previous normative view of society divided into knights (shi, the term that would later be applied to the literati or gentry), farmers, artisans and merchants." [4] [1]: (Peers 1995, 21) [2]: (Graff 2002, 44) [3]: (Theobald, U. 2015. CHINAKNOWLEDGE - a universal guide for China studies. http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Division/jin-admin.html) [4]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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Troops of the Northern Chou reorganized "into twelve units - four guards (wei) and eight army headquarters offices (fu). In addition to his central command structure, regional military commands (tsung-kuan fu), which had overall control of an area, sometimes of a few prefectures (chou) and in other cases more than ten, were established in areas of major strategic importance. These districts were officered by ranked military officials appointed from the capital; in some cases the generals appointed were made concurrently civil governors of the regions in which they were to serve."
[1]
[1]: (Wright 1979, 100) |
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"By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times."
[1]
[1]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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e.g. in the Khan’s personal guard.
[1]
[1]: Bira, Sh. “THE MONGOLS AND THEIR STATE IN THE TWELFTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Vol. IV: The Age of Achievement A.D. 750 to the End of the Fifteenth Century. Part I The Historical, Social and Economic Setting, edited by C. E. Bosworth, Muhammad S. Asimov, and Yar Muhammad Khan, Paris: Unesco, 1998. 255-256 |
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"While the army itself had changed from a mostly hereditary, financially independent force into a paid, professional force, now heavily dependent upon firearms, the officer corps remained dependent on hereditary leaders. These hereditary leaders were not the families of the early Ming..."
[1]
"By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times." [2] "The problem Chinese statesmen had with the standing army was how to keep it out of politics and isolate its functions to a static, reliable instrument of dynastic stability ...The answer for the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties was to fuedalize much of the army into a hereditary class with attached lands that would support them in peacetime." [3] [1]: (Lorge 2005, 139) [2]: (Lorge 2005, 7) [3]: (Lorge 2005, 8) |
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"The Wei shu reports that early in the 5th century, Shelun introduced the so-called decimal system: "For the first time, military laws were established according to which 1000 people formed a detachment (run), and at the head of a detachment a military leader was placed. 100 people formed a banner (zhuang) and a chief stood at the head of a banner" (WS 103: 3a; Taskin 1984, p. 269). A term run can be translated as ’military head’, while shawu as ’leader or commander’."
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2005, 155) |
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Clan and tribal organizations traditional to nomadic peoples were likely "reflected in the administrative structure of the state and in the organization of the army".
[1]
Presumably a military aristocracy. inferred present for full-time and trained.
[1]: (Zeimal 1996, 136) Zeimal, E. V. The Kidarite Kingdom In Central Asia. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.123-137. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf |
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Nomadic warriors are full-time.
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"Over the years, Turkic junior officers who had proven themselves at the platoon and squadron levels rose in the ranks, until by the time of Nasr II they dominated the officer corps."
[1]
Iqtas "Bukhara was held by the latter as an iqta ... as a conditional reward for services rendered in the capacity of governor with the right to levy for his own benefit a part of the income of Bukhara and, later, the entire income from the town. It is also clear from the legends on Samanid coins that Bukhara, Akhsikath, Kuba, Nasrabad and other towns and regions were held as iqtas for various periods of time by members of the dynasty and by senior military and civilian officials as rewards for their services. These grants were neither lifelong nor hereditary, although attempts were made to move in that direction and were resisted by the central government." [2] [1]: (Starr 2013) Starr, S. Frederick. 2013. Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton University Press. Princeton. [2]: (Davidovich 1997, 143) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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"The tribal home guard has formed a part of the military organization side by side with the professional army divisions of emperor and a number of eminent aristocrats and armed forces of vassal people. It is not accidental that in Laio shi it is mentioned that a banner is a distinctive attribute of a tribe (LS 49: 1b-2a)."
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2014, 156) |
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"We can also deduce from inscriptions on the coins that the system of rewards and ownership had developed and acquired features ’in the upper echelons of power’ that clearly demonstrate the inappropriateness of applying the term iqta to it."
[1]
[1]: (Davidovich 1997, 146) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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As with Mongols.
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All freemen were expected to carry out military service as and when their duke or king summoned them. However there does not seem to have been a standing professional army.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Christie 1998: 118. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/975BEGKF [2]: Clayton 2021: 162. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4N2ZFRX8 |
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professional hierarchy within bodyguard units?
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"In the Kassite period, Babylonia also experienced the influence of new military techniques (chariots and horses). The latter benefited a small group of military professionals, who received generous land grants from the king."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 367) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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The only professional soldiers were employed in the king’s personal bodyguard.
[1]
"The ancient Yemeni military structure consisted of four different elements: 1) the national troops called the Khamis under the king, or one of his generals; 2) levied troops from the highland communities; 3) cavalry (light and heavy); and 4) Bedouin allies/mercenaries. It is not known whether the Khamis consisted of professional soldiers or peasant conscripts, but the king’s bodyguards certainly did consist of professionals." [1] [1]: (Syvanne 2015, 134) Ilkka Syvanne. 2015. Military History of Late Rome 284-361. Pen and Sword. Barnsley. |
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The only professional soldiers were employed in the king’s personal bodyguard.
[1]
"The ancient Yemeni military structure consisted of four different elements: 1) the national troops called the Khamis under the king, or one of his generals; 2) levied troops from the highland communities; 3) cavalry (light and heavy); and 4) Bedouin allies/mercenaries. It is not known whether the Khamis consisted of professional soldiers or peasant conscripts, but the king’s bodyguards certainly did consist of professionals." [1] [1]: (Syvanne 2015, 134) Ilkka Syvanne. 2015. Military History of Late Rome 284-361. Pen and Sword. Barnsley. |
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A "military aristocracy" grew out of the success of the Dalamite conquest.
[1]
[2]
"The iqta had been the Buyid answer to the problem of paying the military in a period when specie was in short supply: in lieu of salary an amir would be granted the right to collect the taxes of a given area. An iqta could thus vary in size from a whole province to much smaller subdivision, to a single town or village. In principle, the iqta remained in the figt of the sultan, and could be withdrawn at any moment. Under the Buyids, this system was widely credited with economic disaster, as absentee amirs sought to reap the swiftest possible profits before their iqta was removed them." [3] [1]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran under the Būyids. In Frye, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuq’s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.252 [2]: Donohue, J. J. 2003. The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334H./945 to 403H./1012: Shaping Institutions for the Future. Leiden: Brill. p.199 [3]: (Peacock 2015, 79) Peacock, A C S. 2015. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. |
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Mid-11th century (after conquest of Baghdad?) "the Turkmen began to be supplemented, but never wholly supplanted, as a military force by mamluks."
[1]
The Saljuqs adopted the system of distributing land grants to pay for the army. Iqtas (land tax allotments) were given to military commanders in exchange for military service. They were also given to higher functionaries. [2] [3] There were full time officers within the Sultan’s retinue and military commanders; there were full time soldiers in the mamluk contingent of slave soldiers. [4] Iqta holder, who was a military officer, "was to support himself and his household, including his own retinue of troops, which meant their purchase, training, and upkeep. Unlike fuedalism this system did not usually entail administration of the territory in question." [5] [1]: (Peacock 2015, 218) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 250) [3]: Findley, Carter V., The Turks in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 pp.70-72. [4]: Nicolle, David. Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era, 1050-1350: Islam, Eastern Europe and Asia. Rev. and updated ed. London : Mechanicsburg, Pa: Greenhill Books ; Stackpole Books, 1999. p.220. [5]: (Amitai 2006, 52-53) Amitai, Reuven. The Mamluk Institution, or One Thousand Years of Military Slavery in the Islamic World. Brown, Christopher Leslie. Morgan, Philip D. eds. 2006. Arming Slaves: From Classical To The Modern Age. Yale University Press. New Haven. |
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Mid-11th century (after conquest of Baghdad?) "the Turkmen began to be supplemented, but never wholly supplanted, as a military force by mamluks."
[1]
The Saljuqs adopted the system of distributing land grants to pay for the army. Iqtas (land tax allotments) were given to military commanders in exchange for military service. They were also given to higher functionaries. [2] [3] There were full time officers within the Sultan’s retinue and military commanders; there were full time soldiers in the mamluk contingent of slave soldiers. [4] Iqta holder, who was a military officer, "was to support himself and his household, including his own retinue of troops, which meant their purchase, training, and upkeep. Unlike fuedalism this system did not usually entail administration of the territory in question." [5] [1]: (Peacock 2015, 218) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. [2]: (Lapidus 2012, 250) [3]: Findley, Carter V., The Turks in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 pp.70-72. [4]: Nicolle, David. Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era, 1050-1350: Islam, Eastern Europe and Asia. Rev. and updated ed. London : Mechanicsburg, Pa: Greenhill Books ; Stackpole Books, 1999. p.220. [5]: (Amitai 2006, 52-53) Amitai, Reuven. The Mamluk Institution, or One Thousand Years of Military Slavery in the Islamic World. Brown, Christopher Leslie. Morgan, Philip D. eds. 2006. Arming Slaves: From Classical To The Modern Age. Yale University Press. New Haven. |
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In the Sulayhid state: "The queen was supported by two military chiefs - Amir Abu Himyar Saba ibn Ahmad of the Sulayhid family and Amir Abu l-Rabi’ ’Amir ibn Sulayman of the Zawahi family - both in constant conflict with each other, thus weakening the Sulayhid state."
[1]
[1]: (Hamdani 2006, 777) Hamdani, Abbas. Sulayhids. Josef W Meri ed. 2006. Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia. Volume 1, A - K, Index. Routledge. Abingdon. |
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Middle rank officers, Iqta holders.
"Others were rewarded with an iqta or government fief. ... Some iqtas were also put aside to maintain the fleet and its personnel. The Ayyubid ranking system was quite a simple three tier system of amirs, amir kabirs and amir al isfahsalar. Above these field ranks were five or so specialist senior posts from garrison commander to army chief." [1] [1]: (Nicolle 1986, 20-21) Nicolle, D. 1986. Saladin and the Saracens. Osprey Publishing Ltd. Oxford. |
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Professional soldiers.
[1]
However: "Timur’s bureaucrats therefore resorted to the old trick of handing out vast tracts of land to relatives and favorites on the sole condition that the recipients make regular payments to the treasury." [2] [1]: (Marozzi 2004, 1-2) Marozzi, J. 2004. Tamerlane. HarperCollinsPublishers. London. [2]: (Starr 2013) Starr, S. Frederick. 2013. Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton University Press. Princeton. |
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Officers in the royal guard were full-time professionals.
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[1]
"The main offices within the palace of a raja of the late Vedic period would be held by the chief priest (purohit), the commander-in-chief (senani), the treasurer (samagrahitri), the collector of taxes (bhagadugha) and the keeper of the king’s household (kshata)."
[2]
[1]: J Duncan M. Derrett, ‘Social and Political Thought and Institutions’, in A. L Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp.128-129. [2]: Avari, B. (2007) India: The Ancient Past: A history of the India sub-continent from c. 7,000 BC to AD 1200. Routledge: London and New York. p73 |
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Standing armies.
"The feudal levies due from subordinates to the Gurjara king were supplemented by standing armies garrisoned on the frontiers." [1] [1]: (Deyell 2001, 397) Deyell, J. 2001. The Gurjara-Pratiharas. In R. Chakravarti (ed) Trade in Early India. OUP. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/MF59EW5P/library |
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No evidence for military so one could infer that regularly paid professional military officers were absent.
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No evidence for military so one could infer that regularly paid professional military officers were absent. Would there have been a full-time trained and paid personal retainer/bodyguard to a king?
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"Even though most military historians confidently assert that the Hsia did not maintain a standing army, it would be highly unlikely for the ruler not to have been protected by a body of men with pronounced martial abilities who would form the core of any broader combat effort."
[1]
Regiments of 100-125 men.
[2]
more conservative view "While the Erlitou ceramic tradition was widespread, the mechanisms of this expansion are probably only indirectly related to political activity (if pots don’t equal people, they are even less representative of conquering armies or “state” administrators). The degree of centralization, mechanisms of political control, and social organization can only be guessed at or extrapolated through comparison with Zhengzhou and Anyang." [3] [1]: (Sawyer 2011, 149) [2]: (Sawyer 2011, 151) [3]: (Campbell 2014, 62) |
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Grave of a warrior "chief" or "lord" found at Dayangzhou, contained many weapons.
[1]
Likely full-time, but whether paid by the state in land or salary is unknown. Officers may have been members of the elite and not full-time, paid warriors.
[1]: (Thorp 2013, 110) Thorp, Robert L. 2013. China in the Early Bronze Age: Shang Civilization.University of Pennsylvania Press. |
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"There were many salaried ranks for officers and men and also several specific types of allowance. Most of the military personnel, however, received very small allowances, thus making it difficult for them to maintain a living. ... Serving in the military was a kind of profession, and the soldiers and their family dependants usually lived together in military camps."
[1]
[1]: (Tseng-yü and Wright 2009, 219) |
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Full-time specialists
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Full-time specialists
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Full-time specialists
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Djenne was a new city 2.5km south-east of Jenne-jeno - what relationship was there - if any - between the old and the new cities?
Diop (1987) refers to what could possibly be a professional military officer for the state at Djenne: a "Sana-faran was their general-in-chief" [1] and he had officers under his orders. [1] Diop also references a Sovereign of Djenne who was was converted to Islam in the 12th century probably by ulema religious scholars. [2] before Askia Muhammad Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one." [3] "The western borders of the state of Djenne, before the conquest of the city by Sonni Ali, were defended by the commanders of twelve army corps deployed in the country of Sana: they were specifically assigned to surveillence of the movements of Mali. The Sana-faran was their general-in-chief." [1] There were officers under his orders. [1] "Likewise, twelve commanders of army corps were assigned to the east of the Niger toward Titili. [1] However, no references to Jenne-Jeno using military force to conquer other peoples and demand tribute. Army that is referred to could have been late in period and intended for defence, to maintain its independence against the growing military power of the empires of Western Sudan. [1]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [2]: (Diop 1987, 164) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. |
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Djenne was a new city 2.5km south-east of Jenne-jeno - what relationship was there - if any - between the old and the new cities?
Diop (1987) refers to what could possibly be a professional military officer for the state at Djenne: a "Sana-faran was their general-in-chief" [1] and he had officers under his orders. [1] Diop also references a Sovereign of Djenne who was was converted to Islam in the 12th century probably by ulema religious scholars. [2] before Askia Muhammad Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one." [3] "The western borders of the state of Djenne, before the conquest of the city by Sonni Ali, were defended by the commanders of twelve army corps deployed in the country of Sana: they were specifically assigned to surveillence of the movements of Mali. The Sana-faran was their general-in-chief." [1] There were officers under his orders. [1] "Likewise, twelve commanders of army corps were assigned to the east of the Niger toward Titili. [1] However, no references to Jenne-Jeno using military force to conquer other peoples and demand tribute. Army that is referred to could have been late in period and intended for defence, to maintain its independence against the growing military power of the empires of Western Sudan. [1]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [2]: (Diop 1987, 164) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. |
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Djenne was a new city 2.5km south-east of Jenne-jeno - what relationship was there - if any - between the old and the new cities?
Diop (1987) refers to what could possibly be a professional military officer for the state at Djenne: a "Sana-faran was their general-in-chief" [1] and he had officers under his orders. [1] Diop also references a Sovereign of Djenne who was was converted to Islam in the 12th century probably by ulema religious scholars. [2] before Askia Muhammad Songhay Empire "Chiefs, kings and emperors of earlier times had relied on simply ’calling up’ their subjects, their vassals, or their allies. ... But these were temporary armies. They were amateur armies. They served for a campaign or a war, and then everyone went home again until the next one." [3] "The western borders of the state of Djenne, before the conquest of the city by Sonni Ali, were defended by the commanders of twelve army corps deployed in the country of Sana: they were specifically assigned to surveillence of the movements of Mali. The Sana-faran was their general-in-chief." [1] There were officers under his orders. [1] "Likewise, twelve commanders of army corps were assigned to the east of the Niger toward Titili. [1] However, no references to Jenne-Jeno using military force to conquer other peoples and demand tribute. Army that is referred to could have been late in period and intended for defence, to maintain its independence against the growing military power of the empires of Western Sudan. [1]: (Diop 1987, 116) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [2]: (Diop 1987, 164) Diop, Cheikh Anta. Salemson, Harold trans. 1987. Precolonial Black Africa. Lawrence Hill Books. Chicago. [3]: (Davidson 1998, 168) Davidson, Basil. 1998. West Africa Before the Colonial Era. Routledge. London. |
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"there are Dendugu - literally ’son’s villages - towns created by the king either to house his sons or to hold military garrisons commanded by the nobility."
[1]
[1]: (Monroe and Ogundiran 2012, 177) J Cameron Monroe. Akinwumi Ogundiran. Power and Landscape in Atlantic West Africa. J Cameron Monroe. Akinwumi Ogundiran. eds. 2012. Power and Landscape in Atlantic West Africa: Archaeological Perspectives.Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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Only at the time of Conquest AD"Besides caciques, Spanish sources mention capitanes, principales (nobles), mandadores (commanders), and capitanes de guerra. Fray Pedro Simón (1882-92, 5: 197) also lists a pregonero (speaker or crier) who was second only to the chief. Spanish accounts do not list the duties and powers of all these off icials, but it seems clear that there was a hierarchy of civil and military off ice- holders."
[1]
"Capitanes de guerra" means "war captains". There is no confirmation from Bray on whether these military officers had any other occupation and whether they were full-time professionals."There is also the question concerning the social positioning of people living in these different residential areas. Were they full time attached specialists such as warriors, masons, featherworkers, bead manufacturers, goldsmiths, or religious specialists as Groot (1985) argues?"
[2]
Reichel-Dolmatoff refers to 16th century wars, highlighting that the Tairona were prone on guerilla warfare when resisting the Spaniards and that only on two occasions did they have a more substantial organised force, with military chiefs. This lack of organisation led to their eventual demise.
[3]
Note by RA: However the situation could have been different before contact (population decrease and other factors could have altered the social fabric).
[1]: (Bray 2003, 203) [2]: (Giraldo 2010, 304) [3]: (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1951, 91) |
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Only at the time of Conquest AD"Besides caciques, Spanish sources mention capitanes, principales (nobles), mandadores (commanders), and capitanes de guerra. Fray Pedro Simón (1882-92, 5: 197) also lists a pregonero (speaker or crier) who was second only to the chief. Spanish accounts do not list the duties and powers of all these off icials, but it seems clear that there was a hierarchy of civil and military off ice- holders."
[1]
"Capitanes de guerra" means "war captains". There is no confirmation from Bray on whether these military officers had any other occupation and whether they were full-time professionals."There is also the question concerning the social positioning of people living in these different residential areas. Were they full time attached specialists such as warriors, masons, featherworkers, bead manufacturers, goldsmiths, or religious specialists as Groot (1985) argues?"
[2]
Reichel-Dolmatoff refers to 16th century wars, highlighting that the Tairona were prone on guerilla warfare when resisting the Spaniards and that only on two occasions did they have a more substantial organised force, with military chiefs. This lack of organisation led to their eventual demise.
[3]
Note by RA: However the situation could have been different before contact (population decrease and other factors could have altered the social fabric).
[1]: (Bray 2003, 203) [2]: (Giraldo 2010, 304) [3]: (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1951, 91) |
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Only at the time of Conquest AD"Besides caciques, Spanish sources mention capitanes, principales (nobles), mandadores (commanders), and capitanes de guerra. Fray Pedro Simón (1882-92, 5: 197) also lists a pregonero (speaker or crier) who was second only to the chief. Spanish accounts do not list the duties and powers of all these off icials, but it seems clear that there was a hierarchy of civil and military off ice- holders."
[1]
"Capitanes de guerra" means "war captains". There is no confirmation from Bray on whether these military officers had any other occupation and whether they were full-time professionals."There is also the question concerning the social positioning of people living in these different residential areas. Were they full time attached specialists such as warriors, masons, featherworkers, bead manufacturers, goldsmiths, or religious specialists as Groot (1985) argues?"
[2]
Reichel-Dolmatoff refers to 16th century wars, highlighting that the Tairona were prone on guerilla warfare when resisting the Spaniards and that only on two occasions did they have a more substantial organised force, with military chiefs. This lack of organisation led to their eventual demise.
[3]
Note by RA: However the situation could have been different before contact (population decrease and other factors could have altered the social fabric).
[1]: (Bray 2003, 203) [2]: (Giraldo 2010, 304) [3]: (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1951, 91) |
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Full-time specialists not considered present during the later Xiongnu Imperial Confederation.
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The "tribal leaders" mentioned in the following quote likely served as the non-professional equivalent to military officers. “The Shiwei, in the periods of the Sui and Tang, were relatively weak in the northwestern Manchuria. Their form of social organization appeared fairly loose and still remained at tribal level. Clans and tribes were the basic social patterns. The productive activities were organized by the tribal leaders, as described in the Xin Tangshu, "in hunting (the tribes) were banded together, and dispersed afterward; the tribes did not rule over one another or submitted to one another".”
[1]
[1]: (Xu 2005, 180) |
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After 1185 Chinggiz established specialized military units, including heavy cavalry, scouts, etc. Officers of these specialized units (around two dozens of them) were probably full-time specialists.
"Chingggis did not have professional military officers before 1185, but other khans (heads of chiefdoms) had professional military officers. This was bodyguards - nukers (in Mongolian)." [1] however, forces in nomadic armies usually unpaid other than in loot. [1]: (Kradin 2016, personal communication) |
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After 1185 Chinggiz established specialized military units, including heavy cavalry, scouts, etc. Officers of these specialized units (around two dozens of them) were probably full-time specialists.
"Chingggis did not have professional military officers before 1185, but other khans (heads of chiefdoms) had professional military officers. This was bodyguards - nukers (in Mongolian)." [1] however, forces in nomadic armies usually unpaid other than in loot. [1]: (Kradin 2016, personal communication) |
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Khan’s special guard. inferred continuity from the Mongol Empire.
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continuity with Mongolian Empire?
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Full-time specialists The Orokaiva did not employ professional military officers in interclan warfare, relying on residential and kin ties as well as informal leadership: ’In interclan warfare, the Binandere organised a division of fighting labour. The first group, the scouts, were sent ahead to kill the scouts of the enemy’s main body. Then there were the front-line fighters, experienced men armed with clubs/spears and shields, forming the vanguard. Then there was a group of young people and men who had not killed. They beat drums, blew conch shells, sang war songs and generally used sound to frighten the enemy. Full-scale tribal warfare required the addition of two more groups. Firstly, sorcerers were carried on roofed litters from which they attempted to ward off enemy spirits. Being ritually pure they could have no contact with water. They ate only baked taro or bananas with coconut juice as well as much ginger. The second additional group were the strategists who were vital for long-drawn-out battles. This small group planned tactics, directed the front line and organised ambush killings and so on (1972:13-25).’
[1]
’Kinship and local affiliation together were the basic principles by which subgroups of the raiding party seem to have been drawn up during attack and on which leaders within the party based their rights to command specific combatants.’
[2]
’Waiko (1972) describes in detail the warfare of the Binandere, a society which like the ancient Spartans was reputed to practise infanticide on weak or deformed sons (Monckton 1922:130). Training for warfare began at an early age for boys. At about 12 years old they began living together in a men’s house and learning to dodge spears and to hold shields. Eventually they were required to prove themselves by killing a person in a raid (Waiko 1972:21). Part of the education imparted to the youths in the house was their primary duty to take revenge for the death of a clan member. A clan victim represented the clan and failure to avenge his death badly weakened their prestige and status. Killings had up to two generations delayed payback (1972:24-5).’
[3]
’Prior to European contact, aggression against the members of another tribe took the form of organized, often cannibalistic raids.’
[4]
[1]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 490 [2]: Rimoldi, Max, Cromwell Burau, and Robert Ferraris 1966. “Land Tenure And Land Use Among The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 30 [3]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 489 [4]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva |
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The Orokaiva did not employ professional military officers in interclan warfare, relying on residential and kin ties as well as informal leadership: ’In interclan warfare, the Binandere organised a division of fighting labour. The first group, the scouts, were sent ahead to kill the scouts of the enemy’s main body. Then there were the front-line fighters, experienced men armed with clubs/spears and shields, forming the vanguard. Then there was a group of young people and men who had not killed. They beat drums, blew conch shells, sang war songs and generally used sound to frighten the enemy. Full-scale tribal warfare required the addition of two more groups. Firstly, sorcerers were carried on roofed litters from which they attempted to ward off enemy spirits. Being ritually pure they could have no contact with water. They ate only baked taro or bananas with coconut juice as well as much ginger. The second additional group were the strategists who were vital for long-drawn-out battles. This small group planned tactics, directed the front line and organised ambush killings and so on (1972:13-25).’
[1]
’Kinship and local affiliation together were the basic principles by which subgroups of the raiding party seem to have been drawn up during attack and on which leaders within the party based their rights to command specific combatants.’
[2]
’Waiko (1972) describes in detail the warfare of the Binandere, a society which like the ancient Spartans was reputed to practise infanticide on weak or deformed sons (Monckton 1922:130). Training for warfare began at an early age for boys. At about 12 years old they began living together in a men’s house and learning to dodge spears and to hold shields. Eventually they were required to prove themselves by killing a person in a raid (Waiko 1972:21). Part of the education imparted to the youths in the house was their primary duty to take revenge for the death of a clan member. A clan victim represented the clan and failure to avenge his death badly weakened their prestige and status. Killings had up to two generations delayed payback (1972:24-5).’
[3]
During the colonial period, the Royal Papuan Constabulary was formed. [The constabulary was not Orokaiva specifically but Orokaiva men were drawn into the Royal Papuan Constabulary, where they often served alongside men from elsewhere in the Territory. There they received training from colonial authorities.] ’Thus, in the initial contact period, there were two major influences on the Orokaivan social order. First, the narrow moral universe of pre-contact days was widened. Orokaivans united in attempts to repulse the European intruders and also began to modify their traditional magic to improve taro. New spiritual rationale and ritual for these taro cults quickly spread through the Division after pacification. Some Orokaivans united with Europeans as armed constabulary or as friends and defenders of the missionaries.’
[4]
The development of the constabulary can be sketched as follows: ’During the first phase, no legislation allowed for a police force in either possession, a situation that ended in Papua in 1890 and in New Guinea in 1896. The second phase, which lasted until 1910, saw the establishment of police forces and was characterized by haphazard training and punitive expeditions. In the third phase, from 1910 to 1940, the police forces were consolidated and a coordinated and systematic training program was inaugurated. The disruption and trauma of World War II characterized the fourth phase, from 1940 to 1946. The fifth phase, which began after the war and continued into the 1960s, was marked by changes in structure and organization to accommodate changing conditions.’
[5]
’In New Guinea in 1888, the New Guinea Company took over the responsibility for the formation of a “peace keeping” force for the maintenance of law and order wherever the Germans had established jurisdiction. [...] However, very few Papuans and New Guineans were included in the early forces, which were composed mainly of foreigners: Australians, British, Germans, Malays, and South Sea Islanders (Dutton 1987, 62-63; Sinclair 1972, 918).’
[6]
Training was initially on an ad hoc basis, but became more formalized later on: ’In Papua the annual reports for the period between 1890 and 1910 indicated that the training of new recruits was at best haphazard and at worst nonexistent. [...] In my assessment, the third phase, from 1911 of 1940 was the most significant. It not only marked the beginning of a coordinated and systematic police training program, but also set a pattern that continued to be influential after the war.’
[7]
’The fourth phase, 1940 to 1946, spanned the dramatic era of World War II. Because of the exigencies of the situation, policemen of both forces underwent short but intensive military training in Port Moresby before being deployed wherever they were most needed. The nature of the training received has no parallel in pre- or postwar forces of either territory.’
[8]
Drill-sergeants (aka their equivalents among the colonial forces) worked from a training manual adopted in 1911 that was ’historically linked to British armies and the Royal Irish Constabulary. It proved attractive initially to the Papuan force, and later to the combined force’
[9]
Training involved mostly military-style drills, giving the Constabulary a para-military character. In the 1930s, some elementary-level schooling was added: ’During the 1930s young men in Rabaul learned simple arithmetic, simple English, to tell the time of day by observing changes in the daily routine, and, for those selected for the police band, to read music. During 1933-1934, recruits with particular technical skills were accepted for the first time.’
[10]
[Janice Newton (pers. comm.): After official British annexation in 1884 and Crown colony status in 1888, in 1890 a police force was formed and a Resident Magistrate appointed for each administrative division. It seems there was not much training. The early constabulary were taught a little English and some of the rules for living like the white man (latrines, cleanliness etc). The British administration appointed village officials, village constables and armed constabulary. Often the Orokaivans were captured, taken back to stations taught some English and some of the English ways and laws. Imprisonment of villagers for offences was another way of imparting British principles of law. By 1924 many adult males had passed through the Armed Constabulary and hardly an adult male had not worked for Europeans (Cyndi Banks Women in Transition: Social Control in PNG Australian Institute of Criminology 1993).] A clear-cut distinction between law enforcement and military is hard to draw in this context. In World War II, Orokaiva men were drafted into the Australian colonial army: ’The war of 1939-1945 affected the Yega in several important ways. Their territory became one of the major battlefields of the Pacific War. Every person migrated from the area with the exception of one old crippled woman who somehow managed to survive for eighteen months in the bush. Almost all able-bodied men served in the army or labour corps and the women and children lived at another Anglican mission about thirty miles to the north. When they returned, they found all buildings, and any belongings that they had left behind, destroyed and most of their coconut palms cut down or damaged by gunfire. There were some compensations. The Australian Government paid thousands of dollars in war-damage compensation for all trees and property but, more important, the stimulus of travel, and meeting and working with Australian and American soldiers, gave the younger men in particular a broader view of life which triggered off changes in their traditional economy. In addition, the transfer of the Administrative headquarters from Buna to Higaturu resulted in the construction of a major road to the port of Cape Killerton and brought the Yega into closer touch with the outside world than ever before. As a result, between 1945 and 1950, about twenty families left their re-built villages and moved east to found the new village of Surilai at Cape Killerton (Fig. 9).’
[11]
Orokaiva men also worked as carriers, although their loyalties as a group were at times ambiguous: ’Those in the Northern Division saw the Japanese invasion, bloody fighting and occupation by Allied forces. This led to the peculiar position where the Orokaivans were seen as ‘fuzzy wuzzy angels’ as well as traitors and murderers. ‘Fuzzy wuzzy angel’ was a nickname given to conscripted carriers who demonstrated remarkable solicitude for the wounded whom they carried during the battle on the Kokoda Trail, and who showed considerable endurance in carrying both men and supplies for the Allies over the four months from July until October 1942. The Japanese presence in Northern Division did, however, lead to a reassessment of loyalties on the part of the Orokaivans and the consequent betrayal of some Allied personnel.’
[12]
Orokaivas were conscripted into many non-combat roles as well: ’During the heavy fighting, most villagers had fled to garden houses where they could hide safely. However, in June 1942, there was an order made that ‘any native might be conscripted to serve anywhere in the Territories or Papua or New Guinea, more or less on any conditions imposed by the District Officers’. Carriers had worked so well during the Kokoda campaign that officials of the Australian New Guinea Army Unit (ANGAU) were keen to recruit more (Army File 285/1/680A; Benson 1957:18; Ryan 1969). Those men who were able to avoid the physical confrontations of the war by hiding in rough garden shelters for the duration could not avoid the consequences of the war. They became subject to conscription for work on plantations, for carrying, for malaria control and for clearing and construction work until the war was over (Army File 5/3/147).’
[13]
The code takes into account the presence of colonial armed forces and the recruitment of native men into armed bodies. [Jonathan Ritchie (pers. comm.): On the military, I think pre-War this means the Police… and during the War, we’re looking at the Papuan Infantry Battalion - perhaps either Jim Sinclair’s To Find a Path - The Life and Times of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment or G.M. Byrnes’ Green Shadows will help? The first recruits for the PIB were 70 from the Buna area - who I think were all drawn from the Royal Papuan Constabulary - who came in July 1940, supplemented by another 62 in May 1941. ’Military training was carried out until August 28, 1940 when everybody was put on road construction. During November, 24-hour guard duty was ordered at key points in the Port area [of Port Moresby]…. Until the end of August 1941 the guarding of vulnerable points, together with working parties on roads and wharves and training were the duties of the battalion. During September the battalion was allotted the defence area from Napa Napa to Jolers Bay. Recce (Reconnaissance) parties covered this area and the two companies moved out to positions in the allotted areas and began constructing tactical roads and defence positions. Working parties were practically discontinued as guard duties and intensive training were the order of the day.’ (from Byrnes, pp. 5-6).]
[1]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 490 [2]: Rimoldi, Max, Cromwell Burau, and Robert Ferraris 1966. “Land Tenure And Land Use Among The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 30 [3]: Newton, Janice 1983. “Orokaiva Warfare And Production”, 489 [4]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 34 [5]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 85 [6]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 85p [7]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 86p [8]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 87 [9]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 109 [10]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My gun, my brother: the world of the Papua New Guinea colonial police, 1920-1960", 98 [11]: Dakeyne, R. B. 1969. “Village And Town In New Guinea”, 13 [12]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 43 [13]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 46 |
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No information found in sources so far.
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Warrior aristocracy probably lived on own resources?
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Warrior aristocracy probably lived on own resources?
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eg. Captains, commanders, colonels
[1]
“Parma commanded a disciplined, professional army in contrast to Henry’s largely volunteer forces, at least where the nobility were concerned.”
[2]
Between 1610 and 1652, French military officers were lured to the Netherlands for expert training from the Dutch. Here the most important innovation was the incorporation of drill and discipline to control a large standing army. 1652 the Royal Army created, consisting of professional officers and soldiers, marking the first major step becoming a “premier land force in Europe.”
[3]
Until the changes of the mid-1600s, “the officer corps reflected a unique culture of command based upon aristocratic values that attracted young nobles to the service but limited the professionalization of the army.”
[4]
For example, there came a need to commission rich men because of their wealth and credit were required for the proper maintenance of units, which came a at a cost to the professionalization of both officer and soldier. “The state never mastered the ability to pay for its own army.”
[5]
Despite efforts to create a more professional military by moving through the seventeenth century culture of command, by the close of the grand siècle, the French officer straddled archaic values of aristocratic honor and independence, on one side, and new standards of professional competence and hierarchy, on the other.
[6]
[1]: (Potter 2008: 44, 47, 50, 59) [2]: (Love 2005, 75) [3]: (Lynn 1985, 177) [4]: (Lynn 1997, xvi, 8-9) [5]: (Lynn 1997, xvii, 9) [6]: (Lynn 1997, 248) |
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eg. Captains, commanders, colonels
[1]
“Parma commanded a disciplined, professional army in contrast to Henry’s largely volunteer forces, at least where the nobility were concerned.”
[2]
Between 1610 and 1652, French military officers were lured to the Netherlands for expert training from the Dutch. Here the most important innovation was the incorporation of drill and discipline to control a large standing army. 1652 the Royal Army created, consisting of professional officers and soldiers, marking the first major step becoming a “premier land force in Europe.”
[3]
Until the changes of the mid-1600s, “the officer corps reflected a unique culture of command based upon aristocratic values that attracted young nobles to the service but limited the professionalization of the army.”
[4]
For example, there came a need to commission rich men because of their wealth and credit were required for the proper maintenance of units, which came a at a cost to the professionalization of both officer and soldier. “The state never mastered the ability to pay for its own army.”
[5]
Despite efforts to create a more professional military by moving through the seventeenth century culture of command, by the close of the grand siècle, the French officer straddled archaic values of aristocratic honor and independence, on one side, and new standards of professional competence and hierarchy, on the other.
[6]
[1]: (Potter 2008: 44, 47, 50, 59) [2]: (Love 2005, 75) [3]: (Lynn 1985, 177) [4]: (Lynn 1997, xvi, 8-9) [5]: (Lynn 1997, xvii, 9) [6]: (Lynn 1997, 248) |
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Never entirely professional as majority of posts went to nobility and could be bought and sold.
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present for Greco-Bactrians in 200 BCE but the invading Tocharian tribes may not have been, at least not initially.s
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“The rulers and great merchants also maintained personal retinues or guards called Cakirs (Chin. Che-chieh, Arab. sâ.kariyya). In these guards, who, perhaps, were drawn from the sons of the aristocracy, one may see a possible source for the later gulam/mamluk system of the lslamic world (see below).4
[1]
[1]: (Golden 1992, 190) |
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Full-time specialists Chinese administrators installed military garrisons in the Hmong area long before the onset of the republican period: ’From the middle of the Ming period up to the beginning of the Ch’ing period, soldiers were sent into the Miao area. The most important duty of the military garrisons was to keep the communication lines open for troops and food supplies. So the construction of roads and bridges in the area appears monumental. There are four kinds of land routes: the main road connecting Yunnan with Kweichow is the official road; the roads connecting the various military posts are military roads; the roads traversed by the Chinese people are civilian roads; and the small winding paths leading to Miao settlements are Miao roads. Taking Feng-huang as the center, the official road leads to Ch’en-chou, Mo-yang, and Chih-chiang; the military roads lead to Kan-ch’eng, Yung-sui, and T’ung-jen; the civilian roads lead to P’u-shih and Kan-ch’eng; and the Miao roads are on both sides of the military routes, threading out in all directions so numerous that they defy enumeration. The official and the military roads are all paved with stone slabs (Illus. 20), requiring considerable construction work. The civilian roads were not constructed in a uniform way, those passing prosperous areas being much better than others. The Miao paths generally follow the contours of the mountains and require very little human labor. As to the means of transportation, travelers /Illustrations 18-26 occur on pp. 45-52/ generally ride horses or ride in sedan chairs (Illus. 21), while cargo is carried by carriers on their backs.’
[1]
The military administration was organized bureaucratically, as evidenced in primary sources and clerical documents: ’2. Regulations for the organization and administration of the T’un Bureau from the headquarters of the newly organized Thirty-Fourth Division of the Army. Article 1. The said Bureau is to be organized on the order of Divisional Commander Ch’en of the newly organized Thirty-Fourth Division. Article 2. The said Bureau shall set up, according to the temporary organization regulations of the Division, a chief and a deputy chief, three department heads, a number of departmental staff, clerks, and copyists. Article 3. The chief of the Bureau will receive orders from the Commander of the Division, and will have general superintendence over the t’un army west of the Hsiang River, and Miao defense officials and soldiers, t’un grain supplies, and the keeping in order of t’un properties, and coordinate everything, with the authority to direct and supervise all the Bureau’s personnel. Article 4. The said Bureau shall have three departments, Departments One, Two, and Three. Each department head shall receive his orders from the chief of the Bureau, to assist him by dividing control over military matters, t’un matters, and general matters, with the responsibility to direct and manage his particular department’s responsibilities.’
[2]
Chinese officers and Hmong staff in lower-ranking or intermediate roles were salaried officials or otherwise compensated in the form of produce or arable land, which was also rented out to tenants in order to generate government income: ’The t’un fields in the Miao frontier were divided into people’s /i.e. Chinese/ t’uns and Miao t’uns, the two being entirely different in nature. The t’un males working on the Chinese t’uns were also divided into t’un men and fighting men. The t’un men received fields to cultivate, and guarded the t’un guard houses. The fighting men, also called home guards, were solely trained for military operations, and did not farm. In the five sub-prefectures and hsiens of the Miao frontier there are 7,000 t’un men, from among whom are appointed hsiao-ch’i, tsung-ch’i, and pe-tsung to facilitate control. The distribution of fields was as follows: the men /san ting/ are each given 4.5 mu; the hsiao-ch’i, 5.5 mu; the tsung-ch’i, 6.5 mu; and the pe-tsung, 7.5 mu. There are 1,000 fighting men, each being given 3 shih, 6 tou of rice per year. The non-fighting men are also each given annually 10.8 liang of silver for salt and vegetables. The hsiao-ch’i receives each year 12 liang of silver; the tsung-ch’i, 13.2 liang of silver; the pe-tsung, 16.8 liang of silver. Therefore, in the Chinese t’un, the fields and land left over after the t’un men have received their fields to plant and care for are leased out for the collection of rent. Granaries (Illus. 57) have been built to store the grain, and general t’un leaders are set up to manage these matters. There are no t’un men in the Miao t’uns, and the t’un fields are allotted to people to cultivate /Illus. 57 and 58 on pages 124 and 125/ for the collection of rent, in order to feed the Miao soldiers, under the control of the Miao officials. The t’un fields in the Miao frontier region, at the inception of the system, totaled 150,000 mu of arable land, of which barely a third was directly cultivated by t’un personnel, the rest being allotted out as rented fields. Today, the t’un army in the Miao frontier region is about 1,000 strong. The maintainance of the Black Flag Battalion of the Miao troops (Illus. 58) largely comes from the rented fields. T’un fields were set up to support troops on the spot as a defense against the Miao. Today, the Miao have been largely acculturated by the Chinese and the boundary line between the Miao and the Chinese is gradually becoming obliterated. There is no longer the need for this kind of system of t’un defense against the Miao. In fact, unrest in the Miao area today is often due to the maladministration of the t’un fields system. The Miao petty officers and the t’un leaders often are oppressive in collecting rent and sometimes are corrupt in their methods, thus causing dissatisfaction and disturbances. In the twenty-sixth year of the Republic /1937/ the Miao rebellion in western Hunan arose because of the t’un land system. It resulted in the burning of t’un granaries and killing of t’un officers. Although the rebellion was pacified only after bloody and expensive campaigns, it is imperative to change the t’un and enter the newly opened or reclaimed land as available for taxation, so as to reach a fundamental solution.’
[3]
Hmong communities also had their own informal village security: ’The drum tower is also the post for the night watch. Every night three or four able-bodied men, bearing arms, hunting rifles, ammunition, etc., would keep vigil at the drum tower, crying every hour /lit., several tens of minutes/: “Bandits are coming - do not fall asleep.” All through the night one hears these intermittent strange calls, the idea being to prevent the guards themselves from falling asleep, and the bandits, from coming if they should hear such calls and know that the whole village is on the alert. This is like beating the grass with a stick to scare the snakes away. But if the bandits actually come, the watchmen would then climb up the tower to beat the drum, awaking all the able-bodied men in the village to give the bandits a good fight.’
[4]
We have assumed that these observations are true for the A-Hmao as well, despite of historical differences. [The A-Hmao group doesn’t appear to have been directly involved in the more eastern Hmong rebellions, but it appears to have been increasingly subsumed by the Late Qing/Early Chinese in the aftermath of these rebellions.]
[1]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 70 [2]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 177 [3]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 182 [4]: Che-lin, Wu, Chen Kuo-chün, and Lien-en Tsao 1942. “Studies Of Miao-I Societies In Kweichow”, 110 |
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There is no information regarding the presence of any army or soldiers, etc. in the Ubaid.
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Copied from IqUrIII. "Many records clearly show the aga-uš in specifically military activities (...), particularly in the entourage of the king and of the army’s leadership (...). His life was that of a soldier (...); he was provided with weapons, for the use of which a regular regime of training was necessary (...) and he clearly served under a military chain of command".
[1]
[1]: Lafont 2009,9-10 |
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The commanders would have been formed out of a warrior aristocracy who had inherited the position of leading forces and land which they used to support themselves and their troops. AD: coded inferred present as officers in the lower hierarchical ranks might have been more specialised (eg. leader of 10 horsemen).
"The Parthians were a warrior people. Though possessing armoured knights mounted on weight-carrying chargers." [1] no regular army they were superb horsemen and and archers, and in time of war the nobility provided heavily a "The division between grand and petty nobility was reflected in the structure of the Parthian army. Both provided the cavalry - indeed, during the first century BC the Persian infantry almost completely disappeared - but this was made up of two distinct types of horsemen. On the one hand, there were the mounted archers, lightly armed on nimble mounts, who were supplied by the lesser estate holders. Most of these were from Eastern Iran where they lived in small castles and block-houses, and evolved a typical feudal culture centered round jousting, hunting, war, and a chivalric code that emphasized the virtues of personal honour and the protection of women. The grandees, on the other hand, supplied a new type of horseman, a development of the Sarmatian and the Saka knight, who encased both himself and his horse in mail armour and armed himself with a great bow, lance and sword." [2] "We may suppose that the Arsacids thus preserved the original nomadic nobility, rewarded them for their services by gifts of land which would provide a base for future political and military power." [3] [1]: (Penrose 2008, 221) Penrose, Jane. 2008. Rome and Her Enemies: An Empire Created and Destroyed by War. Osprey Publishing. [2]: (Ellis 2004, 36-37) Ellis, John. 2004. Cavalry: History of Mounted Warfare. Pen and Sword. [3]: (Neusner 2008, 17) Neusner, Jacob. 2008. A History of the Jews in Babylonia. 1. The Parthian Period. Wipf & Stock. Eugene. |
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Unlikely at this time since administrative complexity was so low. "The social structure of these communities was thus characterised by few heads of households (elders), marked gender, age and provenance barriers, but few socio-political differences. Consequently, burials do not display any significant diffferences in status."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 42) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Not present for previous period and read nothing to suggest major change, such as warrior burials (although that alone would not mean professionalism).. In previous period a general reference was: "The social structure of these communities was thus characterised by few heads of households (elders), marked gender, age and provenance barriers, but few socio-political differences. Consequently, burials do not display any significant diffferences in status."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 42) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Not present for earlier periods and read nothing to suggest major change, such as warrior burials (although that alone would not mean professionalism).. In 7000-6000 BCE period a general reference was: "The social structure of these communities was thus characterised by few heads of households (elders), marked gender, age and provenance barriers, but few socio-political differences. Consequently, burials do not display any significant diffferences in status."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 42) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Administrative conventions developed in Uruk period c3800-3000 BCE so this period very low administrative complexity and presumably little capacity to pay and train full time officers and troops.
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Administrative conventions developed in Uruk period c3800-3000 BCE so this period very low administrative complexity and presumably little capacity to pay and train full time officers and troops.
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Administrative conventions developed in Uruk period c3800-3000 BCE so this period very low administrative complexity and presumably little capacity to pay and train full time officers and troops.
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE "monopoly of defence forces to protect internal cohesion. The wealth and technical knowledge accumulated in cities had to be defended against foreign attacks, both from other city-states and other enemies (for instance, nomadic tribes). This defence system then turned into an offensive tactic. ... Instrumental for these kinds of activities was the creation of an army, which was divided into two groups. One group was made of full-time workers, specialised in military activities (although this remains purely hypothetical for the Uruk period). In case of war, an army was assembled through military conscription, and was supported by mandatory provisions of military supplies."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 80) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Inferred present because the Elamites had a powerful army - TO BE CONFIRMED. "Durante el transcurso del siglo XII a.c., Elam pasará nuevamente al primer plano internacional como la mayor potencia militar del Próximo Oriente."
[1]
During the 12th century BCE, Elam rose to prominence as the strongest military faction in the Near East.
[1]: (Quintana 2007, 57) |
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inferred continuity with the Neo Elamite 2 period.
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"The military potential of Elymais was definitely greater (an army of 15,000 is attested for it in 124 bc), but the Arsakids forfeited the country intermittently."
[1]
Between this information and likely continuity with the Seleucids, it seems reasonable to infer the existence of a well-organised army with likely professional soldiers and officers. A regular force of soldiers and mercenaries were employed by the Seleucid kings. [2] [1]: (Olbrycht 2016. 309) Olbrycht, M. J. 2016. MANPOWER RESOURCES AND ARMY ORGANISATION IN THE ARSAKID EMPIRE. Ancient Society 46: 291-338. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/MANPOWER%20RESOURCES%20AND%20ARMY%20ORGANISATION%20IN%20THE%20ARSAKID%20EMPIRE/titleCreatorYear/items/3HUSBQ3E/item-list [2]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p197 |
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"the sultan maintained a force of paid personal guards (ḵawāṣṣ) who were recruited from several different nomadic and semi-nomadic groups."
[1]
This includes the chief of personal guard (kawass).
"land grant system practiced since Saljuq times" (Iqta system) used to pay soldiers. [1] [1]: (Quiring-Zoche 2011) Quiring-Zoche, R. 2011. Aq Qoyunlu. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aq-qoyunlu-confederation |
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In the Predynastic period there is no proof of the existence of professional army. There is also no hieroglyphic sign meaning "army" by Dynastic Period. Moreover, in Ancient Egyptian unitary state, introduction of regular army took place during the New Kingdom
[1]
.
[1]: Shaw, I. 1991 Egyptian Warfare and Weapons. Buckinghamshire: Shire Publications. pg: 26. |
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In the Predynastic period there is no proof of the existence of a professional army. There is probably also no hieroglyphic sign meaning "army" by Dynastic Period
[1]
. Moreover, in Ancient Egyptian unitary state, introduction of regular army took place during the New Kingdom
[2]
.
[1]: Kahl, J. 1994. Das System der ägyptischen Hieroglyphenschrift in der 0.-3. Dynastie. Göttinger Orientforschungen IV: Ägypten 29. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. pg: 423. [2]: Shaw, I. 1991 Egyptian Warfare and Weapons. Buckinghamshire: Shire Publications. pg: 26. |
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In the Predynastic period there is no proof of the existence of a professional army. There is probably also no hieroglyphic sign meaning "army" by Dynastic Period
[1]
. Moreover, in Ancient Egyptian unitary state, introduction of regular army took place during the New Kingdom
[2]
.
[1]: Kahl, J. 1994. Das System der ägyptischen Hieroglyphenschrift in der 0.-3. Dynastie. Göttinger Orientforschungen IV: Ägypten 29. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. pg: 423. [2]: Shaw, I. 1991 Egyptian Warfare and Weapons. Buckinghamshire: Shire Publications. pg: 26. |
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[1]
Permanent, specialized only by time of the New Kingdom. In earlier periods "it can hardly be distinguished from a workforce for mining, quarrying, and trade expeditions." Highest official called "Overseer of the Army" (or "General").
[2]
EWA: ref. Berlev. Examples of titles ’Atju’ and ’Ankhu’. "The army was well organized and in the 12th dynasty it had a core of professional soldiers. They served for prolonged periods of time and were regularly stationed abroad." [3] [1]: (Dupuy and Dupuy 2007, 5) [2]: (Haring 2010) [3]: (Van De Mieroop, M. 2011. A History of Ancient Egypt. Wiley) |
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In Theban Egypt:
"The continuing military ethos of the time is illustrated by the popularity of military titles such as "commander of the crew of the ruler" and "commander of the town regiment." They show a defensive grouping of military resources around the king and confirm the importance of local militias based on towns." [1] [1]: (Bourriau 2003, 192) |
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Warfare consisted of small-scale raiding during this period, and sources do not suggest there is evidence for professional military officers or soldiers.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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Warfare consisted of small-scale raiding during this period, and sources do not suggest there is evidence for professional or permanent military officers or soldiers.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London. [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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Warfare consisted of small-scale raiding during this period, and sources do not suggest there is evidence for professional military officers or soldiers.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London. [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York. |
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Sources do not suggest there is evidence for full-time professional military personnel.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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A permanent army is inferred to have been present based on evidence for Zapotec territorial expansion during this period. Evidence from the Cuicatlan Canada suggests that the Zapotec had enough force to destroy whole settlements and maintain a tributary relationship with the Zapotec centre.
[1]
[1]: Spencer, C. S. (1982) The Cuicatlán Cañada and Monte Albán: A study of primary state formation. Studies in Archaeology. Academic Press, New York. p243-4 |
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A permanent army is inferred to have been present based on evidence for Zapotec territorial expansion during this period. Evidence from the Cuicatlan Canada suggests that the Zapotec had enough force to destroy whole settlements and maintain a tributary relationship with the Zapotec centre.
[1]
[1]: Spencer, C. S. (1982) The Cuicatlán Cañada and Monte Albán: A study of primary state formation. Studies in Archaeology. Academic Press, New York. p243-4 |
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There is little direct evidence for Zapotec military organisation during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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Descriptions in the Spanish relaciones dating to the time of the Spanish conquest provide evidence for the presence of military officers in charge of competing armies at the end of this period. Their presence in the centuries before the Spanish conquest is inferred.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1976). "Formative Oaxaca and Zapotec Cosmos." American Scientist 64(4): 374-383, p376 [2]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p217-8 |
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Descriptions in the Spanish relaciones (Spanish written documents from the time of the Spanish conquest) provide evidence for the presence of military officers in charge of competing armies at the end of this period. Their presence in the centuries before the Spanish conquest is inferred.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1976). "Formative Oaxaca and Zapotec Cosmos." American Scientist 64(4): 374-383, p376 [2]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p217-8 |
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’The state the Qasimis formed in the midst of this was none the less impressive (for the rulers’ genealogy see Fig. 6.1). Al-Qasim himself, who early in his fight against the Turks had wept over his children starving at Barat, was wealthy when the truce was signed. He built the mosque at Shaharah, then built houses for himself and his followers, planted coffee in al-Ahnum, and amassed more land than the public treasury (Nubdhah: 258, 334-6). The court expanded with the southern conquests. Al-Mutawakkil received an embassy from Ethiopia and exchanged gifts of fine horses with Aurangzib of India (Serjeant 1983: 80-1), while his relatives expressed concern about his monthly demands for funds from Lower Yemen. Further criticism of his taxation policy came from Muhammad al-Ghurbani at Barat, but in 1675 the levies on Lower Yemen were redoubled (ibid. 82). Under Muhammad Ahmad, ’He of al-Mawahib’" (1687-1718), the exactions became more severe still, in support of a grandiose court and a large standing army complete with slave soldiers (ibid., Zabarah 1958: 451, 457; alShawkani 1929: ii. 98).’
[1]
[1]: Dresch, Paul 1989. "Tribes, Government and History in Yemen", 200 |
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For example, officers: "In the last two wars with the Ottomans, a greater number of non-Italian soldiers and officers wasemployed"
[1]
. Naval commanders: "Venetian overseas colonies depended to a great extent on the defensive shield provided by Venice’s fleet, and the role of the Provveditore General dell’Armata, who acted not only as a navy commander but also as supreme authority over the colonies in peacetime as well as during wars, was another idiosyncratic feature of the overseas colonies.
[2]
.
[1]: (Arbel 2013: 203) Benjamin Arbel. Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2013. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. [2]: (Arbel 2013: 129) Benjamin Arbel. Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period. Eric Dursteler. ed. 2013. A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797. BRILL. Leiden. |
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"The fubing system had originally preserved the Chinese ideal of the farmer-soldier, but after the early Tang soldiers became increasingly a separate, professional class. By the tenth century, soldiers, to the intense consternation of statesmen, were wholly divorced from any productive activities and earned their livings by skill at arms. Despite many attempts to replace this "mercenary" system, it remained in place until the end of imperial times."
[1]
[1]: (Lorge 2005, 7) |
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"By the end of the Eastern Han the system of universal military service, developed during the Warring States period and maintained into Western Han, had been abandoned, as China’s rulers found smaller, more professional forces to be of greater utility in guarding the steppe frontier and also less of a threat to the central authority (they were, for example, less susceptible to being suborned by local elites). These forces included highly effective cavalry contingents recruited from among steppe peoples, such as the Wuhuan of the Northeast. The trend toward the creation of a long-serving, professional soldiery culminated during the multi-cornered civil wars at the end of the second century and crystallized in the form of new military institutions during the Three Kingdoms period."
[1]
[1]: (Graff 2019: 294) Graff, D. A. 2019. The Art of War. In Dien and Knapp (eds) The Cambridge History of China Volume 2: The Six Dynasties, 220–589 pp. 275-295. Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/8I4JZ4PC/library |
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“Habsburg grand strategy is also reflected in the institutions that Austria developed for conceiving of and implementing decisions about means and ends in both their conceptual and material dimensions.39 These included a court war council with specialized roles to prepare for war on a standing basis, a professional and highly competent diplomatic corps, an intelligence bureau, and a general staff.”
[1]
“Reversals at the start of the war also prompted refinements in Habsburg planning at the operational level. In 1757, the foundation was laid for a professional General Staff, with a separate reporting structure from that of the civilian- dominated Hofkriegsrat.71 These changes, together with the improved education for military officers and heightened emphasis on maps and planning, had an unmistakable effect on the army’s performance in the field.
[2]
[1]: (Mitchell 2018: 15) Mitchell, A. Wess. 2018. The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/TESFCKPW [2]: (Mitchell 2018: 180) Mitchell, A. Wess. 2018. The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/TESFCKPW |
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“At the same time the Emperor continued to ennoble military officers and bourgeois civil servants with patents of minor nobility (Dienstadel) that were essentially career awards. Between 1804 and 1918 the Emperor approved 8,931 ennoblements, including 2,157 to civil servants and over 4,000 to military officers. From 1848 to 1918, 84% of the grants of nobility went to bourgeois for longstanding public or military service.”
[1]
[1]: (Boyer 2022: 417) Boyer, John W. 2022. Austria, 1867–1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/CG3P4KKD |
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To the high honors associated with the military profession, were joined three other characteristics which help to explain the predominance that military officers acquired in governmental positions during the reigns of Philip V. The first one was that military officers, perhaps more than any other class, owed all their promotions and rewards to the king alone. With the reduction of the Council of War to the role of a military appeal court and the exclusion of viceroys and captains-general from appointing or recommending individuals for promotions above the rank of sargento, the position of military officers was made increasingly dependent upon direct decisions from the king, a situation which was accentuated for members of the royal guards.”(Eissa-Barroso 2017: 109) Eissa-Barroso, Francisco A. 2017. The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717–1739). Leiden: Brill. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XNET89MW “The creation of a new army and navy was an impressive achievement. During the centuries of world predominance the nation, like others in Europe, had no permanent military forces and recruited armies only when required. Now, for the first time in its history, it began to maintain a powerful standing army. The new Bourbon army, recruited with great difficulty because of the objections everywhere (especially in the Crown of Aragon) to military service, inevitably involved important administrative and fiscal reforms. We have seen that the poor condition of the Spanish forces in the War of Succession made it necessary at every stage to have the support of foreign troops and foreign generals. Philip had decreed a few limited reforms during the war, mainly in order to obtain recruits. But the problem of securing a good standing army remained unresolved. Fortunately, many of the foreign soldiers and officers who had served in the war continued their career under the Spanish crown. As a result, in the 1720s up to one third of the infantry of Spain consisted of foreigners who chose to continue the old tradition of serving the Spanish crown. In 1734 there were thirty thousand foreigners in service, mainly Belgians, followed in number by Swiss and then by Irish. In effect, the astonishing number of Belgians serving in the Spanish army meant that the famous Army of Flanders had reconstituted itself in the peninsula. The annual cost of the army in 1725 was nearly five and a half million escudos, a massive sum that had no precedent in the history of the Spanish treasury.”(Kamen 2003: 451) Kamen, Henry. 2003. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763. New York: Harper Collins. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/YRK2VXUS
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The period saw significant efforts to restructure officer-enlisted relations and recruit officers in tune with changing political and societal contexts. There were large-scale purges of officers post-1906 for various reasons, including age and perceived incompetence. Despite attempts to base promotions on merit, these were often resisted or poorly implemented. The officer corps was influenced by political and nationalistic considerations, with a range of political views among the officers. Younger officers and rising generals advocated for military reforms, emphasizing education, equal treatment, and merit-based promotions.
[1]
[1]: Roger R. Reese, The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856-1917, Modern war studies (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2019). Zotero link: WS82YGDU |
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Soldiers and officers were employed by Dukes in their territories and for the King’s army.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Coss 2019: 40-42) Coss, Peter. ‘Andrew Ayton, the Military Community and the Evolution of the Gentry in Fourteenth-Century England’, in Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton, ed. Craig L. Lambert, David Simpkin, and Gary P. Baker, vol. 44 (Boydell & Brewer, 2018), 31–50, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781787442221.007. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/WIE6TS8M [2]: (Simpkin 2018: 50-60) Simpkin, David. 2018. ‘Knights Banneret, Military Recruitment and Social Status, c. 1270–c. 1420: A View from the Reign of Edward I’, in Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton, ed. Craig L. Lambert, David Simpkin, and Gary P. Baker, vol. 44 (Boydell & Brewer, 2018), 51–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781787442221.008. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4V56P62M |
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Roles such as castellans or knights leading small units were temporary and tied to specific contexts, such as defending a castle or participating in a campaign. These were not salaried or full-time specialist positions. [R_Morillo 0]
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Peter the Great’s Military Reforms: Before Peter the Great, the Russian military largely comprised villagers and a few professional units like the Streltsy and Cossacks, often officered by foreigners. Peter initiated comprehensive reforms, introducing a standing army in 1699. He modernized the army, enforcing uniform training for all soldiers and creating elite Guards regiments. By 1725, the Russian army had expanded to 130,000 men, significantly professionalizing its ranks.
[1]
[1]: Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham, eds., The Military History of Tsarist Russia (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002). Zotero link: 28NSCAIL |
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The Red Army was recruited exclusively from among workers and peasants and immediately faced the problem of creating a competent and reliable officers’ corps. Trotsky met this problem by mobilizing former officers of the imperial army. Up to 1921 about 50,000 such officers served in the Red Army and with but few exceptions remained loyal to the Soviet regime. Political advisers called commissars were attached to all army units to watch over the reliability of officers and to carry out political propaganda among the troops. As the Russian Civil War continued, the short-term officers’ training schools began to turn out young officers who were regarded as more reliable politically.
The number of Communist Party members increased among the Red Army’s ranks from 19 to 49 percent during 1925–33, and among officers this increase was much higher. Moreover, all commanders were graduates of Soviet military academies and officers’ training schools, admission to which was limited to those recommended by the Communist Party. [1] [1]: “Red Army,” Encyclopedia, Encyclopædia Britannica, last modified 2023, accessed November 22, 2023. Zotero link: FZC67C4G |
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The following quote--though not entirely reliable--suggests the possible existence of a standing army, which implies the existence of full-time professional military officers. "Labat’s account was published in 1725, but refers to events at around 1700, and though clearly drawing on second-hand information is worth citing: ’[In Kaabu] at the start of this century there was a king called Biram Mansaté who lived more splendidly and magnificently than all the other kings of the region. He [...] always had six or seven thousand soldiers well armed and ready for war, through which means he harrassed all of his neighbours, making them pay regular tributes and punishing those who refused to pay with military executions, or again making them pay double. He had such a powerful control of his States, and everything was so well controlled, that merchants could easily leave their goods on the main roads without fear that anyone would touch them”."
[1]
[1]: Green 2009: 94) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. |
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The following quote seems to suggest that military leaders also had secular functions. "Traditionally the role of the Mende chief seens to have been that of a military leader, with absolute powers in secular matters, which were sometimes delegated to lieutenants in other parts of the chiefdoms."
[1]
[1]: (Kup 1975: 37) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/36IUGEZV/collection. |
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Inferred from the following quote. "In sum, we have not found unambiguous evidence of social complexity and the often suggested highly advanced social system of the Nok Culture. [...] As demonstrated by the uniformity of their material culture and their presumed belief system, most prominently reflected by the terracotta sculptures, external contacts within their culture must have existed. However, such a larger social network apparently was not organised and maintained in a way as to infer social inequality, social hierarchies or other signs of internal demarcation traceable by available archaeological data. None of the numerous excavations brought to light architectural remains of specified buildings or the spatial organisation of housing areas that might have been occupied by high-ranking members of the community. Further, among the admittedly few features interpreted as graves there is no evidence of any heterogeneity pointing to a difference between burials of elite members or commoners. Nowhere, an accumulation of valuable objects neither of iron nor any other materials signifying inequality in terms of property or prosperity was found."
[1]
[1]: (Breunig and Ruppe 2016: 252) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/ES4TRU7R. |
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The following reconstruction of small communities consisting of extended families based in autonomous homesteads suggests minimal social diffrentiation. ”For the first 400 years of the settlement’s history, Kirikongo was a single economically generalized social group (Figure 6). The occupants were self-sufficient farmers who cultivated grains and herded livestock, smelted and forged iron, opportunistically hunted, lived in puddled earthen structures with pounded clay floors, and fished in the seasonal drainages. [...] Since Kirikongo did not grow (at least not significantly) for over 400 years, it is likely that extra-community fissioning continually occurred to contribute to regional population growth, and it is also likely that Kirikongo itself was the result of budding from a previous homestead. However, with the small scale of settlement, the inhabitants of individual homesteads must have interacted with a wider community for social and demographic reasons. [...] It may be that generalized single-kin homesteads like Kirikongo were the societal model for a post-LSA expansion of farming peoples along the Nakambe (White Volta) and Mouhoun (Black Volta) River basins. A homestead settlement pattern would fit well with the transitional nature of early sedentary life, where societies are shifting from generalized reciprocity to more restricted and formalized group membership, and single-kin communities like Kirikongo’s house (Mound 4) would be roughly the size of a band.”
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 27, 32) |
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Inferred from the following quote. "In sum, we have not found unambiguous evidence of social complexity and the often suggested highly advanced social system of the Nok Culture. [...] As demonstrated by the uniformity of their material culture and their presumed belief system, most prominently reflected by the terracotta sculptures, external contacts within their culture must have existed. However, such a larger social network apparently was not organised and maintained in a way as to infer social inequality, social hierarchies or other signs of internal demarcation traceable by available archaeological data. None of the numerous excavations brought to light architectural remains of specified buildings or the spatial organisation of housing areas that might have been occupied by high-ranking members of the community. Further, among the admittedly few features interpreted as graves there is no evidence of any heterogeneity pointing to a difference between burials of elite members or commoners. Nowhere, an accumulation of valuable objects neither of iron nor any other materials signifying inequality in terms of property or prosperity was found."
[1]
[1]: (Breunig and Ruppe 2016: 252) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/ES4TRU7R. |
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Inferred from the following quote, which refers to "permanent" military chiefs. "There was never a regular Mossi army, although there were, of course, permanent military chiefs."
[1]
[1]: (Zahan 1967: 171) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TVIRPGXD/collection. |
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The following quote suggests the emergence of social differentiation in this period, but little appears to be understood about this phenomenon apart from the appearance of specialised smiths and the formation of senior and cadet social segments. "During Yellow II, the inhabitants of Mound 4 began a process that eventually led to centralization of iron production, as described in detail above. Iron ore extraction involves profound digging in the earth, the realm of spirits, and historically in Bwa society the practice is reserved solely for specialized smiths, who also excavate burials (see discussions below). The mid first millennium A.D. therefore witnessed a transformation from redundant social and economic roles for houses to specialization in at least one craft activity. While houses were still highly independent, even producing their own pottery, a formalized village structure was likely present with both cadet and senior social segments, founded upon common descent with a common ancestor."
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 28) |
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Full-time specialists likely absent. Given the tendency for most public functions to be concentrated in the hands of the local chiefs and different social leaders in Karanga society, it seems reasonable to infer that Great Zimbabwean military leadership would have been distributed similarly, if Chirikure’s proposition that Great Zimbabwe’s social organization was similar to that of the Karanga is correct. “Great Zimbabwe is a ruined Shona city or guta which controlled a sizeable territory…. As a collection of homesteads and misha, the guta had no formalised bureaucracy, no formalised division of labour or occupational specialisations… // …In general [in Karanga society], imba…, was the smallest and lowest level social unit. A collection of dzimba formed misha…. A group of misha formed dunhu…. A group of matunhu formed a state (nyika) under a chief (ishe/mambo/changamire)…. Each level performed administrative, economic, religious, and political roles consistent with rank.”
[1]
.
[1]: (Chirikure 2021, 258-267) Shadreck Chirikure, Great Zimbabwe: Reclaiming a ‘Confiscated’ Past (Routledge, 2021). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/MWWKAGSJ/collection |
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Possibly present, as comments by Mazarire clearly imply a military organization of some kind – though not necessarily a fully specialized one. Comments from Portuguese primary records analysed by Livneh seem to more clearly imply specialization, but the European pre-conceptions of the Portuguese documents these perceptions are sourced from may be distorting the reality of the situation. “Mutapa Gatsi Rusere, who succeeded to the throne in 1586, suffered a number of setbacks, among them the Maravi invasions led by Kapambo and Chikanda. These had fuelled divisions in the Mutapa army and subsequently led to a revolt by its high-ranking staff, including the general, or mukomohasha.”
[1]
“When the Mutapa planned a military expedition, the account goes, he gathered his ‘mutumbus’, who are like dukes, marquises and barons, for a war council. The European titles would denote control over land, and high standing. These, accompanied by the ‘priest’, Simboti (Cimbote), and ‘war counsellors’ decided on the plan of the coming war. Then it was delivered into the hands of the three ‘generals’, who were responsible for carrying out the decisions.”
[2]
[1]: (Mazarire 2009, 16) Gerald C. Mazarire, “Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe, c. 850-1880s,” in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulos & A.S. Mlambo (Harare, Weaver: 2009). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/B9TK7GP8/item-details [2]: (Livneh 1976, 112) “Pre-Colonial Polities in Southern Zambesia and their Political Communications,” Doctoral Dissertation, University of London, 1976. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/CWC584VN/item-details |
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"The government measures introduced in July 1673 meant that the company commanders were no longer forced to commit fraud in order to be able to maintain their units, as had been the case at the time of Maurits and Frederik Hendrik. The captains and rittmasters were transformed from suppliers and leaders of mercenaries into professional officers employed by the state."
[1]
[1]: (Nimwengen 2010: 342) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/P4FWE8NE/collection. |
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"The government measures introduced in July 1673 meant that the company commanders were no longer forced to commit fraud in order to be able to maintain their units, as had been the case at the time of Maurits and Frederik Hendrik. The captains and rittmasters were transformed from suppliers and leaders of mercenaries into professional officers employed by the state."
[1]
[1]: (Nimwengen 2010: 342) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/P4FWE8NE/collection. |
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“Precisely at the time when the Ethiopian throne was occupied by a series of under-aged princes, Adal was in the most capable hands of a powerful general called Mahfūz, who had dominated the political scene in Adal since the 1480s and who is variously given the title of imām, amīr and garad.”
[1]
[1]: (Tamrat 2008, 166) Tamrat, Taddesse. 2008. ‘Ethiopia, the Red Sea and the Horn’ In the Cambridge History of Africa: c. 1050 – c.1600 vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp 98-182. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Tamrat/titleCreatorYear/items/A68FCWWI/item-list |
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“Another feature of Ajuran rule was a powerful armed, mounted army that policed the state and collected taxes, or ‘tributes,’ of cereal and livestock.”
[1]
[1]: (Mukhtar 2003, 35) Mukhtar, Mohamed H. 2003. Historical Dictionary of Somalia. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Mukhtar/titleCreatorYear/items/J8WZB6VI/item-list |
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Full-time specialists. The following quote suggests that there may have been conflict between the Proto-Yoruboid and the aboriginal populations of the lands they moved into, but the consulted literature does not otherwise provide information on military organization at this time, such as it may have been. "The landscape that these proto-Yoruboid ancestors were moving into, however, was not devoid of human populations. The Later Stone Age (LSA) populations had occupied the region as early as the ninth millennium BC as shown by the findings at Iwò Elérú, near Àkúré. [...] Nevertheless, the proto-Yorùbá migrants seem to have gained the upper hand in their southward radiation. They displaced, and also integrated, with these aboriginal LSA populations, who were already practicing a combination of agriculture, horticulture, and hunting, similar to what the proto-Yorùbá and their descendant migrants were familiar with in their Niger-Benue ancestral homeland."
[1]
[1]: (Ogundiran 2020: 44-45) |
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“The semblance of a military institution began to evolve during the reign of Ogiso Odoligie, the twenty-fourth king of the dynasty. He is reputed to have organised the first group of Benin warriors called Ivbiyokuo. Initially, the fighting force was restricted to the Avbiogbe but it was expanded to include all the Ighele age group, and this marked the beginning of a civic militia in Benin history. Thus, Odoligie became the first ruler in Benin to succeed in organising an army of his subjects. He was not a warrior king nor did he assign himself the responsibility of being the war commander of the army, nor was the Ezomo given the responsibility to be the commander of the Benin army. Rather, he created two new war chieftaincy titles, the Esagho ‘as the greatest war chief’ and the Olou as another ‘great war chief.’ They had the responsibility to co-ordinate and command the war leaders who were called Okakuo, and to also lead the militia in war. This was, indeed the birth of a really fighting force, although the extent in which they were trained in military discipline is not well known.”
[1]
[1]: Osadolor, O. B. (2001). The Military System of Benin Kingdom, c.1440–1897. University of Hamburg, Germany: 69. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4RZF5H5/collection |
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The Are Ona Kakanfo, Eso, etc. There’s an implication that there was state apparatus to pay military personnel, too (this quote seems to refer to the Eso, not to lower-ranking sodiers): “Second was the military might of the imperial army, which was based on the mobility of its strong army. The army which was made up of the Esos, constituted the nucleus of the imperial army. Third was the power that the state derived from its control of the trade route from the savannah to the sea (Awe, 1960:11). From the toll collected from the traders, the state could pay the soldiers and equip them.”
[1]
[1]: Akinwumi, O. D. (1992). The Oyo-Borgu Military Alliance of 1835: A Case Study in the Pre-Colonial Military History. Transafrican Journal of History, 21, 159–170: 160–161. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J42GPW63/collection |
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"Contexts that could shed light on the dynamics of social structure and hierarchies in the metropolis, such as the royal burial site of Oyo monarchs and the residences of the elite population, have not been investigated. The mapping of the palace structures has not been followed by systematic excavations (Soper, 1992); and questions of the economy, military system, and ideology of the empire have not been addressed archaeologically, although their general patterns are known from historical studies (e.g, Johnson, 1921; Law, 1977)."
[1]
Regarding this period, however, one of the historical studies mentioned in this quote also notes: "Of the earliestperiod of Oyo history, before the sixteenth century, very little is known."
[2]
Law does not then go on to provide specific information directly relevant to this variable.
[1]: (Ogundiran 2005: 151-152) [2]: (Law 1977: 33) |
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Though there were military commanders, these were part of the administration of the caliphate, so their role wasn’t purely military. “The political programmes of the Sokoto Caliphate are set out in a number of works written by the Shehu, Abdullahi dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello. One of their most important features was to outline the political structures of caliphal administration. The Caliphate was to be led by the Caliph as the amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful), assisted by his wazirai (advisers), alkalai (judges), a muhtasib (the officer charged upholding morals), the sa’i (in charge of the markets), the wali al-shurta (police chief), limamai, and military commanders.”
[1]
“The Shaykh had neither a standing army nor an organized structurally based military. Every able bodied was a contingent.”
[2]
“The armies of the Caliphate and its emirates were organised in a completely different fashion. There was no single army and no commander-in-chief who enjoyed respect on the basis of his seniority, experience and expertise. The armies of the emirates were also far from being neatly structured and lacked the cohesion of their enemies. Each emirate had its general and a more or less numerous corps of military commanders, but the commanders did not co-ordinate their movements and never had as much control over their troops as did their British counterparts. Lack of co-ordination and a clear chain of command was a crucial reason for the extremely poor performance of most emirate troops against the British. Differences in training were equally important.”
[3]
[1]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 101. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection [2]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection [3]: Ubah, Chinedu N. “The British Occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Military Dimension, 1897-1906.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 81–97: 85. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SQX8BRCP/collection |
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“The Igala kingdom had no standing army but there was initiation preparedness where adults were initiated and weapons were amassed awaiting any eventuality. Weapons such as arrows, bows, cutlasses, spears, shields and charms were abundantly stored in the armory. In the absence of standing army, servants, attendants, slaves and a large number of local farmers were mobilized and deployed for operation during wars. In the Igala political kingdom, Attah’s chief were at the head of those local armies but in serious wars such as the one between the Igalas and Jukuns, Attah himself would lead the battle.”
[1]
“Igala (with its capital at Idah) was another major political and commercial power in the Lower Niger. Igala’s importance in the Niger trading system was based on its control of the Niger-Benue confluence. Consequently, it was the meeting-point of trade from the upper reaches of both rivers and, in the case of the Benue, this was specifically through Adda Kuddu which was its vassal. In addition, Igala had the military strength to enforce order on the Niger. In 1832, the Ata of Igala sent his gunboats to punish the Kakanda for disrupting trade; Budon was paying a tribute of one horse a year to Idah, and the Ata’s word was law at Ikiri.”
[2]
[1]: Jacob, Audu. “Pre-Colonial Political Administration in the North Central Nigeria: a Study of the Igala Political Kingdom.” European Scientific Journal, vol. 10, no. 19, 2014, pp. 392–402: 399. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5AN8R7UW/collection [2]: Nwaubani, Ebere. “The Political Economy of Aboh, 1830-1857.” African Economic History, no. 27, 1999, pp. 93–116: 108. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/FZIM9AVA/collection |
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“The Kingdom of Nri (1043–1911) was the West African medieval state of the Nri Igbo, a subgroup of the Igbo people, and is the oldest kingdom in Nigeria. The Kingdom of Nri was unusual in the history of world government in that its leader exercised no military power over his subjects.”
[1]
“Although bloodshed is inherent in this historical charter, for many centuries the people of Nri have had a strong commitment to peace, rooted in the belief that it is an abomination to pollute the sacred Earth. “The white men that came started by killing those who did not agree with their rules. We Nri never did so”.”
[2]
[1]: Ngara, C. A. (n.d.). An Ethnohistorical Account Of Pre-Colonial Africa, African Kingdoms And African Historical States. 25:11. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/UJG3ED8W/collection [2]: Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press, 1997: 246. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection |
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Full-time specialists “The role played by the horse in military affairs can also be seen from the number and rank of the titles pertaining to them, such as Ubandateakfi1 Madaki¡Madawaki (leader of the cavalry and/or commander-in-chief of the army) and Sarkin Dawaki (general in the cavalry division). The enhanced status of horses was also due to the innovations introduced by the acquisition oisulke (coats of mail) and the manufacture of lifidi (horse-trappings), whence the titles Sarkin Lifidi (general in the heavy cavalry division) and Lifidi (commander in-chief of the heavy cavalry division) which were among the highest ranking military officers.”
[1]
“The political, administrative and military aristocracy represented a uniform group which grew rich by various methods of exploitation, ranging from levies on the income derived from pillaging to almost mandatory political gifts.”
[2]
[1]: Ogot, B. (Ed.). (1998). Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth century. Heinemann; University of California Press: 471. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/M4FMXZZW/collection [2]: Ogot, B. (Ed.). (1998). Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth century. Heinemann; University of California Press: 473. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/M4FMXZZW/collection |
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“The regular army consisted of fourteen regiments of about eight hundred men strong, and three brigades of Amazons amounting altogether to three thousand. Two officers, ranked as councillors, commanded the army. The Gau, the commander-in-chief, led the right wing. During the campaign he shared the prerogatives of the king. The Kposu, second-in-command, led the left wing. In peace-time the Gau came under the Migan, on the king’s right; the Kposu came under the Meu, on the king’s left.Regular soldiers wore blue-and-white tunics and were organized into regiments and companies, under the command of an officer, each with its own drums and standard. Veterans wore indigo tunics and were called atchi. Among the others, the more numerous were the fusiliers, who fought with bayonets, and the blunderbussmen, or agbaraya. The Ashanti company was the élite corps, formed of the king’s hunters. Lastly, there were companies of archers, armed with poisoned arrows, a cavalry company, and a few artillerymen.The Amazons were organized into two separate corps: a permanent army and a reserve. The reserve company guarded the capital, and especially the palace, in war-time. In the nineteenth century the Amazons were highly organized. They wore uniforms similar to the men’s: sleeveless tunics, with blue-and-white stripes, reached to the knees; baggy breeches were held in at the waist by a cartridge belt. Members of the king’s bodyguard wore a band of white ribbon about the forehead, embroidered with a blue crocodile. Amazons lived at the palace and belonged to the king, who recruited them from free Dahomeans and captives. They were celibate and were forbidden to marry until they reached middle age, when they still needed the king’s consent. In peace-time they saw to their own needs by manufacturing pots or carving calabashes; both crafts were their exclusive monopoly.During the campaign the Amazon army was organized into three groups: the Fanti company - royal bodyguard - constituted the main body, and the left and right wings came under female officers who corresponded to the Gau and Kposu of the male army. Individual companies were distinguished by the arms they carried: bayonets, muskets (each musketeer was accompanied by a carrier), and bows and arrows (borne by the youngest recruits). The élite corps, the Fanti company, consisted of the famed elephant huntresses, the boldest and toughest of the Amazons.”
[1]
[1]: Lombard, J. (1976). The Kingdom of Dahomey. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 70–92). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press; 86–88. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/T6WTVSHZ/collection |
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“Some enigie held official positions in the state military organization.”
[1]
“Nor was there any concentration of military offices in oneorder. There were two alternative commands, one led by Ezɔmɔ (Uzama) assisted by Ologbose; the other by Iyasɛ with Edogun (Ibiwe Nekhua) as his second-in-command. Their warriors were recruited by the fief-holders on the Oba’s instructions.”
[2]
Specifically taking about period 1440CE–1600CE: “Finally, the army high command was constituted by four officers: the Oba as Supreme Military Commander, Iyase as General Commander, Ezomo as Senior War Commander, and Edogun as a war chief and commander of the royal troops.”
[3]
Specifically referring to 1801CE–1897CE period: “The top four military officers in Benin Army were the Iyase, the Ezomo, the Edogun and the Ologbosere. Three were all hereditary positions except the Iyase whose role in the state was first political.”
[4]
[1]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 10. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [2]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 28. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [3]: Osadolor, O. B. (2001). The Military System of Benin Kingdom, c.1440–1897. University of Hamburg, Germany: 94. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4RZF5H5/collection [4]: Osadolor, O. B. (2001). The Military System of Benin Kingdom, c.1440–1897. University of Hamburg, Germany: 187. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4RZF5H5/collection |
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"There was no standing army in pre-colonial Buganda, although as we shall see, there was by the nineteenth century a class of chiefs associated with military duties, while a measure of what we might call ‘part-time professionalism’ lay at the heart of the Ganda military ethos."
[1]
[1]: (Reid 2010: 51) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2H64W34U/collection. |
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"There was no standing army in pre-colonial Buganda, although as we shall see, there was by the nineteenth century a class of chiefs associated with military duties, while a measure of what we might call ‘part-time professionalism’ lay at the heart of the Ganda military ethos."
[1]
[1]: (Reid 2010: 51) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2H64W34U/collection. |
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" In time, Ndori’s army became greater than that of his enemies and ended up including from four to six times more well trained warriors than the armies of other chiefs. Moreover, younger and stronger warriors were inducted into it whenever a new company was created. Each new company was instructed by one composed of veterans and learned from their experience so that after a few years the last recruits became the shock troops. Thanks to this organization, Ndori’s army surpassed by far the intore companies of its adversaries. Even royal security and military discipline benefited from the new organization, since it was no longer possible for a company to wield more than a small parcel of military power. True, every company maintained its internal esprit-decorps, but the size of the army reduced the effects of any indiscipline. Moreover, that size encouraged the appearance of an esprit-de-corps that expressed itself through its allegiance to the commander-in-chief. And finally, a first step toward a permanent army was taken when Ndori’s successor formed his new army from the last company of the preceding one)."
[1]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 61) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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"For a ’conquest state’, Ankole was singularly lacking in even a defensive military capacity and clearly had never developed the organized force for carrying out any but the most casual of raiding operations. The absence of a military system for the defense of the territorial integrity of Ankole further attests to the nature of the society as a congeries of pastoral clans with only the most rudimentary institutions of chieftainship down through the reign of Ntare IV."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 138) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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"Following the Nyoro invasion, Ntare also began to engage in military innovation, organizing the first regiments (emitwe) of trained warriors rather than relying upon a hasty call-up of able-bodied men. [...] The system of standing regiments (emitwe) under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under Mugabe Mutambuka (1839-67) a century later."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 138, 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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"Following the Nyoro invasion, Ntare also began to engage in military innovation, organizing the first regiments (emitwe) of trained warriors rather than relying upon a hasty call-up of able-bodied men. [...] The system of standing regiments (emitwe) under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under the command of royal appointees begun by Ntare IV was revived by his successors and became fully operational under Mugabe Mutambuka (1839-67) a century later."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 138, 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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“The military administration was efficiently organized and a regular army was associated with each ruler.”
[1]
[1]: (Jankiraman, 2020) Jankiraman, M. 2020. Perspectives in Indian History: From the Origins to AD 1857. Chennai: Notion Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/N3D88RXF/collection |
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Military officers were posted across the empire. In 1881 British India had an imperial army of 63,000, with 4,400 officers.
[1]
[1]: (Smith 1881: 4, 9) Smith, George. 1882. The Geography of British India, Political & Physical. London: J. Murray. http://archive.org/details/geographybritis00smitgoog. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/AW5H8NPI |
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Professional officers are not mentioned in the sources, however it is likely that they performed the same duties as the soldiers and were called upon by their monarch or lord when needed as most rulers did not have a standing army.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Wilson 2016: 5-7. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/N5M9R9XA [2]: Power 2006: 21. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/4V4WE3ZK |
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Military leadership was held by feudal lords and knights, who served as part-time commanders based on their social status and landholding obligations rather than as full-time professionals. [Reuter 1991]
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