| # | Polity | Coded Value | Tags | Year(s) | Edit | Desc |
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Numerous, well-spaced, relatively small scale, 1-3 tier settlement hierarchies seem to indicate numerous autonomous tribe and/or chiefdom-level political economies.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[1]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. [2]: Plunket, P., & Uruñuela, G. (2012). Where east meets west: the Formative in Mexico’s central highlands. Journal of Archaeological Research, 20(1), 1-51. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (1996). "The Basin of Mexico: Multimillenial Development toward Cultural Complexity." In Olmec Art of Ancient Mexico, edited by Emily P. Benson and Beatriz de la Fuente. Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, pp. 83-93. [4]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [5]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [6]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [7]: Steponaitis, Vincas P. (1981). "Settlement hierarchies and political complexity in nonmarket societies: the Formative Period of the Valley of Mexico." American Anthropologist, 83(2): 320-363. [8]: Earle, Timothy K., (1976). "A nearest-neighbor analysis of two formative settlement systems." In Flannery, Kent V. (Ed.), The Early Mesoamerican Village. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 196-223. |
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|
Numerous, well-spaced, relatively small scale, 1-3 tier settlement hierarchies seem to indicate numerous autonomous tribe and/or chiefdom-level political economies.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[1]: Charlton, Thomas H., & Deborah L. Nichols. (1997). "Diachronic studies of city-states: Permutations on a theme—Central Mexico from 1700 BC to AD 1600." In Charlton and Nichols, eds. The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp.169-207. [2]: Plunket, P., & Uruñuela, G. (2012). Where east meets west: the Formative in Mexico’s central highlands. Journal of Archaeological Research, 20(1), 1-51. [3]: Niederberger, Christine. (1996). "The Basin of Mexico: Multimillenial Development toward Cultural Complexity." In Olmec Art of Ancient Mexico, edited by Emily P. Benson and Beatriz de la Fuente. Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, pp. 83-93. [4]: Niederberger, Christine. (2000) "Ranked Societies, Iconographic Complexity, and Economic Wealth in the Basin of Mexico Toward 1200 BC." In Olmec Art and Archaeology in Mesoamerica, edited by John E. Clark and Mary E. Pye. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169-192. [5]: Sanders, William T., Jeffrey R. Parsons, and Robert S. Santley. (1979) The Basin of Mexico: Ecological Processes in the Evolution of a Civilization. Academic Press, New York, pg. 94-7, 305-334. [6]: Santley, Robert S. (1977). "Intra-site settlement patterns at Loma Torremote, and their relationship to formative prehistory in the Cuautitlan Region, State of Mexico." Ph.D. Dissertation, Depatartment of Anthropology, The Pennsylvania State University, pp. 365-425. [7]: Steponaitis, Vincas P. (1981). "Settlement hierarchies and political complexity in nonmarket societies: the Formative Period of the Valley of Mexico." American Anthropologist, 83(2): 320-363. [8]: Earle, Timothy K., (1976). "A nearest-neighbor analysis of two formative settlement systems." In Flannery, Kent V. (Ed.), The Early Mesoamerican Village. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 196-223. |
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Inferred.
[1]
There was little stratification at this time, and probably no ‘state’ in any real sense. ’Hawaii 1 is very difficult to say, but most likely to have been several independent polities - maybe as many as 5 or 6. ’Umi-a-Liloa is said to have been the first to consolidate all of these into one island-wide polity, and he is dated genealogical estimation to ca. AD 1570-1590, toward the end of your Hawaii2 period’.
[2]
[1]: Kirch, P. V. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2016, personal communication) |
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|
’Hawaii 1 is very difficult to say, but most likely to have been several independent polities - maybe as many as 5 or 6. ’Umi-a-Liloa is said to have been the first to consolidate all of these into one island-wide polity, and he is dated genealogical estimation to ca. AD 1570-1590, toward the end of your Hawaii 2 period’.
[1]
[1]: (Kirch 2016, personal communication) |
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|
Overall, this period was characterized by an initial period of political integration, followed by a split into two polities, then a general move towards ’islandwide integration’ again in the time leading up to Cook’s arrival.
[1]
By about 1580 ’Umi had ascended as ruler of the entire island.
[2]
[3]
In Kirch’s reckoning, ’Umi was the first true king of the Big Island, as opposed to the mere chiefs who had governed the island until then. ’Umi did not fill a merely ceremonial role, as the previous chiefs had, but controlled the use of land, instituted a system of territorial administration and ahupua’a land parcels, intensified food production, specialized labour, and elaborated the religious system.
[4]
I think we can consider this a unitary state. ’According to Kamakau, ’Umi divided his kingdom’ between two of his sons, Keli’iokaloa-a-’Umi and Keawenui-a-’Umi, thus splitting the island, but Keli’iokaloa defeated his brother in battle and ’became the king of a once again unified island’.
[5]
After the death of King Lonoikamakahiki c. 1630 ’follows [a] phase of political fragmentation, when the leeward and windward regions came under the control of the Mahi and ’Ī lineages of Kohala and Hilo, respectively’.
[5]
Nominally, Keakealanikane became king of the island, but ’his reign was either ineffectual or simply not recognized by the district chiefs’.
[5]
After the death of Keakealaniwahine around 1690, her son Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku ’established some degree of unity over the island, even though the district chiefs retained considerable power’:
[6]
this sounds like ’loose’ control. After Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku’s death, ’A strong and powerful kingship reasserted itself again ... with Alapa’inui’ c. 1710.
[7]
Around 1752 CE, a warrior chief with a claim to the throne, Kalani’ōpu’u, rose up against Alapa’inui and ’gained control of his natal districts of Ka’ū and Puna, while Alapa’inui ruled the rest of the island’, so the Big Island became a quasi-polity once again.
[8]
After Alapa’inui’s death, Kalani’ōpu’u managed to defeat Alapa’inui’s son Keawe’ōpala and gain control of the whole island - this must have happened around 1755 as Kirch tells us that Keawe’ōpala’s reign began c. 1754 but ’was short’.
[8]
Kalani’ōpu’u ’devoted considerable attention to administration’ and held onto power long enough to greet Captain James Cook off the windward coast of Maui in 1778.
[9]
(Dates are approximate here due to the oral-historical nature of the sources. I have used Table 3.1 in Kirch’s How Chiefs Became Kings as a guide).
[10]
[1]: (Kirch 2010, 104) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2010, 92, 98) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [3]: Kirch 2016, personal commmunication. [4]: (Kirch 2010, 102-03) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [5]: (Kirch 2010, 105) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [6]: (Kirch 2010, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [7]: (Kirch 2010, 82, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [8]: (Kirch 2010, 108) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [9]: (Kirch 2010, 108-09) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [10]: (Kirch 2010, 83) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. |
||||||
|
Overall, this period was characterized by an initial period of political integration, followed by a split into two polities, then a general move towards ’islandwide integration’ again in the time leading up to Cook’s arrival.
[1]
By about 1580 ’Umi had ascended as ruler of the entire island.
[2]
[3]
In Kirch’s reckoning, ’Umi was the first true king of the Big Island, as opposed to the mere chiefs who had governed the island until then. ’Umi did not fill a merely ceremonial role, as the previous chiefs had, but controlled the use of land, instituted a system of territorial administration and ahupua’a land parcels, intensified food production, specialized labour, and elaborated the religious system.
[4]
I think we can consider this a unitary state. ’According to Kamakau, ’Umi divided his kingdom’ between two of his sons, Keli’iokaloa-a-’Umi and Keawenui-a-’Umi, thus splitting the island, but Keli’iokaloa defeated his brother in battle and ’became the king of a once again unified island’.
[5]
After the death of King Lonoikamakahiki c. 1630 ’follows [a] phase of political fragmentation, when the leeward and windward regions came under the control of the Mahi and ’Ī lineages of Kohala and Hilo, respectively’.
[5]
Nominally, Keakealanikane became king of the island, but ’his reign was either ineffectual or simply not recognized by the district chiefs’.
[5]
After the death of Keakealaniwahine around 1690, her son Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku ’established some degree of unity over the island, even though the district chiefs retained considerable power’:
[6]
this sounds like ’loose’ control. After Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku’s death, ’A strong and powerful kingship reasserted itself again ... with Alapa’inui’ c. 1710.
[7]
Around 1752 CE, a warrior chief with a claim to the throne, Kalani’ōpu’u, rose up against Alapa’inui and ’gained control of his natal districts of Ka’ū and Puna, while Alapa’inui ruled the rest of the island’, so the Big Island became a quasi-polity once again.
[8]
After Alapa’inui’s death, Kalani’ōpu’u managed to defeat Alapa’inui’s son Keawe’ōpala and gain control of the whole island - this must have happened around 1755 as Kirch tells us that Keawe’ōpala’s reign began c. 1754 but ’was short’.
[8]
Kalani’ōpu’u ’devoted considerable attention to administration’ and held onto power long enough to greet Captain James Cook off the windward coast of Maui in 1778.
[9]
(Dates are approximate here due to the oral-historical nature of the sources. I have used Table 3.1 in Kirch’s How Chiefs Became Kings as a guide).
[10]
[1]: (Kirch 2010, 104) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2010, 92, 98) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [3]: Kirch 2016, personal commmunication. [4]: (Kirch 2010, 102-03) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [5]: (Kirch 2010, 105) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [6]: (Kirch 2010, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [7]: (Kirch 2010, 82, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [8]: (Kirch 2010, 108) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [9]: (Kirch 2010, 108-09) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [10]: (Kirch 2010, 83) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. |
||||||
|
Overall, this period was characterized by an initial period of political integration, followed by a split into two polities, then a general move towards ’islandwide integration’ again in the time leading up to Cook’s arrival.
[1]
By about 1580 ’Umi had ascended as ruler of the entire island.
[2]
[3]
In Kirch’s reckoning, ’Umi was the first true king of the Big Island, as opposed to the mere chiefs who had governed the island until then. ’Umi did not fill a merely ceremonial role, as the previous chiefs had, but controlled the use of land, instituted a system of territorial administration and ahupua’a land parcels, intensified food production, specialized labour, and elaborated the religious system.
[4]
I think we can consider this a unitary state. ’According to Kamakau, ’Umi divided his kingdom’ between two of his sons, Keli’iokaloa-a-’Umi and Keawenui-a-’Umi, thus splitting the island, but Keli’iokaloa defeated his brother in battle and ’became the king of a once again unified island’.
[5]
After the death of King Lonoikamakahiki c. 1630 ’follows [a] phase of political fragmentation, when the leeward and windward regions came under the control of the Mahi and ’Ī lineages of Kohala and Hilo, respectively’.
[5]
Nominally, Keakealanikane became king of the island, but ’his reign was either ineffectual or simply not recognized by the district chiefs’.
[5]
After the death of Keakealaniwahine around 1690, her son Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku ’established some degree of unity over the island, even though the district chiefs retained considerable power’:
[6]
this sounds like ’loose’ control. After Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku’s death, ’A strong and powerful kingship reasserted itself again ... with Alapa’inui’ c. 1710.
[7]
Around 1752 CE, a warrior chief with a claim to the throne, Kalani’ōpu’u, rose up against Alapa’inui and ’gained control of his natal districts of Ka’ū and Puna, while Alapa’inui ruled the rest of the island’, so the Big Island became a quasi-polity once again.
[8]
After Alapa’inui’s death, Kalani’ōpu’u managed to defeat Alapa’inui’s son Keawe’ōpala and gain control of the whole island - this must have happened around 1755 as Kirch tells us that Keawe’ōpala’s reign began c. 1754 but ’was short’.
[8]
Kalani’ōpu’u ’devoted considerable attention to administration’ and held onto power long enough to greet Captain James Cook off the windward coast of Maui in 1778.
[9]
(Dates are approximate here due to the oral-historical nature of the sources. I have used Table 3.1 in Kirch’s How Chiefs Became Kings as a guide).
[10]
[1]: (Kirch 2010, 104) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2010, 92, 98) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [3]: Kirch 2016, personal commmunication. [4]: (Kirch 2010, 102-03) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [5]: (Kirch 2010, 105) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [6]: (Kirch 2010, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [7]: (Kirch 2010, 82, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [8]: (Kirch 2010, 108) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [9]: (Kirch 2010, 108-09) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [10]: (Kirch 2010, 83) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. |
||||||
|
Overall, this period was characterized by an initial period of political integration, followed by a split into two polities, then a general move towards ’islandwide integration’ again in the time leading up to Cook’s arrival.
[1]
By about 1580 ’Umi had ascended as ruler of the entire island.
[2]
[3]
In Kirch’s reckoning, ’Umi was the first true king of the Big Island, as opposed to the mere chiefs who had governed the island until then. ’Umi did not fill a merely ceremonial role, as the previous chiefs had, but controlled the use of land, instituted a system of territorial administration and ahupua’a land parcels, intensified food production, specialized labour, and elaborated the religious system.
[4]
I think we can consider this a unitary state. ’According to Kamakau, ’Umi divided his kingdom’ between two of his sons, Keli’iokaloa-a-’Umi and Keawenui-a-’Umi, thus splitting the island, but Keli’iokaloa defeated his brother in battle and ’became the king of a once again unified island’.
[5]
After the death of King Lonoikamakahiki c. 1630 ’follows [a] phase of political fragmentation, when the leeward and windward regions came under the control of the Mahi and ’Ī lineages of Kohala and Hilo, respectively’.
[5]
Nominally, Keakealanikane became king of the island, but ’his reign was either ineffectual or simply not recognized by the district chiefs’.
[5]
After the death of Keakealaniwahine around 1690, her son Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku ’established some degree of unity over the island, even though the district chiefs retained considerable power’:
[6]
this sounds like ’loose’ control. After Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku’s death, ’A strong and powerful kingship reasserted itself again ... with Alapa’inui’ c. 1710.
[7]
Around 1752 CE, a warrior chief with a claim to the throne, Kalani’ōpu’u, rose up against Alapa’inui and ’gained control of his natal districts of Ka’ū and Puna, while Alapa’inui ruled the rest of the island’, so the Big Island became a quasi-polity once again.
[8]
After Alapa’inui’s death, Kalani’ōpu’u managed to defeat Alapa’inui’s son Keawe’ōpala and gain control of the whole island - this must have happened around 1755 as Kirch tells us that Keawe’ōpala’s reign began c. 1754 but ’was short’.
[8]
Kalani’ōpu’u ’devoted considerable attention to administration’ and held onto power long enough to greet Captain James Cook off the windward coast of Maui in 1778.
[9]
(Dates are approximate here due to the oral-historical nature of the sources. I have used Table 3.1 in Kirch’s How Chiefs Became Kings as a guide).
[10]
[1]: (Kirch 2010, 104) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2010, 92, 98) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [3]: Kirch 2016, personal commmunication. [4]: (Kirch 2010, 102-03) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [5]: (Kirch 2010, 105) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [6]: (Kirch 2010, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [7]: (Kirch 2010, 82, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [8]: (Kirch 2010, 108) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [9]: (Kirch 2010, 108-09) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [10]: (Kirch 2010, 83) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. |
||||||
|
Overall, this period was characterized by an initial period of political integration, followed by a split into two polities, then a general move towards ’islandwide integration’ again in the time leading up to Cook’s arrival.
[1]
By about 1580 ’Umi had ascended as ruler of the entire island.
[2]
[3]
In Kirch’s reckoning, ’Umi was the first true king of the Big Island, as opposed to the mere chiefs who had governed the island until then. ’Umi did not fill a merely ceremonial role, as the previous chiefs had, but controlled the use of land, instituted a system of territorial administration and ahupua’a land parcels, intensified food production, specialized labour, and elaborated the religious system.
[4]
I think we can consider this a unitary state. ’According to Kamakau, ’Umi divided his kingdom’ between two of his sons, Keli’iokaloa-a-’Umi and Keawenui-a-’Umi, thus splitting the island, but Keli’iokaloa defeated his brother in battle and ’became the king of a once again unified island’.
[5]
After the death of King Lonoikamakahiki c. 1630 ’follows [a] phase of political fragmentation, when the leeward and windward regions came under the control of the Mahi and ’Ī lineages of Kohala and Hilo, respectively’.
[5]
Nominally, Keakealanikane became king of the island, but ’his reign was either ineffectual or simply not recognized by the district chiefs’.
[5]
After the death of Keakealaniwahine around 1690, her son Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku ’established some degree of unity over the island, even though the district chiefs retained considerable power’:
[6]
this sounds like ’loose’ control. After Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku’s death, ’A strong and powerful kingship reasserted itself again ... with Alapa’inui’ c. 1710.
[7]
Around 1752 CE, a warrior chief with a claim to the throne, Kalani’ōpu’u, rose up against Alapa’inui and ’gained control of his natal districts of Ka’ū and Puna, while Alapa’inui ruled the rest of the island’, so the Big Island became a quasi-polity once again.
[8]
After Alapa’inui’s death, Kalani’ōpu’u managed to defeat Alapa’inui’s son Keawe’ōpala and gain control of the whole island - this must have happened around 1755 as Kirch tells us that Keawe’ōpala’s reign began c. 1754 but ’was short’.
[8]
Kalani’ōpu’u ’devoted considerable attention to administration’ and held onto power long enough to greet Captain James Cook off the windward coast of Maui in 1778.
[9]
(Dates are approximate here due to the oral-historical nature of the sources. I have used Table 3.1 in Kirch’s How Chiefs Became Kings as a guide).
[10]
[1]: (Kirch 2010, 104) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2010, 92, 98) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [3]: Kirch 2016, personal commmunication. [4]: (Kirch 2010, 102-03) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [5]: (Kirch 2010, 105) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [6]: (Kirch 2010, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [7]: (Kirch 2010, 82, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [8]: (Kirch 2010, 108) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [9]: (Kirch 2010, 108-09) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [10]: (Kirch 2010, 83) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. |
||||||
|
Overall, this period was characterized by an initial period of political integration, followed by a split into two polities, then a general move towards ’islandwide integration’ again in the time leading up to Cook’s arrival.
[1]
By about 1580 ’Umi had ascended as ruler of the entire island.
[2]
[3]
In Kirch’s reckoning, ’Umi was the first true king of the Big Island, as opposed to the mere chiefs who had governed the island until then. ’Umi did not fill a merely ceremonial role, as the previous chiefs had, but controlled the use of land, instituted a system of territorial administration and ahupua’a land parcels, intensified food production, specialized labour, and elaborated the religious system.
[4]
I think we can consider this a unitary state. ’According to Kamakau, ’Umi divided his kingdom’ between two of his sons, Keli’iokaloa-a-’Umi and Keawenui-a-’Umi, thus splitting the island, but Keli’iokaloa defeated his brother in battle and ’became the king of a once again unified island’.
[5]
After the death of King Lonoikamakahiki c. 1630 ’follows [a] phase of political fragmentation, when the leeward and windward regions came under the control of the Mahi and ’Ī lineages of Kohala and Hilo, respectively’.
[5]
Nominally, Keakealanikane became king of the island, but ’his reign was either ineffectual or simply not recognized by the district chiefs’.
[5]
After the death of Keakealaniwahine around 1690, her son Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku ’established some degree of unity over the island, even though the district chiefs retained considerable power’:
[6]
this sounds like ’loose’ control. After Keawe-’ikekahi-ali’i-o-ka-moku’s death, ’A strong and powerful kingship reasserted itself again ... with Alapa’inui’ c. 1710.
[7]
Around 1752 CE, a warrior chief with a claim to the throne, Kalani’ōpu’u, rose up against Alapa’inui and ’gained control of his natal districts of Ka’ū and Puna, while Alapa’inui ruled the rest of the island’, so the Big Island became a quasi-polity once again.
[8]
After Alapa’inui’s death, Kalani’ōpu’u managed to defeat Alapa’inui’s son Keawe’ōpala and gain control of the whole island - this must have happened around 1755 as Kirch tells us that Keawe’ōpala’s reign began c. 1754 but ’was short’.
[8]
Kalani’ōpu’u ’devoted considerable attention to administration’ and held onto power long enough to greet Captain James Cook off the windward coast of Maui in 1778.
[9]
(Dates are approximate here due to the oral-historical nature of the sources. I have used Table 3.1 in Kirch’s How Chiefs Became Kings as a guide).
[10]
[1]: (Kirch 2010, 104) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [2]: (Kirch 2010, 92, 98) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [3]: Kirch 2016, personal commmunication. [4]: (Kirch 2010, 102-03) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [5]: (Kirch 2010, 105) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [6]: (Kirch 2010, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [7]: (Kirch 2010, 82, 106) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [8]: (Kirch 2010, 108) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [9]: (Kirch 2010, 108-09) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. [10]: (Kirch 2010, 83) Patrick Vinton Kirch. 2010. How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai’i. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. |
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When Kamehameha I took power, “the government continued to be essentially a feudal autocracy. The king’s will was the supreme authority”
[1]
Taxes were transmitted to the center
[2]
[1]: Kuykendall, Ralph S. 1968[1938]. The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume 1: 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Pg. 51. [2]: Kuykendall, Ralph S. 1968[1938]. The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume 1: 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Pg. 54. |
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"Though they are often described as a confederacy [...] and sometimes assembled into very large settlements that incorporated several tribes, there is no evidence of any overall intertribal organization or political institutions like those found among the Creeks or the League of the Iroquois"
[1]
.
[1]: C. Callender, Illinois, in B. Trigger, Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 15: Northeast (1978), pp. 673-680 |
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’This passage gives the impression of Fu-nan as an empire, but modern scholars are distrustful of such a portrayal. It is likely that the communities involved were all relatively small city-states scattered along the coast; they could conduct raids upon one another, but there were no great tracts of territory settled by agriculturalist, and it is not likely that centralized control could extend over a large area. [...] Fu-nan, then, was less likely a dominant empire than the largest and most aggressive of a number of principalities.’
[1]
’We do not know if Funan was a unitary state, as the Chinese descriptions seem to suggest, or a series of competing centers. Whichever was the case, certain trends are found which were to contribute to the character of later complex polities in Southeast Asia. The handful of surviving inscriptions, for example, indicates that the local rulers adopted Sanskrit language and took Sanskrit names. Indian religious and legal systems were adopted as well.’ [2] ’There was a taxation system involving payment in gold, silver, perfumes, and pearls, and a script which originated in India.’ [2] ’Some historians suspect that the Chinese assumed that Funan’s political structure was more centralized than was really the case. No territorially based polities can be found in Southeast Asia before the imperial era of Angkor in the 11th and 12th centuries. It is unlikely that Funan was such a kingdom. More likely it was a typical early Southeast Asian mandala, in which political power manifested itself in the form of ability to extract tribute and occasional other tokens of subservience, but not direct rule of distant provinces. It is impossible to tell whether Funan could be defined as a unified state or as a cluster of small polities in the delta. Evidence in favor of territorial organization covering at least the lower Mekong includes extensive remains of a canal network and signs of the emergence of an elite stimulated by trade involving resources brought downriver from the hinterland.’ [3] ’We should think of Funan, therefore, not as a centralised kingdom extending from southern Vietnam all the way around to the Kra Isthmus, but rather as a mandala, the power of whose capital in southeastern Cambodia waxed and waned, and whose armed merchant ships succeeded in enforcing its temporary suzerainty over small coastal trading ports around the Gulf of Thailand. What gave Funan the edge over other such centres of power was clearly its position astride the India-China trade route. Its power, however, is unlikely to have spread far inland. Further north, on the middle Mekong and on the lower Chao Phraya River, other power centres were establishing themselves that in time would challenge and replace Funan.’ [4] ’The pre-Angkor scholar Michael Vickery has warned against assuming that Funan was a unified state—it is possible that it was a loose alliance of port towns in the lower Mekong delta. However, the existence of large canals suggests a strong state power capable of planning and managing the large numbers of labourers required for such projects. Such workforces would have depended on regular food supplies, produced by efficient agriculture and with an efficient tax collection system. On the other hand, we know that the city-states of Ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy were capable of building public works and large monuments without direction by overarching ‘national’ or supra-national polities, so Vickery is probably right about pre-Angkorean Cambodia.’ [5] ’The area was occupied in the prehistoric period, and the inhabitants prospered with the control of the international maritime trade to create a vigorous and powerful state.’ [6] ’Chinese sources awarded this area, known as “Funan,” an exaggerated political solidity, for in truth what Chinese writers, eager to flatter their emperor, described as a substantial tributary kingdom seems to have been no more than an unstable network of superficially Indianized ports and small principalities’ [7] ’Combining the assumptions of Chinese sources with their own bias in favor of consolidated states, early European scholars portrayed Champa as a unified kingdom, with a hierarchy of provincial functionaries and a centralized administration.19 Recent research has substantially modi- fied that view, preferring to see Champa (like neighboring Funan) even at its height as a loose confederation of local polities which might com- bine for longer or shorter periods under powerful leaders, but which retained a basic autonomy grounded in the self-sufficiency of small east-west river valleys and isolated coastal plains, and perhaps in an irreducibly polycentric world view. Not infrequently, Cham principali- ties fought one another. A hegemon became merely “king of the kings (raja di raja) of Champa,” and the location of the preeminent center - when such a center existed - shifted: in the 8th century, which may have seen the first sustained coalescence, Panduranga dominated, in the late 9th century Indrapura, after c. 1000 Vijaya, and in the 16th century Kauthara and Panduranga.20 It would be foolish to assume that Cham political structures remained frozen for centuries.’ [8] ’The elements of a social overlay to the archaeological record are found in the surviving texts: we read of kings, a legal system, taxation, warfare and sujugation of rivals. Yet important issues remain unresolved. Was there, for example, a unitary state which straddled the delta, or were there a series of competing polities?’ [9] ’At any given time dozens of lesser kings would have been paying tribute to Funan; the loss of much of that revenue and the peace it signaled led to the eventual re- placement of Funan by Chenla as the dominant force in the mandala system of Southeast Asia.’ [10] ’Through connections to India that remain somewhat unclear the Funanese practiced Hinduism, used a script adapted from Sanskrit, and utilized a god-king model of state organization similar to that of ancient India.’ [11] [1]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.73) [2]: (Higham 2012b, p. 590) [3]: (Miksin 2007, p. 122) [4]: (Stuart-Fox 2003, p. 29-30) [5]: (Tully 2005, p. 9) [6]: (Higham 2004, p. 113) [7]: (Lieberman 2003, p. 217) [8]: (Lieberman 2003, p. 350) [9]: (Higham 2014, p. 286) [10]: (West 2009, p. 225) [11]: (West 2009, pp. 391-392) |
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’This passage gives the impression of Fu-nan as an empire, but modern scholars are distrustful of such a portrayal. It is likely that the communities involved were all relatively small city-states scattered along the coast; they could conduct raids upon one another, but there were no great tracts of territory settled by agriculturalist, and it is not likely that centralized control could extend over a large area. [...] Fu-nan, then, was less likely a dominant empire than the largest and most aggressive of a number of principalities.’
[1]
’We do not know if Funan was a unitary state, as the Chinese descriptions seem to suggest, or a series of competing centers. Whichever was the case, certain trends are found which were to contribute to the character of later complex polities in Southeast Asia. The handful of surviving inscriptions, for example, indicates that the local rulers adopted Sanskrit language and took Sanskrit names. Indian religious and legal systems were adopted as well.’
[2]
’There was a taxation system involving payment in gold, silver, perfumes, and pearls, and a script which originated in India.’
[2]
’Some historians suspect that the Chinese assumed that Funan’s political structure was more centralized than was really the case. No territorially based polities can be found in Southeast Asia before the imperial era of Angkor in the 11th and 12th centuries. It is unlikely that Funan was such a kingdom. More likely it was a typical early Southeast Asian mandala, in which political power manifested itself in the form of ability to extract tribute and occasional other tokens of subservience, but not direct rule of distant provinces. It is impossible to tell whether Funan could be defined as a unified state or as a cluster of small polities in the delta. Evidence in favor of territorial organization covering at least the lower Mekong includes extensive remains of a canal network and signs of the emergence of an elite stimulated by trade involving resources brought downriver from the hinterland.’
[3]
’We should think of Funan, therefore, not as a centralised kingdom extending from southern Vietnam all the way around to the Kra Isthmus, but rather as a mandala, the power of whose capital in southeastern Cambodia waxed and waned, and whose armed merchant ships succeeded in enforcing its temporary suzerainty over small coastal trading ports around the Gulf of Thailand. What gave Funan the edge over other such centres of power was clearly its position astride the India-China trade route. Its power, however, is unlikely to have spread far inland. Further north, on the middle Mekong and on the lower Chao Phraya River, other power centres were establishing themselves that in time would challenge and replace Funan.’
[4]
’Combining the assumptions of Chinese sources with their own bias in favor of consolidated states, early European scholars portrayed Champa as a unified kingdom, with a hierarchy of provincial functionaries and a centralized administration.19 Recent research has substantially modified that view, preferring to see Champa (like neighboring Funan) even at its height as a loose confederation of local polities which might com- bine for longer or shorter periods under powerful leaders, but which retained a basic autonomy grounded in the self-sufficiency of small east-west river valleys and isolated coastal plains, and perhaps in an irreducibly polycentric world view. Not infrequently, Cham principali- ties fought one another. A hegemon became merely “king of the kings (raja di raja) of Champa,” and the location of the preeminent center - when such a center existed-shifted: in the 8th century, which may have seen the first sustained coalescence, Panduranga dominated, in the late 9th century Indrapura, after c. 1000 Vijaya, and in the 16th century Kauthara and Panduranga.20 It would be foolish to assume that Cham political structures remained frozen for centuries.’
[5]
’The elements of a social overlay to the archaeological record are found in the surviving texts: we read of kings, a legal system, taxation, warfare and sujugation of rivals. Yet important issues remain unresolved. Was there, for example, a unitary state which straddled the delta, or were there a series of competing polities?’
[6]
’At any given time dozens of lesser kings would have been paying tribute to Funan; the loss of much of that revenue and the peace it signaled led to the eventual re- placement of Funan by Chenla as the dominant force in the mandala system of Southeast Asia.’
[7]
[1]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.73) [2]: (Higham 2012b, p. 590) [3]: (Miksin 2007, p. 122) [4]: (Stuart-Fox 2003, p. 29-30) [5]: (Lieberman 2003, p. 350) [6]: (Higham 2014, p. 286) [7]: (West 2009, p. 225) |
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’Many historians believe that for virtually all of the ’Chen-la’ period there was no one major kingdom of the Khmers but an arena of principalities in competition. Thus, at one extreme we have before us the suggestion in the Chinese sources that the Khmers were subjects of a single unitary state, Chen-la, which spilt into two for a period in the eighth century, and at the other we have the view of ’Chen-la’ as an area of competing transient chiefdoms. It is clear at least that certain kings were able to assert their control over a great part of the Khmer territory, and it has recently been suggested by Michael Vickery that there was indeed for most of the seventh and eighth centuries just one main centre of power.’
[1]
Coedes and other scholars have called attention to a passage in the early eighth-century ’History of the Sui Dynasty’ that may be a specific reference to this cult [i.e., the cult surrounding Lingaparvata centred at the temple complex of Wat Phu]. In speaking of ’Zhenla’ it states: "Near the capital is a mountain named Ling-jia-bo-po, on the summit of which a temple is constructed, always guarded by five thousand soldiers and consecrated to the spirit named Po-do-li, to whom human sacrifices are made. Each year, the king himself goes to this temple to make a human sacrifice during the night. It is thus that they honour the spirits." According to Coedes, a long-time believer in the reality of ’funan’ and ’Zhenla’, Champassak was the place where the ruling dynasty of ’Zhenla’ originated, and Wat Phu was the first capital of what he took to be a unitary state--a view not accepted by modern scholarshi [...] As for the human sacrifice mentioned in the Chinese annals, this was not entirely absent in Cambodia before the French Protectorate -- for instance, right up until the mid-nineteenth century, humans were crushed alive under the gate foundations of every fortified enclosure, of which they became the guardian spirits.’
[2]
’Although the Chinese histories mentioned two distinct kingdoms in the eighth century, the study of Sanskrit and Old Khmer inscriptions has revealed a far more complex political struc- ture, with largely autonomous city-states controlling particular areas of rice-growing land or particular stretches of the Mekong Valley. The rulers of these city-states were only the most conspicuous and sometimes arbitrary represen- tatives of a highly stratified and largely perma- nent local bureaucracy, whose members enjoyed inherited status and performed particular duties within the society. It was clearly exceptional for a large number of city-states to be combined under one ruler, and only rarely were embassies sent to China as a mark of this status (or of the ambition to achieve it).’
[3]
’The question is whether Chenla was a unified state, or whether Cambodia was divided into a number of principalities in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries; probably the latter is the case. As Vickery points out, there was an ‘explosion’ of Khmer epigraphy from the seventh century, with the earliest recorded Khmer stone inscription dating from 612 AD at Angkor Borei. None of this refers to what the Chinese called Chenla. Probably, the decline of Funan was relative, with power devolv- ing to a multiplicity of petty kingdoms along the Mekong.’
[4]
’Chinese histories record that a state called Chenla sent an embassy to China in 616 or 617 C.E. The History of the Sui Dynasty (Sui-shu) noted that Chenla was originally a vassal of FUNAN in Cambodia, but under its ruler Citrasena conquered Funan and gained independence. Sub- sequent references described further missions to the Chinese court; the descriptions give the impression that it was a unified state under a king, which had defeated and absorbed Funan. During the early eighth century, the his- tories record that Chenla was divided into two states, labeled Land Chenla and Water Chenla, respectively.’
[5]
:’An inscription from the small sanctuary of Kdei Ang illustrates how original documents provide an insight into the actual transition from Funan to Chenla. Written in 667 C.E., the inscription names successive members of an elite family of court officials. It begins with Brahmadatta, a retainer of King RUDRAVARMAN of Funan (c. 514-50). His maternal nephews, Dharmadeva and Simhadeva, served the kings Bhavavarman and Mahendravarman. Simhavira, a maternal nephew of Dharmadeva, was an official under King Ishanavarman (r. c. 615-37). Finally, Simhadatta served King JAYAVARMAN I (c. 635-80). This dynasty of rulers is the major, but not only, evidence for central royal authority. However, by following the rulers’ history, it is possible to trace the development of increasingly central- ized state authority. ’
[6]
’ISHANAVARMAN OF CHENLA seems to have exercised author- ity over a wide area, as many regional leaders acknowl- edged him as their overlord. One text from 250 kilometers (150 mi.) south of his capital records how the local mag- nate Ishanadatta referred to the heroic and illustrious Ishanavarman. An inscription from ISHANAPURA itself describes the valor and military prowess of Ishanavarman, a king “who extended the territory of his parents.” He was succeeded by his son, Bhavavarman II, about whom little is known except that from the region of Ishanapura he continued to maintain control over most if not all of his father’s fiefs. It is intriguing that a series of inscriptions dating to his reign record foundations by local leaders without any reference to this king, a situation that might well indicate their independence. Jayavarman I was the great-grandson of Ishanavarman. His inscriptions indicate the tightening of central power and control over a considerable area, the creation of new titles and admin- istrators, and the availability of an army, the means of defense and destruction. A text described how King Jayavarman’s commands were obeyed by “innumerable vassal kings.” Jayavarman also strengthened the legal code: “Those who levy an annual tax, those who seize carts, boats, slaves, cattle, buffaloes, those who contest the king’s orders, will be punished.” New titles were accorded highly ranked retainers who fulfilled important posts in government. One lineage held the priestly posi- tion of hotar. Another functionary was a samantagajapadi, chief of the royal elephants, and a military leader; the dhanyakarapati would have controlled the grain stores. The king also appointed officials known as a mratan and pon to a sabha, or council of state. Another inscription prescribes the quantities of salt to be distributed by barge to various foundations and prohibits any tax on the ves- sels going up- or downriver. Thus Jayavarman I intensi- fied royal control over dependent fiefs begun by his great-grandfather, Ishanavarman. Thereafter this dynasty loses visibility, although the king’s daughter, Jayadevi, ruled from a center in the vicinity of ANGKOR.
[6]
’There was no single state or ruler at this time, but rather a series of competing micro city states.’
[7]
’Both must be treated with caution, for if the Chinese texts were our only source of information, we would assume that a state called Chenla existed in this area’
[8]
’Their contents inform us on two vital issues. The first is the use of official titles, such as President of the Royal Court, which was located at a centre called Purandarapura. Another prescribed punishment for those who disobey a royal order. Two brothers of high social standing were appointed to a variety of posts: officer of the royal guard, chief of rowers, military chief, and governor of Dhruvapura. Another highly-ranked courtier became chief of elephants, reminding us of the traditional role of elephants in warfare. A further text mentions a chief of the royal grain store. These high officials were rewarded with honorific symbols, such as a parasol embellished with gold. The trends already evident under Ishanavarman were greatly strengthened under his great grandson: with Jayavarman I, we can identify the establishment of a state. It was, however, ephemeral. Only one inscription of his daughter Jayadevi survives. Thereafter, the dynasty disappears from the historic record.’
[9]
’We should not be deluded by Chinese references to a state of Chenla. Wolters (1974) and Dupont (1943-6) have both shown convincingly that hegemony over most Chenla centres was the exception rather than the rule, and may have been achieved only briefly unde rIshanavarman and more firmly by his great grandson Jayavarman I.’
[10]
[1]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p79-81) [2]: (Coe 2003, p 76-77) [3]: (Southworth 2004, 325) [4]: (Tully 2005, 14) [5]: (Higham 2004, 74) [6]: (Higham 2004, 75) [7]: (Higham 2014, 831) [8]: (Higham 2014b, 293) [9]: (Higham 2014b, 294) [10]: (Higham 2014b, 343) |
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• ’All the institutions of government reviewed above give the impression that they belong to an apparatus of (as least potentially) oppressive, even totalitarian, power. Indeed, it is altogether likely that after the time of Rajendravarman the kings of Angkor presided over a much more centralized regime than the Khmers had known before. Institutions of government embodied no principles of constitutional checks upon royal power beyond the notion of religious morality. An impulse to totalitarian government was present, and found expression whenever rulers found themselves temporarily without dangerous rivals still at large. We must remember, though, that this tate lacked all the advantages of modern communications and technology to assert its control in detail, and that all sorts of regional, personal and factional loyalties were liable to obstruct the impulse to totalitarianism before too long.’
[1]
• ’Angkor under Suyavarman [II] was at the peak of its glory. The institutional reforms of Rajendravarman were secure, giving a measure of centralisation to the administration of the empire. [2] :• :• ’The central administration in Angkor must have had fairly detailed information for the purposes of taxation and core labour of all the empire’s inhabitants, for according to Zhou a census was taken during the ninth Cambodian month, where everyone (or, more likely, all heads of families) was called to the capital, and passed in review before the Royal Palace. Such census registers were kept in Aymonier’s day, and revised every three years.’ [3] ’Because the Angkor kingdom commanded a significant army and a large centralized administrative apparatus and because thousands of workers were needed to build and maintain its enormous building complexes, it has been assumed that around the stone constructions of the palaces and temples a city with a substantial population must have existed.’ [4] • ’Jayavarman II appears to have brought significant land and regional lords into a ‘single’ domain by 802 CE. We can begin to discern a ‘united’ polity, and a series of single or at least preeminent capitals: Hariharālaya (Roluos); Yaśodharapura (Angkor); Koh Ker.’ [5] • ’All such leaders were tied to the overlord by webs of family, mar- riage, and patronage whose instability ensured constant fluctuations in the center’s territorial influence. Reliable royal control in the sense of resource exaction was therefore confined to the capital zone, which nor- mally included the empire’s most populous districts but which might not exceed a 60-mile radius. In Pagan, Angkor, and to a lesser extent perhaps early Champa and Dai Viet, temples and monasteries served simultaneously as agencies of agricultural reclamation, ritual validation, and intra-elite alliance. Because these wealthy, self-regulating religious institutions helped to stabilize labor and to concentrate resources, they tended to compress and, in some ways, to obviate royal administration. Nonetheless, the ruler remained indispensable as ritual intermediary between kingdom and cosmos, as military leader, and as coordinator of temple as well as secular patronage. Thus, while accepting that these were weak forms of the genus, we can still recognize charter-era entities as “states” according to Charles Tilly’s minimalist definition: “coercion- wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other orga- nizations within substantial territories.”45’ [6] [1]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.169) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 145) [4]: (Miksic 2007, p. 18) [5]: (Lustig 2009, p. 66) [6]: (Lieberman 2003, p. 33) |
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’All the institutions of government reviewed above give the impression that they belong to an apparatus of (as least potentially) oppressive, even totalitarian, power. Indeed, it is altogether likely that after the time of Rajendravarman the kings of Angkor presided over a much more centralized regime than the Khmers had known before. Institutions of government embodied no principles of constitutional checks upon royal power beyond the notion of religious morality. An impulse to totalitarian government was present, and found expression whenever rulers found themselves temporarily without dangerous rivals still at large. We must remember, though, that this tate lacked all the advantages of modern communications and technology to assert its control in detail, and that all sorts of regional, personal and factional loyalties were liable to obstruct the impulse to totalitarianism before too long.’
[1]
’Angkor under Suyavarman [II] was at the peak of its glory. The institutional reforms of Rajendravarman were secure, giving a measure of centralisation to the administration of the empire.
[2]
’The central administration in Angkor must have had fairly detailed information for the purposes of taxation and core labour of all the empire’s inhabitants, for according to Zhou a census was taken during the ninth Cambodian month, where everyone (or, more likely, all heads of families) was called to the capital, and passed in review before the Royal Palace. Such census registers were kept in Aymonier’s day, and revised every three years.’
[3]
’Because the Angkor kingdom commanded a significant army and a large centralized administrative apparatus and because thousands of workers were needed to build and maintain its enormous building complexes, it has been assumed that around the stone constructions of the palaces and temples a city with a substantial population must have existed.’
[4]
’All such leaders were tied to the overlord by webs of family, marriage, and patronage whose instability ensured constant fluctuations in the center’s territorial influence. Reliable royal control in the sense of resource exaction was therefore confined to the capital zone, which normally included the empire’s most populous districts but which might not exceed a 60-mile radius. In Pagan, Angkor, and to a lesser extent perhaps early Champa and Dai Viet, temples and monasteries served simultaneously as agencies of agricultural reclamation, ritual validation, and intra-elite alliance. Because these wealthy, self-regulating religious institutions helped to stabilize labor and to concentrate resources, they tended to compress and, in some ways, to obviate royal administration. Nonetheless, the ruler remained indispensable as ritual intermediary between kingdom and cosmos, as military leader, and as coordinator of temple as well as secular patronage. Thus, while accepting that these were weak forms of the genus, we can still recognize charter-era entities as “states” according to Charles Tilly’s minimalist definition: “coercion- wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other orga- nizations within substantial territories.”45’
[5]
[1]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.169) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 145) [4]: (Miksic 2007, p. 18) [5]: (Lieberman 2003, p. 33) |
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“The central administration in Angkor must have had fairly detailed information for the purposes of taxation and core labour of all the empire’s inhabitants, for according to Zhou a census was taken during the ninth Cambodian month, where everyone (or, more likely, all heads of families) was called to the capital, and passed in review before the Royal Palace. Such census registers were kept in Aymonier’s day, and revised every three years.”
[1]
’Because the Angkor kingdom commanded a significant army and a large centralized administrative apparatus and because thousands of workers were needed to build and maintain its enormous building complexes, it has been assumed that around the stone constructions of the palaces and temples a city with a substantial population must have existed.’
[2]
[1]: (Coe 2003, p. 145) [2]: (Miksic 2007, p. 18) |
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’All the institutions of government reviewed above give the impression that they belong to an apparatus of (as least potentially) oppressive, even totalitarian, power. Indeed, it is altogether likely that after the time of Rajendravarman the kings of Angkor presided over a much more centralized regime than the Khmers had known before. Institutions of government embodied no principles of constitutional checks upon royal power beyond the notion of religious morality. An impulse to totalitarian government was present, and found expression whenever rulers found themselves temporarily without dangerous rivals still at large. We must remember, though, that this tate lacked all the advantages of modern communications and technology to assert its control in detail, and that all sorts of regional, personal and factional loyalties were liable to obstruct the impulse to totalitarianism before too long.’
[1]
’Angkor under Suyavarman [II] was at the peak of its glory. The institutional reforms of Rajendravarman were secure, giving a measure of centralisation to the administration of the empire.
[2]
The central administration in Angkor must have had fairly detailed information for the purposes of taxation and core labour of all the empire’s inhabitants, for according to Zhou a census was taken during the ninth Cambodian month, where everyone (or, more likely, all heads of families) was called to the capital, and passed in review before the Royal Palace. Such census registers were kept in Aymonier’s day, and revised every three years.’
[3]
’Because the Angkor kingdom commanded a significant army and a large centralized administrative apparatus and because thousands of workers were needed to build and maintain its enormous building complexes, it has been assumed that around the stone constructions of the palaces and temples a city with a substantial population must have existed.’
[4]
[1]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.169) [2]: (Mabbett and Chandler 1995, p.105) [3]: (Coe 2003, p. 145) [4]: (Miksic 2007, p. 18) |
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"Working from the outer layers inward, we encounter first a circle of semi-independent rulers who did little more than pay tribute to Bangkok on a regular basis and who often paid tribute to other states as well. [...] A second tier of states, or perhaps more properly principalities, was relatively more integrated into the Siamese system. In addition to paying tribute, they often were required to provide Siam with manpower to warfare or public works, paid relatively larger amounts in tribute, sometimes were married into the Siamese royal family, and occasionally suffered Siamese interference in their internal affairs. [...] The next layer consisted of large regional centers around Siam’s periphery, ruled by chaophraya and considered to be major, but quasi-independent, provinces. [...]" A fourth tier were small polities with hereditary rulers, who paid ’nominal’ and provided manpower when needed. "Finally, the inner core of the kingdom consisted of provinces properly speaking, ruled by officials appointed from the capital [...] and subjected to the regulation of the central government through the chief ministries of state."
[1]
[1]: (Wyatt 1984, pp. 159-160) |
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"The Chinese sources from the fifth and seventh centuries mention several principalities in Jawa (to which Thromanagara may be added), without recording any dependencies (unless the note about Ho-lo-tan meant "dependent on Jawa"). These principalities each senttheir own envoys, only rarely banding together. There are indeed hints of fierce fratricidal wars and the subjection of neighboring states ina letter of the king of Ho-lo-tan to the emperor and in the story about Gunavarman. But the first reference to a true overlordship dates from the eighth century and is provided by both the Revised T’ang Annals and the proclamation of the king Sanjaya. Yet the extent of this overlord- ship remains a matter for conjecture."
[1]
[1]: (van der Meulen 1977, 95) |
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Political centralization hard to achieve, despite the lack of geographical barriers, due to the influence of local elites in eco-regions. The main political actors were the leaders of eco-region water boards who coordinated the planting of rice. "Kingdoms" began to form on the rice plains through alliance structures.
[1]
[1]: (Hall in Tarling 1993, 205) |
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A political structure evolved that despite being decentralised, allowed a flow of income to the central government.
[1]
. Although this supported a sophisticated level of court life, there was still no centre of power and instead a number of principalities and vassal states vied for dominance.
[2]
[1]: (Kinney 2003, 49) [2]: (Kinney 2003, 83) |
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Majapahit marked a transition to a kingdom with a more powerful centre which could collect revenue and products directly from outlying and subordinate areas rather than just receiving them as tribute or ritual offering. Tax and revenue is sent to the centre, but this relationship is mediated through watek ruled by individuals known as rakrayan, many of which would have once been independent chiefdoms which retained a separate but clearly subordinate identity, though the centre remained neither brave nor powerful enough to totally strip the power of this traditional elite. As time went on, the central court increasingly dealt directly with local indigenous temples and built trade links with the villages, bypassing the watek and offering local temples tax exemption or sima in exchange for loyalty.
[1]
Furthermore, the degree of centralisation increased throughout the Majapahit era - the idea of state evolvmed from fluid Indic mandala as described in the Tuhanaru inscription of 1326, but Jawa bhûmi as conceptualised in the Nagarakërtagama. In this formulation, the state is more stable and integrated politically and economically - it is distinguished from the larger territory that was said to be "in the orbit" of the Majapahit kraton.
[2]
However, the generally decentralized system also created powerful and autonomous enclaves in port areas.
[3]
[1]: (Hall in Tarling 1993) [2]: (Hall 2000, 59) [3]: (Christie 1991, 37) |
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Generally there was a rule of autonomous financing for all parts of the administration - it was a state governed by the ideal of non-interference, which in turn was in accord with the self-sufficiency of the agrarian life. Not much differentiation of occupation nor contact with the outside world was required, and the state became the guardian against disturbance, interfering only when there was a threat to tranquility. The punggawa, or official, within his region wielded the power of administrator, judge, and commander of the local contingent of troops.
[1]
Amangkurat I (Sultan Agung’s son) attempted to consolidate the empire and to centralise its administration and finances. He hoped to turn an empire which Sultan Agung had based on military might into a unified kingdom where resources were monopolised for the benefit of the king. However communication, population and geographical factors proved impossible to overcome and Amangkurat I brought about the greatest rebellion in the seventeenth century and allowed for the intervention of the VOC.
[2]
[1]: (Moertono 2009, 88) [2]: (Ricklefs 1993, 91) |
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Traditionally, authority did not extend beyond the atoll and was shared among multiple chiefs on one island. Chuuk was somewhat more fragmented than other Micronesian societies: ’Throughout most of Micronesia the maximum independent autonomous political unit was the high island or the atoll, often subdivided into more than one polity. At the time of European contact, Satawan Atoll in the Mortlocks had four separate communities, each with its own leader, which sometimes fought one another. Palau had two confederations of villages or districts, each independent of the other, and the villages themselves had considerable autonomy. Pohnpei had five petty states, although traditions of a unified rule for the whole island are apparent from an earlier period. Chuuk was extremely fragmented politically, with several independent communities on each of the six larger high islands. The Marshalls and the Gilberts had larger polities and integrated groups of separate atolls under a high chief; these expansionist states achieved their fullest development after the introduction of firearms by Europeans.’
[1]
[1]: (Kahn, Fischer and Kiste 2017) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/XHZTEDKE. |
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The colonial governments appointed a number of head-chiefs and superimposed a colonial administration onto the native system: ’In 1904 the disarming of the Truk people was undertaken by the “Kondor.” There were 436 guns and 2,531 cartridges confiscated. For better control the government appointed six head-chiefs, banished some swashbucklers who did not want to submit, and turned out the Japanese. With this a peaceful development was initiated. The missions (Protestant mission since 1879, Catholic mission since 1912) were able to work undisturbed. Unfortunately, the German government took little notice of Truk, since it was too preoccupied with the other islands. Yet many things were accomplished. Under the last director of the station, A. Überhorst, the lagoon was given new impetus in every respect. The relationship between officials and the population was usually a good one, under Mr. Überhorst even a cordial one. Anyone who was on Truk in those years certainly did not see any bad treatment of the natives. Much was done also with regard to health; in particular Dr. Mayer and his wife traveled from island to island without rest in order to take care of the sick. If during the Japanese occupation a young naval officer was not ashamed to assert that the Germans had done nothing for the islands, anyone who lived on the islands during the Japanese period can only say from the heart: “God protect the poor Truk people under the Japanese.”’
[1]
Head-chiefs or island-chiefs resolved disputes that could not be settled on the village level: ’The Germans set up a single chief over each island, or in Truk proper, over each large island with its satellites. One of the functions of this single chief was to settle such land disputes as could not be settled at the village level in order to prevent the outbreak of intra-island warfare.’
[2]
In the Japanese period, schooling was introduced, producing a small Chuukese elite of petty officials: ’The purpose of the schools for natives, judging from both reported policies and the Japanese school regulations was to civilize the natives and make them into loyal and economically useful citizens of the Japanese empire. While there was theoretically no limit to the higher education which the native child with sufficient ability and financial support might obtain, in actual fact only a minority of Trukese children attended the fourth and fifth grades, and only a minority of those completing fifth grade obtained further education at the vocational schools. Apparently no Trukese native obtained any academic education beyond fifth grade, except incidentally along with vocational training. The system was geared in effect to produce a supply of general laborers and domestic servants who understood the Japanese language, plus a small elite of skilled laborers and petty officials.’
[3]
Fischer also speaks of ’magistrates’ and village chiefs, although their relationship to the above categories is somewhat unclear: ’The chiefs who receive these food presentations and feasts may not be the elected magistrates. If the magistrates happen to be also hereditary village chiefs, they receive such presentations, but only from their own village and not from the whole island. Most islands, even the outer islands, have at least two villages, and the larger island of Truk has a dozen or so each. Usually the village chief is a member of the chiefly clan who has been chosen for personal ability and not for seniority. This tendency is by no means universal.’
[4]
Expert feedback on this is needed.
[1]: Bollig, Laurentius 1927. “Inhabitants Of The Truk Islands: Religion, Life And A Short Grammar Of A Micronesian People”, 253 [2]: Fischer, John L. 1958. “Native Land Tenure In The Truk District”, 205 [3]: Fischer, John L. 1961. “Japanese Schools For The Natives Of Truk, Caroline Islands”, 84 [4]: Fischer, John L. 1958. “Native Land Tenure In The Truk District”, 209 |
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It is generally argue that during 2200-1900 BCE, the major communities acted as political, economic and ritual centers for their surrounding hinterland.
[1]
[1]: e.g. Whitelaw, T. 2012. "The urbanization of prehistoric Crete: settlement perspectives on Minoan state formation," in n Schope, I., Tomkins, P. and Driessen, J. (eds), Back to the Beginning: Reassessing Social and Political Complexity on Crete during the Early and Middle Bronze Age, Oxford, 114-76. |
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It is generally argued that island was divided into small independent "states" centered upon large monumental complexes generally known as "palaces".
[1]
[2]
These polities appear to be independent and autonomous in political and economic terms.
[1]: e.g. Cherry, J. F. 1986. “Polities and palaces: some problems in the Minoan state formation,” in Renfrew, C. and Cherry, J. F. (eds), Peer-Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change, Cambridge, 19-45 [2]: Cadogan, G. 1994."An Old Palace period Knossos state," in in Evely, D., Hughes-Brock, H., and Momigliano, N. (eds), Knossos. A Labyrinth of History. Papers in Honor of Sinclair Hood, London, 57-68. |
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Some scholars see the island divided into small independent "states" centered upon large monumental complexes generally known as "palaces".
[1]
[2]
[3]
Others favours Knossian hegemony implying that Crete was politically unified under the control of the Knossian ruler
[4]
[5]
[6]
Yet other have favored the idea of independent political formations emulating Knossos.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[1]: Cherry, J. F. 1986. “Polities and palaces: some problems in the Minoan state formation,” in Renfrew, C. and Cherry, J. F. (eds.), Peer-Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change, Cambridge, 19-45 [2]: Bennet, J. 1990. "Knossos in context: comparative perspectives on the Linear B administration of LM II-III Crete," American Journal of Archaeology 94, 193-211 [3]: Christakis, K.S. 2008. The Politics of Storage. Storage and Sociopolitical Complexity in Neopalatial Crete (Prehistory Monographs 25), Philadelphia, 2-7 [4]: Betts, J.H. 1967. " New light on Minoan bureaucracy. A reexamination of some Cretan seals," Kadmos 6, 15-40 [5]: Hallager, E. and B. P. 1996. "The Knossian bull-political propaganda in Neo-palatial Crete," in Laffineur, R. and Niemeier, W.-D. (eds), POLITEIA. Society and State in the Aegean Bronze Age. Proceedings of the 5th International Aegean Conference, Heidelberg, 10-13 April 1994 (Aegaeum 12), Liège, 547-56 [6]: Wiener, M. W. 2007. "Neopalatial Knossos: rule and role," in Betancourt, P.P., Nelson, M. C., Williams, H. (eds), Krinoi kai Limenes. Studies in Honor of Joseph and Maria Shaw (Prehistory Monographs 22), Philadelphia 231-42. [7]: Schoep, I. 1999. "Tables and territories: reconstructing Late Minoan IB political territories throughout undeciphered documents," American Journal of Archaeology 103, 201-21 [8]: Soles, J. S. 1995. "The function of a cosmological center: Knossos in palatial Crete," in Laffineur, R. and Niemeier, W.-D. (eds.), POLITEIA. Society and State in the Aegean Bronze Age (Aegaeum12), Liège, 405-14 [9]: Knappett, C. J. and Schoep, I. 2000. "Continuity and change in Minoan political power," Antiquity 74, 365-71. |
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Two different narratives have been proposed based on archaeological data and epigraphy. Bennet argued that Crete, except the east region of the island, was divided into a series of provinces, hierarchy organized, and centered upon Knossos.
[1]
[2]
Driessen suggested that the Knossian satellites acted more as local extractions nodes.
[3]
[4]
.
[1]: Bennet, J. 1988. "Outside in the distance: problems in understanding the economic geography of Mycenaean palatial territories," in Olivier, J.-P. and Palaima, T. G. (eds), Text, Tablets and Scribes. Studies in Mycenaean Epigraphy and Economy Offered to Emmett L. Bennett, Jr. (Minos Suppl. 10), Salamanga, 19-42 [2]: Bennet, J. 1990. "Knossos in context: comparative perspectives on the Linear B administration of LM II-III Crete," American Journal of Archaeology 94, 193-211. [3]: Driessen, J. 2001." Centre and periphery: some observations on the administration of the kingdom of Knossos," in Voutsaki, S. and Killen, J. T. (eds), Economy and Politics in the Mycenaean Palace States (Cambridge Philosophical Society Suppl. 27), Cambridge, 96-112 [4]: Driessen, J. and Langohr, C. 2007. "Rallying round a "Minoan" past: the legation of power at Knossos during the Late Bronze Age," in Galaty, M. L. and Parkinson, W. A. (eds), Rethinking Mycenaean Palaces II (2nd ed.), Los Angeles, 178-89 |
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The violent destruction of the Knossian "palace" at the end of the Late Minoan IIIA2, the longest-lived monumental building compound of the island, mark the end of the political authority which controlled most regions of Crete during the Late Minoan II and Late Minoan IIIA periods. Regional centers, once secondary capitals under the Knossian control, regain a degree of independence. The regional elites exerted their authorities over the land by adopting social instruments and ideological strategies which turned out to be very similar to those used by the previous Knossian power, beginning possibly with the Linear B administration.
[1]
Crete, to quote Popham "was free, too, of centralized control and it may be assumed that the various geographical regions, or provinces, existed independently under their local rulers."
[2]
[1]: Borgna, E. 2003. "Regional settlement patterns, exchange systems and sources of power in Crete at the ends of the Late Bronze Age: establishing a connection," SMEA 45, 158. [2]: Popham, M. R. 1994. "Late Minoan II to the end of the Bronze Age," in Evely, D., Hughes-Brock, H., and Momigliano, N. (eds), Knossos. A Labyrinth of History. Papers in Honour of Sinclair Hood, London, 90. |
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The centralized administrations established by regional elites in Late Minoan IIIB (1300-1200 BCE), once under the control of the Knossian polity, are now replaced by new ones, "thereby creating new processes and new dynamics and exerting a new impact of settlement patterns, social organizations, forms of production and exchange and the conception of the role of the individual within the social community."
[1]
[1]: Borgna, E. 2003. "Regional settlement patterns, exchange systems and sources of power in Crete at the ends of the Late Bronze Age: establishing a connection," SMEA 45, 153-83. |
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"Pottery distributions indicate that this polity was not organized as a centralized state."
[1]
"Settlement patterns from the Sacred Valley and Paruro study regions indicate that the polity in the Cusco Basin was capable of dominating an area within about 20 kilometers of its principal settlements (fig. 4.8). Groups living outside of that area interacted with the Cusco polity but probably were not under its control." [2] However, the Cuzco polity may have been large enough to influence small polities to the north and south. [3] [1]: (Covey 2006, 69) [2]: (Covey 2006, 68) [3]: (Bauer 2004, 54) |
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Two main polities are known for this period; the Killke (Inca) and Pinagua of the Lucre Basin.
For the Incas, chroniclers say earliest rulers had a small territory and lacked control over neighbouring groups. Mayta Capac* consolidated Inca control over the Cusco Basin. Military hierarchy increased from these times. [1] *(c1290 CE) Cuzco/Killke polity in the 1000-1200 CE period [2] influenced the Masca and Tambo regions had sustained interaction with the Chillque Paruro were possibly under Cusco domination [3] [1]: (Covey 2006, 112) [2]: (Covey 2006, 135) [3]: (Covey 2006, 105) |
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Chroniclers say earliest rulers had a small territory and lacked control over neighbouring groups. Mayta Capac* consolidated Inca control over the Cusco Basin. Military hierarchy increased from these times.
[1]
*(c1290 CE)
Incas employed both an indirect form of rule through local elites and a direct rule within provinces organized under a state administrator. [2] "Control was not territorially continuous, nor was it stable until the imperial period." [3] [1]: (Covey 2006a, 112) [2]: (Covey 2006a, 112-116) [3]: (Covey 2003, 347) |
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"The archaeological evidence and chronicle accounts indicate that a centralized state formed in the Cusco region and expanded over a period of several generations leading up to the explosive territorial expansion of the 15th and early 16th centuries."
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“Although Castile, with its relatively small population and weak economy, did not have the resources to sustain great-power status on its own, when these were allied with the naval expertise and military manpower of Genoa and Naples, Flemish and Milanese weaponry and American silver, it could. In any event we must be careful not the judge the Monarchy from our own perspective of the compact nation state. The Spanish Habsburgs looked upon their network of domains as a family patrimony, and this concept of patrimony was accepted and understood by the elite.”
[1]
“It was attempts at increasing control beyond what was customary which led to unrest and rebellion, as happened with the Dutch in the sixteenth century and the Portuguese and Catalans in the seventeenth.” [1] “In New Spain and Peru, a series of extraordinary vicerorys brought administrative order out of the chaos of conquest and shaped a well-structured hierarchy of power that relied on the loyalty of soldiers, clerics, nobles, bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens…Some area in the Americans continued to resist Spanish control, but overall the empire functioned as an evolving fusion of Spanish and New World laws, peoples, institutions, and social structures.” [2] “From the time of Charles V, the military leaders of Italy, notably from the families of Gonzaga, Colonna and Medici, took service with the Spanish crown and helped to impose Spanish influence over the Italian states. At the same time, these military leaders strengthened the links of the Crown with local governing elites. The efficiency of the council of Italy lay in the fact that it was linked to a network of influence that spread throughout Italy. The community of interest, therefore, between local nobility and the distant crown, made it possible for a system of ‘empire’ to develop whereby the ruling circles benefited considerably from the Spanish presence, at the same time as they sought to make that presence less onerous. The crown had two powerful inducements it could use. It could offer posts in the bureaucracy to local nobility and thereby confirm their power; it could also distribute honours, titles, privileges and pensions, and in that way build up a network of eager clients.” [3] [1]: (Darby 2014, preview). Darby, Graham. 2014. Spain in the seventeenth century. New York: Routledge. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/3XIHTNCH [2]: (Philips and Philips 2010, 185) Philips, William D. and Carla Rahn Philips. 2010. A Concise History of Spain. Cambridge: CUP. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/ZT84ZFTP [3]: (Kamen 2002, 312) Kamen, Henry. 2002. Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763. London: Penguin Books. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/5IIFB6KQ |
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This is contested between two main positions among scholars. The first assumes that empires and centralization happen together, and is based on an uncritical reading of the main source for the period, the Arthashastra. The source is from the perspective of elites in the imperial centre, and may be overstating the efficiency of the state.
[1]
. The work of Gerard Fussman instead presents an argument that the empire could not have been centralized based on both the size and the technology of communication avaliable at the time. This argument is further bolstered by the presence of non-literal translations of edicts in local administrative languages.
[2]
As with most questions of this nature, the empire was in parts centralized, and part autonomous. It was a large metropolitan state with an outward looking elite overseeing with varying degrees of success over a large and in no way homogeneous collection of functionaries at both the provincial, district and village level connected together through a central vision originating with the King.
[1]: Singh, Upinder. A History of Ancient and Early medieval India: from the Stone Age to the 12th century. Pearson Education India, 2008, p. 340 [2]: Singh, A History of Ancient and Early medieval India, p. 340 |
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Western Deccan: "The earliest organized state in the region was that of the Satavahanas evolving out of the declining Mauryan power. The presence of the state is suggested by the evidence of political control and the use of an adminsitrative structure. References to units of adiministration and of what appear to be official designations point to a monarchical system. The title of mahamatra is suggestive of the Mauryan designation. The mahabhoja and maharathi as officials may in origin have been associated with high office in the Bhoja and Rathika clans and made the transition to administrative office when the requirements of the state demanded it. The constituents of the seven limbs of the state, the saptanga, are reflected in these and other indications such as the reference to Satavahana armies in action against the ksatrapas, to allies and enemies, to the treasury from the existence of Satavahana coins and revenue collection, to the capital from references to Pratishana and finally to the recognition of territory under Satavahana control."
[1]
[1]: (Thapar 1996, 23) Thapar, Romila. "Significance of Regional History with reference to the Konkan." Kulkarni, A R. Nayeem, M A. de Souza, T R. eds. 1996. Mediaeval Deccan History. Commemoration volume in honour of Purshottam Mahadeo Joshi. Popular Prakashan. Bombay. |
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"The fragmentation of the kingdom was inevitable as the Satavahana state was very loosely organized, with the local administration, even the maintenance of the royal army, being largely left to their feudatories, who even struck their own coins. This loose state organization was necessitated by the limited economic resources of the kingdom; the soil of their land being poor, the Satavahanas could not afford to maintain a large standing army or an elaborate administrative organization."
[1]
Only centralized after moving east after 140 CE: "The continued invasions by the Sakas of Ujjain (Malwa) and the prospects of encroaching upon the rich regions in the southern and eastern Deccan prompted them to shift their political base to the east around AD 140. The Satavahana state brought with it an organized administration and bureaucracy, a standing army, garrison towns, provincial administrative headquarters and a fortified capital." [1]: (Eraly 2011, 56) Abraham Eraly. 2011. The First Spring: The Golden Age of India. Viking. Penguin Books India Pvt, Ltd. |
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"The fragmentation of the kingdom was inevitable as the Satavahana state was very loosely organized, with the local administration, even the maintenance of the royal army, being largely left to their feudatories, who even struck their own coins. This loose state organization was necessitated by the limited economic resources of the kingdom; the soil of their land being poor, the Satavahanas could not afford to maintain a large standing army or an elaborate administrative organization."
[1]
Only centralized after moving east after 140 CE: "The continued invasions by the Sakas of Ujjain (Malwa) and the prospects of encroaching upon the rich regions in the southern and eastern Deccan prompted them to shift their political base to the east around AD 140. The Satavahana state brought with it an organized administration and bureaucracy, a standing army, garrison towns, provincial administrative headquarters and a fortified capital." [1]: (Eraly 2011, 56) Abraham Eraly. 2011. The First Spring: The Golden Age of India. Viking. Penguin Books India Pvt, Ltd. |
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Central authority
"the Vakataka period is represented by, 1. change in settlement pattern, 2. permanent land grants, 3. centrally ruling authority, 4. absence of long distance trade, and 5. revival of Brahmanism" [1] Under Harishena, "no contemporary kingdom was so extensive and powerful. Hari-shena must have been an able ruler, a skilful administrator, and a renowned general to render this achievement possible." [2] [1]: (Sawant 2009) Reshma Sawant. 2008. ‘State Formation Process In The Vidarbha During The Vakataka Period’. Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute 68-69: 137-162.< [2]: (Majumbar and Altekar 1946, 123) Majumdar, Ramesh Chandra. Altekar, Anant Sadashiv. 1986. Vakataka - Gupta Age Circa 200-550 A.D. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. |
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feudal empire; tripartite empire Inferred from the fact that the empire’s provinces were not directly ruled by the Emperor, but by "viceroys"
[1]
. After Mrigashavarma’s succession to the throne in 450, his brothers declared themselves independent rulers of their own territories, and the empire was therefore split into three smaller polities
[2]
. In the literature, this appears to be considered more a "phase" in the empire’s history than the beginning of three new polities, which is why I have elected not to create a separate page for whichever polity included the NGA we are interested in. Indeed, the polities would eventually reunite
[3]
.
[1]: Suryanatha Kamath, A Concise History of Karnataka (1980), p. 39 [2]: H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy and R. Ramakrishnan, A History of Karnataka (1978), pp. 47-48 [3]: H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy and R. Ramakrishnan, A History of Karnataka (1978), p. 48 |
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The Emperor was "the source of all power and the head of the civil, military as well as judicial administration"
[1]
. However, he did not rule directly over annexed territories: rather, he subdivided his empire among his subordinates (feudatories), who in turn subdivided their own territories among their own subordinates (sub-feudatories), and "feudatories and sub-feudatories enjoyed almost complete autonomy"
[2]
.
[1]: A.P. Madan, The History of the Rashtrakutas (1990), p. 193 [2]: A.P. Madan, The History of the Rashtrakutas (1990), p. 192 |
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Inferred from the following: "With the exception of Kampili, which never controlled large territories, each of these states incorporated local elites into their administrative structures in various ways, adding additional levels of complexity to this shifting political mosaic."
[1]
"The Hoysala state remained a significant southern power until the sultanate invasions in AD 1310." [2] [1]: (Sinopoli 2003, 66) [2]: (Sinopoli 2003, 74) |
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Inferred from the following: "With the exception of Kampili, which never controlled large territories, each of these states incorporated local elites into their administrative structures in various ways, adding additional levels of complexity to this shifting political mosaic."
[1]
"The Hoysala state remained a significant southern power until the sultanate invasions in AD 1310." [2] [1]: (Sinopoli 2003, 66) [2]: (Sinopoli 2003, 74) |
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loose: 1336-1509; confederated state: 1509-1565; nominal: 1565-1646While there is some debate over whether to define the relations between local lordships and the Vijayanagara kings as feudal or other, but there is no doubt that the degree of centralization differed during various periods of the kingdom.
The early Vijayanagara kingdom was more a group of semi-autonomous states rather than a unified kingdom. Centralized authority was enhanced by the occasional appointment of non-kinsmen, including Brahmans, to important military commands, and even to governorships of one of the five core provinces in the center of the kingdom. But this was not the usual policy; most often sons of the king ruled for him [1] . Through most of the first dynasty, Vijayanagara kings were content to be conquerors whose conquests left the ancient Cholas and Panyas in their sovereign places, except that they were reduced by their homage to Vijayanagara. Until the early sixteenth century, the latter were ritual sovereigns everywhere outside their Deccan heartland; apart from occasional plundering forays, they were content with the homage of distant lords [2] . Krishnadevaraya (reigned 1509-29 [3] ) changed much of this. He replaced earlier royal predecessors by his own Brahmans and military commanders and charged his agents to extract money tribute from subordinate lords who had previously been required to pay nothing to Vijayanagara, merely to acknowledge the latter’s hegemony in a number of symbolic ways [2] . Krishnadevaraya cast aside the ancient the ancient Chola and Pandya kings in the South and installed military commanders who not long after established centers of sovereignty opposed to its successors [4] . After the catastrophic sack of the capital of Vijayanagara in 1565, the kingdom saw a big decline in power, and a series of civil wars [5] . It was also during this time that the ’Nayaka kingdoms’, which had emerged at the very zenith of the Vijayanagara monarchy (during the early 16th century; e.g. Mysore and Ikkeri), became increasingly independent and sought to avert the re-emergence of a strong Vijayanagara king capable of reducing their authority and territorial ambitions [6] . Thus, the level of the centralization of the kingdom post-1565 should be defined as ’nominal’. [1]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 27-8 [2]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 140 [3]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 27 [4]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 141 [5]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 13, 122 [6]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 130-9 |
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loose: 1336-1509; confederated state: 1509-1565; nominal: 1565-1646While there is some debate over whether to define the relations between local lordships and the Vijayanagara kings as feudal or other, but there is no doubt that the degree of centralization differed during various periods of the kingdom.
The early Vijayanagara kingdom was more a group of semi-autonomous states rather than a unified kingdom. Centralized authority was enhanced by the occasional appointment of non-kinsmen, including Brahmans, to important military commands, and even to governorships of one of the five core provinces in the center of the kingdom. But this was not the usual policy; most often sons of the king ruled for him [1] . Through most of the first dynasty, Vijayanagara kings were content to be conquerors whose conquests left the ancient Cholas and Panyas in their sovereign places, except that they were reduced by their homage to Vijayanagara. Until the early sixteenth century, the latter were ritual sovereigns everywhere outside their Deccan heartland; apart from occasional plundering forays, they were content with the homage of distant lords [2] . Krishnadevaraya (reigned 1509-29 [3] ) changed much of this. He replaced earlier royal predecessors by his own Brahmans and military commanders and charged his agents to extract money tribute from subordinate lords who had previously been required to pay nothing to Vijayanagara, merely to acknowledge the latter’s hegemony in a number of symbolic ways [2] . Krishnadevaraya cast aside the ancient the ancient Chola and Pandya kings in the South and installed military commanders who not long after established centers of sovereignty opposed to its successors [4] . After the catastrophic sack of the capital of Vijayanagara in 1565, the kingdom saw a big decline in power, and a series of civil wars [5] . It was also during this time that the ’Nayaka kingdoms’, which had emerged at the very zenith of the Vijayanagara monarchy (during the early 16th century; e.g. Mysore and Ikkeri), became increasingly independent and sought to avert the re-emergence of a strong Vijayanagara king capable of reducing their authority and territorial ambitions [6] . Thus, the level of the centralization of the kingdom post-1565 should be defined as ’nominal’. [1]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 27-8 [2]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 140 [3]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 27 [4]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 141 [5]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 13, 122 [6]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 130-9 |
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loose: 1336-1509; confederated state: 1509-1565; nominal: 1565-1646While there is some debate over whether to define the relations between local lordships and the Vijayanagara kings as feudal or other, but there is no doubt that the degree of centralization differed during various periods of the kingdom.
The early Vijayanagara kingdom was more a group of semi-autonomous states rather than a unified kingdom. Centralized authority was enhanced by the occasional appointment of non-kinsmen, including Brahmans, to important military commands, and even to governorships of one of the five core provinces in the center of the kingdom. But this was not the usual policy; most often sons of the king ruled for him [1] . Through most of the first dynasty, Vijayanagara kings were content to be conquerors whose conquests left the ancient Cholas and Panyas in their sovereign places, except that they were reduced by their homage to Vijayanagara. Until the early sixteenth century, the latter were ritual sovereigns everywhere outside their Deccan heartland; apart from occasional plundering forays, they were content with the homage of distant lords [2] . Krishnadevaraya (reigned 1509-29 [3] ) changed much of this. He replaced earlier royal predecessors by his own Brahmans and military commanders and charged his agents to extract money tribute from subordinate lords who had previously been required to pay nothing to Vijayanagara, merely to acknowledge the latter’s hegemony in a number of symbolic ways [2] . Krishnadevaraya cast aside the ancient the ancient Chola and Pandya kings in the South and installed military commanders who not long after established centers of sovereignty opposed to its successors [4] . After the catastrophic sack of the capital of Vijayanagara in 1565, the kingdom saw a big decline in power, and a series of civil wars [5] . It was also during this time that the ’Nayaka kingdoms’, which had emerged at the very zenith of the Vijayanagara monarchy (during the early 16th century; e.g. Mysore and Ikkeri), became increasingly independent and sought to avert the re-emergence of a strong Vijayanagara king capable of reducing their authority and territorial ambitions [6] . Thus, the level of the centralization of the kingdom post-1565 should be defined as ’nominal’. [1]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 27-8 [2]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 140 [3]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 27 [4]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 141 [5]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 13, 122 [6]: Burton Stein, The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara (1990), p. 130-9 |
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The Mughal empire had a centralized and imperialistic government; the emperor had unlimited freedom in making laws. Although he had a council of ministers he was not bound to consult them. The third Emperor, Abu Akbar, established a form of delegated government in which the provincial governors were personally responsible to him for the quality of government in their territory. Taxes were imposed by, and transmitted to, the center (the emperor).
[1]
[1]: C. Srinivasa Reddy, Mughal Historiography; review of Panjab in the Seventeenth Century by Chetan Singh, Social Scientist, Vol. 21, No. 1/2 (1993), pp. 105 |
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’The League of the Iroquois was originally a confederacy of 5 North American Indian tribes: the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. A sixth tribe, the Tuscarora, joined the League in 1722 after migrating north from the region of the Roanoke River in response to hostilities with White colonists. [...] On the eve of European contact the Iroquois territory extended from Lake Champlain and Lake George west to the Genesee River and Lake Ontario and from the St. Lawrence River south to the Susquehanna River. Within these boundaries each of the original 5 tribes occupied an north-south oblong strip of territory; from east to west, they were the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. The region was primarily lake and hill country dissected by numerous rivers. Deciduous forests of birch, beech, maple and elm dominated the region, giving way to fir and spruce forests in the north and in the higher elevations of the Adirondack Mountains. In aboriginal times fish and animal species were diverse and abundant.’
[1]
The individual member nations were represented in a common leage council: ’The Seneca ([unknown] sen[unknown] ku, locally also[unknown] sen[unknown] k[unknown] ), westernmost of the Iroquois tribes, were the largest in the Confederacy. Their numbers were often reported to be almost equal to or to exceed those of the other four Iroquois tribes combined (“The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual,” table 1, this vol.). Nevertheless, of all the Iroquois tribes they had the fewest number of chiefs on the League council; they held eight such chieftainships.’
[2]
The Iroquois Confederacy was effective in dealing with external enemies until the American revolution, but individual nations also enjoyed considerable agency in handling their own affairs: ’The Iroquois Confederacy differed from other American Indian confederacies in the northeastern woodlands primarily in being better organized, more consciously defined, and more effective. The Iroquois used elaborately ritualized systems for choosing leaders and making important decisions. They persuaded colonial governments to use these rituals in their joint negotiations, and they fostered a tradition of political sagacity based on ceremonial sanction rather than on the occasional outstanding individual leader. Because the league lacked administrative control, the nations did not always act in unison; but spectacular successes in warfare compensated for this and were possible because of security at home.’
[3]
The Confederacy was therefore an alliance of independent nations rather than a confederate state: ’Thus the League of the Iroquois was an alliance conceived among aboriginal nations which, though culturally related and speaking languages fundamentally similar but differing in vocabulary and idiom, had recurrently been in conflict. The league brought them out of conflict into peace. Then came the French, the Dutch, and the English, and the doom of the league was sealed, its desired results nullified. Here was an alliance binding together five distinct nations, based upon an orally transmitted constitution. It had no inscribed statutes, no taxes or levies, no gendarmerie, no hireling politicians. We hear, however, of tribute exacted of subjugated tribes. Tribute, as the Iroquois took it, consisted of stipulated sums of wampum demanded of the Algonkian tribes on the Atlantic Coast who produced it; and wampum was not an item of money, cash, or currency in native economy before the coming of Europeans to the Hudson Valley. Its function was that of a symbol, valuable in a spiritual sense and capable of serving the purposes of mnemonic record making. Thus the wampum tribute we read so much about would seem to be a measure pressed upon subjugated smaller tribes in the shell-bearing coastal regions, requiring them to furnish the wampum the Iroquois needed in the score of ceremonial uses they had developed for it.’
[4]
’During the 15th and early 16th centuries, warfare in the Northeast culture area fostered the creation of extensive political and military alliances. It is generally believed that this period of increasing conflict was instigated by internal events rather than by contact with Europeans; some scholars suggest that the region was nearing its carrying capacity. Two of the major alliances in the area were the Huron confederacy (which included the Wendat alliance) and the Five Tribes (later Six Tribes), or Iroquois Confederacy. The constituent tribes of both blocs spoke Iroquoian languages; the term “Iroquoian” is used to refer generally to the groups speaking such languages, while references to the “Iroquois” generally imply the tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy alone.’
[5]
’The Five Tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy lived south of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Erie, for the most part in the present-day state of New York. The alliance comprised the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca peoples; the Tuscarora joined the confederacy later. Evenly matched with the Huron alliance in terms of aggregate size, the Iroquois were more loosely united and somewhat less densely settled across the landscape. While the Huron nations traded extensively for food, this was less the case for the Five Tribes, who relied more thoroughly upon agriculture. Before colonization they seem to have removed southward, perhaps in response to raids from the Huron to their north. The alliances among the Five Tribes were initiated not only for defense but also to regulate the blood feuds that were common in the region. By replacing retributory raids among themselves with a blood money payment system, each of the constituent nations was better able to engage in offensive and defensive action against outside enemies.’
[5]
[1]: Reid, Gerald: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Iroquois [2]: Abler, Thomas S., and Elisabeth Tooker 1978. “Seneca”, 505 [3]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Iroquois-Confederacy [4]: Speck, Frank Gouldsmith 1945. “Iroquois: A Study In Cultural Evolution”, 36p [5]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Native-American/Native-American-history#ref968222 |
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’The League of the Iroquois was originally a confederacy of 5 North American Indian tribes: the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. A sixth tribe, the Tuscarora, joined the League in 1722 after migrating north from the region of the Roanoke River in response to hostilities with White colonists. [...] On the eve of European contact the Iroquois territory extended from Lake Champlain and Lake George west to the Genesee River and Lake Ontario and from the St. Lawrence River south to the Susquehanna River. Within these boundaries each of the original 5 tribes occupied an north-south oblong strip of territory; from east to west, they were the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. The region was primarily lake and hill country dissected by numerous rivers. Deciduous forests of birch, beech, maple and elm dominated the region, giving way to fir and spruce forests in the north and in the higher elevations of the Adirondack Mountains. In aboriginal times fish and animal species were diverse and abundant.’
[1]
The individual member nations were represented in a common leage council: ’The Seneca ([unknown] sen[unknown] ku, locally also[unknown] sen[unknown] k[unknown] ), westernmost of the Iroquois tribes, were the largest in the Confederacy. Their numbers were often reported to be almost equal to or to exceed those of the other four Iroquois tribes combined (“The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual,” table 1, this vol.). Nevertheless, of all the Iroquois tribes they had the fewest number of chiefs on the League council; they held eight such chieftainships.’
[2]
The Iroquois Confederacy was effective in dealing with external enemies until the American revolution, but individual nations also enjoyed considerable agency in handling their own affairs: ’The Iroquois Confederacy differed from other American Indian confederacies in the northeastern woodlands primarily in being better organized, more consciously defined, and more effective. The Iroquois used elaborately ritualized systems for choosing leaders and making important decisions. They persuaded colonial governments to use these rituals in their joint negotiations, and they fostered a tradition of political sagacity based on ceremonial sanction rather than on the occasional outstanding individual leader. Because the league lacked administrative control, the nations did not always act in unison; but spectacular successes in warfare compensated for this and were possible because of security at home.’
[3]
The Confederacy was therefore an alliance of independent nations rather than a confederate state: ’Thus the League of the Iroquois was an alliance conceived among aboriginal nations which, though culturally related and speaking languages fundamentally similar but differing in vocabulary and idiom, had recurrently been in conflict. The league brought them out of conflict into peace. Then came the French, the Dutch, and the English, and the doom of the league was sealed, its desired results nullified. Here was an alliance binding together five distinct nations, based upon an orally transmitted constitution. It had no inscribed statutes, no taxes or levies, no gendarmerie, no hireling politicians. We hear, however, of tribute exacted of subjugated tribes. Tribute, as the Iroquois took it, consisted of stipulated sums of wampum demanded of the Algonkian tribes on the Atlantic Coast who produced it; and wampum was not an item of money, cash, or currency in native economy before the coming of Europeans to the Hudson Valley. Its function was that of a symbol, valuable in a spiritual sense and capable of serving the purposes of mnemonic record making. Thus the wampum tribute we read so much about would seem to be a measure pressed upon subjugated smaller tribes in the shell-bearing coastal regions, requiring them to furnish the wampum the Iroquois needed in the score of ceremonial uses they had developed for it.’
[4]
[1]: Reid, Gerald: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Iroquois [2]: Abler, Thomas S., and Elisabeth Tooker 1978. “Seneca”, 505 [3]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Iroquois-Confederacy [4]: Speck, Frank Gouldsmith 1945. “Iroquois: A Study In Cultural Evolution”, 36p |
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Canaan featured several city-states, which sometimes formed larger coalitions with each other; in any case, there were usually several opposing coalitions within the territory of Canaan.
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"In 1983, Röllig criticized the “rather imprecise concept of the Phoenicians” employed by most scholars, but argued that “this need not surprise us unduly since the nation itself never developed an idea of ‘Phoenician’ as a national concept.” Most of our inscriptional evidence indicates that the populations others referred to as “Phoenicians” self-identified in terms of city-based affiliations or family ties during the Iron II-III periods; the tendency in presentations of Phoenician history from the past twenty-five years has been to emphasize these city-based allegiances, or to describe them politically in terms of a working confederacy."
[1]
[1]: Dixon (2013:12-13). |
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This is uncertain. While the region featured frequent civil war, there are no independent records or biblical traditions of powerful noblemen or the like with any territorial bases or autonomy. However, much of local administration seems to have been performed by tribal elders; and it is possible that taxes were collected within each region.
[1]
Pfoh (2008) argues that Israel was actually a "patronage kingdom" in which the monarchy did not control a truly unitary state.
[1]: Cf. McMaster (2014:85) |
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Loose federation with irregular taxation under Cyrus and Cambyses with automomous satrapies. Relied on non-Persian officials and existing institutions.
[1]
After Darius put down rebellions he created the ’world empire’ [1] but under this system regions were still autonomous, the improvement was fixed system of tax collection based on surveys [2] and an inspection regime. Centralization occurred at the satrap level such as with codification of laws, and coinage. Before Darius trade was in barter or Lydian gold coins. Satraps could coin money but only King of Kings could coin in gold. [3] Darius I developed a national script (Old Persian cuneiform) [4] but seems to have been ceremonial and used by Persians, in satraps local languages used. "Prior to the Parthians, political systems in Southwest Asia were for the most part relatively loose confederations in which central government ruled their ’empires’ through unstable alliances with vassals and satraps. Even Hammurabi, Darius, and Alexander were only temporarily successful in linking their centralized governments to local administrative institutions, particularly outside of the core areas of Greater Mesopotamia." [5] [1]: (Shahbazi 2012, 131) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [2]: (Shahbazi 2012, 132-133) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [3]: (Shahbazi 2012, 133) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [4]: (Shahbazi 2012, 126) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [5]: (Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 |
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Loose federation with irregular taxation under Cyrus and Cambyses with automomous satrapies. Relied on non-Persian officials and existing institutions.
[1]
After Darius put down rebellions he created the ’world empire’ [1] but under this system regions were still autonomous, the improvement was fixed system of tax collection based on surveys [2] and an inspection regime. Centralization occurred at the satrap level such as with codification of laws, and coinage. Before Darius trade was in barter or Lydian gold coins. Satraps could coin money but only King of Kings could coin in gold. [3] Darius I developed a national script (Old Persian cuneiform) [4] but seems to have been ceremonial and used by Persians, in satraps local languages used. "Prior to the Parthians, political systems in Southwest Asia were for the most part relatively loose confederations in which central government ruled their ’empires’ through unstable alliances with vassals and satraps. Even Hammurabi, Darius, and Alexander were only temporarily successful in linking their centralized governments to local administrative institutions, particularly outside of the core areas of Greater Mesopotamia." [5] [1]: (Shahbazi 2012, 131) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [2]: (Shahbazi 2012, 132-133) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [3]: (Shahbazi 2012, 133) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [4]: (Shahbazi 2012, 126) Shahbazi, A Shapour. The Archaemenid Persian Empire (550-330 BCE) Daryaee, Touraj. ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. Oxford University Press. [5]: (Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 |
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The Seleucid kings kept as much power as possible in their own hands, and had the final authority over decisions of the state, including the appointment of regional governors
[1]
[2]
.
"Prior to the Parthians, political systems in Southwest Asia were for the most part relatively loose confederations in which central government ruled their ’empires’ through unstable alliances with vassals and satraps. Even Hammurabi, Darius, and Alexander were only temporarily successful in linking their centralized governments to local administrative institutions, particularly outside of the core areas of Greater Mesopotamia." [3] [1]: Dreyer, B. 2011. How to Become a "Relative" of the King: Careers and Hierarchy at the court of Antiochus III. American Journal of Philology, 132 (1), pp. 45-57. p53 [2]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p152 [3]: (Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 |
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The Seleucid kings kept as much power as possible in their own hands, and had the final authority over decisions of the state, including the appointment of regional governors
[1]
[2]
.
"Prior to the Parthians, political systems in Southwest Asia were for the most part relatively loose confederations in which central government ruled their ’empires’ through unstable alliances with vassals and satraps. Even Hammurabi, Darius, and Alexander were only temporarily successful in linking their centralized governments to local administrative institutions, particularly outside of the core areas of Greater Mesopotamia." [3] [1]: Dreyer, B. 2011. How to Become a "Relative" of the King: Careers and Hierarchy at the court of Antiochus III. American Journal of Philology, 132 (1), pp. 45-57. p53 [2]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p152 [3]: (Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 |
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Prior to British imperial rule, the A’chik tribal population was not organized around a common political or administrative centre, with clans and lineages being the only supra-local social institutions: ‘The Garos are divided into nine subtribes: the Awe, Chisak, Matchi-Dual, Matabeng, Ambeng, Ruga-Chibox, Gara-Ganching, Atong, and the Megam. These are geographic subtribes, but are also dialectal and subcultural groups. According to their beliefs and religion, the Garos are divided into the SONGSAREK (following their indigenous beliefs and practices) and the Christians.’
[1]
[1]: Roy, Sankar Kumar: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Garo |
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Prior to British imperial rule, the A’chik tribal population was not organized around a common political or administrative centre, with clans and lineages being the only supra-local social institutions: ‘The Garos are divided into nine subtribes: the Awe, Chisak, Matchi-Dual, Matabeng, Ambeng, Ruga-Chibox, Gara-Ganching, Atong, and the Megam. These are geographic subtribes, but are also dialectal and subcultural groups. According to their beliefs and religion, the Garos are divided into the SONGSAREK (following their indigenous beliefs and practices) and the Christians.’
[1]
During the colonial period, a British administrative structure was superimposed on the native population, but the latter largely continued to regulate local matters according to A’chik laws and institutions: ‘Garo tribe inhabit the Garo Hills district in the state of Meghalaya. The district used to be administered as a ‘partially excluded area’ by the Deputy Commissioner under the executive orders of the British Government during the British rule. The tribal ways of life, community ownership and use of land and the administration of the society according to the traditional laws and customs were least interfered with overtly under the British Administration.’
[2]
The A’chik retained some autonomy under Indian rule as well: ‘The history of Khasi, and Jaintia hills and its people can be found from the early part of the sixteenth century, as prior to this neither the records nor traditions reveal any substantial information. Moderately large changes were brought forth through development of the settlements and the formation of the Khasi and the Jaintia Hill district in the year 1835 and the Garo district in the year 1866. The capital of these provinces was Cherrapunji in 1827 which later on was shifted to Shillong in 1864. The prevailing groups in the State are the Khasi, Jaintia and Garo. In an amendment made recently in the provision of Scheduled Tribe in the Constitution of India, the Rabha, the Bodo-Kachari and the Koch have been given the status of Scheduled Tribe in the State.’
[3]
[1]: Roy, Sankar Kumar: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Garo [2]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 28 [3]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 38 |
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Multiple, sometimes short-lived, Akan states governed the coastal area in the colonial period: ’The Portuguese first arrived in 1471 and later built a trading post at Elmina in 1486. Drawn by the trading activity on the coast, descendants of the defunct Bonda and Kumbu kingdoms settled along the north-south trade routes connecting the coast to the Niger bend region. The Queen mother of the Bonda founded the Akyerekyere kingdom along one trade route, which became a clearinghouse for goods from the coast. A prince of the former Kumbu royal house founded the Akumu-Akoto kingdom on another trade route. The Portuguese referred to this latter kingdom as the ’Acanes,’ hence the name Akan. Emigrants from Akumu-Akoto founded a second city-state to the east, called Akwamu. Emigrants from Akwamu in turn founded the Asantemanso kingdom in the Kumasi region. Mande-speaking immigrants conquered the Akyerekyere kingdom and later the Asantemanso kingdom to become the dominant power in the region, the Denkyira. In 1701, the Asantemanso under the leadership of Osei Tutu (d. 1717) rebelled and defeated the Denkyira.’
[1]
The individual Akan polities shared some structural commonalities, despite of considerable differences in popular participation: ’According to some ancient writers, there are two forms of government at the Gold Coast, namely, Monarchical and Republican. The districts of Axim, Ahanta, Fanti, and others were, previous to the year 1700, considered to be commonwealths; whereas Commenda, at that time a very populous district, Effutu or Fetu, Asebu, and Accra, were of the first kind. Henry Meredith, whose work was published in 1811, describes the governments along the coast as partaking of various forms. At Appolonia it was monarchical and absolute; in Ahanta it was a kind of aristocracy; but in the Fanti country, and extending to Accra, it was composed of a strange number of forms; for in some places the government was vested in particular persons, whilst in others it was in the hands of the community. What struck him as strange in the Fanti districts was that they frequently changed their form of government on certain occasions by uniting together under particular persons for their general safety, giving implicit [Page 26] obedience to their leaders; but as soon as the object of their union was attained, they reverted to their independent units. What is undoubtedly true is, that for very many years the Fanti town and village communities have enjoyed independence in a greater degree than any other tribes on the Gold Coast. In Appolonia one finds that so much authority was vested in the Omanhene that writers frequently thought his power was absolute. But on examining the constitutions of these places, they will be found to be sprung from the same root; the monarchical form of government so mentioned is what is common in Wassaw and other inland districts, and the republican is simply the constitution of some of the sea-coast towns close to European settlements and forts. These coast towns are communities whose government is based on the system already described; the president is Ohene, and his office is elective. Each town is divided into several parts, for fighting purposes, called companies (Asafu). One of these companies acts as the Gyasi to the Ohene. The Tufuhene is responsible for the good order of all the fighting men; the orders of the Ohene and his council are communicated to them by the Tufuhene.’
[2]
[1]: HRAF Cultural Summary for ’Akan’ Michelle Gilbert, Robert O. Lagacé, and Ian Skoggard [2]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 25p |
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The Union founded after Osei Tutu’s military victory against the Denkyira incorporated a set of allied sub-polities under the overall authority of the Asantehene based at Kumasi: ’In the aftermath of the Denkyira war the military coalition of states was transformed into a political union.’
[1]
For Hayford, this union was essentially a confederation of several ’imperia in imperio’ under the paramount authority of the Asantehene: ’The Native State, in its highest development, is to be found where a number of considerably important communities combine and own allegiance to one central paramount Authority. Such Authority is the King, properly so called. Thus in Ashanti, before the breaking up of the Court at Kumasi, there were the Manpons, the Juabins, the Kokofus, the Beckwas, the Adansis, and several other large and important communities, owning allegiance to the stool of Kumasi as the paramount stool of all Ashanti. Each of these important communities, when regarded with respect to the entire State, was a sort of imperium in imperio-in fact, several distinct native states federated together under the same laws, the same customs, the same faith and worship, the people speaking the same language, and all owning allegiance to a paramount king or president, who represented the sovereignty of the entire Union.’
[2]
For Arhin, the ’official’, confederated character of the Ashanti Union was being increasingly eroded during the time period in question, with the Asantehene seeking to concentrate power in Kumasi: ’Formally the Asante lived within a system of decentralized ‘patrimonialism’: that is to say, under the authority of hereditary rulers selected by the heads of the constituent units of the oman, the localized matrilineages, the villages and the districts who were, in the main, a gerontocratic body. The members of the various units also enjoyed rights of use in land. But the political history of Asante, from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the eve of colonial rule, was the history of the erosion of these political and economic rights. It was a history of the increasing personalization of power at the expense of the holders of hereditary authority and also of commoners.’
[3]
British colonial incursions subsequently upset the indigenous power structure and weakened Kumasi by imposing their own administration on the native system, including a court of ’appeals in the hands of a British administrative officer’
[4]
, and by backing indigenous resistance against the King. Wilks describes a dynamic struggle between competing interests: ’The Kumaseman sought to build up its power to ensure not only its de jure but also its de facto preeminence within the Asanteman. It moved slowly but surely towards a form of absolutism. The aman resisted the engrossment of power by Kumase and strove to maintain a “parcellization” of sovereignty of the sort also characteristic of feudalism.’
[5]
This supports the characterization of Asanteman as a confederated state despite of this process of centralization: ’It is arguable that the union, the Asanteman, has survived precisely because different (and even conflicting) concepts of its nature have always been possible. Did member states, for example, have a right to secede, or was the union indissoluble? In the early nineteenth century the Dwabenhene clearly believed that he did have the right, the Asantehene that he did not.’
[1]
[1]: Wilks, Ivor 1993. “Forests Of Gold: Essays On The Akan And The Kingdom Of Asante”, 112 [2]: Hayford, J. E. Casely (Joseph Ephraim Casely) 1970. “Gold Coast Native Institutions With Thoughts Upon A Healthy Imperial Policy For The Gold Coast And Ashanti”, 19 [3]: Arhin, Kwame 1986. “Asante Praise Poems: The Ideology Of Patrimonialism”, 169 [4]: Arhin, Kwame 1983. “Peasants In 19Th-Century Asante”, 478 [5]: Wilks, Ivor 1993. “Forests Of Gold: Essays On The Akan And The Kingdom Of Asante”, 118 |
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unknown/ nominal/ loose/ confederated state /unitary state ’It is important to keep in mind that Iceland as a whole (the ‘Commonwealth’) only had nominal centralization and was little more than a loose federation of smaller polities. However, the real political players were the godords (goðorð/chieftaincies) and, towards the end, the territorial lordships (héraðsríki/principalities). The latter can be regarded as emerging tiny centralized states. In some cases, complexity appears less when we consider the Commonwealth as a polity than if we were considering smaller units, especially the territorial lordships. Commonwealth Iceland could therefore be treated as a ‘quasi-polity’. However, this would make it difficult to describe a ‘typical’ polity within Iceland because there were two kinds. One could split the Commonwealth into two periods, the former characterized by godords and the latter by territorial lordships. Admittedly, the latter period would be a short one (1200-1262) although some territorial lordships existed before 1200 and some godords survived into the 13th century.’
[1]
The eminent political institutions of Commonwealth Iceland were the chieftaincy and its associated courts and assemblies: ’At the time of Iceland’s settlement, Norse people worshiped gods whom they called æsir (singular áss), and this religion left behind an extensive mythology in Icelandic literature. Thor seems to have been the most popular of the pagan gods in Iceland, although Odin is thought to have been the highest in rank. It appears that heathen worship was organized around a distinct class of chieftains called godar (singular godi), of which there were about 40. In the absence of royal power in Iceland, the godar were to form the ruling class in the country. By the end of the settlement period, a general Icelandic assembly, called the Althing, had been established and was held at midsummer on a site that came to be called Thingvellir. This assembly consisted of a law council (lögrétta), in which the godar made and amended the laws, and a system of courts of justice, in which householders, nominated by the godar, acted on the panels of judges. At the local level, three godar usually held a joint assembly in late spring at which a local court operated, again with judges nominated by the godar. All farmers were legally obliged to belong to a chieftaincy (godord) but theoretically were free to change their allegiance from one godi to another; the godar were allotted a corresponding right to expel a follower. Some scholars have seen in this arrangement a resemblance to the franchise in modern societies. On the other hand, there was no central authority to ensure that the farmers would be able to exercise their right in a democratic way. No one was vested with executive power over the country as a whole. In any case, no trace of democratic practice reached farther down the social scale than to the heads of farming households; women and workers (free or enslaved) had no role in the political system.’
[2]
’One of the peculiarities of early Iceland was the lack of formal state institutions. The legislature, extensive law code, and judicial system of local and higher courts left prosecution and the enforcement of settlements in the hands of individuals. From an early date, the country was divided into Quarters. Each quarter constituted a broad community with three assemblies (ÞINGS), with the exception of the Northern Quarter that had four, and a system of local courts. Once a year the General Assembly (ALÞINGI) met in the southwest of Iceland. Judicial cases that could not be resolved in local quarters were heard and the parliament (LÖGRÉTTA) convened. The parliament was the principal legislative institution and was responsible for the introduction and maintanence of law. It consisted of chieftains (GOÐAR) from the local quarters. After the conversion to Christianity, the two Icelandic bishops were each given a seat in the parliament. The institution of chieftaincy (GOÐORÐ) was the main locus of political leadership in the country. Originally there were 36 but this number was later expanded. Chieftaincies themselves were a form of property and could be alienated and even divided among multiple individuals. In some cases, individuals asserted power beyond the scope of the political system and controlled multiple chieftaincies. All independent farmers had to be affiliated with a chieftain, although they could choose among any of the chieftains in their quarter and could switch allegiances if they did not feel that their needs were being met. Other than a seat on the parliament, chieftains had few rights beyond those of other independent farmers and few institutional means of dominating others. Chieftains derived much of their authority from their ability to broker support as advocates for their constituents in legal disputes or feuds.’
[3]
Households and communes functioned as primary economic units: ’The principal unit of social organization was the household. Those with rights to property, the farmer and his (or her) family, headed households. Large households incorporated a range of dependent labor: wage laborers, servants, and slaves. As an institution, slavery declined in the twelfth century and had probably disappeared sometime in the thirteenth century; however, social distinctions were maintained between self-sufficient farmers (either land-owners or renters) and the majority of the population who served as household labor. The main cooperative unit outside of the household was the commune (HREPPUR). The commune was a territorial unit including many households (20 or more). The commune’s main functions were management of summer grazing lands, the cooperative round up of animals in the fall, and care for paupers who had no other household support. They also provided some insurance to households against fire or the loss of livestock.’
[3]
[1]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [2]: http://www.britannica.com/place/Iceland/Government-and-society#toc10088 [3]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders |
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With the acceptance of the union agreement, Icelanders formally pledged their allegiance to a higher political authority embodied by the Norwegian crown: ’The agreement by which Iceland was formally brought under Norwegian rule created only a confederate union, adn did not materially change the status of the Icelandic chieftains. They were now to hold their rights from the king, and were forbidden to wage war on each other; but since the Icelandic laws were still in force, the union agreement really involved only an acknowledgment of the king’s sovereignty, and the payment of a small tribute to the crown. It appear from the Icelandic code, the "Jónsbók", adopted in 1280, that the taxes to be paid were very moderate, as the twenty alnar vaomál payable by each freeholder for himself and his household, and by unmarried persons who owned property to the value of ten hundred unincumbered by debts, included also the old tax of thingfararkaup. Only one-half of the whole sum was to be paid to the king. The other half was to be kept in Iceland for the payment of the usual taxes. To the common people the union with Norway brought the distinct advantage of the termination of the bloody conflicts in which they had been forced to take part. Peace was established, and the conviction that henceforth the government would safeguard life and property must have created a new sense of security and well-being. Freedom from lawless terror, established by the altered relation to the mother country, must have been welcomed by the people in general as a new freedom rather than as foreign oppression.’
[1]
But the first jarl, i.e. the personal representative of the Norwegian crown on the island, only had limited influence on the chieftains: ’During the first years following the establishment of the union conditions in Iceland remained quite unchanged. The godords were still in the hands of the leading chieftains. Gizur, who was to exercise the highest authority as jarl, was unpopular, and his power was very limited. Royal commissioners were sent to Iceland to exercise control with or without his consent, and and he had to share his nominal authority with the powerful Oddaverjar chieftains of southern Iceland, Hrafn Oddsson of the Borgarfjord district, and Orm Ormsson of eastern Iceland. The king regarded him with suspicion; the chieftains hated him because of his rank and title; opposition and difficulties confronted him everywhere. Even his own character and previous record rendered him unfit to maintain peace and order, which was his principal official duty. He was unable to see the need of any change in the general régime, and the last chapter of his stormy life formed a fitting close to the drama of bloody feuds in which he had played so conspicuous a part. Shortly after the meeting of the Althing of 1264, while visiting in southern Iceland, he was suddenly attacked by Thord Andrisson, the head of the Oddaverjar family. With great difficulty he escaped from his assailants, and after gathering an army of 750 men he cruelly ravged the Rangarvalla district, where the Oddaverjar chieftains were dwelling.’
[2]
The crown established several offices for the purpose of governance: ’After Gizur’s death no new jarl was appointed, and for a time there was no real head of Icelandic affairs. In 1267 Orm Ormsson and Thorvard Thorarinsson went to Norway, Hrafn Oddsson following in 1268. Both Hrafn and Orm seem to have aspired to succeed Gizur, but the king found it advisable not to elevate another chieftain to the rank of jarl, as the title had been very unpopular. After some delay, and probably with the advice of Sturla Thordsson, he gave both ranks as hirdmenn and placed them in charge of Icelandic affairs with no other title than that of valdsmadr, or royal magistrate. Hrafs was to govern the western and Orm the eastern districts. Hrafn assumed the duties of his office, but Orm was drowned shortly after his appointment, probably on the homeward voyage.’
[3]
After the changes introduced to the Icelandic legal structre, royal officials and representatives were to preside over the Icelandic general assembly: ’Some of the most important parts of the code were, nevertheless, sanctioned already in 1271, as the thingfararbölkr, or constitution of the thing, the thegngildi, or laws governing the payment of fines to the king in cases of murder of freemen, and a part of the arfabölkr, or laws about inheritance. The remaining portions of the code received sanction in 1272 ad 1273. The introduction of this code wrought a fundamental change in the Icelandic constitution and jurisprudence. Norwegian law had been substituted for the old Icelandic code, the "Grágás"; the godords were abolished, so also the characteristic features of the Althing: the fjordungsdómar, the fimtardómr, and the office of lögsögumadr. The thing system was reorganized according to Norwegian pattern. The valdsmadr should choose a certain number of men from each thing district, 140 in all, to constitute the thing, and from these the lawman should select three from each thing district, in all-thirty-six, to sit in the lögrétta. Instead of the lögsögumadr there should be a lawman, after 1277 two lawmen, as in Norway. Royal officials and representatives of the crown should preside over the Althing and take part in its decisions.’
[4]
The law received more institutional backing: ’These new codes wrought a fundamental change in the conception of positive law as well as in legal practice in Iceland. The old court procedures with its intricacies and formalities was replaced by the simpler Norwegian system. The king was ruler and lawgiver was regarded as the source of justice, and behind the laws now stood the royal authority, ready to execute the decrees of the courts even against the most powerful offenders. Violation of the law was no longer viewed as a private affair to be settled by the offender and the party injured, but as a crime for which the wrong-doer had to answer to the government. The fines to be paid and other punishments to be inflicted were still to be determined by twelve men according to ancient usage. The old punishment of banishment for serious offenses was retained, but fines payable to the king were instituted in numerous cases, and capital punishment was to be inflicted for grave crimes, like murder, robbery, rape, counterfeiting, forgery, and seduction. Other severe punishments were also established. [...] But care had been taken by the lawgiver to guard against hasty action and undue harshness in the treatment of wrong-doers. In a chapter about legal decisions he advises the judges to consider carefully truth, justice, patience and mercy, in order that their decisions not bear the marks of cruelty and hatred. [...] The first lawmen appointed under the new law were Stural Thordsson and Jon Einarsson. The first royal magistrates who received the title of sýslumadr were Hrafn Oddsson in western Iceland, and Thorvard Thorarinsson for the southern and eastern districts, and Asgrim Thorsteinsson in the south-western districts. Others may have been appointed, but their names are not known. In 1279 Hrafn Oddsson became royal merkismadr with authority over all Iceland, as already noted.’
[5]
The presence of the government in the day-to-day life of ’commoners’ might not have been considerable, though.
[1]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 208 [2]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 211p [3]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 213 [4]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 214 [5]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 215pp |
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With limited archaeological (and no literary) evidence, it is not clear what sort of polity (or polities) were present at this time.
[1]
The earliest sedentary populations in South Asia thus appear to have been relatively small, and to have favoured specific ecological zones for the establishment of their settlements. In this earliest stage, it is likely that sedentary populations co-existed with hunter gatherers, and at least at Mehrgarh, it appears that the initial farming populations also engaged in hunting. [2] [1]: Rita Wright: The Ancient Indus: Urbanism, Economy and Society; Cambridge: CUP, 2010, pp. 79-105 [2]: Petrie, C. A. (in press) Chapter 11, Case Study: Mehrgarh. In, Barker, G and Goucher, C (eds.) Cambridge World History, Volume 2: A World with Agriculture, 12,000 BCE - 500 CE. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge |
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With limited archaeological (and no literary) evidence, it is not clear what sort of polity (or polities) were present at this time
[1]
. However, it is much more likely that we are dealing with a quasi-polity rather than a polity, and that there was nothing resembling a state at this time
[2]
.
[1]: Rita Wright: The Ancient Indus: Urbanism, Economy and Society; Cambridge: CUP, 2010, pp. 79-105 [2]: A. Ceccarelli, pers. comm. to E. Cioni, Feb 2017 |
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The settlements and artefacts from this period suggest increasing complexity, although it is not clear what sort of polity (or polities) were present. It is likely that there was a form of centralised authority, based on the complexity of urban planning, but whether this was a chiefdom or incipient state is debated.
[1]
[1]: Rita Wright: The Ancient Indus: Urbanism, Economy and Society; Cambridge: CUP, 2010, pp. 79-105 |
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The extent to which people in the Mature Harappan period were unified in a single polity is debated. Evidence suggests that there was a certain degree centralised authority to ensure the standardisation of weights, craft specialisation and the uniform urban planning at sites including Nausharo, Mohenjo Daro and Kalibangan (Rajasthan)
[1]
; but different forms of material culture suggest several distinct areas in the Indus Valley.
[2]
[1]: Agrawal, D. P. (2007) The Indus Civilization: An interdisciplinary perspective. Aryan Books International: New Delhi. p44 [2]: Schug, G. R., Gray, K., Mushrif-Tripathy, V., and Sankhyan, A. R. (2012) A peaceful realm? Trauma and social differentiation at Harappa. International Journal of Paleopathology 2, pp136-147. p136 |
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The extent to which people in the Mature Harappan period were unified in a single polity is debated. Evidence suggests that there was a certain degree centralised authority to ensure the standardisation of weights, craft specialisation and the uniform urban planning at sites including Nausharo, Mohenjo Daro and Kalibangan (Rajasthan)
[1]
; but different forms of material culture suggest several distinct areas in the Indus Valley.
[2]
[1]: Agrawal, D. P. (2007) The Indus Civilization: An interdisciplinary perspective. Aryan Books International: New Delhi. p44 [2]: Schug, G. R., Gray, K., Mushrif-Tripathy, V., and Sankhyan, A. R. (2012) A peaceful realm? Trauma and social differentiation at Harappa. International Journal of Paleopathology 2, pp136-147. p136 |
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According to Coningham, there is no evidence of centralized systems of government during this period. Attempts by scholars such as Maurizio Tosi to find evidence of differentiation and increasing complexity were not born out by the evidence. While recording systems are present, stamp seals and sealing, these appeared to be quite localized in terms of their production.
[1]
[1]: Coningham pers. comm. interview with Harvey Whitehouse and Christina Collins, Jan 2017 |
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The Parthian Empire was divided into three areas: self governing kingdoms in Mesopotamia; semi-independent kingdoms on the borders of Iran); and Parthian ’heartlands’ in the centre under rule of the King.
[1]
[1] "Written documents (mainly in Greek, Latin, or Hebrew) from the first two centuries A.D. in Southwest Asia suggest that the Parthian ’Empire’ was at most times an unstable coalition of vassal states brought periodically under imperial Parthian control." [2] [1]: (Lukonin 1983, 734-735) Lukonin, V. G. Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade. in Yar-Shater, Ehsan ed. 1983. The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2. III. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [2]: (Wenke 1981, 306) Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 |
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The two and a half centuries between Diodotus I and the last Indo-Greek king Strato II (10 CE) the names of more than thirty kings have been in recorded the region. Power seems to have been collaborative. The lack of consistent or reliable sources from either Western or Chinese sources means that any answer is largely speculative. As with so much with central Asian history, this is largely as a result of a reliance on numismatic evidence.
[1]
Numismatic evidence suggests kingship was collaborative but there are few reliable sources to provide details. [2] It is likely the rulers, who simultaneously produced their own coinage, ruled different parts of the Indo-Greek polity and employed their own administrators. That few of the rulers who succeeded Menander "could easily be named as his relatives, and the Indo-Greek realms were scarcely united after his death" [3] suggests the Indo-Greek region was for the most part not a united state and organization extended only to the limits of a particular king’s power. "Hellenistic kingship was personal, not defined by exact borders." [3] [1]: Guillaume, Olivier. "An Analysis of the Modes of Reconstruction of the Graeco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek History." Studies in History 2, no. 1 (1986): 1-16. [2]: Guillaume, Olivier. 1986. "An Analysis of the Modes of Reconstruction of the Graeco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek History." Studies in History 2, no. 1. p.1-16. [3]: (Jakobsson 2009) Jakobsson, Jens. Who Founded the Indo-Greek Era of 186/5 B.C.E.? Dec 2009. The Classical Quarterly. New Series. Vol. 59. No.2. pp. 505-510. |
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Government infrastructure consisted of bureaucratic, military and feudatory elements headed by an absolute or near absolute military monarchy. The empire was expanded and its territorial integrity maintained by its army. One theory advocates that the political structure of the empire was characterized by a ’hierarchical organization in a feudatory system’. Another view suggests the Kushan concept of kingship represented ’a step in the growth of a centralized, imperial state’. Another hypothesis suggests the Kushan structure was a mixture of both bureaucratic and feudal elements. Outer Satraps exerceted a large degree of independence the further south into the Indian subcontinent and further from the capitals one went.
[1]
[1]: B. N. Mukherjee, ’The Rise and Fall of the Kushana Empire’ (Calcutta, 1988), p. 448 |
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The Hepthalites were one group of a series of nomadic tribal confederations that are sometimes referred to as the White Huns. The evidence seems to indicate that they were a second wave of Hunnish migration. Commentators at the time differ as to what the structure of the group was and to what degree they differed from the other nomadic peoples of the area. The Byzantian commentator Procopius of Caesarea stressed that, ’They are not nomadic like the other Hunnish peoples, but have long since settled on fertile land.’ He further explained that unlike the other peoples of central asia, the Hepthalites were, ’ruled by one king and possess a legal state structure, observing justice among themselves and with their neighbours in no lesser measure than the Byzantines and Persians.’
[1]
As a nomadic confederation, there does not seem to have been a centralized power structure, although some evidence indicates the adoption of local administrations for the purposes of exacting tribute. [2] During the peak of their power, they seem to have become increasingly sedentary, and this potentially increased the degree of centralization. [1]: http://en.unesco.org/silkroad/sites/silkroad/files/knowledgebankarticle/vol_III%20silk%20road_the%20hephthalite%20empire%20BIS.pdf p. 140 [2]: encyclopedia iranica vol. XII, HAREM I - ILLUMINATIONISM, 2004. Fasc. 2, pp. 198-201 |
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The Hepthalites were one group of a series of nomadic tribal confederations that are sometimes referred to as the White Huns. The evidence seems to indicate that they were a second wave of Hunnish migration. Commentators at the time differ as to what the structure of the group was and to what degree they differed from the other nomadic peoples of the area. The Byzantian commentator Procopius of Caesarea stressed that, ’They are not nomadic like the other Hunnish peoples, but have long since settled on fertile land.’ He further explained that unlike the other peoples of central asia, the Hepthalites were, ’ruled by one king and possess a legal state structure, observing justice among themselves and with their neighbours in no lesser measure than the Byzantines and Persians.’
[1]
As a nomadic confederation, there does not seem to have been a centralized power structure, although some evidence indicates the adoption of local administrations for the purposes of exacting tribute. [2] During the peak of their power, they seem to have become increasingly sedentary, and this potentially increased the degree of centralization. [1]: http://en.unesco.org/silkroad/sites/silkroad/files/knowledgebankarticle/vol_III%20silk%20road_the%20hephthalite%20empire%20BIS.pdf p. 140 [2]: encyclopedia iranica vol. XII, HAREM I - ILLUMINATIONISM, 2004. Fasc. 2, pp. 198-201 |
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unitary state: 750-936 CE; nominal: 937-946 CE In 936 CE, the Caliphate lost substantial powers of authority and was reduced in its ability to control outlying territory because of bankruptcy and the disintegration of the army. The Caliph granted Ibn Ra’iq the control of military and civil power. Ten years later, the Daylamite Buyids conquered Baghdad, reducing the Abbasid Caliphs to figureheads.
[1]
.
[1]: Lapidus, Ira A., History of Islamic Society 2nd edition(Cambridge, 2002), pp. 58-60 |
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unitary state: 750-936 CE; nominal: 937-946 CE In 936 CE, the Caliphate lost substantial powers of authority and was reduced in its ability to control outlying territory because of bankruptcy and the disintegration of the army. The Caliph granted Ibn Ra’iq the control of military and civil power. Ten years later, the Daylamite Buyids conquered Baghdad, reducing the Abbasid Caliphs to figureheads.
[1]
.
[1]: Lapidus, Ira A., History of Islamic Society 2nd edition(Cambridge, 2002), pp. 58-60 |
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unitary state: 854-1218 CE; loose: 1297-1317 CE; nominal: 1318-1352 CE Independence and cohesion in the polity from 854-1218 CE. After this annexation by the Delhi sultanate and then civil war saw a loss of cohesion within the polity. The rise of the Samma Jams saw a degree unity return.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Panhwar, M. H. "Chronological Dictionary of Sindh, (Karachi, 1983) pp. 184-206 [2]: Panhwar, M.H, An illustrated Historical Atlas of Soomra Kingdom of the Sindh, Karachi, 2003, pp.19-71 |
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unitary state: 854-1218 CE; loose: 1297-1317 CE; nominal: 1318-1352 CE Independence and cohesion in the polity from 854-1218 CE. After this annexation by the Delhi sultanate and then civil war saw a loss of cohesion within the polity. The rise of the Samma Jams saw a degree unity return.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Panhwar, M. H. "Chronological Dictionary of Sindh, (Karachi, 1983) pp. 184-206 [2]: Panhwar, M.H, An illustrated Historical Atlas of Soomra Kingdom of the Sindh, Karachi, 2003, pp.19-71 |
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unitary state: 854-1218 CE; loose: 1297-1317 CE; nominal: 1318-1352 CE Independence and cohesion in the polity from 854-1218 CE. After this annexation by the Delhi sultanate and then civil war saw a loss of cohesion within the polity. The rise of the Samma Jams saw a degree unity return.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Panhwar, M. H. "Chronological Dictionary of Sindh, (Karachi, 1983) pp. 184-206 [2]: Panhwar, M.H, An illustrated Historical Atlas of Soomra Kingdom of the Sindh, Karachi, 2003, pp.19-71 |
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Late 12th CE Bosworth talks of branches: one based at Firuzkuh, at Gazna (after it was taken from the Turks) which was a base for attacking India, and Bamian which was a base for attacks into Central Asia.
[1]
"Although the earlier history of the Sansabani family had been full of feuds and disputes, the brothers maintained a partnership, with mutual amity and a division of spheres of activity and influence." [1] [1]: (Bosworth 2012) Bosworth, Edmund C. 2012. GHURIDS. Encyclopaedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ghurids |
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Late 12th CE Bosworth talks of branches: one based at Firuzkuh, at Gazna (after it was taken from the Turks) which was a base for attacking India, and Bamian which was a base for attacks into Central Asia.
[1]
"Although the earlier history of the Sansabani family had been full of feuds and disputes, the brothers maintained a partnership, with mutual amity and a division of spheres of activity and influence." [1] [1]: (Bosworth 2012) Bosworth, Edmund C. 2012. GHURIDS. Encyclopaedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ghurids |
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Centralisation only lasted for a few decades before the polity become much more loosely organised.
[1]
"the Delhi Sultanate was more like a conglomeration of nearly-independent principalities, jagirs and provinces, each ruled by a hereditary chief or zamindar, with their subjects looking more to their immediate governors who had absolute power in the provinces than the sovereign who was far away." [2] Only the area around the capital and a few major fortresses elsewhere, were under the direct rule of the sultan. Outlying areas were administered either by Muslim governors appointed from Delhi or by Hindu kings who recognized the sultan’s supremacy. Across most of the sultanate, local power remained in the hands of petty Hindu chieftains. In return for paying the land revenue to muqtas, subject kings, provincial governors, or sultans, the chieftains were allowed to rule their tiny kingdoms more or less as they pleased. Governers and kings alike assumed independence whenever the sultanate was too weak to keep them in check. [3] [1]: Habib, I. (2005). The Delhi Sultanate in The state and society in medieval India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp.37-44. [2]: (Ahmed 2011, 100) Ahmed, Farooqui Salma. 2011. A Comprehensive History of Medieval India: Twelfth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century. Pearson Education India. [3]: McLeod, J. (2002). The history of India (Vol. 1096, No. 2905). Greenwood Publishing Group, pp.39. |
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Ahmad Sh¯ah Durr¯an¯ı, Tim¯ ur Sh¯ah and later kings ruled through uniting the tribal groups in Afghanistan under them. However, there were internal rebellions from tribal chiefs and other ethnic groups. The kings after Tim¯ ur Sh¯ah were much less successful in holding the tribes together.
[1]
[1]: Dani, Ahmad Hasan, V. M Masson, J Harmatta, Baij Nath Puri, G. F Etemadi, Boris Anatolʹevich Litvinskiĭ, Guangda Zhang, et al. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Vol. V The Sixteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Centuries. Paris: Unesco, 1992., pp.288-301. |
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i.e. not a unitary state.
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"the Yayaoi period was the first fully agrarian phase in Japanese history. The Kofun period is commonly regarded as the state formation phase."
[1]
[1]: (Mizoguchi 2013, 26) Mizoguchi, Koji. 2013. The Archaeology of Japan: From the Earliest Rice Farming Villages to the Rise of the State. Cambridge University Press. |
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"the official record is anything but uneventful, and for the years after A.D. 550 it is essentially an account of how a few men finally transformed the loosely joined Yamato state into a centralized empire."
[1]
[1]: Mason, Richard Henry Pitt. 1997. A History of Japan: Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing.p.38 |
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’In these ways the central administration was streamlined. At the same time, provincial affairs were closely supervised. Japan in the ninth century was more unified than it had ever been, in terms of effective administration.’
[1]
’The Heian period as a whole saw a steady growth in the number of shōen, and the power of great families and temples came to be based more and more on their holdings of these estates. Changes in the way land was controlled, together with persistent familism, led eventually to the breakdown of centralized monarchy and to the emergence of feudalism in Japan.’
[2]
[1]: Mason, Richard Henry Pitt. 1997. A History of Japan: Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing.p.67 [2]: Mason, Richard Henry Pitt. 1997. A History of Japan: Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing.p.76 |
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’the core of the government was now a single lord-vassal group, spread rather thinly throughout the nation. Yoritomo rewarded his loyal vassals with estates and offices such as jito¯(steward) and shugo (protector or constable)... They also collected dues for the bakufu, and were entitled to retain a portion of the produce of the land for themselves. Through this system Yoritomo exercised a relatively direct control over much of Japan, and also further eroded the revenue of the noble court families and central government.’
[1]
[1]: Henshall, Kenneth.2012. A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. [Third Edition]. p.36-35. |
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"It was an age when rival warlords, called daimyo (literally ‘the great names’) fought one another with armies of samurai - for land, for survival and, in some cases, even for that seemingly most empty of prizes, the control of the shogun himself and his devastated capital."
[1]
[1]: (Turnbull 2002) |
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Tokugawa shogunate built on the work of the generals Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) who between 1568 and 1590 succeeded in uniting all the daimyo (local military lords) ‘under a single military command, binding them together into a national confederation’.
[1]
The Tokugawa shogunate was capable of ‘exerting nationwide enforcement over military and fiscal institutions’, however, the daimyo still held considerable administrative authority and maintained their own armies. ‘although in theory they [daimyo] were allowed considerable autonomy in matters such as taxation rights and internal administration, including law enforcement, in practice they were expected to follow the examples and guidelines established by the shogunate. In effect, local government became their responsibility, and they had to carry out their responsibilities to the shogunates’s liking.’
[2]
[1]: Hall, John Whitney (ed.). 1991.The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 4. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p.1. [2]: Henshall, Kenneth (2012) A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. [Third Edition]. p.56. |
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The Iban claim to originate in the Kapuas Basin, but had established themselves in Sarawak by the 19th century: ’The Iban trace their origins to the Kapuas Lake region of Kalimantan. With a growing population creating pressures on limited amounts of productive land, the Iban fought members of other tribes aggressively, practicing headhunting and slavery. Enslavement of captives contributed to the necessity to move into new areas. By the middle of the 19th century, they were well established in the First and Second Divisions, and a few had pioneered the vast Rejang River valley. Reacting to the establishment of the Brooke Raj in Sarawak in 1841, thousands of Iban migrated to the middle and upper regions of the Rejang, and by the last quarter of the century had entered all remaining Divisions.’
[1]
Sarawak was initially controlled by the sultanate of Brunei before being ceded to the White Rajahs: ’Sarawak became the southern province of the sultanate of Brunei when the Majapahit empire of Java declined in the 15th century. James Brooke, an English adventurer and a former military officer of the East India Company, visited the territory in 1839 and aided the sultan in suppressing a revolt. As a reward for his services, Brooke was installed (1841) as raja of Sarawak over the sector from Tanjung Datu to the Batang (River) Samarahan; there he endeavoured to suppress piracy and headhunting.’
[2]
’At Singapore (founded 20 years earlier by Sir Stamford Raffles), Brooke learned that Pengiran Muda Hassim, chief minister of the sultanate of Brunei, was engaged in war with several rebel Iban (Sea Dayak) tribes in neighbouring Sarawak, nominally under Brunei control. The rebellion was crushed with Brooke’s aid, and as a reward for his services the title of raja of Sarawak was conferred upon him in 1841, confirmed in perpetuity by the sultan of Brunei in 1846. For the next 17 years Brooke and a handful of English assistants made expeditions into the interior of Sarawak, partially suppressed the prevalence of headhunting, and established a secure government.’
[3]
’British interests, particularly in the north and west, diminished that of the Dutch. The Brunei sultanate was an Islāmic kingdom that at one time had controlled the whole island but by the 19th century ruled only in the north and northwest. Sarawak was split away on the southwest, becoming an independent kingdom and then a British colony’
[4]
There was no central organization among the Iban themselves: ’Each longhouse, as each BILEK, is an autonomous unit. Traditionally the core of each house was a group of descendants of the founders. Houses near one another on the same river or in the same region were commonly allied, marrying among themselves, raiding together beyond their territories, and resolving disputes by peaceful means. Regionalism, deriving from these alliances, in which Iban distinguished themselves from other allied groups, persist in modern state politics. Essentially egalitarian, Iban are aware of long-standing status distinctions among themselves of RAJA BERANI (wealthy and brave), MENSI SARIBU (commoners), and ULUN (slaves). Prestige still accrues to descendants of the first status, disdain to descendants of the third.’
[1]
’Prior to the arrival of the British adventurer, James Brooke, there were no permanent leaders, but the affairs of each house were directed by consultations of family leaders. Men of influence included renowned warriors, bards, augurs and other specialists. Brooke, who became Rajah of Sarawak, and his nephew, Charles Johnson, created political positions -- headman (TUAI RUMAH), regional chief (PENGHULU), paramount chief (TEMENGGONG) -- to restructure Iban society for administrative control, especially for purposes of taxation and the suppression of head-hunting. The creation of permanent political positions and the establishment of political parties in the early 1960s have profoundly changed the Iban.’
[1]
It is assumed here that the reach of the Sultanate vis-á-vis the Iban population both in Sarawak and the interior was superficial at best. The sources also seem to indicate that the Iban population did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the Sultanate, being de facto self-governing.
[1]: Sutlive, Vinson H. Jr. and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Iban [2]: http://www.britannica.com/place/Sarawak-state-Malaysia [3]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Brooke-Raj [4]: http://www.britannica.com/place/Borneo-island-Pacific-Ocean |
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Under Brooke Raj rule, the governed Iban communities were relatively autonomous in the regulation of local matters, although a colonial administrative structure was superimposed onto the Iban system were independent small villages. The White Rajahs sought to suppress infighting and mobilize Iban communities for their own military interests: ’In the present day, under the rule of Rajah Brooke, no Sea Dyaks may go out on a fighting expedition unless called out for that purpose by the Government. I remember not long ago that there were some rebels in the upper reaches of the Batang Lupar River, who had been guilty of many murders, and would not submit to the Government. After trying milder measures without any effect, it was decided to take a force into their country, and the Government sent round the War Spear to let the people of the different villages know they were to be ready to go on expedition at a certain date.’
[1]
’Recurring hostility between the Brookes and the highest ranking Malays, who were “Arabs” and Brunei pengiran, grew out of rivalry, and the rivalry was in no small measure a contest for influence over the Iban population, as the history of the Malay Plot demonstrates. The Ibans were of central political importance because they loved to fight simply for the sake of fighting. The success of Charles Brooke with Iban levies from the lower Skrang and Saribas has already been described, but it is obvious that at this stage in Sarawak history, calling out the Ibans was still a game that more than one could play. At the time of the Chinese revolt in 1857, Charles had summoned his Skrang followers to the aid of besieged Kuching by sending a spear among them. Three years later the Brookes indignantly accused Sharif Masahor of using exactly the same tactic in the same area to call out hostile Ibans to fight the Rajah after the siege of Mukah. Well into the twentieth century, as we shall see, the dispatch of a “calling out spear” remained the standard official method of summoning Ibans for unpaid military service.’
[2]
The allegiance of the Iban subject population to Brooke authority was loose and ambiguous: ’Friendly Ibans were frequently able to manipulate Residents, who depended on them for information as well as for striking power. A classic case of confusion took place in 1879 in the Second Division, when the Resident, F.R.O. Maxwell, entrusted a Government spear to a visiting Iban headman from the Kantu River in Dutch Borneo. Maxwell asked this man to deliver a message to another headman on the Skrang River, who was supposed to report to Fort Alice. In this case the spear was merely a token of Government authority, according to Maxwell’s account, but it was also the sign commonly employed to raise forces for an expedition. Instead of using it to summon the man Maxwell wanted to see, his messenger called out a large force of Skrang warriors and led them in an attack on certain enemies in the upper Batang Lupar. The Resident then demanded a heavy fine from the Skrang leaders, charging that they should have known better, Government spear or no, than to follow a spurious call to arms. But they refused to pay the fine, and made threats against the Government. Eventually Maxwell had to send two large punitive expeditions into the Skrang River to restore Brooke authority. He blamed the whole affair on the principal Skrang headman, Kedu (Lang Ngindang).’
[3]
[1]: Gomes, Edwin H. 1911. “Seventeen Years Among The Sea Dyaks Of Borneo: A Record Of Intimate Association With The Natives Of The Bornean Jungles", 77 [2]: Pringle, Robert Maxwell 1968. “Ibans Of Sarawak Under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941”, 201 [3]: Pringle, Robert Maxwell 1968. “Ibans Of Sarawak Under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941”, 391 |
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Autonomous states:"from the time written records begin for the individual states that lay within the land called Hatti in Iron Age texts, it is clear that there was no sense of these states constituting a single political entity, or any form of political federation. Each was entirely independent from the others, each had its own autonomous ruler."
[1]
[1]: (Bryce 2012, 52) |
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mid-9th century BCE Assyrian records suggest Tabal "consisted of a number of small independent states (which may have evolved several centuries earlier) whose rulers became tributaries of Assyria. Shalmaneser claims to have received gifts from twenty-four kings of Tabal during a campaign which he conducted in the region in 837 ... However, by the middle of the following century, many of the states were apparently consolidated into a small number of larger kingdoms."
[1]
"from the time written records begin for the individual states that lay within the land called Hatti in Iron Age texts, it is clear that there was no sense of these states constituting a single political entity, or any form of political federation. Each was entirely independent from the others, each had its own autonomous ruler." [2] [1]: (Bryce 2002, 43) [2]: (Bryce 2012, 52) |
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The Kingdom of Lydia had mixed levels of centralization. In some areas control was strongly in the hands of the kings, for example, Alyattes appointed his son Croesus as governor of Adramyttetion, northwest of Lydia, when Cimmerians were causing trouble there. However, in the form of an Empire, much of Lydia’s control was carried out throught the enforcement of annnual tribute.
[1]
[1]: Roosevelt, C.H. 2012. Iron Age Western Anatolia. In Potts, D.T. (ed.) A Companion to the Archaeology of the Near East. London: Blackwell. p. 897-913 |
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It is unclear how much influence Lysimachus had on all parts of Thrace, particularly as the role of the Thracian ruler Seuthes is unclear. However: “Some poleis were accorded internal autonomy and the right to form alliances, but under the supervision of a strategos of the King as attested by the Ionian League. Similar organizations may to some extent even have the freedom to follow a foreign policy of their own.”
[1]
[1]: Dimitrov, K. (2011) Economic, Social and Political Structures on the Territory of the Odrysian Kingdom in Thrace (5th - first half of the 3rd century BC). ORPHEUS. Journal of IndoEuropean and Thracian Studies. 18, p. 4-24. p15 |
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380-331 BCE: nominal; {331 BCE; 301 BCE}-96 BCE: unitary state; 99 BCE - 17 CE: loose dates are not machine readable yet - ET
The Cappadocian rulers paid nominal allegiance to the Achaemenid Empire before it collapsed in 331 BCE [1] . After Alexander’s conquest of Asia Minor, Ariarathes I established himself as the first king of Cappadocia (a region largely left alone by Alexander) and ruled from 331 - 322 BCE. There was, however, some disagreement with Rome after Ariarathes I and the dynasty only continued when his son, Ariarathes II, regained the throne from the Roman Eumenes in 301 BCE. The Ariarathid dynasty then ruled until the 90s BCE, and ruled as the head of all state and religious affairs. The last Ariarathes (IX Eusebes) was the son of the Pontic king Mithridates VI Eupator, who was ousted by the Roman Senate and eventually replaced by the elected Ariobarzanes I [2] [3] . Ariobarzanes I, II, III and Ariarathes X then ruled Cappadocia from 95 - 36 BCE and maintained friendship with Rome during that time, leading up to Cappadocia becoming a province of the Roman Empire in AD 17. [1]: Ansen, E. M. (1988) Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 37, H. 4 (4th Qtr.), pp. 471-477, p472 [2]: Sherwin-White, A. N. (1984) Roman Foreign Policy in the Near East, 168 BC to AD 1. London: Duckworth, p71-71; 106-107 [3]: Rubinsohn, W. Z. (1993) Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos and Rome’s conquest of the Hellenistic East. Mediterranean Historical Review, 8(1), pp. 5-54. p18-19 |
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380-331 BCE: nominal; {331 BCE; 301 BCE}-96 BCE: unitary state; 99 BCE - 17 CE: loose dates are not machine readable yet - ET
The Cappadocian rulers paid nominal allegiance to the Achaemenid Empire before it collapsed in 331 BCE [1] . After Alexander’s conquest of Asia Minor, Ariarathes I established himself as the first king of Cappadocia (a region largely left alone by Alexander) and ruled from 331 - 322 BCE. There was, however, some disagreement with Rome after Ariarathes I and the dynasty only continued when his son, Ariarathes II, regained the throne from the Roman Eumenes in 301 BCE. The Ariarathid dynasty then ruled until the 90s BCE, and ruled as the head of all state and religious affairs. The last Ariarathes (IX Eusebes) was the son of the Pontic king Mithridates VI Eupator, who was ousted by the Roman Senate and eventually replaced by the elected Ariobarzanes I [2] [3] . Ariobarzanes I, II, III and Ariarathes X then ruled Cappadocia from 95 - 36 BCE and maintained friendship with Rome during that time, leading up to Cappadocia becoming a province of the Roman Empire in AD 17. [1]: Ansen, E. M. (1988) Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 37, H. 4 (4th Qtr.), pp. 471-477, p472 [2]: Sherwin-White, A. N. (1984) Roman Foreign Policy in the Near East, 168 BC to AD 1. London: Duckworth, p71-71; 106-107 [3]: Rubinsohn, W. Z. (1993) Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos and Rome’s conquest of the Hellenistic East. Mediterranean Historical Review, 8(1), pp. 5-54. p18-19 |
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380-331 BCE: nominal; {331 BCE; 301 BCE}-96 BCE: unitary state; 99 BCE - 17 CE: loose dates are not machine readable yet - ET
The Cappadocian rulers paid nominal allegiance to the Achaemenid Empire before it collapsed in 331 BCE [1] . After Alexander’s conquest of Asia Minor, Ariarathes I established himself as the first king of Cappadocia (a region largely left alone by Alexander) and ruled from 331 - 322 BCE. There was, however, some disagreement with Rome after Ariarathes I and the dynasty only continued when his son, Ariarathes II, regained the throne from the Roman Eumenes in 301 BCE. The Ariarathid dynasty then ruled until the 90s BCE, and ruled as the head of all state and religious affairs. The last Ariarathes (IX Eusebes) was the son of the Pontic king Mithridates VI Eupator, who was ousted by the Roman Senate and eventually replaced by the elected Ariobarzanes I [2] [3] . Ariobarzanes I, II, III and Ariarathes X then ruled Cappadocia from 95 - 36 BCE and maintained friendship with Rome during that time, leading up to Cappadocia becoming a province of the Roman Empire in AD 17. [1]: Ansen, E. M. (1988) Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 37, H. 4 (4th Qtr.), pp. 471-477, p472 [2]: Sherwin-White, A. N. (1984) Roman Foreign Policy in the Near East, 168 BC to AD 1. London: Duckworth, p71-71; 106-107 [3]: Rubinsohn, W. Z. (1993) Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos and Rome’s conquest of the Hellenistic East. Mediterranean Historical Review, 8(1), pp. 5-54. p18-19 |
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Ḡāzān had princes removed from power.
[1]
[1]: REUVEN AMITAI, ’IL-KHANIDS i. DYNASTIC HISTORY’ http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/il-khanids-i-dynastic-history |
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The Roman Republic was a unitary state, but highly decentralized in its administration.
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418 CE the Visigoths "finally left Spain and were settled permanently as an autonomous body on lands in southwestern Gaul, in the provinces of Aquitania secunda, Novempopulana, and Narbonensis prima."
[1]
[1]: (Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 477) Maenchen-Helfen, Otto. 1973. The World of the Huns: Studies in Their History and Culture. University of California Press. |
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Loose
"Governing Ostrogoths was a constant struggle to pull the forces of villages and kindreds, nobles and their followers, farae and allied peoples into line behind the will of the monarch. Tradition strengthens the hands of the nobility, prolonged crisis those of the royalty. Under such circumstances, Rome usually held the initiative and the Goths reacted as best they could. Consistent and long-term policy was virtually impossible. Even on campaigns, the king was rarely able to control his own people except in extremis ... even Theodoric himself at Marcianopolis... Ermanaric created the Ostrogothic confederacy as a military structure to establish a broad regional control over the numerous groups in the area and then led it against the Huns. And in this way he endeared himself to generation after generation. ... The Hunnic episode raised an elite far above the masses. The Amalian line profited from Hunnic favor, but the basic problems of leadership remained." [1] Unitary state "Once the Ostrogoths took over Italy from Odovacar ... In terms of government there was, of course, but one alternative - the late Roman imperial system. As a king of an allied people and as magister militum praesentalis, consul for 484, patrician, and Flavius, Theodoric saw his task as essentially the establishment of an adequate system of government over the Goths to refocus gradually their personal loyalty from him onto his agents and officers. Insofar as possible, he allowed the Roman bureaucratic state and its many departments to function as usual." [2] "The Anonymous Valesianus reports that Theoderic ’made peace with the emperor Anastasius with regard to the presumption of the rule (presumptio regni) and Anastasius sent back to him all the ornaments of the palace, which Odovacer had transferred to Constantinople [in 476]’. This symbolic act of returning the ornamenta palatii in 498 signalled the acceptance of Theoderic’s independent rule in the Italian provinces." [3] [1]: (Burns 1991, 167-168) Thomas S Burns. 1991. A History of the Ostrogoths. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [2]: (Burns 1991, 168-169) Thomas S Burns. 1991. A History of the Ostrogoths. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [3]: (Heydemann 2016, 20) Heydemann, Gerda. The Ostrogothic Kingdom: Ideologies and Transitions. in Arnold, Jonathan J. Bjornlie, Shane M. Sessa, Kristina. eds. 2016. A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy. BRILL. Leiden. |
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Loose
"Governing Ostrogoths was a constant struggle to pull the forces of villages and kindreds, nobles and their followers, farae and allied peoples into line behind the will of the monarch. Tradition strengthens the hands of the nobility, prolonged crisis those of the royalty. Under such circumstances, Rome usually held the initiative and the Goths reacted as best they could. Consistent and long-term policy was virtually impossible. Even on campaigns, the king was rarely able to control his own people except in extremis ... even Theodoric himself at Marcianopolis... Ermanaric created the Ostrogothic confederacy as a military structure to establish a broad regional control over the numerous groups in the area and then led it against the Huns. And in this way he endeared himself to generation after generation. ... The Hunnic episode raised an elite far above the masses. The Amalian line profited from Hunnic favor, but the basic problems of leadership remained." [1] Unitary state "Once the Ostrogoths took over Italy from Odovacar ... In terms of government there was, of course, but one alternative - the late Roman imperial system. As a king of an allied people and as magister militum praesentalis, consul for 484, patrician, and Flavius, Theodoric saw his task as essentially the establishment of an adequate system of government over the Goths to refocus gradually their personal loyalty from him onto his agents and officers. Insofar as possible, he allowed the Roman bureaucratic state and its many departments to function as usual." [2] "The Anonymous Valesianus reports that Theoderic ’made peace with the emperor Anastasius with regard to the presumption of the rule (presumptio regni) and Anastasius sent back to him all the ornaments of the palace, which Odovacer had transferred to Constantinople [in 476]’. This symbolic act of returning the ornamenta palatii in 498 signalled the acceptance of Theoderic’s independent rule in the Italian provinces." [3] [1]: (Burns 1991, 167-168) Thomas S Burns. 1991. A History of the Ostrogoths. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [2]: (Burns 1991, 168-169) Thomas S Burns. 1991. A History of the Ostrogoths. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [3]: (Heydemann 2016, 20) Heydemann, Gerda. The Ostrogothic Kingdom: Ideologies and Transitions. in Arnold, Jonathan J. Bjornlie, Shane M. Sessa, Kristina. eds. 2016. A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy. BRILL. Leiden. |
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The archbishops of Ravenna resisted papal claims to suzerainty long and well.
[1]
The territories of the Papal States were mountainous which made it difficult for the Popes to exercise its sovereignty, so the region preserved its old system of government, with many small countships and marquisates, each centred upon a fortified rocca. Reference needed
[1]: Partner, 61 |
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In general, this period was marked by a high degree of fragmentation and sub-regional autonomy, with various areas of the Patrimony of St. Peter virtually independent of the Papacy or subject to central powers in a very nominal way.
[1]
Papal sovereignty over central Lazio was rarely in question,
[2]
yet the papacy’s ability to control subject cities and defend its territory from outside threats was often minimal, particularly in regard to territory on the fringes of papal control.
[3]
For example, the city of Gaeta, in the extreme south of Lazio, was de facto independent of the papacy by the early 10th century.
[4]
In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, the papacy was frequently at war with the German emperors, causing serious destabilization of political authority in the Patrimony. I should emphasize, however, that it is difficult to pin down which of these terms is most accurate, since the papacy frequently entered alliances during this period, and significant parts of the Patrimony were de facto annexed by the Empire for decades at a time.
[5]
[1]: Wickham (2009), 164 [2]: Marazzi, 64 [3]: Marazzi, 64-65; Kreutz, 57-60. [4]: Skinner (1995), 2 [5]: Partner, 231 |
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"The centralization of the church had also resulted in its bureaucratization. The church at its center seemed less like a religious body and more like a governmental institution; the pope was not the spiritual leader of Christendom but a man of business, a lawyer. His aims seemed less governed by a religious agenda than a political one. And, always, he was asking for more and more money."
[1]
RC: The Papal states in this period fluctuated repeatedly between 3, or all 4 degrees of centralization. It had various factions of feudal noble vassals, ecclesiastical bureaucrats, and factions of Roman families, and the power dynamics between these forces and the papacy greatly affected the degree of centralization. [1]: (Madigan 2015, 297) |
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"The centralization of the church had also resulted in its bureaucratization. The church at its center seemed less like a religious body and more like a governmental institution; the pope was not the spiritual leader of Christendom but a man of business, a lawyer. His aims seemed less governed by a religious agenda than a political one. And, always, he was asking for more and more money."
[1]
RC: The Papal states in this period fluctuated repeatedly between 3, or all 4 degrees of centralization. It had various factions of feudal noble vassals, ecclesiastical bureaucrats, and factions of Roman families, and the power dynamics between these forces and the papacy greatly affected the degree of centralization. [1]: (Madigan 2015, 297) |
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|
"The centralization of the church had also resulted in its bureaucratization. The church at its center seemed less like a religious body and more like a governmental institution; the pope was not the spiritual leader of Christendom but a man of business, a lawyer. His aims seemed less governed by a religious agenda than a political one. And, always, he was asking for more and more money."
[1]
RC: The Papal states in this period fluctuated repeatedly between 3, or all 4 degrees of centralization. It had various factions of feudal noble vassals, ecclesiastical bureaucrats, and factions of Roman families, and the power dynamics between these forces and the papacy greatly affected the degree of centralization. [1]: (Madigan 2015, 297) |
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|
"The centralization of the church had also resulted in its bureaucratization. The church at its center seemed less like a religious body and more like a governmental institution; the pope was not the spiritual leader of Christendom but a man of business, a lawyer. His aims seemed less governed by a religious agenda than a political one. And, always, he was asking for more and more money."
[1]
RC: The Papal states in this period fluctuated repeatedly between 3, or all 4 degrees of centralization. It had various factions of feudal noble vassals, ecclesiastical bureaucrats, and factions of Roman families, and the power dynamics between these forces and the papacy greatly affected the degree of centralization. [1]: (Madigan 2015, 297) |
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The papacy’s ability to control the papal states fluctuated dramatically during this period, especially during the Great Schism (1378-1417). In general, the various lords, cities, and feudatories of the papal states were ready and willing to rebel when possible (for example, in 1375.
[1]
) Furthermore, the lords of the Romagna were de facto independent for much of the late 14th and early 15th centuries.
[2]
During the mid-15th century, King Ferrante of Naples deliberately contracted with Roman barons for them to raise mercenary bands for his service, undercutting these barons’ feudal ties to the papacy.
[3]
Brackets are required to reflect the consolidation of papal authority in the papal states during the fifteenth century, and the ambiguous relationship between papally-appointed, clerical officials and the local elites they were theoretically superior to.
[4]
Peterson has characterized the Church by this period as bureaucratic and legalistic, especially in the administration of the papal state.
[5]
[1]: Partner, 366-67 [2]: For these petty lordships, see Larner [3]: Mallett and Shaw, 10 [4]: For growing centralization under Martin V, see Partner, 402-09 [5]: Peterson in Najemy, 74 |
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The papal bureaucracy (the curia) was, to a significant degree, able to enforce decisions and collect taxes for the papacy during the second half the period. The foundations of political power in the Papal State during this period remained a unity of interests between the Roman nobles, the rural nobility of the Papal States and Lazio in particular, and the papal government.
[1]
This internal arrangement was usually based on a wider context of Spanish protection of the papacy and bankrolling its armies.
[2]
Brackets should be added, however, to reflect the fact that clerical officials appointed by the papacy were not always superior, in practice, to these nobles, particularly in rural areas and on the fringes of the Papal State.
[1]: Symcox in Marino, 114 [2]: Dandelet in Marino, 25 |
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By this period, the papacy was in unchallenged control of the territory encompassed by the Papal States, especially following the War of Castro (see above).
|
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Sakha clan and tribal organization was decentralized: ’Kinship and politics were mixed in the hierarchical council system that guided AQA-USA, AIMAK, and DZHON. Yakut explanations of DZHON in the nineteenth century included concepts like "people," "community," or "tribe," territorially defined. Councils were composed of ranked circles of elders, usually men, whose leaders, TOYONS, were called nobles by Russians. A lineage head was BIS-USA-TOYON; respected warriors and hunters were BATYR. Lineage councils decided major economic issues, interfamily disputes, and questions of blood revenge for violence committed against the group. AIMAK and DZHON councils were infrequent, dealing with issues of security, revenge, alliance, and, before Russian control, war. Through war, slaves were captured for service in the wealthiest TOYON households. Kin-based councils were rare by the nineteenth century and had little influence on twentieth-century politics.’
[1]
’Key kin relations are based on a patrilineage (AQA-USA) that traces membership back nine generations. Within this, children born to a specific mother are distinguished as a group (YE-USA), and may form the basis for different households (KORGON). Historically, more distant kin were recognized on two levels, the AIMAK (or territorial NASLEG), with one to thirty lineages, and the DZHON (or territorial ULUS), composed of several AIMAK. These larger units were united by alliances, including for common defense, alliances, and by economic relations; these links were renewed at councils and festivals.’
[1]
’The Sakha are thought to be an admixture of migrants from the Lake Baikal region with the aborigines of the Lena-probably mostly Evenk (Evenki), who have contributed much to their culture. Other evidence, however, points to a southern ancestry related to the Turkic-speaking tribes of the steppe and the Altai Mountains. The early history of the Sakha is little known, though epic tales date from the 10th century. In the 17th century they had peacefully assimilated with other northern peoples and consisted of 80 independent tribes, subdivided into clans.’
[2]
During the early Russian period, the Czarist administrative structure was superimposed on the Sakha system: ’No less significant changes occurred in the administrative organization of the Yakut country. In the seventeenth century Yakutsk was the center of a great independent country directly subordinate to Moscow, although for some specific questions it was dependent on the governors of Tobolsk. In the time of Peter the Great, Yakutsk entered into the newly organized Siberian Goubernyia (government) and with the division of the Siberian government into provinces was included in Irkutsk Province. In 1775 Irkutsk Province was organized into a government and the Yakut country formed one of the provinces of the new government. ’
[3]
[1]: Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Yakut [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Sakha-people [3]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut”, 224 |
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Sakha clan and tribal organization was decentralized: ’Kinship and politics were mixed in the hierarchical council system that guided AQA-USA, AIMAK, and DZHON. Yakut explanations of DZHON in the nineteenth century included concepts like "people," "community," or "tribe," territorially defined. Councils were composed of ranked circles of elders, usually men, whose leaders, TOYONS, were called nobles by Russians. A lineage head was BIS-USA-TOYON; respected warriors and hunters were BATYR. Lineage councils decided major economic issues, interfamily disputes, and questions of blood revenge for violence committed against the group. AIMAK and DZHON councils were infrequent, dealing with issues of security, revenge, alliance, and, before Russian control, war. Through war, slaves were captured for service in the wealthiest TOYON households. Kin-based councils were rare by the nineteenth century and had little influence on twentieth-century politics.’
[1]
’Key kin relations are based on a patrilineage (AQA-USA) that traces membership back nine generations. Within this, children born to a specific mother are distinguished as a group (YE-USA), and may form the basis for different households (KORGON). Historically, more distant kin were recognized on two levels, the AIMAK (or territorial NASLEG), with one to thirty lineages, and the DZHON (or territorial ULUS), composed of several AIMAK. These larger units were united by alliances, including for common defense, alliances, and by economic relations; these links were renewed at councils and festivals.’
[1]
’The Sakha are thought to be an admixture of migrants from the Lake Baikal region with the aborigines of the Lena-probably mostly Evenk (Evenki), who have contributed much to their culture. Other evidence, however, points to a southern ancestry related to the Turkic-speaking tribes of the steppe and the Altai Mountains. The early history of the Sakha is little known, though epic tales date from the 10th century. In the 17th century they had peacefully assimilated with other northern peoples and consisted of 80 independent tribes, subdivided into clans.’
[2]
During the early Russian period, the Czarist administrative structure was superimposed on the Sakha system: ’No less significant changes occurred in the administrative organization of the Yakut country. In the seventeenth century Yakutsk was the center of a great independent country directly subordinate to Moscow, although for some specific questions it was dependent on the governors of Tobolsk. In the time of Peter the Great, Yakutsk entered into the newly organized Siberian Goubernyia (government) and with the division of the Siberian government into provinces was included in Irkutsk Province. In 1775 Irkutsk Province was organized into a government and the Yakut country formed one of the provinces of the new government. In 1783 the government was again reorganized into a vice-royalty composed of four provinces, one of which was Yakutsk Province. In 1797 the vice-royalty was abolished and the government restored. In [Page 225] 1805 under the Emperor Alexander I, the Yakut country was made a separate province dependent upon Irkutsk. In 1852 the Yakut country was given a separate governor. After the revolution in February, 1917, a commissar was appointed by the Provisional Government.’
[3]
[1]: Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Yakut [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Sakha-people [3]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut”, 224 |
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The Spanish colonial administration resided in Quito: ’During much of the colonial period, what is now Ecuador was under the direct jurisdiction of the law court (audiencia) of Quito and ultimately under the rule of the Spanish crown. Spanish culture was spread primarily by religious orders and male Spanish colonists. In the Sierra, the Spaniards established a colony of large estates worked by Indian peons. Settlements included semiautonomous Indian villages and Spanish and mestizo administrative and religious centres such as Quito, Ambato, and Cuenca. The making of rough textiles in primitive sweatshops was the only industry. The development of Roman Catholic religious establishments provided for the flowering of Baroque architecture, sculpture in wood and stone, painting, music, and other arts and crafts. In the tropical Costa, much of the population died as a result of introduced diseases, and the area remained unhealthy until the advent of modern medicine. As a result, the coast was somewhat neglected during the colonial period, although there was some shipbuilding and exporting of cacao (as cocoa beans) from the port of Guayaquil. The small coastal population of slaves, free blacks, and mixed ethnicities, with plenty of vacant land and less coercion of labour, developed a culture very different from that of the Sierra. In the Oriente, the region on the eastern slopes between the Andes and the headwaters of the Amazon, large populations of Shuar and other indigenous people successfully repelled European invaders; however, Jesuits and other missionaries were able to spread both Christianity and the Quichua language. The Spaniards used Quichua as a language of evangelization-at one period missionaries were required to know the language-and continued to spread it orally by means of Quichua speakers who travelled with them in further conquests. The country’s fourth major subdivision, the Galapagos Islands, were little more than pirate nests during the colonial period. They were to achieve world fame in the 19th century, because it was there that Charles Darwin made a major portion of the observations that led to his theories on evolution and his On the Origin of Species. The people of Quito, the Ecuadoran capital, claim that it was the scene of the first Ecuadoran patriot uprising against Spanish rule (1809). Invading from Colombia in 1822, the armies of Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre came to the aid of Ecuadoran rebels, and on May 24 Sucre won the decisive Battle of Pichincha on a mountain slope near Quito, thus assuring Ecuadoran independence.’
[1]
While initially subject to Spanish colonial incursions, the Shuar tribes later resisted successfully: ’The first reported white penetration of Jivaro territory was made in 1549 by a Spanish expedition under Hernando de Benavente. Later expeditions of colonists and soldiers soon followed. These newcomers traded with the Jivaro, made peace pacts with them, and soon began to exploit the gold found in alluvial or glacial deposits in the region. Eventually the Spaniards were able to obtain the co-operation of some of the Indians in working the gold deposits, but others remained hostile, killing many of the colonists and soldiers at every opportunity. Under the subjection of the Spaniards, the Jivaro were required to pay tribute in gold dust; a demand that increased yearly. Finally, in 1599, the Jivaro rebelled en masse, killing many thousands of Spaniards in the process and driving them from the region. After 1599, until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century, Jivaro-European relations remained intermittent and mostly hostile. A few missionary and military expeditions entered the region from the Andean highlands, but these frequently ended in disaster and no permanent colonization ever resulted. One of the few "friendly" gestures reported for the tribe during this time occurred in 1767, when they gave a Spanish missionizing expedition "gifts", which included the skulls of Spaniards who had apparently been killed earlier by the Jivaro (Harner, 1953: 26). Thus it seems that the Jivaros are the only tribe known to have successfully revolted against the Spanish Empire and to have been able to thwart all subsequent attempts by the Spaniards to conquer them. They have withstood armies of gold seeking Inkas as well as Spaniards, and defied the bravado of the early conquistadors.’
[2]
The code cannot fully reflect the complexities of the colonial situation, with white settlers, subjected native communities, and de facto self-governing groups all inhabiting land nominally claimed by the Spanish crown and its administration in Quito. Most Shuar communities were de facto autonomous, hence the code.
[1]: http://www.britannica.com/place/Ecuador/Cultural-life#toc25823 [2]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro |
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The Spanish colonial administration resided in Quito: ’During much of the colonial period, what is now Ecuador was under the direct jurisdiction of the law court (audiencia) of Quito and ultimately under the rule of the Spanish crown. Spanish culture was spread primarily by religious orders and male Spanish colonists. In the Sierra, the Spaniards established a colony of large estates worked by Indian peons. Settlements included semiautonomous Indian villages and Spanish and mestizo administrative and religious centres such as Quito, Ambato, and Cuenca. The making of rough textiles in primitive sweatshops was the only industry. The development of Roman Catholic religious establishments provided for the flowering of Baroque architecture, sculpture in wood and stone, painting, music, and other arts and crafts. In the tropical Costa, much of the population died as a result of introduced diseases, and the area remained unhealthy until the advent of modern medicine. As a result, the coast was somewhat neglected during the colonial period, although there was some shipbuilding and exporting of cacao (as cocoa beans) from the port of Guayaquil. The small coastal population of slaves, free blacks, and mixed ethnicities, with plenty of vacant land and less coercion of labour, developed a culture very different from that of the Sierra. In the Oriente, the region on the eastern slopes between the Andes and the headwaters of the Amazon, large populations of Shuar and other indigenous people successfully repelled European invaders; however, Jesuits and other missionaries were able to spread both Christianity and the Quichua language. The Spaniards used Quichua as a language of evangelization-at one period missionaries were required to know the language-and continued to spread it orally by means of Quichua speakers who travelled with them in further conquests. The country’s fourth major subdivision, the Galapagos Islands, were little more than pirate nests during the colonial period. They were to achieve world fame in the 19th century, because it was there that Charles Darwin made a major portion of the observations that led to his theories on evolution and his On the Origin of Species. The people of Quito, the Ecuadoran capital, claim that it was the scene of the first Ecuadoran patriot uprising against Spanish rule (1809). Invading from Colombia in 1822, the armies of Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre came to the aid of Ecuadoran rebels, and on May 24 Sucre won the decisive Battle of Pichincha on a mountain slope near Quito, thus assuring Ecuadoran independence.’
[1]
While initially subject to Spanish colonial incursions, the Shuar tribes later resisted successfully: ’The first reported white penetration of Jivaro territory was made in 1549 by a Spanish expedition under Hernando de Benavente. Later expeditions of colonists and soldiers soon followed. These newcomers traded with the Jivaro, made peace pacts with them, and soon began to exploit the gold found in alluvial or glacial deposits in the region. Eventually the Spaniards were able to obtain the co-operation of some of the Indians in working the gold deposits, but others remained hostile, killing many of the colonists and soldiers at every opportunity. Under the subjection of the Spaniards, the Jivaro were required to pay tribute in gold dust; a demand that increased yearly. Finally, in 1599, the Jivaro rebelled en masse, killing many thousands of Spaniards in the process and driving them from the region. After 1599, until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century, Jivaro-European relations remained intermittent and mostly hostile. A few missionary and military expeditions entered the region from the Andean highlands, but these frequently ended in disaster and no permanent colonization ever resulted. One of the few "friendly" gestures reported for the tribe during this time occurred in 1767, when they gave a Spanish missionizing expedition "gifts", which included the skulls of Spaniards who had apparently been killed earlier by the Jivaro (Harner, 1953: 26). Thus it seems that the Jivaros are the only tribe known to have successfully revolted against the Spanish Empire and to have been able to thwart all subsequent attempts by the Spaniards to conquer them. They have withstood armies of gold seeking Inkas as well as Spaniards, and defied the bravado of the early conquistadors.’
[2]
The code cannot fully reflect the complexities of the colonial situation, with white settlers, subjected native communities, and de facto self-governing groups all inhabiting land nominally claimed by the Spanish crown and its administration in Quito. Most Shuar communities were de facto autonomous, hence the code.
[1]: http://www.britannica.com/place/Ecuador/Cultural-life#toc25823 [2]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro |
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Authority among the Shuar was mostly informal and local: ’“At the present time the political organization of the Jivaros is at best a very flexible thing and is simple both in theory and in practice. The Jivaro-speaking peoples are divided into scores of so-called tribes. These tribal divisions, however, are merely artificial denominations given by the whites to groups more or less isolated in certain geographical units such as rivers or divides. Tribes in this sense have no existence in the minds of the Indians themselves.’
[1]
’The simplest unit of organization is the patrilineal family group living under a single roof. Such a household is quite independent and self-sufficient, being subservient to no one. The head of the [39] household is usually the oldest man in it, known by the Spanish term ‘capito.’ Where there are a number of houses in the same general vicinity these may recognize a common war leader known by the Quechua term ‘curaka.’ It is significant that there is apparently no word in the Jivaro language indicating the equivalent of our idea of a chief.”’
[1]
’The chieftain is called kuháku. In the case of disputes within the group he has no executive, but only advisory powers. He has no greater number of wives than any other respected member of the community.’
[2]
’“A typical unit or group under a curaka [KS: head of the household]consists of six or seven houses, each with its capito [KS: common war leader], situated over an area of 5 or 6 miles on some small river. Such a group has no name to designate it other than that of the stream on which it is located. The blood ties in such a group are likely to be rather close. All groupings of the Jivaros other than the household group proper, which is a natural family unit, are traceable directly to the custom of blood revenge. Such groups are in the nature of loose alliances for defensive or offensive warfare. Insomuch as war raids are purely in the nature of feuds, these alliances are never very extensive or very permanent.”’
[3]
’“The power of the curaka [KS: head of the household] is purely advisory and is confined to warfare. He had no authority to order men against their will for any purpose, even that of fighting. The curaka has no special insignia denoting rank and has no special privileges, other than the prestige which his position gives him. He holds his position only as long as he retains his personal influence with the group. Realinements of household groups are frequent as leaders lose prestige or die.”’
[4]
’“The number of households under the influence of a given curaka is subject to a great deal of fluctuation. It frequently happens that a strong curaka will build up a fairly powerful group of warriors about him. A weak curaka or capito may have a blood-revenge killing to attend to but will find himself outnumbered by the enemy to such an extent that he is afraid to attempt a killing with his own group. In this event he is likely to call upon the strong curaka to arrange the killing for him, paying him with a gun or a woman. Often, too, a weak curaka, fearing that his group would not be able successfully to defend themselves against an attack from enemies, will voluntarily place himself and his group under the influence of the strong curaka in a loose sort of alliance. In this way the strong group tends to grow and to become even stronger until one curaka may have 8 or 10 lesser curakas more or less under his control. This state of affairs is usually not very permanent. Owing to the loose organization and lack of any real power on the part of the head curaka, the large group becomes unwieldy or develops diverse interests and it tends to split up again into independent units. Consequently, in as little as 2 or 3 years’ time, the original head curaka may find that one or more of his former lieutenants are now stronger than he.”’
[5]
’Although on some occasions considerable numbers of Jivaros unite for the purpose of war raids, or in defense against attack from invaders, their decentralized manner of living makes this rather difficult. Living as they do in individual houses, each containing a few families at most, and separated one from the other by considerable distances, there is no concentration of population at any one place such as would tend to produce large engagements.”’
[6]
This decentralized pattern even applied to more prominent leaders: ’Four or five years ago there was a strong chief on the Upano River named Tuki, known to the Ecuadoreans as José Grande. In the manner previously described, all of the curakas from Macas on the Upano River to Mendez on the Paute River became subchiefs under him until he was generally recognized as the strongest of all of the Jivaro curakas. However, he was beginning to grow old by this time and some of his subcurakas were strong men in their own right. About 2 years ago, Ambusha, who had been gradually gaining in power and becoming famous for his head-hunting activities, split off with his own group, taking several curakas and their men with him. A little later Utita did the same thing. At the time of the writer’s visit (1931), although Tuki was recognized by the Government of Ecuador as being head chief of the Macas-Mendez region, actually he had lost all power excepting that over his own family group and was in reality no more than a capito. These divisions of the organization, if it may be termed such, took place apparently without any ill-feeling or formal announcements.’
[7]
While Ecuador claimed nominal sovereignty over the Oriente, bureaucratic control was low and no regular governmental officials were present in Shuar communities. The Shuar themselves did not recognize Ecuadorian rule: ’“Rising in the western foothills of the Cordillera Oriental the Rio Zamora flows through Loja, where it is joined by the Rio Malacatos. ( ) Ten miles farther north, in confluence with the Rio de las Juntas, it breaks through the Andes and enters the province of Oriente, the Amazon region of Ecuador, comprising a northwestern part of the basin of the great river. Vast in extent and largely unknown, unexplored and unmapped, this territory has always been a bone of contention among the republics of Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. But although the particular portion of it which I visited, on a reconnaissance of the Rio Zamora, was supposedly under the sovereignty of Ecuador, no evidence of administrative authority was to be found there, nor did the savages of the Jíbaro tribe who live there acknowledge allegiance to the government at Quito.”’
[8]
Accordingly, ’quasi-polity’ most closely reflects the realities on the ground.
[1]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 38p [2]: Tessmann, Günter, b. 1884. 1930. “Indians Of Northeastern Peru”, 360 [3]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 39p [4]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians", 39p [5]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 39 [6]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 42 [7]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 40 [8]: Hermessen, J. L. 1917. “Journey On The Rio Zamora, Ecuador”, 435 |
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Breakdown of the centralized state under Rameses III
[1]
: "the king had only nominal control over who was appointed high priest."
[2]
According to Hassan (1993), "Southern Egypt, at the periphery of the new centre of power, eventually became an independent territory under the heredity rule of the priests of Karnak." [3] [1]: (Van Dijk 2000, 298) [2]: (Van Dijk 2000, 300) [3]: (Hassan 1993, 568) |
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Breakdown of the centralized state under Rameses III
[1]
: "the king had only nominal control over who was appointed high priest."
[2]
According to Hassan (1993), "Southern Egypt, at the periphery of the new centre of power, eventually became an independent territory under the heredity rule of the priests of Karnak." [3] [1]: (Van Dijk 2000, 298) [2]: (Van Dijk 2000, 300) [3]: (Hassan 1993, 568) |
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"In 21st-dynasty Egypt the northern royal house nominally ruled the entire country, but in reality allowed another branch of the family to run the south on the basis of its priestly office."
[1]
Control High Priest of Amun had "over all sectors of government made him like a king and most high priests of Amun used royal titles, but only as local kings and they did not date their records with regnal years." [2] Although technically second in authority, southern commanders had "supreme civil, military, and religious authority" in Upper Egypt. [3] After Seshong I (945-924 BCE) monarchy weakened, power of provincial rulers increased and there was "fragmentation of the country." [4] "The political picture that emerges as the Third Intermediate Period progresses is one of a federation of semi-autonomous rulers, nominally subject (and often related) to an overlord-king." [5] "Thebes and Tanis functioned as independent centers of power. They were the seats of parallel dynaties ... The official characterization of government in the two places was distinct - religious in Thebes and secular in Tanis - and the holders of power were related by blood and marriage and most often worked in unison in a system they both accepted. Scholars have likened the arrangement to a concordat, the division of power between popes and kings in European history." [2] Third Intermediate Period was "an era of political decentralization in the Nile Valley". [6] [1]: (Van De Mieroop 2011, 270) Van De Mieroop, Marc. 2011. A History of Ancient Egypt. Wiley-Backwell. Chichester. [2]: (Van De Mieroop 2011, 265) Van De Mieroop, Marc. 2011. A History of Ancient Egypt. Wiley-Backwell. Chichester. [3]: (Taylor 2000, 327) [4]: (Taylor 2000, 330) [5]: (Taylor 2000, 338) [6]: (Pagliari 2012, 183) Pagliari, Giulia. 2012. Function and significance of ancient Egyptian royal palaces from the Middle Kingdom to the Saite period: a lexicographical study and its possible connection with the archaeological evidence. Ph.D. thesis. University of Birmingham. |
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"In 21st-dynasty Egypt the northern royal house nominally ruled the entire country, but in reality allowed another branch of the family to run the south on the basis of its priestly office."
[1]
Control High Priest of Amun had "over all sectors of government made him like a king and most high priests of Amun used royal titles, but only as local kings and they did not date their records with regnal years." [2] Although technically second in authority, southern commanders had "supreme civil, military, and religious authority" in Upper Egypt. [3] After Seshong I (945-924 BCE) monarchy weakened, power of provincial rulers increased and there was "fragmentation of the country." [4] "The political picture that emerges as the Third Intermediate Period progresses is one of a federation of semi-autonomous rulers, nominally subject (and often related) to an overlord-king." [5] "Thebes and Tanis functioned as independent centers of power. They were the seats of parallel dynaties ... The official characterization of government in the two places was distinct - religious in Thebes and secular in Tanis - and the holders of power were related by blood and marriage and most often worked in unison in a system they both accepted. Scholars have likened the arrangement to a concordat, the division of power between popes and kings in European history." [2] Third Intermediate Period was "an era of political decentralization in the Nile Valley". [6] [1]: (Van De Mieroop 2011, 270) Van De Mieroop, Marc. 2011. A History of Ancient Egypt. Wiley-Backwell. Chichester. [2]: (Van De Mieroop 2011, 265) Van De Mieroop, Marc. 2011. A History of Ancient Egypt. Wiley-Backwell. Chichester. [3]: (Taylor 2000, 327) [4]: (Taylor 2000, 330) [5]: (Taylor 2000, 338) [6]: (Pagliari 2012, 183) Pagliari, Giulia. 2012. Function and significance of ancient Egyptian royal palaces from the Middle Kingdom to the Saite period: a lexicographical study and its possible connection with the archaeological evidence. Ph.D. thesis. University of Birmingham. |
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The city of Aksum was perhaps initially a principality then became the capital province of a fuedal kingdom.
[1]
King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [2] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. Early monarchs had to contend with hereditary, and rebellious, vassals, but in "the sixth century an Aksum king was already appointing the south Arabian kings". [3] The status of ruler Zoscales and the port of Adulis Adulis "was no isolated outpost. What is less clear, however, is the nature of the relationship between Adulis and Aksum throughout this period. We know from both the Periplus and from material evidence that Aksum had begun to assert a growing influence on the region by the middle of the 1 st century CE (see Munro-Hay 1991; Phillipson 2000) - the Periplus describes "the city of the Axomite," through which the majority of the ivory traded at Adulis was transported." [4] "a careful reading of the Periplus’ Greek text, and a more general consideration of what is known from other sources about the growth of the Aksumite state, suggest that Zoscales’ rule was probably restricted to the coastal region centred on Adulis. This interpretation is in accord with the attribution of RIE 277 to a ruler of a coast-centred kingdom during the first two centuries AD. While the Periplus mentions Zoscales in the context of Adulis-based trade, there is no indication that the port was his capital." [5] RIE 277 is "Monumentum Adulitanum II ... a third-century Aksumite inscription erected at Adulis which, though now lost, was copied in the sixth century by Cosmas Indicopleustes." [6] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [3]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [4]: (Glazier and Peacock 2016) Darren Glazier. David Peacock. Historical background and previous investigations. David Peacock. Lucy Blue. eds. 2016. The Ancient Red Sea Port of Adulis, Eritrea: Results of the Eritro-British Expedition, 2004-5. Oxbow Books. Oxford. [5]: (Phillipson 2012, 73) David W Phillipson. 2012. Foundations of an African Civilisation. Aksum & The Northern Horn 1000 BC - AD 1300. Addis Ababa University Press. James Currey. Woodbridge. [6]: (Hatke 2013) George Hatke. 2013. Aksum and Nubia: Warfare, Commerce, and Political Fictions in Ancient Northeast Africa (Institute for the Study of the Ancient World). New York University Press. |
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The city of Aksum was perhaps initially a principality then became the capital province of a fuedal kingdom.
[1]
King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [2] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. Early monarchs had to contend with hereditary, and rebellious, vassals, but in "the sixth century an Aksum king was already appointing the south Arabian kings". [3] The status of ruler Zoscales and the port of Adulis Adulis "was no isolated outpost. What is less clear, however, is the nature of the relationship between Adulis and Aksum throughout this period. We know from both the Periplus and from material evidence that Aksum had begun to assert a growing influence on the region by the middle of the 1 st century CE (see Munro-Hay 1991; Phillipson 2000) - the Periplus describes "the city of the Axomite," through which the majority of the ivory traded at Adulis was transported." [4] "a careful reading of the Periplus’ Greek text, and a more general consideration of what is known from other sources about the growth of the Aksumite state, suggest that Zoscales’ rule was probably restricted to the coastal region centred on Adulis. This interpretation is in accord with the attribution of RIE 277 to a ruler of a coast-centred kingdom during the first two centuries AD. While the Periplus mentions Zoscales in the context of Adulis-based trade, there is no indication that the port was his capital." [5] RIE 277 is "Monumentum Adulitanum II ... a third-century Aksumite inscription erected at Adulis which, though now lost, was copied in the sixth century by Cosmas Indicopleustes." [6] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [3]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [4]: (Glazier and Peacock 2016) Darren Glazier. David Peacock. Historical background and previous investigations. David Peacock. Lucy Blue. eds. 2016. The Ancient Red Sea Port of Adulis, Eritrea: Results of the Eritro-British Expedition, 2004-5. Oxbow Books. Oxford. [5]: (Phillipson 2012, 73) David W Phillipson. 2012. Foundations of an African Civilisation. Aksum & The Northern Horn 1000 BC - AD 1300. Addis Ababa University Press. James Currey. Woodbridge. [6]: (Hatke 2013) George Hatke. 2013. Aksum and Nubia: Warfare, Commerce, and Political Fictions in Ancient Northeast Africa (Institute for the Study of the Ancient World). New York University Press. |
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The city of Aksum was perhaps initially a principality then became the capital province of a fuedal kingdom.
[1]
King Ezana built an army that could control the regions. [2] This suggests that before King Ezana the army found it difficult to control the regions - less professional, or smaller number of professional troops, and most likely did not have capability to garrison troops far from capital. Early monarchs had to contend with hereditary, and rebellious, vassals, but in "the sixth century an Aksum king was already appointing the south Arabian kings". [3] The status of ruler Zoscales and the port of Adulis Adulis "was no isolated outpost. What is less clear, however, is the nature of the relationship between Adulis and Aksum throughout this period. We know from both the Periplus and from material evidence that Aksum had begun to assert a growing influence on the region by the middle of the 1 st century CE (see Munro-Hay 1991; Phillipson 2000) - the Periplus describes "the city of the Axomite," through which the majority of the ivory traded at Adulis was transported." [4] "a careful reading of the Periplus’ Greek text, and a more general consideration of what is known from other sources about the growth of the Aksumite state, suggest that Zoscales’ rule was probably restricted to the coastal region centred on Adulis. This interpretation is in accord with the attribution of RIE 277 to a ruler of a coast-centred kingdom during the first two centuries AD. While the Periplus mentions Zoscales in the context of Adulis-based trade, there is no indication that the port was his capital." [5] RIE 277 is "Monumentum Adulitanum II ... a third-century Aksumite inscription erected at Adulis which, though now lost, was copied in the sixth century by Cosmas Indicopleustes." [6] [1]: (Kobishanov 1981, 383) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [2]: (Falola 2002, 58) Toyin Falola. 2002. Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Publishing Group. Westport. [3]: (Kobishanov 1981, 386) Y M. Kobishanov. Aksum: political system, economics and culture, first to fourth century. Muḥammad Jamal al-Din Mokhtar. ed. 1981. UNESCO General History of Africa. Volume II. Heinemann. UNESCO. California. [4]: (Glazier and Peacock 2016) Darren Glazier. David Peacock. Historical background and previous investigations. David Peacock. Lucy Blue. eds. 2016. The Ancient Red Sea Port of Adulis, Eritrea: Results of the Eritro-British Expedition, 2004-5. Oxbow Books. Oxford. [5]: (Phillipson 2012, 73) David W Phillipson. 2012. Foundations of an African Civilisation. Aksum & The Northern Horn 1000 BC - AD 1300. Addis Ababa University Press. James Currey. Woodbridge. [6]: (Hatke 2013) George Hatke. 2013. Aksum and Nubia: Warfare, Commerce, and Political Fictions in Ancient Northeast Africa (Institute for the Study of the Ancient World). New York University Press. |
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"The persistently arid conditions which for centuries had been a primary determinant of human population trends and movements in sub-Saharan Africa yielded to more amenable conditions around AD 300. Rainfall increased and became plentiful during the period up to about AD 1100, promoting the expansion of both local and long-distance trade networks. Population densities increased too - of both humans and livestock - and a conjunction of internal and external influences transformed the political structure of some ethnic groups from the age-set system which dispersed authority through the community to a system favouring centralized control and the formation of states."
[1]
"the only area in which we can convincingly assert that a kingdom existed in the period under review was at the western edge of the Sudan, where the kingdom of Ghana was certainly in existence by +700 and could have been emerging for up to a thousand years." [2] [1]: (Reader 1998, 277-278) [2]: (Posnansky 1981, 723, 731) |
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"The coming of Badr al-Jamali in 466/1074 altered permanently the structure of the Fatimid state."
[1]
[1]: (Walker 2006, 88) Walker, Paul E. The Relationship Between Chief Qadi and Chief Da’i Under The Fatimids. Kramer, Gudrun. Schmidtke, Sabine. eds. 2006. Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies. BRILL. |
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"The persistently arid conditions which for centuries had been a primary determinant of human population trends and movements in sub-Saharan Africa yielded to more amenable conditions around AD 300. Rainfall increased and became plentiful during the period up to about AD 1100, promoting the expansion of both local and long-distance trade networks. Population densities increased too - of both humans and livestock - and a conjunction of internal and external influences transformed the political structure of some ethnic groups from the age-set system which dispersed authority through the community to a system favouring centralized control and the formation of states."
[1]
"the only area in which we can convincingly assert that a kingdom existed in the period under review was at the western edge of the Sudan, where the kingdom of Ghana was certainly in existence by +700 and could have been emerging for up to a thousand years." [2] [1]: (Reader 1998, 277-278) [2]: (Posnansky 1981, 723, 731) |
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"The Shang Dynasty was a monarchy governed by a series of kings, 29 or 30 in total, over the course of almost 600 years. The king was served by officials who held specialized positions of authority and function; and the officials belonged to a hereditary class of aristocrats, usually related to the king himself."
[1]
[1]: (The Shang Dynasty, 1600 to 1050 BCE. Spice Digest, Fall 2007. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/117/ShangDynasty.pdf) |
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loose 1122-1045 BCE; unitary state: 1045-957 BCE; loose: 957-771 BCE Henry Maspero (1927) argued Zhou state was a "loose federation of vassal states" however this view has since been challenged. Herrlee G. Creel presented evidence Zhou was empire with a centralized government.
[1]
[1]: (Roberts 2003, 14) |
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loose 1122-1045 BCE; unitary state: 1045-957 BCE; loose: 957-771 BCE Henry Maspero (1927) argued Zhou state was a "loose federation of vassal states" however this view has since been challenged. Herrlee G. Creel presented evidence Zhou was empire with a centralized government.
[1]
[1]: (Roberts 2003, 14) |
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"In evolving the forms of a new centralized government the T’ang based themselves on their predecessors, partially on the Sui but, in reality they reached back to the Han period. Their policy, however, differed in one very important respect from that of the Han: the establishment of semi-independent princedoms was not permitted and the entire country was ruled as one state and empire."
[1]
[1]: (Rodzinski 1979, 118) |
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’the official record is anything but uneventful, and for the years after A.D. 550 it is essentially an account of how a few men finally transformed the loosely joined Yamato state into a centralized empire.’
[1]
[1]: Mason, Richard Henry Pitt. 1997. A History of Japan: Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing.p.38 |
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Unitary state early on then more like a confederated state.
"Although ultimately defeated, the An Lu-shan rebellion revealed fully all the inherent weaknesses of the T’ang government. In effect, it broke its power, and while the dynasty lasted almost another century and a half it never recovered fully, in spite of the attempts made by some of the subsequent T’ang rulers, as for example Emperor Hsien-tsung (806-820), to restore a strong, centralized monarchy." [1] The An Lu-shan rebellion "transformed a centralized, rich, stable and far-flung empire into a struggling, insecure and divided one." [2] Ruth Mostern: Tang was a confederate state after the An Lushan rebellion and a unitary state before the rebellion. [3] [1]: (Rodzinski 1979, 130) [2]: (Peterson 1979, 464) [3]: (Mostern, Ruth. Personal Correspondence. September 2016) |
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"During his lifetime Čengiz Khan had allotted to his kinsfolk specific grazing-grounds, together with the nomadic troops and bodies of the subject people—the units called ulus (olus) in the sources."
[1]
[1]: Peter Jackson, ’MONGOLS’ in Encyclopædia Iranica http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/mongols |
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"There were three main geographical divisions consisting of the east and west, otherwise known as the ‘‘left and right’’ kingships, with an implied third division being the core central region administered directly by the paramount leader. Within this system there were 24 regional leaders, each with the title of ‘‘ten thousand horsemen.’’ The 24 regional leaders represent a dispersed control hierarchy, probably composed of the leaders of long-standing aristocratic lineages (e.g., Sneath 2007, p. 116)."
[1]
"Unlike the Xiongnu, the Wuhuan maintained a dispersed set of control hierarchies, with only partial evidence for a single paramount leader."
[2]
[1]: (Rogers 2012, 220) [2]: (Rogers 2012, 222) |
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"Before 50 B.C., the Xiongnu split into a northern and southern polity. Both remained well organized and expansionistic at first, but eventually the southern Xiongnu (estimated at 200,000 people) became a vassal state of the Han Chinese, and by A.D. 150 their political control was virtually nonexistent."
[1]
[1]: (Rogers 2012, 222) |
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During the reign of king Kidara "the Kidarite kingdom occupied vast territories to the north and south of the Hindu Kush." "the principal city of the Kidarites south of the Hindu Kush was situated near present day Peshawar ... Fu-lou-sha ... which probably represents Purushapura ... Its ruler was Kidara’s son".
[1]
Accordng to the Chinese chronicle, the Pei-shih (Annals of the Wei Dynasty)
[1]: (Zeimal 1996, 126) Zeimal, E. V. The Kidarite Kingdom In Central Asia. in Litvinsky, B. A. ed. and Iskender-Mochiri, I. ed. 1996. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750. pp.123-137. unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001046/104612e.pdf |
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" Politically, the Türk Empire “grew out of a tribal confederation.” It had a core of “inner tribes” (the ruling clan and its allies, including “in-law” tribes), a second tier of tribes that joined freely (retaining their ruling houses), a third tier of tribes that joined under constraint (and whose ruling houses were usually replaced by state officials), and finally tribute-paying sedentary populations. Subject populations retaining their own kings included the Sogdians, with their major centers at Bukhara and Samarkand and farflung merchant colonies, willing collaborators with a nomadic state that possessed the military power to force open the Chinese markets.76"
[1]
[1]: (Findley 2004, 43) |
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" Politically, the Türk Empire “grew out of a tribal confederation.” It had a core of “inner tribes” (the ruling clan and its allies, including “in-law” tribes), a second tier of tribes that joined freely (retaining their ruling houses), a third tier of tribes that joined under constraint (and whose ruling houses were usually replaced by state officials), and finally tribute-paying sedentary populations. Subject populations retaining their own kings included the Sogdians, with their major centers at Bukhara and Samarkand and farflung merchant colonies, willing collaborators with a nomadic state that possessed the military power to force open the Chinese markets.76"
[1]
[1]: (Findley 2004, 43) |
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"The Uighur polity began from an initial coalition of nine smaller groups. Together this coalition was responsible for the fall of the second Turkic empire."
[1]
"Uighur political organization was relatively centralized, with several levels of administration, including a system of tax collection. Still, a leader often served dual civil and military functions. Some evidence indicates that local leaders were relatively autonomous and that royal edicts were not always the law of the land (Mackerras 1990, p. 328)."
[1]
[1]: (Rogers 2012, 226) |
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"The Kitan tribal confederation comprised several tribes of Uighur origin, such as the I-shih, second in rank only to the imperial Yeh-lü clan."
[1]
"The incorporation of Chinese craft and administrative specialists is closely tied to the transition from a confederation to a state. Prior to this phase of empire-building, the various ‘‘tribes’’ within the Khitan polity had collectively elected a central leader for three-year terms. As with other steppe polities, the term ‘‘tribe’’ was applied to groups that were part of the Khitan confederation but not necessarily ethnically Khitan. In some cases certain ‘‘tribes’’ had only recently come into existence and were linked to other ethnicities, such as the Uighurs (Franke 1990, p. 404)."
[2]
[1]: (Sinor 1998, 237) [2]: (Rogers 2012, 227) |
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Confederated state
"The persistent tendency toward fragmentation within the Karakhanid clan was the Achilles heel of this first Turkic Muslim state, as it was to be for the many other Turkic dynasties that followed. In truth, it was no state at all but a loose confederation of appendages, the ruling houses of which were linked by blood ties." [1] Ibrahim "did not set up a centralized state, but managed to reduce considerably the number of appanages and the rights of appanage-holders." [2] [1]: (Starr 2013) Starr, S. Frederick. 2013. Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton University Press. Princeton. [2]: (Davidovich 1997, 137) Davidovich, E A. in Asimov, M S and Bosworth, C E eds. 1997. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part I. UNESCO. |
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"At the time of Temur’s rise to power, politics in the Ulus Chaghatay was controlled by the tribes who made it up. With the decline of central leadership, control over the territory and wealth of the Ulus had fallen to them. They provided most of the military manpower of the Ulus, either from their own tribesmen or from the armies of the regions under their control. No one therefore could either become or remain leader of the Ulus wihout the backing of the tribal leaders. Tribal chiefs naturally were not eager to strengthen the position of a central leader; they were intolerant of claims to sovereignty over them,and if a leader displeased them, they were quick to switch their loyalties to a rival candidate. Under these circumstances, central leadership was often contested, sometimes even after a leader had been acclaimed by the tribes of the Ulus."
[1]
[1]: (Forbes Manz 1983, 79-80) |
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loose: 840-843 CE; nominal: 844-883 CE; loose: 884-887 CE; nominal: 888-987 CE
Partitioned after the Treaty of Verdun 843 CE, reunited briefly 884-887 CE. [1] Rest of the time nominal, although there was no nominal ruler, only the "idea" of the Empire. Treaty of Mersen 870 CE: kingdom divided into three. [2] [1]: (Chazelle 1995, 333) [2]: (Nicolle 2005, 7) |
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loose: 840-843 CE; nominal: 844-883 CE; loose: 884-887 CE; nominal: 888-987 CE
Partitioned after the Treaty of Verdun 843 CE, reunited briefly 884-887 CE. [1] Rest of the time nominal, although there was no nominal ruler, only the "idea" of the Empire. Treaty of Mersen 870 CE: kingdom divided into three. [2] [1]: (Chazelle 1995, 333) [2]: (Nicolle 2005, 7) |
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During Mieszko I’s reign and continuing through the rule of Bolesław III Wrymouth, Poland could be considered a unitary state evidenced by the adoption of Christianity, the establishment of a centralized church structure, and the consolidation of territories under a central authority.
[1]
[1]: Eduard Mühle, Die Piasten: Polen im Mittelalter, Bsr 2709 (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2011). Zotero link: EVZQ25XL |
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The organization of the Teutonic Order was highly structured, with the Grand Master at the top of the hierarchy exercising significant control over the territories and military orders within the state.
[1]
[1]: Jürgen Sarnowsky, Der Deutsche Orden, 3., durchgesehene Auflage., C.H. Beck Wissen 2428 (München: C.H.Beck, 2022). Zotero link: QW4M9YTP |
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Institutions of a centralized state were present. However, civil war meant frequent state breakdown.
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There was a large influx of foreigners and hill people in the Kassite period. Together with the tribes, which inhabited their own provinces, this caused a lack of centralisation in the Kassite period when Babylon was largely de-urbanised
[1]
and the more rural, tribal communities existed in a kind of feudal state.
[2]
[1]: Liverani, M. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. p.364-366 [2]: Balkan, K. 1986. Studies in Babylonian Feudalism of the Kassite Period. Monographs on the Ancient Near East. Volume 2. Malibu: Undena Publications |
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The lack of consistent or reliable sources from either Western or Chinese written accounts means that any answer is largely speculative, though the limited evidence we do have seems to indicate a monarchical government. As with so much with central Asian history, this is largely as a result of a reliance on numismatic evidence, and a faint glimmer of archaeology and epigraphy.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Guillaume, Olivier. "An Analysis of the Modes of Reconstruction of the Graeco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek History." Studies in History 2, no. 1 (1986): 1-16. [2]: Holt, Frank L. Lost World of the Golden King, University of California Press, 2012, pp. 211-220 |
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In the Middle Period 1-400 CE: "the state organization of the Himyarite South appears to be significantly stronger than that of the Sabaean North" and tribes were less important there.
[1]
[1]: (Korotayev 1996, 10) Andrey Vitalyevhich Korotayev. 1996. Pre-Islamic Yemen. Socio-political Organization of the Sabaean Cultural Area in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries AD. Harrassowitz Verlag. Wiesbaden. |
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In the Middle Period 1-400 CE: "the state organization of the Himyarite South appears to be significantly stronger than that of the Sabaean North" and tribes were less important there.
[1]
[1]: (Korotayev 1996, 10) Andrey Vitalyevhich Korotayev. 1996. Pre-Islamic Yemen. Socio-political Organization of the Sabaean Cultural Area in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries AD. Harrassowitz Verlag. Wiesbaden. |
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"The Ziyadi state was firmly entrenched in the Tinhama, and enjoyed loose suzerainty over a sultan at Aden, whose authority extended eastward along the coast. The Banu Ziyad, on the other hand, had no influence in the highlands."
[1]
Tihama = coastal plain. "For a century and a half no central power of consequence existed in the Yemen inland from the Tihama. Most of the local rulers invoked the Abbasid caliph in the Friday prayers; they repressed overt manifestations of Ismaili sentiment, but offered no persuaive ideological alternative." [2] [1]: (Stookey 1978, 54) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. [2]: (Stookey 1978, 57) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. |
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The Daylam State existed in a kind of military feudal system. The Dailamites were natural warriors and a military hierarchy had emerged which was used to rule the people under Buyid control. ’Ali b.Būya took confiscated land and gave it to his generals in lieu of payment. This system had a hereditary element.
The power system was further complicated by ’Ali b. Būya appointing his brothers as kings of areas of the empire. Rukn al-Daula ruled Isfahāhan and Ray. His coins suggest that he was sole ruler in this area since they contain only his name and the caliphs. Mu’izz al-Daula, the youngest brother, was placed in command of Buyid interests in Khūzistān, but only as a representative of ’Ali b. Būya. His coins contain his brother’s name, as well as his own and the caliphs. Therefore, there existed a partially independent, partially hierarchical kingship system within the Daylam State. [1] Furthermore, there existed the Caliphate in Baghdad. The Caliphate were considered religious leaders chosen by God to rule the Islamic world. They had political power by nature of their religious power. ’Ali b. Būya did not seek to overthrow the ’Abbāsid Calliph at Baghdad; instead he treated with him to gain recognition as viceroy, although he never paid the agreed tribute. [2] Since the Buyid dynasty was in control of Baghdad it has been suggested the the calliph were the pawns of the Buyids. [3] There continued to be several exchanges between the caliph and the ruler of the Daylam state to establish the state of power throughout the Buyid dynasty. [4] Once ’Adud al-Daula had unified the Empire it existed as a confederated state with one ruler and was governed by a network of Buyid princes and other tribal leaders. There were also a number of vassal states which ruled themselves, though acknowledged the overlordship of the Buyids. [5] [1]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran Under the Būyids. In Fyre, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.259 [2]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran Under the Būyids. In Fyre, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.256 [3]: Katouzian, H. 2009. The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran. London: Yale University Press. p.87 [4]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran under the Būyids. In Frye, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuq’s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.277-78 [5]: Busse, H. 1975. Iran under the Būyids. In Frye, R. N. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 4. The period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuq’s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.270 |
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"The united Seljuq Empire was only to last until the 1090s. Subsequently, Seljuq power retreated to Iran, although a cadet branch of the Seljuq family was to rule Anatolia until 1243 (and thereafter as Mongol vassals until the early fourteenth century)."
[1]
"Like the Karakhanids, the Seljuks were a clan of brothers and cousins, each of whom felt himself sovereign in his own territory. This made for a loose confederation rather than a unified state.". [2] "For most of its history, the empire was divided into a western and eastern half, and it lacked a single capital or political centre." [3] [1]: (Amitai 2006, 53) Amitai, Reuven. The Mamluk Institution, or One Thousand Years of Military Slavery in the Islamic World. Brown, Christopher Leslie. Morgan, Philip D. eds. 2006. Arming Slaves: From Classical To The Modern Age. Yale University Press. New Haven. [2]: (Starr 2013) Starr, S. Frederick. 2013. Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton University Press. Princeton. [3]: (Peacock 2015, 6) Peacock, A C S. 2015. The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Edinburgh. |
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"From the foregoing brief account, it may be seen that in one sense there was a Yemeni polity during these troubled centuries. At no time did the values and objectives of would-be rulers and of the population at large agree. Tribes, dynasties, and religious leaders nevertheless acted frequently, if intermittently, over most of Yemen’s territory ... The ad hoc, evanescent coalitions formed are characteristic of a segmental pattern of authority, and thus of weakness of the political system as a whole. Some dynasties - the Sulayhids, the Zuray’ids, the Najab - succeeded in assembling substantial material resources, and were wealthy by the standards of the time; but they failed in the essential task of mobilizing the human energies needed to build and defend a viable Yemeni state. This consequent debility made Yemen an attractive target for foreign ambitions, and the country was in fact to become a family colony of the Ayyubids."
[1]
[1]: (Stookey 1978, 99) Robert W Stookey. 1978. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Westview Press. Boulder. |
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unknown/ nominal/ loose/ confederated state /unitary state
After the death of Saladin, his sons contested control over the sultanate, but Saladin’s brother al-Adil eventually established himself as Sultan in 1200. In the 1230s, the Ayyubid rulers of Syria attempted to assert their independence from Egypt and remained divided until the Sultan as-Salih Ayyub restored Ayyubid unity by taking over most of Syria, except Aleppo, by 1247. |
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unknown/ nominal/ loose/ confederated state /unitary state
After the death of Saladin, his sons contested control over the sultanate, but Saladin’s brother al-Adil eventually established himself as Sultan in 1200. In the 1230s, the Ayyubid rulers of Syria attempted to assert their independence from Egypt and remained divided until the Sultan as-Salih Ayyub restored Ayyubid unity by taking over most of Syria, except Aleppo, by 1247. |
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|
unknown/ nominal/ loose/ confederated state /unitary state
After the death of Saladin, his sons contested control over the sultanate, but Saladin’s brother al-Adil eventually established himself as Sultan in 1200. In the 1230s, the Ayyubid rulers of Syria attempted to assert their independence from Egypt and remained divided until the Sultan as-Salih Ayyub restored Ayyubid unity by taking over most of Syria, except Aleppo, by 1247. |
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Did not take the title of "Khan" because he was not in the family of Genghis Khan: "he maintained the charade that he was a governor under the Chagatai khan, when in reality he was the supreme power."
[1]
[1]: (Khan 2003, 33) Khan, A. 2003. A Historical Atlas of Uzbekistan. The Rosen Publishing Group. |
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|
Did not take the title of "Khan" because he was not in the family of Genghis Khan: "he maintained the charade that he was a governor under the Chagatai khan, when in reality he was the supreme power."
[1]
[1]: (Khan 2003, 33) Khan, A. 2003. A Historical Atlas of Uzbekistan. The Rosen Publishing Group. |
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|
Did not take the title of "Khan" because he was not in the family of Genghis Khan: "he maintained the charade that he was a governor under the Chagatai khan, when in reality he was the supreme power."
[1]
[1]: (Khan 2003, 33) Khan, A. 2003. A Historical Atlas of Uzbekistan. The Rosen Publishing Group. |
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-
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either confederated state or unitary state. Did the shah appoint and remove regional governors and impose taxes and send them to the centre [unitary]?
|
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"[I]t would be worthwhile to assess whether the evidence at our disposal really indicates that any such “Śuṅga” empire existed in this time. The only reason for this belief has been the puranic mentions of Puṣyamitra and his exploits, supported weakly by two inscriptional mentions, viz., the reckoning of one of the Pabhosa inscription in the tenth year of a so-called Śuṅga ruler Odraka/Udāka, and two words at the beginning of one of the Bhārhut inscriptions which roughly translate as “during the Śuṅga rule.” None of this evidence is critically attested—the first has been widely contested, especially for the meaning of the word “Udāka,” and the second is too scanty to prove any point even after the words are regarded as they are. Coins of one of the rulers mentioned in same Bharhut inscription, viz., Agarāju, are known, and they conform to the regiospecific series of one of the urban centers in Vatsa. Coins of two rulers in the Pabhosa inscription are known, viz., Vangapāla and Bahasatimita—one of them conforms to the Pāñchāla series and the other to the Kausambi/Vatsa realm. None of them suggest any “Śuṅga” connection. The name of a “Senāpati Puṣyamitra” does occur in the Ayodhya inscription of Dhana(deva) but here too, the inference that he was an imperial overlord of any sort is entirely conjectural. [...] In short, the puranic mentions are nothing but a series of details confused in time and space. “Śuṅgas,” if they ever existed, were probably as localized as the rest of the groups we know from coins in terms of their political prowess. Coins offer an entirely different picture of the post-Mauryan fragmentation, which links two singularly important phenomena of ancient Indian history—the fall of an empire and a concomitant spurt in urbanization with an increase in localized money economy. They also hint a probable non sequitur—the fall of historical jargon that makes random use of terms like “Śuṅga supremacy” and “Śuṅga art.”"
[1]
[1]: (Bhandare 2006, 97) Shailendra Bhandare. 2006. ’Numismatics and History: The Maurya-Gupta Interlude in the Gangetic Plain’ in Between the Empires: Society in India 300 BCE to 400 CE, edited by Patrick Olivelle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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"In the Deccan and elsewhere beyond the frontiers of his Gangetic arya-varta, [Samudra-Gupta] had made no attempt at annexation. ’Uprooted’ kings were reinstated, their territories restored, and the Gupta forces withdrawn. A one-off tribute was exacted and on this the Gupta court waxed wealthy[...]. But unlike the directly administered empire of the Mauryas, this was at best a web of feudatory arrangements and one which, lacking an obvious bureaucratic structure, left the sovereignty of the feudatories intact. [...] In the case of distant rulers a nominal submission looks to have been sufficient, while of those nearer at hand regular attendance on the cakravartin was also required."
[1]
[1]: (Keay 2010, 139-140) Keay, John. 2010. India: A History. New Updated Edition. London: HarperPress. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/HSHAKZ3X. |
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"Discovered by the Swedish geologist J. G. Andersson in 1920 at Yangshao village in Mianchi county, Henan, this was the first Neolithic culture to be found in China and is still the best known. More than a thousand archaeological sites of this culture have been found distributed in the Yellow River valley from Zhengzhou in the east to the upper reaches in Gansu and Qinghai. Within this vast area, the culture can be divided into several phases on the basis of ceramic styles. All of these, however, are of reddish color and are painted with various designs in black or dark brown (Fig. 1.4). Major vessel types include the bowl, water bottle, jar, and urn. Tripods and bowls on ring stands are seen in the east only, possibly being forms introduced from the eastern coastal areas.The Yangshao was a culture of millet farmers, already planting both Setaria and Panicum millets. The people lived in lineage units regularly laid out in villages.
[1]
[1]: (Chang 1999, 49-52) |
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"In most regions, population growth during the Late Neolithic was coupled with the clustering of sites and the formation of site hierarchies. The few sites that were fortified stood at the top of the settlement hierarchy. More than 20 walled sites, some very large in scale, are known from the lower and middle Yellow River area. The relatively regular spacing of these sites, at a distance of some 30-50 km from one another (Guojia 2006, 2007; Liu 2004), suggests that they were central nodes of small-scale polities each covering some 1,500-2,000 km2. Other evidence, such as the association of fortified sites with prestigious buildings and artifacts and specialized production activities, also supports this hypothesis (Liu 2004, pp. 104- 105; Underhill et al. 2008)."
[1]
"The late Longshan period, that is, the latter part of the third millennium and the earlier part of the second millennium B.C., was the period of the legendary wan guo (ten thousand states), a term often seen in the later, classical period. The surge in interactions among these many states made the Longshan one of the most active periods in ancient Chinese history." [2] [1]: (Shelach and Jaffe 2014, 339) [2]: (Chang 1999, 64) |
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"Erlitou, rather than being a departure, continued the third-millennium pattern of megasites, centering an expansive sphere of material cultural influence (Figure 2.1). At the same time, a number of features that were to become central to Central Plains Bronze Age elite traditions, such as a rectangular, walled “palace-temple” district; rammed earth monumental courtyard structures; and bronze ritual vessels, apparently made their first appearance at Erlitou (Figures 2.2-2.6). The Erlitou tradition, however, was not alone on the Mainland East Asian stage. The land between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers was home to a variety of local and regional ceramic and other material cultural traditions beyond those of Erlitou."
[1]
"The political organization of the polity centered at Erlitou is unclear. Erlitou sat atop a settlement hierarchy of unknown size,48 and for perhaps a century, maybe less (1700-1600 BCE), it was the largest urban center in East Asia for which we have evidence (Shimao may overlap with the early phases of Erlitou; Sanxingui, with at least the late phases; and Yanshi and Zhengzhou were probably both major centers by the Erlitou phase IV). While the Erlitou ceramic tradition was widespread, the mechanisms of this expansion are probably only indirectly related to political activity (if pots don’t equal people, they are even less representative of conquering armies or “state” administrators). The degree of centralization, mechanisms of political control, and social organization can only be guessed at or extrapolated through comparison with Zhengzhou and Anyang. This comparison can justifiably be made insofar (and only insofar) as many of Erlitou’s elite cultural forms appear to be ancestral to those found at Zhengzhou and Anyang, from architecture, to symbols of status and implements of ritual.49 Nevertheless, as will be discussed in more detail later on, there are considerable qualitative and quantitative differences between Erlitou, Zhengzhou, and Anyang, making their comparison—and especially the derivation of the lesser known from the better known—a more complex problem than most have credited. Seen in regional context, if Erlitou has its civilizational sphere (Baines and Yoffee 1998; Allan 2007), it was not alone." [2] [1]: (Campbell 2014, 22-23) [2]: (Campbell 2014, 61-62) |
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"These scholars also see the presence of these walled sites and the Erligang expansion in general as evidence for the direct control of a huge territory by a centralized state (Bagley 1999). While the presence of walled Erligang-type sites over a large area suggests a common elite cultural sphere, even while the unparalleled scale of Zhengzhou suggests a cultural and political core, the actual relationships between sites and the mechanisms of putative political control remain unknown. If the analogy to the Anyang period can be made, lacking the infrastructure of later Qin-Han-type imperial control, political relationships even within the Central Plains cultural sphere were likely indirect, mutable, and based on ritually reinforced kinship hierarchy, alliance, and sporadic, rather than routine, mechanisms of coercion. It is also likely that—as with the Zhou dynasts, who set up statelets in strategic areas after the conquest of the Shang—the political, economic, and cultural relationships between sites changed over the course of their occupation, each site and each region having its own local historical trajectory related to, but not necessarily determined by, the fate of the cultural and political core."
[1]
[1]: (Campbell 2014, 100) |
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"These scholars also see the presence of these walled sites and the Erligang expansion in general as evidence for the direct control of a huge territory by a centralized state (Bagley 1999). While the presence of walled Erligang-type sites over a large area suggests a common elite cultural sphere, even while the unparalleled scale of Zhengzhou suggests a cultural and political core, the actual relationships between sites and the mechanisms of putative political control remain unknown. If the analogy to the Anyang period can be made, lacking the infrastructure of later Qin-Han-type imperial control, political relationships even within the Central Plains cultural sphere were likely indirect, mutable, and based on ritually reinforced kinship hierarchy, alliance, and sporadic, rather than routine, mechanisms of coercion. It is also likely that—as with the Zhou dynasts, who set up statelets in strategic areas after the conquest of the Shang—the political, economic, and cultural relationships between sites changed over the course of their occupation, each site and each region having its own local historical trajectory related to, but not necessarily determined by, the fate of the cultural and political core."
[1]
[1]: (Campbell 2014, 100) |
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all warring states kingdoms centralized control, but still relied to some degree on the hereditary noble lineages for support and resources
|
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There is no evidence of a hierarchical social system and centralized control
[1]
Jenne-jeno was "a large, complex, but non-coercive urban settlement." [2] "the demands of specialization pushed groups apart while the requirements of a generalized economy pulled them together ... created a dynamism that ensured growth and the establishment of urban settlements. And they were non-coercive settlements. Groups congregated by choice. This is an instance of transformation from a rural to an urban society that did not establish a hierarchical society and coercive centralized control... The process in the delta and at Jenne-jeno in particular, was one of ’complexification’ rather than centralization." [3] [1]: (Reader 1998, 219) [2]: (Reader 1998, 225) [3]: (Reader 1998, 228) |
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There is no evidence of a hierarchical social system and centralized control
[1]
Jenne-jeno was "a large, complex, but non-coercive urban settlement." [2] "the demands of specialization pushed groups apart while the requirements of a generalized economy pulled them together ... created a dynamism that ensured growth and the establishment of urban settlements. And they were non-coercive settlements. Groups congregated by choice. This is an instance of transformation from a rural to an urban society that did not establish a hierarchical society and coercive centralized control... The process in the delta and at Jenne-jeno in particular, was one of ’complexification’ rather than centralization." [3] [1]: (Reader 1998, 219) [2]: (Reader 1998, 225) [3]: (Reader 1998, 228) |
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There is no evidence of a hierarchical social system and centralized control
[1]
Jenne-jeno was "a large, complex, but non-coercive urban settlement." [2] "the demands of specialization pushed groups apart while the requirements of a generalized economy pulled them together ... created a dynamism that ensured growth and the establishment of urban settlements. And they were non-coercive settlements. Groups congregated by choice. This is an instance of transformation from a rural to an urban society that did not establish a hierarchical society and coercive centralized control... The process in the delta and at Jenne-jeno in particular, was one of ’complexification’ rather than centralization." [3] [1]: (Reader 1998, 219) [2]: (Reader 1998, 225) [3]: (Reader 1998, 228) |
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|
There is no evidence of a hierarchical social system and centralized control
[1]
Jenne-jeno was "a large, complex, but non-coercive urban settlement." [2] "the demands of specialization pushed groups apart while the requirements of a generalized economy pulled them together ... created a dynamism that ensured growth and the establishment of urban settlements. And they were non-coercive settlements. Groups congregated by choice. This is an instance of transformation from a rural to an urban society that did not establish a hierarchical society and coercive centralized control... The process in the delta and at Jenne-jeno in particular, was one of ’complexification’ rather than centralization." [3] [1]: (Reader 1998, 219) [2]: (Reader 1998, 225) [3]: (Reader 1998, 228) |
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1650-1680: unitary state; 1680-1712: loose
[1]
[1]: K.C. MacDonald, A Chacoun son Bambara, encore une fois: History, Archaeology and Bambara Origins, in F.G. Richard and K.C. MacDonald, Ethnic Ambiguity and the African Past: Materiality, History, and the Shaping of Cultural Identities (2014), pp. 119-144 |
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1650-1680: unitary state; 1680-1712: loose
[1]
[1]: K.C. MacDonald, A Chacoun son Bambara, encore une fois: History, Archaeology and Bambara Origins, in F.G. Richard and K.C. MacDonald, Ethnic Ambiguity and the African Past: Materiality, History, and the Shaping of Cultural Identities (2014), pp. 119-144 |
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"Bray (1984:337) suggests that the complexity of the Neguanje burial found by Mason implies a certain political complexity. Some speak of a tribal society, characterized by great variation, due to "diverse degrees of influence, contact, or both at the same time, with neighboring cultural groups of the Rancheria (Guajira), Bajo Magdalena and southwestern Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta" (Oyuela 1986:34). Nevertheless, knowledge about social organization during the Neguanje period is based almost exclusively on site excavations, which make any proposal about social organization difficult. "Tribes" are mentioned for the ancient phase because it is assumed that the societies that the Spanish found were organized as "chiefdoms". And, as anyone knows, tribes precede chiefdoms."
[1]
Probably many small-size polities, even if the degree of centralization cannot be confirmed due to the lack of data: "In the study region, the settlements for the three prehispanic periods have a convex deviation from the rule (figure 15). The convex tendency is most notable for the Late Period. This implies that it cannot be said that there were integrated or centralized systems, but rather, that there were poorly integrated systems with little centralization. [...] If the studied region were smaller than what is expected of a polity (or many, one for each bay for example), the results would be very different. [...] Only if the bays constituted one or many political units independent from any larger settlement beyond the study area, could it be said that none of the sites dominated the others. It is not possible to resolve this issue with the information presently available." [2] [1]: (Langebaek 2005, 13) [2]: (Langebaek 2005, 87) |
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"Between A.D. 1100-1200 and until their demise around A.D. 1600 after a century of disease, displacement, and war, these people continued to settle the narrow river valleys of the northern and western faces of the Sierra Nevada. It is these polities that are considered to be the “Tairona” proper and upon which the greater part of the research in the area has concentrated."
[1]
"The socio-political organization of Tairona culture during the early part of the sixteenth century consisted of relatively independent chiefdoms, each including a priestly class and a hierarchy of chiefs as well as specialists in arts and crafts (e.g., gold workers, semiprecious stone engravers, merchants). This arts and crafts specialization, coupled with intensive exchange of agricultural products, was possible because of the regional ecological diversity found in the SNSM. The diversity encouraged the development of centers of specialization and regions of production for items such as ceramics, lithic artifacts, and agricultural products. At last archaeologists are beginning to understand the ancient system as they reconstruct the web of roads and pathways that connected all of the sites (Oyuela-Caycedo 1987a, 1990; Herrera de Turbay 1985; Kurela 1993; Herrera 2000)."
[2]
"I believe that a religious movement that included peoples with different languages and from diverse political units (Reichel-Dolmattoff 1954a, b; Reichel-Dolmatoff and Dussan 1955; Mason 1931, 1936, 1939; Oyuela-Caycedo 1986a) produced the expansion of the “Tairona culture”. Tairona culture was a religious complex that promoted colonization of the SNSM."
[3]
"The Spanish encountered a truly complicated and fragmented political landscape with an assortment of ethnic and political groups of varying size, complexity, and regional power, amongst them those that may be thought of as the “Tairona”11 proper. Other groups residing in different parts of the Sierra Nevada at the end of the 15th century included the “Orejones” (Big Ears) and Chimilas to the Southwest and Southeast, the Tupe (Bari, Yuko-Yukpa) and Giriguano to the East, and the Guanebucan, Guajiro (Wayuu) and Cocina to the Northeast in the Guajira Peninsula. Spanish sources mention a number of “provinces” that they identify with these socio-political entities and called them accordingly; as in Provincia de los Orejones, Provincia de los Guanebucanes, and so on and so forth (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1951)."
[4]
"It is nevertheless, quite clear that some of these polities were larger and more powerful than others and actually exerted some degree of control over subject populations and territories. For example, 16th century Spanish sources constantly mention two notoriously large and powerful Tairona polities that stood out from all others: Bonda and Pocigueica, with whom they warred on and off throughout the 16th century. It is also equally true that no single polity exerted its domain over all others."
[5]
At the time of conquest, various polities (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1951, 61):-Taironas along the rivers Don Diego, Buritaca and Guachaca (northern Sierra Nevada)-Bonda along the river Manzanares-the Santa Marta Coast populations also inhabited the Gaira and Durcino region to the South-another (possibly the same) group occupied the northern bays between Santa Marta and Dibulla-further away from Dibulla, the Guanebucán group-the populations of Betonia and Pocigueica [1]: (Giraldo 2010, 53) [2]: (Oyuela-Caycedo 2008, 423) [3]: (Oyuela-Caycedo 2008, 418) [4]: (Giraldo 2010, 58-59) [5]: (Giraldo 2010, 60) |
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"Like the Wuhuan, their political organization was not highly centralized, with leadership reportedly based on merit, although given other evidence this could not have been the only criterion. This may have allowed lesser leaders to operate relatively independently, which served to limit Xianbei effectiveness against the later Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220) in China (Barfield 1989, p. 86; Gardner and de Crespigny 1977, p. 2)."
[1]
[1]: (Rogers 2012, 223) |
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"Like the Wuhuan, their political organization was not highly centralized, with leadership reportedly based on merit, although given other evidence this could not have been the only criterion. This may have allowed lesser leaders to operate relatively independently, which served to limit Xianbei effectiveness against the later Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220) in China (Barfield 1989, p. 86; Gardner and de Crespigny 1977, p. 2)."
[1]
[1]: (Rogers 2012, 223) |
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"Productive activities were organized by the tribal leaders, as described in the Xin Tangshu, "in hunting (the tribes) were banded together, and dispersed afterward; the tribes did not rule over one another or submitted to one another".103 It can be seen that no united tribal confederation had been formed yet by the Shiwei. "
[1]
[1]: (Xu 2005, 180) |
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"It had a core of “inner tribes” (the ruling clan and its allies, including “in-law” tribes), a second tier of tribes that joined freely (retaining their ruling houses), a third tier of tribes that joined under constraint (and whose ruling houses were usually replaced by state officials), and finally tribute-paying sedentary populations. Subject populations retaining their own kings included the Sogdians, with their major centers at Bukhara and Samarkand and farflung merchant colonies, willing collaborators with a nomadic state that possessed the military power to force open the Chinese markets.76"
[1]
[1]: (Findley 2005, 43) |
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|
"It had a core of “inner tribes” (the ruling clan and its allies, including “in-law” tribes), a second tier of tribes that joined freely (retaining their ruling houses), a third tier of tribes that joined under constraint (and whose ruling houses were usually replaced by state officials), and finally tribute-paying sedentary populations. Subject populations retaining their own kings included the Sogdians, with their major centers at Bukhara and Samarkand and farflung merchant colonies, willing collaborators with a nomadic state that possessed the military power to force open the Chinese markets.76"
[1]
[1]: (Findley 2005, 43) |
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A typical chief/paramount chief exerted strong control over the warband during the times of war, but between wars the chief’s authority became diffuse (reference needed).
PT: How do we code this? We need to bring our coding scheme in line with nomadic polities |
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"Toghon Temür, the last Yüan emperor of China and a Genghisid of the Toluy-Qubilay line, fled in 1368 to Mongolia after the dynasty’s defeat and replacement by the national Ming Dynasty. From then on, his descendants and those of other Genghisid lineages would claim the right to rule the Mongols, but without achieving the re-establishment of even a unified Mongolia, to say nothing of a resurrection of the Genghisid empire."
[1]
[1]: (Soucek 2000, 167) |
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|
"Toghon Temür, the last Yüan emperor of China and a Genghisid of the Toluy-Qubilay line, fled in 1368 to Mongolia after the dynasty’s defeat and replacement by the national Ming Dynasty. From then on, his descendants and those of other Genghisid lineages would claim the right to rule the Mongols, but without achieving the re-establishment of even a unified Mongolia, to say nothing of a resurrection of the Genghisid empire."
[1]
[1]: (Soucek 2000, 167) |
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|
"Atwood (2006, p. 209) describes the Zunghar political structure as ‘‘a confederated pattern of several ruling lineages competing for domination, and linked by marriage alliance.’’ Such a system contrasts sharply with the single-lineage type of power structure found in the earlier Mongol empire."
[1]
[1]: (Rogers 2012, 236) |
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Orokaiva political organization was fluid and not centralized: ’Political organization incorporates no central authority or hereditary leadership. Instead, it is characterized by big-men(EMBO DAMBO) and an ascendancy of elders who have proved themselves equal to the task. Such men command the respect of the village, based upon observed qualities of generosity, diligence, wealth, ability to make wise decisions, and skill in arranging ceremonial activities. This status confers no sanctioning authority, however. The Orokaiva tribes, around twelve in number, are very loose units politically and recognize no single leader. The largest unit is the tribe, which has a common territory usually demarcated from neighboring tribal territories by a belt of uninhabited land.’
[1]
’The social system is characterized by flexibility in arrangements for group membership and for transmission of rights to land. A village normally contains more than one clan branch and consequently is not necessarily a landholding unit. Residents may have closer kinship ties to residents of other villages than with some of their coresidents. Nevertheless, common residence implies some community of interest and a degree of group solidarity that is reinforced by government policy, which recognizes villages rather than descent groups as functional entities. Marriages between members of different clan branches within the village also reinforce this solidarity, which is expressed in ways such as daily food gifts, cooperation in certain tasks, and joint ceremonial activities. On the average, a lineage comprises three households. Usually, several clans are represented in a village, with members of a single clan (clan branches) being scattered among a number of neighboring villages. Lineages are more localized in cha racter, frequently being confined to a single village and tending to occupy one section of it.’
[1]
[1]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva |
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|
Orokaiva political organization was fluid and not centralized: ’Political organization incorporates no central authority or hereditary leadership. Instead, it is characterized by big-men(EMBO DAMBO) and an ascendancy of elders who have proved themselves equal to the task. Such men command the respect of the village, based upon observed qualities of generosity, diligence, wealth, ability to make wise decisions, and skill in arranging ceremonial activities. This status confers no sanctioning authority, however. The Orokaiva tribes, around twelve in number, are very loose units politically and recognize no single leader. The largest unit is the tribe, which has a common territory usually demarcated from neighboring tribal territories by a belt of uninhabited land.’
[1]
’The social system is characterized by flexibility in arrangements for group membership and for transmission of rights to land. A village normally contains more than one clan branch and consequently is not necessarily a landholding unit. Residents may have closer kinship ties to residents of other villages than with some of their coresidents. Nevertheless, common residence implies some community of interest and a degree of group solidarity that is reinforced by government policy, which recognizes villages rather than descent groups as functional entities. Marriages between members of different clan branches within the village also reinforce this solidarity, which is expressed in ways such as daily food gifts, cooperation in certain tasks, and joint ceremonial activities. On the average, a lineage comprises three households. Usually, several clans are represented in a village, with members of a single clan (clan branches) being scattered among a number of neighboring villages. Lineages are more localized in cha racter, frequently being confined to a single village and tending to occupy one section of it.’
[1]
During the colonial period, a British and Australian administrative structure was superimposed on the native system: ’In response to Australian pressure, the British government annexed Papua in 1888. Gold was discovered shortly thereafter, resulting in a major movement of prospectors and miners to what was then the Northern District. Relations with the Papuans were bad from the start, and there were numerous killings on both sides. The Protectorate of British New Guinea became Australian territory by the passing of the Papua Act of 1905 by the Commonwealth Government of Australia. The new administration adopted a policy of peaceful penetration, and many measures of social and economic national development were introduced. Local control was in the hands of village constables, paid servants of the Crown. Chosen by European officers, they were intermediaries between the government and the people. In 1951 an eruption occurred on Mount Lamington, completely devastating a large part of the area occupied by the Orokaiva. Survivors were provided with food, medicine, and other relief by the government and were maintained in evacuatio n camps. Large-scale, expertly planned social, economic, and political development began in Papua around 1960 with the introduction of cash crops, agricultural extension work, land-title improvement, road improvement, and educational development.’
[1]
The colonial period also saw the emergence of new supralocal religious movements: ’We have already noted the mutual amity which prevails among all branches of the cult, and have discovered cause to suspect that it is based on the fear of sorcery (p. 47). This general amity or fraternity, however, whatever its basis may be, is not only a striking, but on the whole a commendable feature of the cult. Clashes of arms-part in fun, part in earnest-are still common enough among the clans of the north; the warlike display at the welcome of visitors which sometimes leads to these affrays is in fact a regular custom. But although the Taro parties are constantly engaged in travel and visiting, I know of no serious quarrel between rival parties qua Taro parties. It is not necessary to observe that, but for the previous pacification of the Division, the Taro cult could never have spread itself so widely in so short a time. But it is still true that the cult is consolidating the work to which it was in the first place indebted. In fine, by arousing this elementary tendency toward cohesion, by establishing the intertribal power of a few individuals, and by advancing the spirit of intertribal friendliness, the Taro cult has played its part in emphasizing the unity of the Orokaiva. No movement of native origin has, since European occupation, made the same universal appeal to all the clans and tribes of this people.’
[2]
[1]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva [2]: Williams, F. E. (Francis Edgar) 1928. “Orokaiva Magic”, 96 |
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2500-800 BCE (European Bronze Age)
"centralization of power but only at a restricted scale and in three forms (Brun and Pion 1992): 1. A cluster of dispersed farms gravitate around a monument, a sort of tomb-sanctuary, which symbolizes the unity of the territorial community. This community is ruled by a chief who occupies one of the farms. 2. A cluster of farmsteads polarized by a village, near which is found the territorial sanctuary. ... 3. Identical in organization to #2, but the central role of the village is held by a fortification. It appears that this type of settlement owes its existence to the control it exerted over long-distance exchange, especially over exchange in metal." [1] [1]: (Brun 1995, 15) |
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2500-800 BCE (European Bronze Age)
"centralization of power but only at a restricted scale and in three forms (Brun and Pion 1992): 1. A cluster of dispersed farms gravitate around a monument, a sort of tomb-sanctuary, which symbolizes the unity of the territorial community. This community is ruled by a chief who occupies one of the farms. 2. A cluster of farmsteads polarized by a village, near which is found the territorial sanctuary. ... 3. Identical in organization to #2, but the central role of the village is held by a fortification. It appears that this type of settlement owes its existence to the control it exerted over long-distance exchange, especially over exchange in metal." [1] [1]: (Brun 1995, 15) |
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"late Hallstatt society was in a liminal phase, on the threshold between a chiefdom and a state."
[1]
While from 900-600 "a north-south axis of exchange gradually superseded all other axes" it involved mainly "the eastern part of the North-Alpine Complex." During the sixth century BC, the founding of the Greek colony at Massalia introduced exotic products to "chiefs that were located directly on the principal communication routes." Thus "In the framework of a prestige economy, they gained in power, reinforcing their control of exchange with the Mediterranean civilizations, monopolizing redistribution, and finally subjugating neighbouring chiefs. In this manner, centralized political units of a scale previously unknown in Europe were formed." [2] The princedoms "disintegrated in the fifth century BC" when other communities "situated at the north-western periphery of the area held by the princedoms" became more powerful: the Tessin community; Hunsruck-Eifel region; Aisne-Marne region; Berry region." [3] [1]: (Arnold 1995, 44) [2]: (Brun 1995, 15-16) [3]: (Brun 1995, 16) |
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In the early La Tene: "The import of exotic luxury items accentuated an already existing trend towards increased social stratification among Celtic-speaking communities, accelerating the development of centralized chiefdoms and the formation of an elite class which controlled and monopolized the flow of trade."
[1]
Early Iron Age settlements had large towns [2] so there was some degree of centralization. However, after 400 CE there were no large towns on the scale of the Early Iron Age settlements. Small communities predominated, hamlets and farmsteads typically had a population of about 50. [2] [1]: (Allen 2007, 34) [2]: (Wells 1999, 45-47) |
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In the early La Tene: "The import of exotic luxury items accentuated an already existing trend towards increased social stratification among Celtic-speaking communities, accelerating the development of centralized chiefdoms and the formation of an elite class which controlled and monopolized the flow of trade."
[1]
Early Iron Age settlements had large towns [2] so there was some degree of centralization. However, after 400 CE there were no large towns on the scale of the Early Iron Age settlements. Small communities predominated, hamlets and farmsteads typically had a population of about 50. [2] [1]: (Allen 2007, 34) [2]: (Wells 1999, 45-47) |
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In this period tribes became urbanised and more centralized but did not join together within a unified centralized polity.
Confederations of tribes joined together for battles [1] and "federal" institutions are known from one such instance - a site for war trophies. [2] Early Iron Age settlements had large towns [3] so there was some degree of centralization. However, after 400 CE there were no large towns on the scale of the Early Iron Age settlements. Small communities predominated, hamlets and farmsteads typically had a population of about 50. [3] [1]: (Kruta 2004, 105) [2]: (Kruta 2004, 186) [3]: (Wells 1999, 45-47) |
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In this period tribes became urbanised and more centralized but did not join together within a unified centralized polity.
Confederations of tribes joined together for battles [1] and "federal" institutions are known from one such instance - a site for war trophies. [2] Early Iron Age settlements had large towns [3] so there was some degree of centralization. However, after 400 CE there were no large towns on the scale of the Early Iron Age settlements. Small communities predominated, hamlets and farmsteads typically had a population of about 50. [3] [1]: (Kruta 2004, 105) [2]: (Kruta 2004, 186) [3]: (Wells 1999, 45-47) |
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Urbanised and centralized with strong economic and cultural ties, but did not join together within a unified centralized polity ruled from one power-centre/capital.
Confederations of tribes joined together for battles [1] and "federal" institutions are known from one such instance - a site for war trophies. [2] [1]: (Kruta 2004, 105) [2]: (Kruta 2004, 186) |
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Urbanised and centralized with strong economic and cultural ties, but did not join together within a unified centralized polity ruled from one power-centre/capital.
Confederations of tribes joined together for battles [1] and "federal" institutions are known from one such instance - a site for war trophies. [2] [1]: (Kruta 2004, 105) [2]: (Kruta 2004, 186) |
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nominal: 987-1130 CE; loose: 1130-1150 CE
Capetians had little authority outside the region of Paris. Count of Bois and Count of Troyes arguably had more power, while Capetians more legitimacy with stronger links to Catholic church. [1] Centralization under Louis VI (reign 1108-1137 CE): "was effective in making the king’s vassals recognize royal suzerainty; the great lords of France presented the Capetians with few problems after the first decades of the 12th century." [1] [1]: (Bouchard 1995, 313-317) |
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nominal: 987-1130 CE; loose: 1130-1150 CE
Capetians had little authority outside the region of Paris. Count of Bois and Count of Troyes arguably had more power, while Capetians more legitimacy with stronger links to Catholic church. [1] Centralization under Louis VI (reign 1108-1137 CE): "was effective in making the king’s vassals recognize royal suzerainty; the great lords of France presented the Capetians with few problems after the first decades of the 12th century." [1] [1]: (Bouchard 1995, 313-317) |
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loose: 1150-1200 CE; unitary state: 1200-1328 CE
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loose: 1150-1200 CE; unitary state: 1200-1328 CE
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’Discussing the problems of pre-Achaemenian Khorezm, S. P. Tolstov considered that this ancient realm was a tribal confederation of chiefdoms that gradually evolved into a state’.
[1]
Abazov says: ’Khwarezm, likely one of the oldest political entities in the territories of Central Asia, was situated between Sogdiana and the Aral Sea. It was probably a loose confederation of settled and seminomadic groups’.
[2]
[1]: (Askarov 1992, 447) A. Askarov. 1992. ’The Beginning of the Iron Age in Transoxania’, in History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol 1: The Dawn of Civilization: Earliest Times to 700 B.C., edited by A. H. Dani and V. M. Masson, 441-58. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. [2]: (Abazov 2008, xxxii) Rafis Abazov. 2008. The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. |
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"Reflecting the major social and political development of the region, this monumental architecture is evidence of a strong local state organization. The inner buildings of these courtyards are at present difficult to reconstruct. Although this question has still to be resolved, it would seem that the courtyards of Koktepe housed earlier religious and administrative institutions."
[1]
[1]: (Rapin 2007, 35) Rapin, Claude. "Nomads and the Shaping of Central Asia: from the Early Iron Age to the Kushan Period." in Cribb, Joe. Herrmann, Georgina. 2007. After Alexander: Central Asia before Islam. British Academy. |
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"Around 100 BCE the Yueh-chih conquered Bactria and drove the Scythians southwards to Gandhara. During the period 100 BCE to 40 CE, conditions in and around Bactria remained unsettled as the five factions of the Yueh-chih battled against each other for supremacy."
[1]
"Thus, both the written sources and the numismatic data show that Transoxiana in the 2nd and 1st centuries B.C.lacked internal political unity. Even Sughd (the basin of the river Zarafshan) was divided between at least two realms, this corresponding more or less to the later partition of the Zarafshan valley into "Bukharan Sughd" and "Samarkandian Sughd"; accordingly we have imitations of tetradrachms of Euthydemus and imitations of drachms of Antiochus I, with a horse’s head on the reverse side." [2] [1]: (Samad 2011, 88) Samad, R. U. 2011. The Grandeur of Gandhara: The Ancient Buddhist Civilization of the Swat, Peshawar, Kabul and Indus Valleys. Angora Publishing. [2]: (Zeimal 1983, 246) |
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City state principalities e.g. in Bukhara and Samarkand. "Sogdiana was not unified, and several Sogdian city-states shared the Zarafshan and adjacent valleys. Samarkand was certainly the principal political power: it occasionally managed to secure control of certain small cities,33 and its king claimed the title of “King of Sogdiana, Sovereign of Samarkand” (sgwdy’nk MLK’ sm’rkndc MR’Y ). Each city had its particular aristocracy, and the cas- tles of the nobles made the Sogdian countryside bristle with many fortified towns around which the population was organized. The nobles drew vast revenues from the land and possessed properties in both town and country."
[1]
[1]: (De la Vaissière 2005, 167) |
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"Under their rule the city and khanate crystallized into an almost classical pattern of a Muslim polity of its time, cherishing and even enhancing traditional values while ignoring or rejecting the vertiginous changes initiated by the Europeans but now reaching other parts of the world."
[1]
"During his long reign (1611-41) Imam Quli maintained a fairly stable government at Bukhara. Generally, he let the Uzbek chiefs govern their appanages as they wished. His brother, Nadr Muhammad, enjoyed a semi-independent status at Balkh."
[2]
[1]: (Soucek 2000, 177) [2]: (Mukminova 2003, 47) |
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The transition from the Qing dynastic to the Chinese republican period was characterized by significant political and economic transformations: ’From Song on, in periods of relative peace, government control was exercised through the tusi system of indirect rule by appointed native headmen who collected taxes, organized corvée, and kept the peace. Miao filled this role in Hunan and eastern Guizhou, but farther west the rulers were often drawn from a hereditary Yi nobility, a system that lasted into the twentieth century. In Guizhou, some tusi claimed Han ancestry, but were probably drawn from the ranks of assimilated Bouyei, Dong, and Miao. Government documents refer to the "Sheng Miao" (raw Miao), meaning those living in areas beyond government control and not paying taxes or labor service to the state. In the sixteenth century, in the more pacified areas, the implementation of the policy of gaitu guiliu began the replacement of native rulers with regular civilian and military officials, a few of whom were drawn from assimilated minority families. Land became a commodity, creating both landlords and some freeholding peasants in the areas affected. In the Yunnan-Guizhou border area, the tusi system continued and Miao purchase of land and participation in local markets was restricted by law until the Republican period (1911-1949).’
[1]
Miao popular uprisings against the deleterious effects of economic and ethnic stratification continued well into the republican period: ’During the Qing, uprisings and military encounters escalated. There were major disturbances in western Hunan (1795-1806) and a continuous series of rebellions in Guizhou (1854-1872). Chinese policies toward the Miao shifted among assimilation, containment in "stockaded villages," dispersal, removal, and extermination. The frequent threat of "Miao rebellion" caused considerable anxiety to the state; in actuality, many of these uprisings included Bouyei, Dong, Hui, and other ethnic groups, including Han settlers and demobilized soldiers. At issue were heavy taxation, rising landlordism, rivalries over local resources, and official corruption. One of the last Miao uprisings occurred in 1905 in western Hunan in opposition to Guomindang (Republican) continuation of the tuntian system, which forced the peasants to open up new lands and grow crops for the state.’
[1]: Diamond, Norma: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Miao |
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On the local level, authority was informal and decentralized: ’Respected knowledgeable elders, heads of family groups, and religious experts of both genders served as informal leaders. Among the more Sinicized, landlords and those who had some literacy in Chinese exercised power in the community. Under the present system, those who are members of the Communist party stand as the official leaders of the community.’
[1]
’Traditionally, the Miao had little political organization above the village level, and the highest position was that of village leader. In China the Miao have come under the political organization common to the whole of China; where minority populations are dense, they live in autonomous counties, townships, or prefectures, where a certain amount of self-representation is allowed.’
[2]
’The Magpie Miao live in villages, occasionally compact but normally consisting of a cluster of separate hamlets. These are located on mountain slopes, usually far enough away from main transportation routes to be inaccessible and readily defensible. The Miao lack any political organization of their own, and are thoroughly integrated into the Chinese administrative system. The basic political, as well as economic and social unit, is the village. Villages are grouped into townships and divided into hamlets of about ten to twenty households each. The headmen of both the village and the hamlet are appointed by the chief of the township. The members of different villages or hamlets are bound principally by affinal ties. They may cooperate for the common good, but they lack any formal organization of an indigenous character. Disputes between members of the same hamlet are settled, if possible, within the hamlet. Those between members of different hamlets of the same village are adjudicated by a council composed of the village headman and the heads of the hamlets involved. If this council cannot effect a settlement, the litigants have a right to carry their dispute to the chief of the township or even to the Chinese court of the county.’
[3]
The integration of the Hmong population into the Chinese administrative structure started well before the onset of the republican period: ’When the Miao rebellion was put down in the first year of Chia Ch’ing /1796/, it was found that the policy of governing the Miao with Chinese was wrong. The then governor-general of Hunan and Kwangtung, Pi Yüan, submitted a plan to govern the Miao with Miao. The ministry’s response to the memorial setting up regulations for Miao officials, Miao Chiang Chin- Yao Shan-Hou Shih I /Important Remedial Measures for the Miao Frontier Region/, has a passage, “Miao Chiang Pe Hu Chai Ch’ang Ming-Mu Ying Cho Liang Keng Ting /The Names of the Village Leaders of 100 Families Should be Decided after Due Deliberation/,” stating: “According to the memorial, in the three provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Hupeh, such areas as Yu-yang and T’ung-jen were all previously governed by headmen, but following their application to be put under government officials, the administrative areas of chou, hsien, and ying were established, subject to the jurisdiction of civil and military authorities. In the Miao villages, there were established only village chiefs to govern a unit of 100 families. However, since Chinese were also permitted to fill these posts, gradually there were rapacious, unscrupulous rogues, whose mistreatment caused disturbances. It is requested that from among the Miao who have submitted, and on whom were conferred the peacock feather decoration /for merit, in early Ch’ing times/, there be selected some intelligent, aware persons, to be appointed at each ying /military station/ as native second captain /shoupei/, lieutenant /ch’ien-tsung/, and sergeant or corporal /wai-wei/, such positions to be filled through the governor-general and governor’s /tu-wu/ yamen /tu-wu ya-men/ and to be subject to the control of the civil and military authorities. When the various t’ang hsin in the Miao area have official despatches to send, they can order the said native petty officers to select Miao to question and send, and also to give them some cash and rations. When officials traveling on official business require servants, they may also recruit them from the Miao, and pay them wages according to the Chinese scales. It would appear that the 100-families village chief was originally inaugurated to discipline the Miao, but these men were unimportant and their powers limited, as that the Miao did not heed them. Moreover, among the Chinese holding such positions there were rapacious, unscrupulous rogues, whose mistreatment led to disturbances. This should naturally be explained, deliberated, and changed, so as to fix responsibility. During the recent campaign those submissive Miao who accompanied the army and won peacock feather awards are numerous, therefore from these select those who are intelligent and aware, and who have the support of the rest, and according to the customary set-up of t’u-kuan /officials governing aboriginal tribes in West China/, every Ying should have one or two men to be native second captains, under whom there should be native lieutenants and sergeants, for better control of the Miao. Their number will depend upon the number of villages put under control, and they shall be appointed by the governor-general and governor’s yamen and also be under the control of regional officials. If there are fights, robberies and thefts among the Miao these native officers will be asked to make the arrests. On their inspection tours, the governor-general and governor and military officials should examine the merits and demerits of these officers and reward or punish them accordingly to demonstrate justice, following the recommendations memorialized by Governor-general Ho Lin. When the t’ang-hsin system of communication in the Miao area has been abolished, official communications should be despatched according to old methods so as to avoid delay. In the regions where the t’ang-hsin system exists as before, the local officials /t’u kuan/ should be asked to pick out honest Miao to be given the responsibility of delivering messages after being questioned, to be paid wages and rations from unallotted funds, according to the scale for t’un soldiers. When officials traveling on official business need servants, then order the said Miao to serve, and pay them wages according to recommendations memorialized.”’
[4]
The Chinese administration operated from district towns and provincial capitals: ’Like Kweiyang, the hsien city of Lung-li was in an open plain, but a narrow one. The space between the mountains was sufficient for a walled town of one long street between the east and west gates and one or two on either side. There were fields outside the city walls. Its normal population was between three and four thousand, augmented during the war by the coming of some “companies” for the installation and repair of charcoal burners in motor lorries and the distillation of grain alcohol for fuel, an Army officers’ training school, and the engineers’ corps of the railway being built through the town from Kwangsi to Kweiyang. To it the people of the surrounding contryside, including at least three groups of Miao and the Chung-chia, went to market. It was also the seat of the hsien government and contained a middle school, postal and telegraph offices, and a cooperative bank, with all of which the non-Chinese, as well as the Chinese, had some dealings. A few of the more well-to-do families sent one of their boys to the middle school. Cases which could not be settled in the village or by the lien pao official, who was also a Chinese, were of necessity brought to the hsien court, as well as cases which involved both Miao and Chinese.’
[5]
’The Ch’uan Miao are not a tribe with a political organization that includes the whole group. There are no tribal rulers, but they have local headmen, called gü leo or “old clubs,” who sometimes cooperate for the common good. These people are an ethnic group bound together by common language, ideals, and customs and by a strong sense of unity. They are very sociable and mutually helpful.’
[6]
The turbulences and conflicts of the republican period make the identification of a reliable code difficult.
[1]: Diamond, Norma: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Miao [2]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Miao [3]: Rui, Yifu 1960. “Magpie Miao Of Southern Szechuan”, 145 [4]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 152 [5]: Mickey, Margaret Portia 1947. “Cowrie Shell Miao Of Kweichow”, 40b [6]: Graham, David Crockett 1954. “Songs And Stories Of The Ch’Uan Miao”, 4 |
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All Akkadian kings aimed to centralize power and control all local governors. Therefore, they undertook several reforms such using Akkadian in official calculation, set the officials and governors which will be dependent on them etc.
[1]
Akkadian Empire: "It was an entity put together and maintained by force, with provinces administered by officials sent out from the capital in the heartland. This is precisely what we see in the Akkadian period." [2] Akkaddian empire can be divided into centre and periphery. "In the centre, Akkadian control was exercised in a compact, yet indirect way. The administration of cities was left in the hands of the local ensi. These were under the authority of the king of Akkad, but held a certain degree of autonomy. It is probably that some cities were ruled by an Akkadian ensi appointed by the king, while other cities continued to be ruled by a local ensi." [3] [1]: Postgate 2007,36 [2]: (Foster 2016, 80) Foster, Benjamin R. 2016. The Age of Agade. Inventing Empire In Ancient Mesopotamia. Routledge. London. [3]: (Leverani 2014, 138) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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[1]
Inscriptions from time of Ur (Shu-Sin) suggest unity within internal land. "the celebratory tone was not directed against Mesopotamian cities or other urbanised centres (such as the ones in Elam and Syria) anymore. The inscriptions rather focused on those turbulent ’barbarian’ groups from the steppes and mountains, considered to be uncivilised and inhuman." [2] [1]: Szeląg 2007, 10 [2]: (Leverani 2014, 159) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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"The Ur III Empire broke up into a number of autonomous smaller states, controlling and fighting over other ancient cities."
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh 2005: 84) McIntosh, J. 2005. Ancient Mesopotamia: New Perspective. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/KK2E3KMD. |
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Until the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE), Babylon existed as a petty state. Kings of smaller city-states would pledge their allegiance to one of the bigger city-states thus creating petty states. The allegiance of the small city-states was constantly fluctuating, thus the size and influence of the petty states were also never constant. Babylon had the allegiance of a number of city states put each still had a king and Babylon’s influence was minimal.
[1]
Once Hammurabi started his military campaigns, he began exerting military power over former allies, such as Zimri-Lin, then further afield in Southern Mesopotamia. He soon claimed the title ’King of Sumer and Akkad’ and later had control of cities such as Assur and Nineveh, thus becoming king of Assyria. While major administrative changes occurred, many of the governing bodies of the cities remained and a significant degree of decision making remained in the former city-states. [2] [1]: Oates, J. Babylon. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson. p.61 [2]: Oates, J. Babylon. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson. p.65 |
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Until the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE), Babylon existed as a petty state. Kings of smaller city-states would pledge their allegiance to one of the bigger city-states thus creating petty states. The allegiance of the small city-states was constantly fluctuating, thus the size and influence of the petty states were also never constant. Babylon had the allegiance of a number of city states put each still had a king and Babylon’s influence was minimal.
[1]
Once Hammurabi started his military campaigns, he began exerting military power over former allies, such as Zimri-Lin, then further afield in Southern Mesopotamia. He soon claimed the title ’King of Sumer and Akkad’ and later had control of cities such as Assur and Nineveh, thus becoming king of Assyria. While major administrative changes occurred, many of the governing bodies of the cities remained and a significant degree of decision making remained in the former city-states. [2] [1]: Oates, J. Babylon. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson. p.61 [2]: Oates, J. Babylon. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson. p.65 |
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"Within the land of Sumer and Akkad, the administration of the dynasty of Isin continued along the same lines as in the Kassite period. We know of around twenty provinces ruled by a governor (šakin ma¯ti, then šakin te¯mi). Some of these provinces were named after their main city (Nippur, Isin, Dur-Kurigalzu, and so on). There were also other territorial entities and tribal ‘houses’ (defined with the term Bït plus the name of the ancestor). The ‘urban’ provinces were mainly in the north (in the former land of Akkad), and less in the south, where Ur seems to have been the most vital city. ‘Tribal’ provinces were mainly located in the area east of the Tigris. It is possible that, within the land, the traditional duties of the ‘governors’ were taking care of irrigation systems and temple architecture. In the provinces along the borders, these tasks were more military and governors had a more personal, rather than administrative, relationship with the king."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 462-463) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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"In terms of content, the Advice to a Prince provides a window into the relationship between royal control and the autonomy of the cities. The political and administrative crisis had forced each city to look after itself. Rather than governors appointed by the kingdom, temples acted as the real centres of local resources and activities. Indeed, temples could rely on their millenary tradition, administrative structure, prestige, and ability to motivate the population. They therefore required and obtained from the kings (probably the weakest ones) a certain degree of autonomy and various exemptions from tributes and obligations (defined with the terms kidinnu in Kassite and zakûtu in Akkadian). They also had a certain degree of self-government for the administration of justice and of the cities’ internal affairs."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 471) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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"In terms of content, the Advice to a Prince provides a window into the relationship between royal control and the autonomy of the cities. The political and administrative crisis had forced each city to look after itself. Rather than governors appointed by the kingdom, temples acted as the real centres of local resources and activities. Indeed, temples could rely on their millenary tradition, administrative structure, prestige, and ability to motivate the population. They therefore required and obtained from the kings (probably the weakest ones) a certain degree of autonomy and various exemptions from tributes and obligations (defined with the terms kidinnu in Kassite and zakûtu in Akkadian). They also had a certain degree of self-government for the administration of justice and of the cities’ internal affairs."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 471) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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The Parthian Empire was divided into three areas: self governing kingdoms in Mesopotamia; semi-independent kingdoms on the borders of Iran); and Parthian ’heartlands’ in the centre under rule of the King.
[1]
"Written documents (mainly in Greek, Latin, or Hebrew) from the first two centuries A.D. in Southwest Asia suggest that the Parthian ’Empire’ was at most times an unstable coalition of vassal states brought periodically under imperial Parthian control." [2] [1]: (Lukonin 1983, 734-735) Lukonin, V. G. Political, Social and Administrative Institutions: Taxes and Trade. in Yar-Shater, Ehsan ed. 1983. The Cambridge history of Iran: the Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Part 2. III. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [2]: (Wenke 1981, 306) Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 |
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Hajji Muhammad ware: "The proposed usage for formal eating and drinking made them a desirable item for display purposes in a society that was, perhaps, beginning to see the emergence of a social hierarchy."
[1]
[1]: (Crawford 2006, 167) Crawford, Harriet in Carter, Robert A. Philip, Graham. eds. 2006. Beyond The Ubaid. Transformation and integration in the late prehistoric societies of the Middle East. The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Illinois. |
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"The development of centers on the Susiana plane, beginning with Middle Cha1colithic Chogha Mish and culminating in the rise of Susa during the Late Chalcolithic. suggests a trend towards regional control in some economic and administrative activities (Delougaz and Kantor 1996, Hole 1987b: 89-90). This trend towards centralization may also be suggested by the presence of possible elite or "Khan’s" houses during this time at several sites (Hole 1987a: 41). In spite of these trends, Chalcolithic society throughout Khuzistan presents a strong egalitarian appearance. During the Middle and Late Chalcolithic, differential access to resources may have involved less archaeological1y visible items such as staples. access to water, and control over labor, as it appears to have done at this time in Mesopotamia (Stein 1994)."
[1]
The Middle Chalcolithic corresponds to 4800-3900 BCE and the Late Chalcolithic corresponds to 3900-3500 BCE in this book.
[1]: (Peasnall in Peregrine and Ember 2002, 173) |
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|
"In Khuzistan, Susiana, the Soghun Valley of the southeastern plateau, and perhaps elsewhere, Late Chalcolithic society may have been made up of a series of small localized chiefdoms similar to the contemporary Ubaid chiefdoms that existed in Mesopotamia. These chiefdoms would have been based on a system of staple finance rather than on the unequal distribution of prestige items. In this case, power would have been based on the control over water, land, and labor. Elsewhere, especially in the more isolated regions of the highlands, relatively small, self-sufficient, autonomous villages probably continued to exist throughout the Late Chalcolithic."
[1]
In this book the Late Chalcolithic corresponds to the period between 3900 and 3500 BCE.
[1]: (Peasnall in Peregrine and Ember 2002, 164) |
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|
Uruk phase "Urban Revolution therefore led to the formation of the Early State, not just in its decisional function, which already existed in pre-urban communities, but in the fullest sense of the term. The latter is to be understood as an organisation that solidly controls and defends a given territory (and its many communities) and manages the exploitation of resources to ensure and develop the survival of its population. What distinguishes the State is the stratified, yet organically coherent, structure of the human groups constituting it. In other words, the formation of the State placed collective interests above individual ones (or of individual groups such as families, villages and so on), the former being pursued in the various functions and contributions provided by each group."
[1]
"A period of depopulation, characterized by political competition between Susa in the west and Chogha Mish in the east led to the rather enigmatic Late Uruk polity in which Chogha Mish was independent of Susa." [2] [1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Sumner 1988) Sumner, William. 1988. Frank Hole, (ed.) - 1987. The Archaeology of Western Iran, Settlement and Society From Prehistory to the Islamic Conquest. Paleorient. Volume 14. Number 1. pp.177-179. |
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|
Proto-Elamite period reference: "The geography of Iran, with its fertile lands surrounded by mountains, or on the margins of the central deserts, favoured the rise of local political entities. The latter would eventually unit in a sort of federal system (especially in the following period). Among these various local entities, Susiana remains a unique case, due to its exposure to Mesopotamian influences."
[1]
Uruk phase "Urban Revolution therefore led to the formation of the Early State, not just in its decisional function, which already existed in pre-urban communities, but in the fullest sense of the term. The latter is to be understood as an organisation that solidly controls and defends a given territory (and its many communities) and manages the exploitation of resources to ensure and develop the survival of its population. What distinguishes the State is the stratified, yet organically coherent, structure of the human groups constituting it. In other words, the formation of the State placed collective interests above individual ones (or of individual groups such as families, villages and so on), the former being pursued in the various functions and contributions provided by each group." [2] "Established in the late fourth millennium B.C., the Elamite Empire was the first Iranian experience in empire building and state tradition. ... the federated state of Elam practiced public administration ... The federal system of Elam was composed of several major kingdoms (the Kassite, the Guti, the Lullubi, Susiana, and Elamite), all being of the same racial group of the pre-Aryan people." [3] -- Note that Potts (2016) says that the link between what has been called "Proto-Elamite" and Elamite culture does not exist, "Proto-Elamite" is a misnomer. Writing system of the succeeding period was derived from proto-cuneiform Susa II/Uruk IV. [4] [1]: (Leverani 2014, 91) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [3]: (Farazmand 2001, 535) Farazmand, Ali in Farazmand, Ali ed. 2001. Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration. Marcel Dekker, Inc. New York. [4]: (Potts 2016, 76) Potts, D T. 2016. The Archaeology of Elam Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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|
Proto-Elamite period reference: "The geography of Iran, with its fertile lands surrounded by mountains, or on the margins of the central deserts, favoured the rise of local political entities. The latter would eventually unit in a sort of federal system (especially in the following period). Among these various local entities, Susiana remains a unique case, due to its exposure to Mesopotamian influences."
[1]
Uruk phase "Urban Revolution therefore led to the formation of the Early State, not just in its decisional function, which already existed in pre-urban communities, but in the fullest sense of the term. The latter is to be understood as an organisation that solidly controls and defends a given territory (and its many communities) and manages the exploitation of resources to ensure and develop the survival of its population. What distinguishes the State is the stratified, yet organically coherent, structure of the human groups constituting it. In other words, the formation of the State placed collective interests above individual ones (or of individual groups such as families, villages and so on), the former being pursued in the various functions and contributions provided by each group." [2] "Established in the late fourth millennium B.C., the Elamite Empire was the first Iranian experience in empire building and state tradition. ... the federated state of Elam practiced public administration ... The federal system of Elam was composed of several major kingdoms (the Kassite, the Guti, the Lullubi, Susiana, and Elamite), all being of the same racial group of the pre-Aryan people." [3] -- Note that Potts (2016) says that the link between what has been called "Proto-Elamite" and Elamite culture does not exist, "Proto-Elamite" is a misnomer. Writing system of the succeeding period was derived from proto-cuneiform Susa II/Uruk IV. [4] [1]: (Leverani 2014, 91) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [3]: (Farazmand 2001, 535) Farazmand, Ali in Farazmand, Ali ed. 2001. Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration. Marcel Dekker, Inc. New York. [4]: (Potts 2016, 76) Potts, D T. 2016. The Archaeology of Elam Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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|
Proto-Elamite reference says federal system especially in following period: "The geography of Iran, with its fertile lands surrounded by mountains, or on the margins of the central deserts, favoured the rise of local political entitites. The latter would eventually unit in a sort of federal system (especially in the following period). Among these various local entities, Susiana remains a unique case, due to its exposure to Mesopotamian influences."
[1]
first half of third millennium saw rise of powerful city-states in southern Mesopotamia. [2] "The conquest of Susiana [by Akkadians] also altered the confederate structure of the Elamite state." [3] "Established in the late fourth millennium B.C., the Elamite Empire was the first Iranian experience in empire building and state tradition. ... the federated state of Elam practiced public administration ... The federal system of Elam was composed of several major kingdoms (the Kassite, the Guti, the Lullubi, Susiana, and Elamite), all being of the same racial group of the pre-Aryan people." [4] Akkadian conquest: "The conquest of Susiana also altered the confederate structure of the Elamite state." [5] "Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [6] [1]: (Leverani 2014, 91) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Amiet, Chevalier and Carter 1992, 5) Amiet, Pierre. Chevalier, Nicole. Carter, Elizabeth. in Harper, Prudence O. Aruz, Joan. Tallon, Francoise. eds. 1992. The Royal City of Susa: Ancient Near Eastern Treasures in the Louvre. Metropolitan Museum of Art. [3]: (Leverani 2014, 132) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [4]: (Farazmand 2001, 535) Farazmand, Ali in Farazmand, Ali ed. 2001. Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration. Marcel Dekker, Inc. New York. [5]: (Leverani 2014, 142) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [6]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
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|
[1]
[2]
"The Shu-Sin texts which describe the defeat of the Shimaskian lands make it clear that each had its own ruler, styled ’great ensi’ (ensi-gal-gal) or ’king’ (lugal) in the case of those who ruled a land, and simply ensi for those whose domain was a city or town (Kutscher 1989: 99). Kutscher suggested that Ziringu, named as the paramount ruler of Zabshali in one of the Shu-Sin texts, ruled a Shimaskian ’empire’ comprised of a ’confederacy of lands whose leading force was the land of Zabshali’ (Kutscher 1989: 100)." [3] "Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [4] [1]: Potts 1999, 156 [2]: Potts 2012, 43 [3]: (Potts 2016, 145) Potts, D T. 2016. The Archaeology of Elam Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [4]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
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|
[1]
[2]
"The Iranologist Walther Hinz once described late third millennium Elam as ’a federal state’, and wrote, ’In an attempt to unite the very diverse areas of the federation, the kings, being sovereign, strove to bind the minor princelings to themselves by ties of blood relationship. The result was a body politic constructed on lines that were unusual, complicated, and indeed unparalleled elsewhere. The ruling houses most adept at this task all seem to have sprung from the high land and not from Susiana, although Susa itself early attained the status of capital’ (Hinz 1972: 69). ... Steinkeller described the six Shimaskian lands defeated by Shu-Sin as a ’confederation’ (Steinkeller 1988a: 119), while Stolper called them ’an extensive interregional union’ (Stolper 1982: 49)." [3] "Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [4] "Elam’s political structure was characterised by its confederate nature. This aspect was typical of the region from as early as the Early Dynastic period. Therefore, the role of the sukkal-mah corresponded to the Elamite confederation and the single sukkal correspond to the individual regional districts. Among these, the role of the sukkal of Elam and Shimashki maintained its privilege as a legacy of the former supremacy of the dynasty of Shimashki at the beginning of the second millennium BC." [5] [1]: Hinz 1971, 256-7 [2]: Liverani 2014, 253 [3]: (Potts 2016, 145) Potts, D T. 2016. The Archaeology of Elam Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [4]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. [5]: (Leverani 2014, 253-254) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
||||||
|
[1]
[2]
"The Iranologist Walther Hinz once described late third millennium Elam as ’a federal state’, and wrote, ’In an attempt to unite the very diverse areas of the federation, the kings, being sovereign, strove to bind the minor princelings to themselves by ties of blood relationship. The result was a body politic constructed on lines that were unusual, complicated, and indeed unparalleled elsewhere. The ruling houses most adept at this task all seem to have sprung from the high land and not from Susiana, although Susa itself early attained the status of capital’ (Hinz 1972: 69). ... Steinkeller described the six Shimaskian lands defeated by Shu-Sin as a ’confederation’ (Steinkeller 1988a: 119), while Stolper called them ’an extensive interregional union’ (Stolper 1982: 49)." [3] "Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [4] "Elam’s political structure was characterised by its confederate nature. This aspect was typical of the region from as early as the Early Dynastic period. Therefore, the role of the sukkal-mah corresponded to the Elamite confederation and the single sukkal correspond to the individual regional districts. Among these, the role of the sukkal of Elam and Shimashki maintained its privilege as a legacy of the former supremacy of the dynasty of Shimashki at the beginning of the second millennium BC." [5] [1]: Hinz 1971, 256-7 [2]: Liverani 2014, 253 [3]: (Potts 2016, 145) Potts, D T. 2016. The Archaeology of Elam Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. [4]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. [5]: (Leverani 2014, 253-254) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
||||||
|
"Elam’s political structure was characterised by its confederate nature. This aspect was typical of the region from as early as the Early Dynastic period. Therefore, the role of the sukkal-mah corresponded to the Elamite confederation and the single sukkal correspond to the individual regional districts. Among these, the role of the sukkal of Elam and Shimashki maintained its privilege as a legacy of the former supremacy of the dynasty of Shimashki at the beginning of the second millennium BC."
[1]
"In the kingdom of Elam during this time (about 1700 B.C.), the people of the southeastern plateau, whose princes had controlled Susiana, fell back into a semi-nomadic state. The trans-Elamite culture that extended across the plateau similarly collapsed, and India too was overwhelmed in a general crisis about which little is known."
[2]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 253-254) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. [2]: (Amiet, Chevalier and Carter 1992, 8) Amiet, Pierre. Chevalier, Nicole. Carter, Elizabeth. in Harper, Prudence O. Aruz, Joan. Tallon, Francoise. eds. 1992. The Royal City of Susa: Ancient Near Eastern Treasures in the Louvre. Metropolitan Museum of Art. |
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|
It is known that kings appointed regional governors. The title King of Anshan and Susa infers greater centralised control of Elam than in previous and later periods, but it is likely that there were periods when there was greater regional power.
[1]
"Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [2] [1]: Carter, E. and Stolpher, M.W. 1984. Elam: Surveys of Political History and Archaeology. London: University of California Publication. p.59 [2]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
||||||
|
It is known that kings appointed regional governors. The title King of Anshan and Susa infers greater centralised control of Elam than in previous and later periods, but it is likely that there were periods when there was greater regional power.
[1]
"Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [2] [1]: Carter, E. and Stolpher, M.W. 1984. Elam: Surveys of Political History and Archaeology. London: University of California Publication. p.59 [2]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
||||||
|
It is known that kings appointed regional governors. The title King of Anshan and Susa infers greater centralised control of Elam than in previous and later periods, but it is likely that there were periods when there was greater regional power.
[1]
"Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [2] [1]: Carter, E. and Stolpher, M.W. 1984. Elam: Surveys of Political History and Archaeology. London: University of California Publication. p.59 [2]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
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|
"Although Elam did not maintain a political unity during these intervening centuries of obscurity, local chieftains must have preserved a semblance of control in areas where their authority had been traditionally exercised. Cameron suggests that local rule would probably have remained strongest in the remote Eastern districts of Elamite territories, sc. the region of modern Fars."
[1]
JR: This view may be changing. We asked Wouter Henkelman about the degree of centralization in Elam in the first half of the 1st millennium BCE as a whole. He told us that ’the ascending view is that Elam was an organised and centralised state up until the Assyrian invasions’ (of the mid-7th century BCE).
[2]
For this reason, I’ve coded for scholarly disagreement.
[1]: (Hansman 1985, 30) [2]: Henkelman 2016, personal communication. |
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|
"Although Elam did not maintain a political unity during these intervening centuries of obscurity, local chieftains must have preserved a semblance of control in areas where their authority had been traditionally exercised. Cameron suggests that local rule would probably have remained strongest in the remote Eastern districts of Elamite territories, sc. the region of modern Fars."
[1]
JR: This view may be changing. We asked Wouter Henkelman about the degree of centralization in Elam in the first half of the 1st millennium BCE as a whole. He told us that ’the ascending view is that Elam was an organised and centralised state up until the Assyrian invasions’ (of the mid-7th century BCE).
[2]
For this reason, I’ve coded for scholarly disagreement.
[1]: (Hansman 1985, 30) [2]: Henkelman 2016, personal communication. |
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|
"It is also likely that, under intense Assyrian pressure, Elam as it had existed in the Middle Elamite period was no longer a unified state linking the highlands of Fars and the lowlands of Khuzistan, and that individual cities, such as Hidalu or Madaktu, were no longer bound by the authority of a single Elamite king at any one time."
[1]
However, Diakonoff says: ’When we next hear of Elam - in the annals of the Assyrian king Šamšī-Adad V under the year 821 B.C. - the news is of a civil war waged inside a still existing big state’.
[2]
JR: The view that the Elamite state was fragmented in the early 1st millennium BCE appears to be less popular now. We asked Wouter Henkelman about the degree of centralization in Elam in the first half of the 1st millennium BCE as a whole. He told us that ’the ascending view is that Elam was an organised and centralised state up until the Assyrian invasions’ (of the mid-7th century BCE).
[3]
For this reason, I’ve coded for scholarly disagreement.
[1]: (Potts 2004, 259) [2]: (Diakonoff 1985, 18-19) I. M. Diakonoff. ’Elam’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2., edited by I. Gershevitch, 1-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3]: Henkelman 2016, personal communication. |
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|
"It is also likely that, under intense Assyrian pressure, Elam as it had existed in the Middle Elamite period was no longer a unified state linking the highlands of Fars and the lowlands of Khuzistan, and that individual cities, such as Hidalu or Madaktu, were no longer bound by the authority of a single Elamite king at any one time."
[1]
However, Diakonoff says: ’When we next hear of Elam - in the annals of the Assyrian king Šamšī-Adad V under the year 821 B.C. - the news is of a civil war waged inside a still existing big state’.
[2]
JR: The view that the Elamite state was fragmented in the early 1st millennium BCE appears to be less popular now. We asked Wouter Henkelman about the degree of centralization in Elam in the first half of the 1st millennium BCE as a whole. He told us that ’the ascending view is that Elam was an organised and centralised state up until the Assyrian invasions’ (of the mid-7th century BCE).
[3]
For this reason, I’ve coded for scholarly disagreement.
[1]: (Potts 2004, 259) [2]: (Diakonoff 1985, 18-19) I. M. Diakonoff. ’Elam’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2., edited by I. Gershevitch, 1-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3]: Henkelman 2016, personal communication. |
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|
unitary state: 820-693 BCE; confederated state: 693-640 BCE In 693 BCE, the new king Kudur Nahhunte relocated his residence from Susa to Madaktu, likely a marginal stronghold, and later Hidalu. These areas had little administrative power and as a result local autonomy increased significantly throughout the rest of the Neo-Elamite Kingdom.
[1]
[2]
Liveracki suggests that the Assyrian king set three Median princes as kings in the three capitals (Susa, Madaktu and Hidalu) after the battle of 653 BCE, thus further dispersing power.
[3]
"Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [4] [1]: Carter, E. and Stopler, M.W. 1984. Elam: Surveys of Political History and Archaeology. London: University of California Press. p.47 [2]: Potts, D.T. 1999. The Archaeology of Elam: Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 259 [3]: Liveraki, M. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History Society and Economy. London: Routledge. p.530 [4]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
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|
unitary state: 820-693 BCE; confederated state: 693-640 BCE In 693 BCE, the new king Kudur Nahhunte relocated his residence from Susa to Madaktu, likely a marginal stronghold, and later Hidalu. These areas had little administrative power and as a result local autonomy increased significantly throughout the rest of the Neo-Elamite Kingdom.
[1]
[2]
Liveracki suggests that the Assyrian king set three Median princes as kings in the three capitals (Susa, Madaktu and Hidalu) after the battle of 653 BCE, thus further dispersing power.
[3]
"Without exaggeration, the Elamite federated system of government can be considered as perhaps the earliest formal federalism on a large scale in history." [4] [1]: Carter, E. and Stopler, M.W. 1984. Elam: Surveys of Political History and Archaeology. London: University of California Press. p.47 [2]: Potts, D.T. 1999. The Archaeology of Elam: Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 259 [3]: Liveraki, M. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History Society and Economy. London: Routledge. p.530 [4]: (Farazmand 2009, 21-22) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
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|
JR: I’ve coded for scholarly disagreement here. Wouter Henkelman is ’personally convinced’ that Elam remained a centralized state after the Assyrian invasions, and that ’it prospered on account of the disappearance of Assyrian pressure (military but especially economic) after the fall of Nineveh. Not everyone subscribes to this view: Daniel Potts still believes in a fragmented state after the 640s. I personally do not see any convincing argument for this’.
[1]
After the Assyrian sack of Susa in 646 BCE, ’It looked as if Elam as a state were completely destroyed, but several kinglets still held out in the mountain strongholds, then descended into the lowlands as soon as the Assyrians went away; and at last the Assyrians went for good’. [2] Some time after about 625 BCE, ’one of the Elamite pretenders seems to have achieved the unification of the devastated kingdom. Later, under the next Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar II, war broke out between Babylonia and Elam (596/5), leading to the capture of Susa by the Babylonians; but, as can be gleaned from Jeremiah 49, the attention of the Babylonian king was riveted on other more important political matters elsewhere, and it seems that Elam again regained its independence (Jeremiah 49.39)’. [2] However, writing more recently, Waters gives us a more fragmented picture: ’It has become the norm to envisage contemporaneous, Neo-Elamite kings ruling independent principalities throughout southwestern Iran - not only in Susiana - in the roughly 100 years between the sack of Susa and Cyrus the Great’s conquest of the Medes’. [3] [1]: Henkelman 2016, personal communication. [2]: (Diakonoff 1985, 23) I. M. Diakonoff. ’Elam’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2., edited by I. Gershevitch, 1-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3]: (Waters 2013, 486) Matthew W. Waters. 2013. ’Elam, Assyria, and Babylonia in the Early First Millennium BC’, in The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran, edited by Daniel T. Potts, 478-92. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
||||||
|
JR: I’ve coded for scholarly disagreement here. Wouter Henkelman is ’personally convinced’ that Elam remained a centralized state after the Assyrian invasions, and that ’it prospered on account of the disappearance of Assyrian pressure (military but especially economic) after the fall of Nineveh. Not everyone subscribes to this view: Daniel Potts still believes in a fragmented state after the 640s. I personally do not see any convincing argument for this’.
[1]
After the Assyrian sack of Susa in 646 BCE, ’It looked as if Elam as a state were completely destroyed, but several kinglets still held out in the mountain strongholds, then descended into the lowlands as soon as the Assyrians went away; and at last the Assyrians went for good’. [2] Some time after about 625 BCE, ’one of the Elamite pretenders seems to have achieved the unification of the devastated kingdom. Later, under the next Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar II, war broke out between Babylonia and Elam (596/5), leading to the capture of Susa by the Babylonians; but, as can be gleaned from Jeremiah 49, the attention of the Babylonian king was riveted on other more important political matters elsewhere, and it seems that Elam again regained its independence (Jeremiah 49.39)’. [2] However, writing more recently, Waters gives us a more fragmented picture: ’It has become the norm to envisage contemporaneous, Neo-Elamite kings ruling independent principalities throughout southwestern Iran - not only in Susiana - in the roughly 100 years between the sack of Susa and Cyrus the Great’s conquest of the Medes’. [3] [1]: Henkelman 2016, personal communication. [2]: (Diakonoff 1985, 23) I. M. Diakonoff. ’Elam’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2., edited by I. Gershevitch, 1-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3]: (Waters 2013, 486) Matthew W. Waters. 2013. ’Elam, Assyria, and Babylonia in the Early First Millennium BC’, in The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran, edited by Daniel T. Potts, 478-92. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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|
"Elymais’ emergence as an independent state"
[1]
73 CE received a Parthian governor.
[2]
"The Greek city-states in Parthia were a survival from the Seleucid period. Under the Parthians they formally retained their autonomy" [3] [1]: (Wenke 1981, 306) Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 [2]: (Wenke 1981, 310) Wenke, Robert J. 1981. Elymeans, Parthians, and the Evolution of Empires in Southwestern Iran. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 101. No. 3. Jul-Sep. American Oriental Society. pp. 303-315. http://www.jstor.org/stable/602592 [3]: (Koshelenko and Pilipko 1999, 146) Koshelenko, G A. Pilipko, V N. in Dani, Ahmad Hasan. 1999. History of Civilizations of Central Asia: The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations: 700 B.C. to A.D. 250. Motilal Banarsidass Publ. |
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The Ak Koyunlu were "a confederation of Turkman tribes".
[1]
"Their political organization was loose."
[1]
[1]: (Quiring-Zoche 2011) Quiring-Zoche, R. 2011. Aq Qoyunlu. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aq-qoyunlu-confederation |
||||||
|
The Ak Koyunlu were "a confederation of Turkman tribes".
[1]
"Their political organization was loose."
[1]
[1]: (Quiring-Zoche 2011) Quiring-Zoche, R. 2011. Aq Qoyunlu. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aq-qoyunlu-confederation |
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-
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There is no evidence for centralization, political authority or government.
|
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During the Naqada period there is a system of quasi-polities.
settlement pattern consists of scattered villages without any ties eventually supravillages polities. By the end of that stage the chiefdoms start to change politically. First we have chiefdoms on the pre-state stages and in the Naqada III proto-states and the kings of Dynasty 0 in the later part of that period [1] . There are a few centres and villages on each territory. However the exact degree of centralization is unknown - it may be loose or nominal. [1]: Andelkovic, B. 2011. "Political Organisation of Egypt in the Predynastic Period". [in:] Teeter, E. [ed.]. Before the Pyramids: The Origin of the Egyptian Cyvilization. Chichago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. pg: 28-31. |
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During the Naqada period there is a system of quasi-polities.
settlement pattern consists of scattered villages without any ties eventually supravillages polities. By the end of that stage the chiefdoms start to change politically. First we have chiefdoms on the pre-state stages and in the Naqada III proto-states and the kings of Dynasty 0 in the later part of that period [1] . There are a few centres and villages on each territory. However the exact degree of centralization is unknown - it may be loose or nominal. [1]: Andelkovic, B. 2011. "Political Organisation of Egypt in the Predynastic Period". [in:] Teeter, E. [ed.]. Before the Pyramids: The Origin of the Egyptian Cyvilization. Chichago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. pg: 28-31. |
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Unknown
During the Naqada period there is a system of quasi-polities. settlement pattern consists of scattered villages without any ties eventually supravillages polities. By the end of that stage the chiefdoms start to change politically. First we have chiefdoms on the pre-state stages and in the Naqada III proto-states and the kings of Dynasty 0 in the later part of that period [1] . There are a few centres and villages on each territory. However the exact degree of centralization is unknown - it may be loose or nominal. [1]: Andelkovic, B. 2011. "Political Organisation of Egypt in the Predynastic Period". [in:] Teeter, E. [ed.]. Before the Pyramids: The Origin of the Egyptian Cyvilization. Chichago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. pg: 28-31. |
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Unknown
During the Naqada period there is a system of quasi-polities. settlement pattern consists of scattered villages without any ties eventually supravillages polities. By the end of that stage the chiefdoms start to change politically. First we have chiefdoms on the pre-state stages and in the Naqada III proto-states and the kings of Dynasty 0 in the later part of that period [1] . There are a few centres and villages on each territory. However the exact degree of centralization is unknown - it may be loose or nominal. [1]: Andelkovic, B. 2011. "Political Organisation of Egypt in the Predynastic Period". [in:] Teeter, E. [ed.]. Before the Pyramids: The Origin of the Egyptian Cyvilization. Chichago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. pg: 28-31. |
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EWA: unitary state 2650-2200.
This period saw the gradual development of a highly-centralized administration. While in the 3rd dynasty the top posts in the Egyptian bureaucracy were held by members of the royal family, and had direct control in all areas of administration, in the 4th dynasty civilian appointments became more common within in a progressively more hierarchical government. By the 5th dynasty the highest bureaucrat was a powerful civilian vizier, who oversaw a highly-stratified government system with specialised departments. [1] [1]: (Papazian 2013, 46) |
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unitary state: 2350-2200 BCE; loose: 2200-2150 BCE. EWA: unitary state 2650-2200.
From the 5th dynasty the highest bureaucrat was a powerful civilian vizier, who oversaw a highly-stratified government system with specialised departments. [1] The decentralizing trend in this period is reflected in the development of a provincial nobility. According to Hassan (1993), "In the later years of the Old Kingdom, the provincial officials became hereditary holders of their posts and regarded their nomes as their own property." [2] [1]: (Papazian 2013, 46) [2]: (Hassan 1993, 567) |
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unitary state: 2350-2200 BCE; loose: 2200-2150 BCE. EWA: unitary state 2650-2200.
From the 5th dynasty the highest bureaucrat was a powerful civilian vizier, who oversaw a highly-stratified government system with specialised departments. [1] The decentralizing trend in this period is reflected in the development of a provincial nobility. According to Hassan (1993), "In the later years of the Old Kingdom, the provincial officials became hereditary holders of their posts and regarded their nomes as their own property." [2] [1]: (Papazian 2013, 46) [2]: (Hassan 1993, 567) |
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Unitary state created by Theban King Wahankh Intef II 2112-2063 BCE?
[1]
although expansion outwards from Thebes probably begun by his predecessors.
[2]
King Wahankh Intef II: "The newly founded state was organized not as a loose knit network of semi-independent magnates, as the Old Kingdom had become toward its end, but as a powerful system relying on strong bonds of personal loyalty and on tight control." [3] "We know less about his adversaries, although it seems that the cause of the Herakleopolitan Kings was prosecuted by the nomarchs of Asyut." [2] Mentuhotep/Nebhepetre reunited Egypt under one ruler. "Egyptologists usually cautiously put the reunification of Egypt as taking place in or about Mentuhotep’s regnal year 39, c.2007 BC." [2] [1]: (Seidlmayer 2003) [2]: (Strudwick and Strudwick 1999, 24) [3]: (Seidlmayer 2003, 126) |
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Unitary state created by Theban King Wahankh Intef II 2112-2063 BCE?
[1]
although expansion outwards from Thebes probably begun by his predecessors.
[2]
King Wahankh Intef II: "The newly founded state was organized not as a loose knit network of semi-independent magnates, as the Old Kingdom had become toward its end, but as a powerful system relying on strong bonds of personal loyalty and on tight control." [3] "We know less about his adversaries, although it seems that the cause of the Herakleopolitan Kings was prosecuted by the nomarchs of Asyut." [2] Mentuhotep/Nebhepetre reunited Egypt under one ruler. "Egyptologists usually cautiously put the reunification of Egypt as taking place in or about Mentuhotep’s regnal year 39, c.2007 BC." [2] [1]: (Seidlmayer 2003) [2]: (Strudwick and Strudwick 1999, 24) [3]: (Seidlmayer 2003, 126) |
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Unitary state created by Theban King Wahankh Intef II 2112-2063 BCE?
[1]
although expansion outwards from Thebes probably begun by his predecessors.
[2]
King Wahankh Intef II: "The newly founded state was organized not as a loose knit network of semi-independent magnates, as the Old Kingdom had become toward its end, but as a powerful system relying on strong bonds of personal loyalty and on tight control." [3] "We know less about his adversaries, although it seems that the cause of the Herakleopolitan Kings was prosecuted by the nomarchs of Asyut." [2] Mentuhotep/Nebhepetre reunited Egypt under one ruler. "Egyptologists usually cautiously put the reunification of Egypt as taking place in or about Mentuhotep’s regnal year 39, c.2007 BC." [2] [1]: (Seidlmayer 2003) [2]: (Strudwick and Strudwick 1999, 24) [3]: (Seidlmayer 2003, 126) |
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EWA: this should be between nominal and loose
if Hyksos polity did not hold further south than el-Qusiya NGA region for the "Hyksos Period" must be a quasi-polity? |
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EWA: this should be between nominal and loose
if Hyksos polity did not hold further south than el-Qusiya NGA region for the "Hyksos Period" must be a quasi-polity? |
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EWA: this should be between nominal and loose
if Hyksos polity did not hold further south than el-Qusiya NGA region for the "Hyksos Period" must be a quasi-polity? |
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This phase was characterised by a number of small settlements, with the exception of one larger site (San José Mogote)
[1]
. The Tierras Largas phase was a period of “egalitarian or “autonomous village” society, where status could be achieved but not inherited (as suggested by three burials of potentially higher status individuals at San José Mogote and Tierras Largas)
[2]
.
[1]: Blanton, R. E., et al. (1979). "Regional evolution in the Valley of Oaxaca, Mexico." Journal of Field Archaeology 6(4): 372. [2]: lannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (2005). Excavations at San José Mogote 1: The Household Archaeology, University of Michigan Museum, p6 |
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There is very limited evidence for social stratification and centralisation of settlements at San José Mogote. Some neighbouring smaller settlements may have been influenced by people at San José Mogote, as suggested by the importing of limestone and travertine from up to 5km away, but there is otherwise little evidence for a unified polity.
[1]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (2005). Excavations at San José Mogote 1: The Household Archaeology, University of Michigan Museum, p11 |
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The largest of the three chiefdoms in the valley at this time was in the Etla arm and consisted of 18-20 villages focused around the central settlement (San José Mogote).
[1]
It is assumed that this network of settlements formed a complex chiefdom because of their proximity and hierarchy in relation to San José Mogote (the largest settlement). It is unlikely that there were alliances between the three chiefdoms based on evidence for violence and inter-village raiding between the three arms of the valley.
[2]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York, p55 [2]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2003). "Militarism, resistance, and early state development in Oaxaca, Mexico." Social Evolution & History 2: 25-70, p32 |
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probably unknown. The establishment of a confederation (although not yet a state) at the beginning of this period is suggested by the simultaneous abandonment of settlements and founding of Monte Albán, which itself was internally divided into different groupings of people (as shown by distinct pottery assemblages).
[1]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York, p84 |
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The establishment of a confederation (although not yet a state) at the beginning of Monte Albán Early I is suggested by the simultaneous abandonment of settlements and founding of Monte Albán, which itself was internally divided into different groupings of people, based on distinctions of pottery assemblages.
[1]
At the beginning of this phase (Late I), the people at Monte Albán began to expand beyond the valley and conquered Cañada de Cuicatlán (as well as other areas including: Ejutla, Peñoles, Miahuatlán and the San Francisco Arriba area)
[2]
, which remained in a subordinate, possibly tributary, relationship with Monte Albán until around 200 CE (the end of the Monte Albán II phase).
[3]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York, p84 [2]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2004). "Primary state formation in Mesoamerica." Annual Review of Anthropology: 173-199, p183 [3]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2003). "Militarism, resistance, and early state development in Oaxaca, Mexico." Social Evolution & History 2: 25-70. |
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The establishment of a confederation (although not yet a state) at the beginning of Monte Albán Early I is suggested by the simultaneous abandonment of settlements and founding of Monte Albán, which itself was internally divided into different groupings of people, based on distinctions of pottery assemblages.
[1]
At the beginning of this phase (Late I), the people at Monte Albán began to expand beyond the valley and conquered Cañada de Cuicatlán (as well as other areas including: Ejutla, Peñoles, Miahuatlán and the San Francisco Arriba area)
[2]
, which remained in a subordinate, possibly tributary, relationship with Monte Albán until around 200 CE (the end of the Monte Albán II phase).
[3]
[1]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York, p84 [2]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2004). "Primary state formation in Mesoamerica." Annual Review of Anthropology: 173-199, p183 [3]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2003). "Militarism, resistance, and early state development in Oaxaca, Mexico." Social Evolution & History 2: 25-70. |
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There is evidence for the conquest of Cañada de Cuicatlán by the Zapotec polity from the Late I period, and a continued tributary relationship throughout the Monte Albán II period.
[1]
Although other areas, such as the Tlacolula arm of the Valley of Oaxaca, may not have had such a subordinate relationship with the Zapotecs: Dainzu, the main settlement of the Tlacolula arm, has a different style of monumental architecture and carving to the standard shown at Monte Albán, suggesting some measure of independence even after the area had been overtaken by the Zapotecs during this period.
[2]
[3]
[1]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2003). "Militarism, resistance, and early state development in Oaxaca, Mexico." Social Evolution & History 2: 25-70, p29 [2]: Flannery, K. V. and J. Marcus (1983). "The Cloud People." New York, p113-4 [3]: Spencer, C. S. and E. M. Redmond (2003). "Militarism, resistance, and early state development in Oaxaca, Mexico." Social Evolution & History 2: 25-70, p31 |
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The Zapotec polity reached its peak of centralisation during this period, even though the territorial extent of the state declined.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p127-8 [2]: Blanton, R. E., et al. (1982). The Prehispanic Settlement Patterns of the Central and Southern Parts of the Valley of Oaxaca, Mexico, Regents of the University of Michigan, the Museum of Anthropology, p85, 88-9 |
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The Zapotec state began to fragment at the end of the IIIA period, and eventually formed numerous smaller competing "kingdoms", each politically independent of the others.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p183 [2]: Caso, et al, 1967 and Acosta, 1965, cited in Balkansky, A. K. (1998). "Origin and collapse of complex societies in Oaxaca, Mexico: Evaluating the era from 1965 to the present." Journal of World Prehistory 12(4): 451-493. |
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The Zapotec state fragmented into numerous competing polities after the end of the IIIA period, each politically independent of the others.
[1]
[2]
[1]: Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. p183 [2]: Caso, et al, 1967 and Acosta, 1965, cited in Balkansky, A. K. (1998). "Origin and collapse of complex societies in Oaxaca, Mexico: Evaluating the era from 1965 to the present." Journal of World Prehistory 12(4): 451-493. |
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"Until the end of the third century AD, when the kingdom of Ḥimyar, which had just expelled an Ethiopian invasion, annexed the kingdom of Sabaʾ and conquered Ḥaḍramawt (Ch. 3), South Arabia was divided between numerous kingdoms".
[1]
[1]: (Robin 2015: 94) Robin, Christian Julien. 2015. “Before Himyar: Epigraphic Evidence for the Kingdoms of South Arabia.” In Arabs and Empires before Islam, edited by Greg Fisher, 91-126. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/ZMFH42PE. |
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"Until the end of the third century AD, when the kingdom of Ḥimyar, which had just expelled an Ethiopian invasion, annexed the kingdom of Sabaʾ and conquered Ḥaḍramawt (Ch. 3), South Arabia was divided between numerous kingdoms".
[1]
[1]: (Robin 2015: 94) Robin, Christian Julien. 2015. “Before Himyar: Epigraphic Evidence for the Kingdoms of South Arabia.” In Arabs and Empires before Islam, edited by Greg Fisher, 91-126. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seshat URL: https://www-oxfordscholarship-com.ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199654529.001.0001/acprof-9780199654529-chapter-3. |
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Tribal leaders held lands, collected taxes, and defended forts, enabling them to form a power base in their own right: ’Whatever setbacks they suffered, however, Bayt al-Ahmar were not displaced permanently. In the year after Abu ’Alamah’s rising, when the Sharif of Abu ’Arish and a rival claimant to the Imamate were active in the north-west, they were again a power to be reckoned with." Certainly they collected taxes as well as rents in the nineteenth century, and local memory credits them with taking revenue even from coastal towns in the north Tihamah, They retain considerable lands in the west to the present day.’
[1]
[1]: Dresch, Paul 1989. "Tribes, Government and History in Yemen", 206 |
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Russian empire during the Romanov period was a highly centralized state.
[1]
[1]: “A History of Russia by Kluchevsky V. O.: Fine Hardcover (1911)“A History of Russia by Kluchevsky V. O.: Fine Hardcover (1911) Zotero link: L3XAFANG |
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"Unlike the Spanish and the French, the British never attempted to rule colonies directly from the metropole ... At the core of Imperial administration .... a series of essentially bilateral relationships which entailed constant negotiation rather than the imposition of rule and the acceptance of subjection."
[1]
"Rather than constituting one empire, this conglomeration of large land masses and territorial fragments comprised several empires ... as a political entity it was loosely held together". [1] Imperial agents in the colonies "exercised considerable latitude of authority and were notoriously difficult to control ... Far from being subordinates, many masterful individuals had their own agendas and ambitions; often they acted independently, disregarding directives or exceeding instructions with cavalier exuberance and frequently with impunity." [1] [1]: (Burroughs 1999) Peter Burroughs. Imperial institutions and the Government of Empire. Andrew Porter. ed. 1999. The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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The Přemyslid rulers worked to centralize authority but faced challenges from the powerful nobility and the fragmented nature of medieval governance up until the rule of Ottokar II who significantly increased efforts of centralisation.
[1]
[1]: Jörg K. Hoensch, Geschichte Böhmens: von der slavischen Landnahme bis zur Gegenwart. Zotero link: APL977ZI |
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Russian empire during the Romanov period was a highly centralized state.
[1]
[1]: “A History of Russia by Kluchevsky V. O.: Fine Hardcover (1911)“A History of Russia by Kluchevsky V. O.: Fine Hardcover (1911) Zotero link: L3XAFANG |
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"Polities centered on charismatic leaders in larger towns who extended limited control over surrounding villages and, sometimes, other larger settlements. On a classificatory continuum the Limba and Kuranko polities were structurally more akin to political organizations sometimes classed as “simple chiefdoms,” with a slightly greater degree of centralization emerging among the Yalunka in the nineteenth century (Fried 1967; also see de Barros this volume; Johnson andEarle 2000; Service 1975:74–80, 104–64). Simple chiefdoms (following Fried 1967) are characterized by a principal settlement surrounded by smaller villages, with a total population in the thousands. [...] Within the Yalunka area, precolonial sociopolitical organization was somewhat different, exhibiting a greater degree of centralized authority. During the eighteenth century the political situation may have been similar to that noted in the neighboring Limba and Kuranko areas, with spheres of influence centered on the principal towns of Kamba, Musaia, Sinkunia, and Falaba. By 1800, however, under the Samura of Falaba, these settlements had coalesced into what Fyle (1976, 1979b) refers to as the Solima Yalunka kingdom. Falaba emerged as a regional, judicial, and administrative center with the Manga, or king of Falaba, as its leader (Fyle 1979b:49–64; also see Donald 1968:9–12, 44–55). Important cases were tried at Falaba, and all trading and redistribution was supervised by the Manga (Fyle 1979b 55, 84, 88; also see Donald 1968:46–49). The kingdom could also bring wayward towns into line with military force (Donald 1968:58–59, 122–23; Fyle 1979b:41–44). Solima came to include all of the Yalunka chiefdoms of modern-day Koinadugu and Yalunka settlements now in the Republic of Guinea to the north and Kuranko Sengbe Chiefdom to the south (Fyle 1976: 111; 1979b: 13; Laing 1825: 346–47). Yet the power of Falaba and the Manga was not absolute. Important decisions of state could not be made without representatives of the other towns, and leaders met regularly at Falaba to decide matters of policy (Fyle 1979b:53–55; also see Laing 1825:356–67). As in the case with Limba and Kuranko towns, the Yalunka settlements of Musaia, Sinkunia, and Falaba seem to have independently undertaken negotiations with Samori Touré, the British, and the French (e.g., Donald 1968:59–61; Lipschutz 1973:85–92, 106, 125–26)."
[1]
[1]: (DeCorse 2012: 285) Seshat URL: . |
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"This was a federation with some 30 provinces, three of which were pre-eminent and held monarchical power which rotated between them."
[1]
"Bertrand-Bocandé was informed that Kaabu comprised twelve states ("pays"): Goussala; Toumanna; Kankoumba; Chagnia; Manna; Sama; Gansala; Payonko; Niapai; Pakis; Jamaral; and Kantor."
[2]
" One of the most important aspects of this document is that it does not support an interpretation of Kaabu’s power as overly centralised. There was clearly substantial freedom of movement by Luso-African traders – the so-called “Christian whites” of the document. The document implies that they traded with many different groups among the “many nations” of the hinterland, something which again would not support an interpretation of Kaabu as a centralised commercial state. This apparent freedom of trade would also imply a relative independence for the lineage chiefs who traded with the Atlantic traders – something which is confirmed by the second document I want to look at."
[3]
Note the following, however: "In their essay, Cornelia Giesing and Eduardo Costa Dias present an analysis of how the political memory of Kaabu came to be composed within the cross-cultural trading communities (Jakhanké and Mandinka Muslim). Combining early European written sources and a wealth of oral documents, as well as the locally-written Tarikh Mandinka (Giesing and Vydrine 2007), from Bijini near Geba, the authors argue that Kaabu as political entity associated with Mali is difficult to assess historically. The institutional memory is in actuality that of a ’pagan’ empire, viewed retrospectively through the filter of nineteenth-century Islamization. Symbolically, Kaabu may be understood as a reference to the economic and cultural unity of southern Senegambia."
[4]
[1]: (Green 2009: 94) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. [2]: (Brooks 2007: 56) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TT7FC2RX/collection. [3]: (Green 2009: 104) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. [4]: (Mark and Da Silva Horta 2007: 3) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/DJ8UINUI/collection. |
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"This was a federation with some 30 provinces, three of which were pre-eminent and held monarchical power which rotated between them."
[1]
"Bertrand-Bocandé was informed that Kaabu comprised twelve states ("pays"): Goussala; Toumanna; Kankoumba; Chagnia; Manna; Sama; Gansala; Payonko; Niapai; Pakis; Jamaral; and Kantor."
[2]
" One of the most important aspects of this document is that it does not support an interpretation of Kaabu’s power as overly centralised. There was clearly substantial freedom of movement by Luso-African traders – the so-called “Christian whites” of the document. The document implies that they traded with many different groups among the “many nations” of the hinterland, something which again would not support an interpretation of Kaabu as a centralised commercial state. This apparent freedom of trade would also imply a relative independence for the lineage chiefs who traded with the Atlantic traders – something which is confirmed by the second document I want to look at."
[3]
Note the following, however: "In their essay, Cornelia Giesing and Eduardo Costa Dias present an analysis of how the political memory of Kaabu came to be composed within the cross-cultural trading communities (Jakhanké and Mandinka Muslim). Combining early European written sources and a wealth of oral documents, as well as the locally-written Tarikh Mandinka (Giesing and Vydrine 2007), from Bijini near Geba, the authors argue that Kaabu as political entity associated with Mali is difficult to assess historically. The institutional memory is in actuality that of a ’pagan’ empire, viewed retrospectively through the filter of nineteenth-century Islamization. Symbolically, Kaabu may be understood as a reference to the economic and cultural unity of southern Senegambia."
[4]
[1]: (Green 2009: 94) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. [2]: (Brooks 2007: 56) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TT7FC2RX/collection. [3]: (Green 2009: 104) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. [4]: (Mark and Da Silva Horta 2007: 3) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/DJ8UINUI/collection. |
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"From the beginning, the power of the Almamy, with his seat at Timbo, was limited by the wide autonomy granted to the chiefs of the provinces of Labe, Buriya, Timbi, Kebaali, Kollade, Koyin, Fugumba and Fode Haaji and also by the existence of a Council of Ancients acting as a parliament at Fugumba, the religious capital."
[1]
[1]: (Barry 1999: 291) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/SU25S5BX/items/24W2293H/item-list |
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"The Mane generals and captains, on the basis of apportioned Sierra Leone among themselves, and ’kings’. There were four principal kingdoms: the Bulloms, which extended from Tagrin Point northwards, the Idolos islands; secondly, the kingdom of Logos about Port Loko; thirdly, the kingdom of Sierra stretched south from the Sierra Leone channel until fourth kingdom, that of Sherbro. Within each of these kingdoms there were subdivisions, whose rulers sometimes wielded great power, as in the case of Tora, who commanded only the islands of the Sierra Leone channel but who by 1605 was the eldest survivor of the Manes. This gave him the status and authority of a king, though he was subject to Fatima, king of the northern Bulloms.//"Strictly speaking, a number of the petty rulers called ’kings’ by the Europeans should really be regarded as ’chiefs’. It was a pyramidal structure of government: the chiefs owed allegiance to the local kings, who themselves supposedly paid deference to the kings of the ’metropolis’ at Cape Mount, who in turn paid tribute to an overlord who remained behind."
[1]
[1]: (Rodney 1967: 227) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/G8G96NVQ/collection. |
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"As demonstrated by the uniformity of their material culture and their presumed belief system, most prominently reflected by the terracotta sculptures, external contacts within their culture must have existed. However, such a larger social network apparently was not organised and maintained in a way as to infer social inequality, social hierarchies or other signs of internal demarcation traceable by available archaeological data. None of the numerous excavations brought to light architectural remains of specified buildings or the spatial organisation of housing areas that might have been occupied by high-ranking members of the community. Further, among the admittedly few features interpreted as graves there is no evidence of any heterogeneity pointing to a difference between burials of elite members or commoners. Nowhere, an accumulation of valuable objects neither of iron nor any other materials signifying inequality in terms of property or prosperity was found."
[1]
[1]: (Breunig and Ruppe 2016: 252) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/ES4TRU7R. |
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"For the first 400 years of the settlement’s history, Kirikongo was a single economically generalized social group (Figure 6). The occupants were self-sufficient farmers who cultivated grains and herded livestock, smelted and forged iron, opportunistically hunted, lived in puddled earthen structures with pounded clay floors, and fished in the seasonal drainages. [...] Since Kirikongo did not grow (at least not significantly) for over 400 years, it is likely that extra-community fissioning continually occurred to contribute to regional population growth, and it is also likely that Kirikongo itself was the result of budding from a previous homestead. However, with the small scale of settlement, the inhabitants of individual homesteads must have interacted with a wider community for social and demographic reasons. [...] It may be that generalized single-kin homesteads like Kirikongo were the societal model for a post-LSA expansion of farming peoples along the Nakambe (White Volta) and Mouhoun (Black Volta) River basins. A homestead settlement pattern would fit well with the transitional nature of early sedentary life, where societies are shifting from generalized reciprocity to more restricted and formalized group membership, and single-kin communities like Kirikongo’s house (Mound 4) would be roughly the size of a band.”
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 27, 32) |
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"As demonstrated by the uniformity of their material culture and their presumed belief system, most prominently reflected by the terracotta sculptures, external contacts within their culture must have existed. However, such a larger social network apparently was not organised and maintained in a way as to infer social inequality, social hierarchies or other signs of internal demarcation traceable by available archaeological data. None of the numerous excavations brought to light architectural remains of specified buildings or the spatial organisation of housing areas that might have been occupied by high-ranking members of the community. Further, among the admittedly few features interpreted as graves there is no evidence of any heterogeneity pointing to a difference between burials of elite members or commoners. Nowhere, an accumulation of valuable objects neither of iron nor any other materials signifying inequality in terms of property or prosperity was found."
[1]
[1]: (Breunig and Ruppe 2016: 252) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/ES4TRU7R. |
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"[T]here are several Mossi kingdoms linked by a common ancestry. Primus inter pares, the Ouagadougou kingdom eclipsed all others. Yet Ouagadougou should not be regarded as the capital of an alleged Mossi ’empire’, as there was considerable autonomy, and even infighting, among the different kingdoms and principalities."
[1]
[1]: (Englebert 2018: 11) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/52JWRCUI/collection. |
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As the following quotes suggests, houses where still highly independent, and differientiation was emerging within settlements rather than between them. "While houses were still highly independent, even producing their own pottery, a formalized village structure was likely present with both cadet and senior social segments, founded upon common descent with a common ancestor."
[1]
[1]: (Dueppen 2012: 28) |
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No actual evidence of the political machinery operating between the capital of Toutswemogela and its subordinate settlements has been found in the literature examined for this sheet, as of this time (17/08/2021). The similar scale of the three discovered Level 1 settlements in this area suggest to Denbow that the Toutswe tradition may have been more decentralized, and consequently its major centers more economically and politically independent than those of its contemporaries, but this is only a hypothesis. “In the Toutswe region, such [competitive] relations may have existed between Toutswe and the two other [Level 1] settlements (Bosutswe and Shoshong) located approximately one hundred kilometres from Toutswe. Their spatial separation… and the clustering of satellite… communities around each… suggests that each may represent the core of a competing system outside… direct control…. It is possible that each cluster was a separate, autonomous or semi-autonomous unit. By contract, Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe have no equals in size (and thus importance) during their respective time periods.”
[1]
[1]: (Denbow 1986; 23) James Denbow, “A New Look at the Later Prehistory of the Kalahari,” in The Journal of African History Vol. 27, No.1 (1986): 3-28. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/X3DXN8CW/collection |
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Appears to have been a loosely-controlled confederacy of chiefdoms, the rulers demanding tribute and allegiance but exercising little greater control. Note that the level of continuity between the Torwa and Rozvi is marked by the continuance of institutions and even elite families, so very little in the structure of governance seems likely to have changed. “… the Rozvi mambo (king)… did not have a monopoly over foreign trade because his vassals paid tribute in ‘cloth, beads, hoes, axes, gold, ivory, skins, cattle, tobacco, foodstuffs and whatever else the various regions could produce’ …. These… items would have had to be acquired through regional exchange mechanisms prior to paying vassalage…. One of the primary ways in which senior Rozvi rulers (mambos) maintained control over the provinces was through the provincial ruler, who in most cases also belonged to the same lineage as the mambos. The subjects of the Rozvi state paid taxes in the form of annual tribute known as mupeta wamambo …. Importantly, historical sources confirm that tribute, if not forthcoming, was exacted through armed force, suggesting that the military played an important role in the power of the mambos…//… rotational succession in the Mutapa and Torwa–Changamire states was in operation by the sixteenth century (contra Huffman 2015). Through a process of rotational succession, power moved from one of these houses to another (see the Mutapa dynastic lists in Beach 1994). After the death of a king, succession often passed to someone who lived in a different district. Control of the distribution and redistribution of land gave kings the power to levy tribute on any production involving underground or aboveground activities. Most kings did not move into the capitals of their predecessors…. There is no record suggesting that all the Mutapa kings listed by Beach (1994) lived in one palace. In fact, there are numerous drystone-walled sites named after former Mutapa kings, such asKasekete, Mutota and Matope, and there are stone-walled sites in every district…//… The political system of … Torwa–Changamire… was not a highly centralised system but a loose confederacy of provinces, districts and villages that were united in their allegiance to the king …. The authority and legitimacy of rulers was underlined by their relationship to ancestry, lineage and kinship. Although there were frequent disputes, leading to succession wars, in principle rulers were appointed through ancestry and were considered to have a divine connection to the land and the people, with the health of the rulers intrinsically linked to health of the region and vice versa…. Although appointed… [the] rulers, the authority and legitimacy of local chiefs derived from their subjects, many of whom were their relatives, and not from their position in relation to the… rulers; local support and tribute were key to the maintenance of regional power structures.”
[1]
. “Portuguese documents referring to Khami suggest a civil war that involved a Portuguese warlord who was able to assist a Togwa aspirant to the throne before himself retiring to the north-east in 1644. There are no other clear references to any Togwa rulers, but we do know of some dominant Togwa houses, such as those of Tumbare and Chihunduru/Chiwundura, because of the power they subsequently wielded in the Rozvi state as part of the non-moyo Rozvi ruling elite.”
[2]
. “Both the Torwa and the Rozvi appear to have spoken the Kalanga dialect of Shona and they likely shared the same general worldview in terms of socio-political organisation and use of space….”
[3]
. “The Rozvi at Khami and Danamombe were at the center of a much larger Rozvi confederacy.”
[4]
. “The Manyika were apparently politically subordinate to the Changamires, for they say that they sent tribute to the Rozvi kings on an annual or semiannual basis. The Changamires confirmed their kings, though they did not choose them.”
[5]
.
[1]: (Chirikure & Moffett 2018, 18-29) Abigail Moffett & Shadreck Chirikure, “Exotica in Context: Reconfiguring Prestige, Power and Wealth in the Southern African Iron Age,” in Journal of World Prehistory Vol. 29 No. 3 (2016). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z29GV5VQ/item-list [2]: (Mazarire 2009, 17) Gerald C. Mazarire, “Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe, c. 850-1880s,” in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulos & A.S. Mlambo (Harare, Weaver: 2009). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/B9TK7GP8/item-details [3]: (Pikirayi 2013, 294) Innocent Pikirayi, “Stone Architecture and the Development of Power in the Zimbabwe Tradition AD 1270-1830,” in Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa Vol. 48 no. 2 (2013): 282-300. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/K3ENN8GP/item-list [4]: (Schoeman 2017) Maria Schoeman, “Political Complexity North and South of the Zambezi River,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedias Online (2017). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/IXQJ656P/item-details [5]: (Waite 1987, 202) Gloria Waite, “Public Health in Pre-Colonial East-Central Africa,” in Social Science & Medicine Vol. 24, No. 3 (1987): 197-208. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/N4Z9DU9S/item-list |
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Power based on a feudalist principle of clientship, the Nyai system, and constantly varied in its extent and level of control as different rulers succeeded to control of the polity through various means, and the capital of the polity shifted with every new ruler, producing centers of power and peripheries that varied every generation. “Politically [Mutapa] was unstable as seen by quick successions and the civil wars fought between houses contending for the throne. Smaller, semi-independent polities controlled by some subrulers emerged in Dande and Chidima. Despite these, [Mutapa] survived because of its military strength, and ability to adapt….”
[1]
“The Mutapa dynasty appears to have arisen out of the nyai process…. The… period of political consolidation, was achieved through the gradual expansion… of the principle of clientship.”
[2]
“Under this succession system, rotation implied that, when a new leader ascended the throne, they did not move into the homestead of their predecessor (see Chirikure et al. 2012). Instead, they ruled from their own home, which became the centre of power. This means that capitals within the state shifted, and that the status of units such as provinces and districts changed depending on the political alignment of the day…. In practice, this principle of political succession was sometimes shortcircuitedthrough military coups and deaths and in cases where rightful successors might not have left offspring. However, an understanding of Mutapa history and archaeology suggests that, in most cases, the principle was that no king ruled from the centre of their predecessor.”
[3]
[1]: (Pikirayi 2005, 1057) Innocent Pikirayi, “Mutapa State, 1450-1884,” in Encyclopedia of African History Vol. 2, ed. Kevin Shillington (Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005): 1056-1058. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AWA9ZT5B/item-details [2]: (Mazarire 2009, 14) Gerald C. Mazarire, “Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe, c. 850-1880s,” in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulos & A.S. Mlambo (Harare, Weaver: 2009). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/B9TK7GP8/item-details [3]: (Chirikure et al. 2017, 48) Shadreck Chirikure et al., “No Big Brother Here: Heterarchy, Shona Political Succession and the Relationship Between Great Zimbabwe and Khami, Southern Africa,” in Cambridge Archaeological Journal Vol. 28 No. 1 (2017): 45-66. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/X54CISW6/item-details |
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Inferred from the following quote. “The Madurai Pandyas established their authority in Tirunelveli, where the political system was rooted in irrigated nadus, and especially in the villages along the Tambraparni. Their kingdom was not based on a bureaucratic, centralized administration, but on a great number of ritualized alliances. Kings displayed their strength, wealth, and generosity as widely as they could, tying themselves in the process to dominant landed groups and petty chiefs. The Pandyas headed a segmentary domain whose core was river-irrigated paddy lands.”
[1]
[1]: Ludden 1979, 355) Ludden, David. 1979. ‘Patronage and Irrigation in Tamil Nadu: A Long-term View’. The Indian Economic & Social History Review. Vol 16: 3. Pp. 347-365. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/G7TWCIIW/collection |
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Inferred from the following quotes. “One important theme emerges from this: the comparative weakness of the central authority vis-à-vis the outlying provinces under the Anurādhapura kings generally. Thus the Sinhalese kingdom was not a highly centralized structure but one in which a balance of political forces incorporated a tolerance of particularism. This held true for the whole history of the Anuradhapura kingdom”.
[1]
“The records relating to the Anuradhapura Period (fourth century BC to the end of the 10th century AD) give a convincing basis to the fact that the ancient Sri Lankan state had matured and evolved to the point that sophisticated city planning (for example, of the capital Anuradhapura) coexisted with a mode of highly decentralized governance. It would be a fair generalization to say that the Anuradhapura civilization was founded on a pattern of autonomous villages. While the king was the all-powerful ruler and custodian of all land, day-to- day life was controlled by a decentralized village administration.”
[2]
“Lists of officials which occur in inscriptions of the ninth and tenth centuries, when the irrigation network of Sri Lanka was most extensive and highly developed, have been cited as evidence of a hydraulic bureaucracy. Quite clearly the services of men with a high degree of technical skill were necessary for the construction of large and complex irrigation works, for their maintenance in good repair, and for the regulation of irrigation water to fields. [...] On the contrary, hydraulic society as it developed in Sri Lanka was not a centralised despotism, rigidly authoritarian and highly bureaucratic, but had many of the attributes of a feudal society, with power devolving on monastic institutions and the gentry. [...] Income-producing irrigation units, such as tanks and canals, and the fields fed by them paid a tax—bojakapathi—probably paid in kind. This the king sometimes granted to individuals as renumeration for services rendered to the state. Such grants were also made to the saṅgha. In a society in which irrigation was of such crucial significance, water was treated as a precious commodity which could be bought and sold as it passes through the tanks, the canals and fields, with the ‘owner’ or tanks (vapi-hamika) imposing a charge for the water that passed through and in turn paying for the water that came in. Because he had the largest of the tanks as his special preserve, and a controlling interest in the whole irrigation system, the king was the prime beneficiary of this levy on water. Until the beginning of the seventh century AD, this payment was called dakapathi. It was paid to the king as well as collected by private ‘owners’ of small reservoirs and canals. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the payment for the share of water made to the king was called diyadedum, and it was termed diyadada in the time of the Polonnaruva kings. In addition to the right to dakapathi, the king claimed a share of the produce from all occupied and cultivated land. Unoccupied waste, both fallow and cultivable, was regarded as being in the king’s ‘possession’, and over these—forests and waste lands, cleared and cultivated—he could grant virtually complete ‘proprietary’ rights to any individual or institution if he so wished.”
[3]
“Inscriptions mainly from the ninth century AD, contain references to a type of tenure known as pamuṇu or paraveṇi, which in the context of the land tenure system of that time conveyed the meaning of heritable right to perpetuity. Religious and charitable institutions received pamuṇu property in at least three ways, namely royal grant, purchase and inheritance (inheritance of land was normally within a framework of kinship). The king also granted pamuṇu rights to individuals, usually are rewards. Pamuṇu were subject to no service except in cases where the king stipulated at the time of the grant that a comparatively small payment shall be made to a religious or charitable institution.”
[4]
“The result was that while the corps of officials in the bureaucracy and in the court kept increasing in number, they did not, for much of the period of the Anurādhapura kings, develop into a baronial class, a feudal aristocracy with very large areas of the country’s agricultural land parcelled out among them. By the ninth century, however, this picture begins to change. The inscriptions of this period refer to a form of tenure known as divel—property granted to officials or functionaries in the employment of the state or of monasteries. (A divel holding from a monastery would be no more than the grant of the revenue of the land allotted to a functionary). Divel holdings were, in effect, property rights bestowed on an individual as subsistence in return for services rendered to the grantor, and were terminable on the death of an employee or at the will of the granting authority. The recipient of a divel holding got the revenue which the king or a monastery had enjoyed earlier. […] Divel tenure was thus doubly significant; it marked a strengthening of rights to private property, and the emergence of a trend towards feudal rights, and of a class of landlord-officials who became a powerful group of intermediaries between the cultivators and royal authority.”
[5]
[1]: (De Silva 1981, 23) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [2]: (Sirivardana 2004, 228) Wignaraja, Ponna and Susil Sirivardana. 2004. Pro-Poor Growth and Governance in South Asia: Decentralization and Participatory Development. New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd. Seshat URL:https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/UBZVJ7PT/collection [3]: (De Silva 1981, 33, 36-37) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [4]: (De Silva 1981, 37) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [5]: (De Silva 1981, 38) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection |
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Inferred from the following quotes. “One important theme emerges from this: the comparative weakness of the central authority vis-à-vis the outlying provinces under the Anurādhapura kings generally. Thus the Sinhalese kingdom was not a highly centralized structure but one in which a balance of political forces incorporated a tolerance of particularism. This held true for the whole history of the Anuradhapura kingdom”.
[1]
“The records relating to the Anuradhapura Period (fourth century BC to the end of the 10th century AD) give a convincing basis to the fact that the ancient Sri Lankan state had matured and evolved to the point that sophisticated city planning (for example, of the capital Anuradhapura) coexisted with a mode of highly decentralized governance. It would be a fair generalization to say that the Anuradhapura civilization was founded on a pattern of autonomous villages. While the king was the all-powerful ruler and custodian of all land, day-to- day life was controlled by a decentralized village administration.”
[2]
“Lists of officials which occur in inscriptions of the ninth and tenth centuries, when the irrigation network of Sri Lanka was most extensive and highly developed, have been cited as evidence of a hydraulic bureaucracy. Quite clearly the services of men with a high degree of technical skill were necessary for the construction of large and complex irrigation works, for their maintenance in good repair, and for the regulation of irrigation water to fields. [...] On the contrary, hydraulic society as it developed in Sri Lanka was not a centralised despotism, rigidly authoritarian and highly bureaucratic, but had many of the attributes of a feudal society, with power devolving on monastic institutions and the gentry. [...] Income-producing irrigation units, such as tanks and canals, and the fields fed by them paid a tax—bojakapathi—probably paid in kind. This the king sometimes granted to individuals as renumeration for services rendered to the state. Such grants were also made to the saṅgha. In a society in which irrigation was of such crucial significance, water was treated as a precious commodity which could be bought and sold as it passes through the tanks, the canals and fields, with the ‘owner’ or tanks (vapi-hamika) imposing a charge for the water that passed through and in turn paying for the water that came in. Because he had the largest of the tanks as his special preserve, and a controlling interest in the whole irrigation system, the king was the prime beneficiary of this levy on water. Until the beginning of the seventh century AD, this payment was called dakapathi. It was paid to the king as well as collected by private ‘owners’ of small reservoirs and canals. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the payment for the share of water made to the king was called diyadedum, and it was termed diyadada in the time of the Polonnaruva kings. In addition to the right to dakapathi, the king claimed a share of the produce from all occupied and cultivated land. Unoccupied waste, both fallow and cultivable, was regarded as being in the king’s ‘possession’, and over these—forests and waste lands, cleared and cultivated—he could grant virtually complete ‘proprietary’ rights to any individual or institution if he so wished.”
[3]
“Inscriptions mainly from the ninth century AD, contain references to a type of tenure known as pamuṇu or paraveṇi, which in the context of the land tenure system of that time conveyed the meaning of heritable right to perpetuity. Religious and charitable institutions received pamuṇu property in at least three ways, namely royal grant, purchase and inheritance (inheritance of land was normally within a framework of kinship). The king also granted pamuṇu rights to individuals, usually are rewards. Pamuṇu were subject to no service except in cases where the king stipulated at the time of the grant that a comparatively small payment shall be made to a religious or charitable institution.”
[4]
“The result was that while the corps of officials in the bureaucracy and in the court kept increasing in number, they did not, for much of the period of the Anurādhapura kings, develop into a baronial class, a feudal aristocracy with very large areas of the country’s agricultural land parcelled out among them. By the ninth century, however, this picture begins to change. The inscriptions of this period refer to a form of tenure known as divel—property granted to officials or functionaries in the employment of the state or of monasteries. (A divel holding from a monastery would be no more than the grant of the revenue of the land allotted to a functionary). Divel holdings were, in effect, property rights bestowed on an individual as subsistence in return for services rendered to the grantor, and were terminable on the death of an employee or at the will of the granting authority. The recipient of a divel holding got the revenue which the king or a monastery had enjoyed earlier. […] Divel tenure was thus doubly significant; it marked a strengthening of rights to private property, and the emergence of a trend towards feudal rights, and of a class of landlord-officials who became a powerful group of intermediaries between the cultivators and royal authority.”
[5]
[1]: (De Silva 1981, 23) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [2]: (Sirivardana 2004, 228) Wignaraja, Ponna and Susil Sirivardana. 2004. Pro-Poor Growth and Governance in South Asia: Decentralization and Participatory Development. New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd. Seshat URL:https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/UBZVJ7PT/collection [3]: (De Silva 1981, 33, 36-37) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [4]: (De Silva 1981, 37) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [5]: (De Silva 1981, 38) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection |
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Inferred by the following quote. “Once the political unification of the island had been re-established, Parākramabāhu followed Vijayabāhu I in keeping a tight check on separatist tendencies in the island, especially in Rohaṇa where particularism was a deeply ingrained political tradition. Rohaṇa did not accept its loss of autonomy without a struggle, and Parākramabāhu faced a formidable rebellion there in 1160 which he put down with great severity (there was a rebellion in the Rājaraṭa as well in 1168 and this too was ruthlessly crushed). All vestiges of its former autonomy were now purposefully eliminated, and as a result there was, in the heyday of the Polonnaruva kingdom, much less tolerance of particularism than under the Anurādhapura kings. As we shall see, the country was to pay dearly for this over-centralisation of authority in Polonnaruva.”
[1]
[1]: (De Silva 1981, 62) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection |
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Inferred from the following quotes. “One important theme emerges from this: the comparative weakness of the central authority vis-à-vis the outlying provinces under the Anurādhapura kings generally. Thus the Sinhalese kingdom was not a highly centralized structure but one in which a balance of political forces incorporated a tolerance of particularism. This held true for the whole history of the Anuradhapura kingdom”.
[1]
“The records relating to the Anuradhapura Period (fourth century BC to the end of the 10th century AD) give a convincing basis to the fact that the ancient Sri Lankan state had matured and evolved to the point that sophisticated city planning (for example, of the capital Anuradhapura) coexisted with a mode of highly decentralized governance. It would be a fair generalization to say that the Anuradhapura civilization was founded on a pattern of autonomous villages. While the king was the all-powerful ruler and custodian of all land, day-to- day life was controlled by a decentralized village administration.”
[2]
[1]: (De Silva 1981, 23) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [2]: (Sirivardana 2004, 228) Wignaraja, Ponna and Susil Sirivardana. 2004. Pro-Poor Growth and Governance in South Asia: Decentralization and Participatory Development. New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd. Seshat URL:https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/UBZVJ7PT/collection |
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"The Republic was a loose confederacy with little in the form of national political institutions. As Schama put it, ‘Indeed national unification in the case of the Dutch is a contradiction in terms since they had come into being as a nation expressly to avoid becoming a state’ (Schama, 1989, p. 62). Power rested firmly in the hands of the individual provinces."
[1]
"The Dutch state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a federation with little centralization. It was sometimes even threatened with disintegration, its main divisive elements being provincial separatism, rivalry among urban oligarchies, competition among the government colleges of the central bureaucracy in The Hague, and the dualist position of the Stadtholder."
[2]
[1]: (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 9) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/M8ENXX8G/collection. [2]: (t’Hart 1989: 663) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/B9DVQGBS/collection. |
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Inferred from the following quotes. “In the early centuries of the Anurādhapura kingdom, there is little or no evidence of a regular army, except for a small body of soldiers who guarded the palace and the capital city. Though a regular force was established with the passage of time with foreign—largely South Indian—mercenaries as a component element in it, this was still far from being a standing army which would have been used on a regular basis to impose the will of the ‘central’ authority over recalcitrant provinces for the purpose of serving as an efficient mechanism of control over such provinces from Anurādhapura. The inscriptions of this period reveal the existence of a sabhā or council of ministers. It is impossible to determine whether this developed from the earlier institution known as ämati pahaja or whether it was something completely new. Nor have we any clear picture of the functions of this council. […] One important theme emerges from this: the comparative weakness of the central authority vis-à-vis the outlying provinces under the Anurādhapura kings generally. Thus the Sinhalese kingdom was not a highly centralized structure but one in which a balance of political forces incorporated a tolerance of particularism. This held true for the whole history of the Anuradhapura kingdom”.
[1]
“The records relating to the Anuradhapura Period (fourth century BC to the end of the 10th century AD) give a convincing basis to the fact that the ancient Sri Lankan state had matured and evolved to the point that sophisticated city planning (for example, of the capital Anuradhapura) coexisted with a mode of highly decentralized governance. It would be a fair generalization to say that the Anuradhapura civilization was founded on a pattern of autonomous villages. While the king was the all-powerful ruler and custodian of all land, day-to- day life was controlled by a decentralized village administration.”
[2]
[1]: (De Silva 1981, 22, 23) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [2]: (Sirivardana 2004, 228) Wignaraja, Ponna and Susil Sirivardana. 2004. Pro-Poor Growth and Governance in South Asia: Decentralization and Participatory Development. New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd. Seshat URL:https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/UBZVJ7PT/collection |
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Inferred from the following quotes. “In the early centuries of the Anurādhapura kingdom, there is little or no evidence of a regular army, except for a small body of soldiers who guarded the palace and the capital city. Though a regular force was established with the passage of time with foreign—largely South Indian—mercenaries as a component element in it, this was still far from being a standing army which would have been used on a regular basis to impose the will of the ‘central’ authority over recalcitrant provinces for the purpose of serving as an efficient mechanism of control over such provinces from Anurādhapura. The inscriptions of this period reveal the existence of a sabhā or council of ministers. It is impossible to determine whether this developed from the earlier institution known as ämati pahaja or whether it was something completely new. Nor have we any clear picture of the functions of this council.”
[1]
“One important theme emerges from this: the comparative weakness of the central authority vis-à-vis the outlying provinces under the Anurādhapura kings generally. Thus the Sinhalese kingdom was not a highly centralized structure but one in which a balance of political forces incorporated a tolerance of particularism. This held true for the whole history of the Anuradhapura kingdom”.
[2]
“The records relating to the Anuradhapura Period (fourth century BC to the end of the 10th century AD) give a convincing basis to the fact that the ancient Sri Lankan state had matured and evolved to the point that sophisticated city planning (for example, of the capital Anuradhapura) coexisted with a mode of highly decentralized governance. It would be a fair generalization to say that the Anuradhapura civilization was founded on a pattern of autonomous villages. While the king was the all-powerful ruler and custodian of all land, day-to- day life was controlled by a decentralized village administration.”
[3]
[1]: (De Silva 1981, 22) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [2]: (De Silva 1981, 23) De Silva, K.M. 1981. A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst & Company, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/4R6DQVHZ/collection [3]: (Sirivardana 2004, 228) Wignaraja, Ponna and Susil Sirivardana. 2004. Pro-Poor Growth and Governance in South Asia: Decentralization and Participatory Development. New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd. Seshat URL:https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/7F5SEVNA/items/UBZVJ7PT/collection |
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“The king held all rights to appoint, transfer, promote and demote officials, and he could devise new positions or mark off new districts.”
[1]
“The king of Jimma Abba Jifar directed much of the economic life of the kingdom. There were two major aspects to this control. One was the collection of revenues by which the king added to his own wealth and finance his administration and political operations […] The other was the administration of marketing trade, and artisanry in which Abba Jiffar and his predecessors played a big role. The kings were the patrons and overseers of the craft specialists, the foreign traders and the markets.”
[2]
[1]: (Lewis 2001, 81) Lewis, Herbert S. 2001. Jimma Abba Jifar, an Oromo Monarchy: Ethiopia, 1830-1932. Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NRZVWSCD/collection [2]: (Lewis 2001, 93-94) Lewis, Herbert S. 2001. Jimma Abba Jifar, an Oromo Monarchy: Ethiopia, 1830-1932. Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NRZVWSCD/collection |
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“In the 11th century, the sultanate expanded southwards to the boundaries of modern Kenya and included most of the Islamic territories of the Horn of Africa. The growth of the sultanate in territory and population required the establishment of emirates and subdivisions. From the early 1200s, there were seven Islamic emirates: Ifat, Dawaro, Arabini, Hadya, Sharkha, Bali, and Dara. Muslim geographers called them Mamalik al-Tiraz al-Islami (the Hemstitch kingdoms of Islam), because they were the buffer line between Christian Abyssinian and Islamic Somalia in the Horn of Africa.”
[1]
[1]: (Mukhtar 2016, Encylopedia of Empire) Mukhtar, Mohamed H. 2016. ‘Adal Sultanate.’ In J. Mackenzie Encyclopedia of Empire. Wiley. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/FM8D55XW/library |
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“The Ajuran was the leading clan of a confederacy, including the Muzaffar dynasty of Mogadishu, the Hawiye-affiliated clans, and the Reewin clans.”
[1]
[1]: (Mukhtar 2003, 35) Mukhtar, Mohamed H. 2003. Historical Dictionary of Somalia. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Mukhtar/titleCreatorYear/items/J8WZB6VI/item-list |
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“Its Arabic chronicle, published by Enrico Cerulli, gives the impression that, towards the end of its history at any rate, the so-called ‘Sultanate of Shoa’ was merely a loose confederation of petty Muslim principalities.”
[1]
[1]: (Tamrat 2008, 140) Tamrat, Taddesse. 2008. ‘Ethiopia, the Red Sea and the Horn’ In the Cambridge History of Africa: c. 1050 – c.1600 vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp 98-182. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/search/Tamrat/titleCreatorYear/items/A68FCWWI/item-list |
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This quote has a date range of around 1530 CE- 1897 CE as indicated by Orent. “Each of these clans was allowed to maintain its autonomy with its own ruler (referred to as tato or king in the legends) who was responsible to the King of Kafa.”
[1]
[1]: (Orent 1970, 269) Orent, Amnon. 1970. ‘Refocusing on the History of Kafa Prior to 1897: A Discussion of Political Processes’. African Historical Studies. Vol. 3:2. Pp 263-293. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2A389XGK/collection |
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This quote has a date range of around 1530 CE- 1897 CE as indicated by Orent. “Each of these clans was allowed to maintain its autonomy with its own ruler (referred to as tato or king in the legends) who was responsible to the King of Kafa.”
[1]
[1]: (Orent 1970, 269) Orent, Amnon. 1970. ‘Refocusing on the History of Kafa Prior to 1897: A Discussion of Political Processes’. African Historical Studies. Vol. 3:2. Pp 263-293. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2A389XGK/collection |
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"As population and settlements increased in the circumscribed rim of the Ifè Bowl, competition for land and resources among the Houses intensified during the last centuries of the Early Formative period, perhaps as early as AD 600. The competitions spurred some of these Houses to build alliances with one another and against other Houses. The alliances resulted in the merging of two or more Houses under a wide range of arrangements. These processes resulted in the birth of the “mega-House” as a new organizational structure. This meant that some of the Houses that had acted as autonomous corporate units lost some of their autonomy in order to become members of a larger sociopolitical unit. Of course, mega-Houses were also formed through forceful incorporation of weak Houses into stronger ones. This development led to the increasing specialization and elaboration of political leadership and to a heightened territorial sensibility. In Ifè oral traditions, thirteen mega-Houses are remembered to have existed during this period of political engineering. These are Ìdó, Ìdèta, Ìloràn, Ìlóròmú, Ìjùgbè, Ìmojùbì, Ìráyè, Ìwìnrìn, Odin, Òkè Àwo, Òkè-Ojà, Omológun, and Parakin (fig. 2.4). Each of these mega-House polities, what Ade Obayemi called “mini-states,” was a federation of contiguous Houses separated by stretches of woods that ranged in distance from a few hundred meters to about a kilometer, but a recognizable ruler from an alpha House governed each of these mega-Houses as a corporate unit. The Ìjùgbè mega-House, for example, comprised Ìjùgbè—the alpha House—and four minor Houses: Eranyiba, Igbogbe, Ipa, and Ita-Asin, each with its own leader, who was also its chief priest. All the leaders of the four corporate houses reported to Obaléjùgbè, “the Lord or Leader of Ìjùgbè.”"
[1]
[1]: (Ogundiran 2020: 53) |
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“By 1820, a Jukun dynasty based at Wukari, south of the Benue, had taken control of what was left of the Kwararafa state. With this transformation, the martial state of Kwararafa had finally come to an end. The Jukun inherited the political power of Kwararafa, but not its martial tradition. The far-flung confederacy had become the homogenous Jukun kingdom of Wukari.”
[1]
“The identification of Jukun, Apa, Kwana and Kwararafa goes back to at least the mid-nineteenth century, but modern Jukun have no memory of Kwararafa or a supposedly martial past, and Kwararafa invasions ended mysteriously in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth, the Jukun lived, not in a unified kingdom, but in a number of small communities in the Benue valley. It is possible that Kwararafa was a generic name for non-Muslim peoples from Dar al-Harb, the Land of Unbelief. It may well have been a multi-ethnic federation, which acted together for specific purposes and then disbanded.”
[2]
“Saad Abubakar contended that the Jukun were possibly part of the legendary Kwararafa which was an ancient kingdom or possibly an empire which flourished in the Benue region several centuries before it was succeeded by the kingdom of Wukari. This position was further established by J.M. Freemantle when he asserted that the Jukun kingdom of Kwararafa at one time or the other extended from the 12th meridian to the Niger, South to the Cross River and North to the borders of Bornu and the varying limits of the central Hausa State. At various times, its suzerainty extended over Kano, the Alago Kingdom of Doma, the Igbira Kindom of Kwatto and the dominions of the Ata-gara. These claims suggested that “Kwararafa” existed as an empire, or at best a confederation, in which groups of semi-independent chiefdoms were knitted together.”
[3]
“Abubakar further observes that while the external activities of the Jukun are well known, virtually nothing is known about their internal organization before the 19th century. He therefore suggest that prior to the 16thcentury, the Jukun lived not under a central authority but in small communities, each independent of the other. He surmises that probably as from that century, a powerful military class emerged among them, possibly to counter Borno’s expansionist policy. Consequently, with a highly efficient cavalry, (horses being obtained from Hausa land,) the various independent Jukun communities were unified under the control of military men. The Jukun began a career of distant military raids against Hausaland to the North-west and Borno to the North-east. Over time, the Jukun were opened to new alien influence and were, consequently, compelled to migrate. Abubakar suggests that the coming of new immigrants, the Pabur in the west and Chamba in the east, completed the process of Jukun decline. With the collapse of the military that had previously held sway over the various groups, the Jukun reverted to their previous arrangement as autonomous communities. This process started probably from the 17th century when Aku Katakpa founded Puje in 1660.”
[4]
[1]: Shillington, K., ed. (2005). Encyclopedia of African History (1st Ed., Vol. 1–3). Fitzroy Dearborn: 248. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AWA9ZT5B/collection [2]: Isichei, E. (1997). A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press: 235. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection [3]: Zhema, S. (2017). A History of the Social and Political Organization of the Jukun of Wukari Division, c.1596–1960 [Benue State University]: 72. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/U667CC36/collection [4]: Zhema, S. (2017). A History of the Social and Political Organization of the Jukun of Wukari Division, c.1596–1960 [Benue State University]: 27. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/U667CC36/collection |
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“Like Allada and Hueda to the south, Dahomey was only weakly centralized in the seventeenth century, yet expanded significantly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”
[1]
“By the mid-15th century, the population of Allada had reached approximately 30,000 people. It seems likely that the collection of small settlements up to this time organized themselves politically along decentralized lines, meaning that they ruled by consensus rather than granting sovereignty to a leader or king. Demographic growth, however, likely necessitated a transition to political centralization. Legends suggest that three brothers who had descended from people in what is now the city of Allada split the region into three parts and administered rule as kings. The first, Kokpon, remained in the capital city and became the ruler of the Allada kingdom. His brothers Do-Aklin and Te-Agdanlin allegedly left the city to establish their own kingdoms of Dahomey and Little Ardra, respectively, in what is now the city of Porto Novo.”
[2]
“[…] under Allada earlier, the state had been conceived as an enlarged kin-group, comprising a federation of essentially autonomous related lineages (with the king’s authority therefore necessarily limited), whereas Dahomey in contrast stood for a new conception, basing authority on the right of conquest rather than consanguinity or inheritance, and stressing the absolute and unmediated authority of the king over his subjects.”
[3]
A commonwealth-style system seems to have been present before Allada fell to the Dahomey. About Agaja, of Dahomey: “His attack on Allada, the ancient Aja kingdom to the south, on March 30, 1724, marked the beginning of the Dahomean domination of Aja and the effective collapse of the commonwealth system in the region.”
[4]
“In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the ’Slave Coast’ of West Africa suffered increasingly severe problems of disorder, which seem to have been in large part a consequence of the impact of the Atlantic slave trade. These disorders involved not only wars among the major states but also (in at least some cases) the weakening of political authority within states. The most obvious aspect of this dissolution of authority was the decline in the power of the kingdom of Allada, which had earlier exercised some degree of suzerainty over most if not all of the other states in the area. Among the tributaries of Allada which repudiated its authority was the kingdom of Whydah (Hueda), on the coast to the south-west, which was already effectively independent by the 1680s, and which even went to war with Allada in 1691-92 and again in 1714-17. The kingdom of Fon, or Dahomey, in the interior north of Allada, was originally also a dependency of Allada, but is recorded to have revolted and asserted its independence in 1715.”
[5]
[1]: Monroe, J. C. (2007). Continuity, Revolution or Evolution on the Slave Coast of West Africa? Royal Architecture and Political Order in Precolonial Dahomey. The Journal of African History, 48(3), 349–373: 364. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ASTPFKNP/collection [2]: Aderinto, Saheed. African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations. ABC-CLIO, 2017: 8. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/EB5TWDG7/collection [3]: Law, Robin. “‘My Head Belongs to the King’: On the Political and Ritual Significance of Decapitation in Pre-Colonial Dahomey.” The Journal of African History, vol. 30, no. 3, 1989, pp. 399–415: 399. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5335RH4I/collection [4]: Aderinto, Saheed. African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations. ABC- CLIO, 2017: 55. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/EB5TWDG7/collection [5]: Law, Robin. “Ideologies of Royal Power: The Dissolution and Reconstruction of Political Authority on the ‘Slave Coast’, 1680-1750.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol. 57, no. 3, 1987, pp. 321–44: 321. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/VJPWCBM6/collection |
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“Like Allada and Hueda to the south, Dahomey was only weakly centralized in the seventeenth century, yet expanded significantly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”
[1]
“By the mid-15th century, the population of Allada had reached approximately 30,000 people. It seems likely that the collection of small settlements up to this time organized themselves politically along decentralized lines, meaning that they ruled by consensus rather than granting sovereignty to a leader or king. Demographic growth, however, likely necessitated a transition to political centralization. Legends suggest that three brothers who had descended from people in what is now the city of Allada split the region into three parts and administered rule as kings. The first, Kokpon, remained in the capital city and became the ruler of the Allada kingdom. His brothers Do-Aklin and Te-Agdanlin allegedly left the city to establish their own kingdoms of Dahomey and Little Ardra, respectively, in what is now the city of Porto Novo.”
[2]
“[…] under Allada earlier, the state had been conceived as an enlarged kin-group, comprising a federation of essentially autonomous related lineages (with the king’s authority therefore necessarily limited), whereas Dahomey in contrast stood for a new conception, basing authority on the right of conquest rather than consanguinity or inheritance, and stressing the absolute and unmediated authority of the king over his subjects.”
[3]
A commonwealth-style system seems to have been present before Allada fell to the Dahomey. About Agaja, of Dahomey: “His attack on Allada, the ancient Aja kingdom to the south, on March 30, 1724, marked the beginning of the Dahomean domination of Aja and the effective collapse of the commonwealth system in the region.”
[4]
“In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the ’Slave Coast’ of West Africa suffered increasingly severe problems of disorder, which seem to have been in large part a consequence of the impact of the Atlantic slave trade. These disorders involved not only wars among the major states but also (in at least some cases) the weakening of political authority within states. The most obvious aspect of this dissolution of authority was the decline in the power of the kingdom of Allada, which had earlier exercised some degree of suzerainty over most if not all of the other states in the area. Among the tributaries of Allada which repudiated its authority was the kingdom of Whydah (Hueda), on the coast to the south-west, which was already effectively independent by the 1680s, and which even went to war with Allada in 1691-92 and again in 1714-17. The kingdom of Fon, or Dahomey, in the interior north of Allada, was originally also a dependency of Allada, but is recorded to have revolted and asserted its independence in 1715.”
[5]
[1]: Monroe, J. C. (2007). Continuity, Revolution or Evolution on the Slave Coast of West Africa? Royal Architecture and Political Order in Precolonial Dahomey. The Journal of African History, 48(3), 349–373: 364. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ASTPFKNP/collection [2]: Aderinto, Saheed. African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations. ABC-CLIO, 2017: 8. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/EB5TWDG7/collection [3]: Law, Robin. “‘My Head Belongs to the King’: On the Political and Ritual Significance of Decapitation in Pre-Colonial Dahomey.” The Journal of African History, vol. 30, no. 3, 1989, pp. 399–415: 399. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5335RH4I/collection [4]: Aderinto, Saheed. African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations. ABC- CLIO, 2017: 55. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/EB5TWDG7/collection [5]: Law, Robin. “Ideologies of Royal Power: The Dissolution and Reconstruction of Political Authority on the ‘Slave Coast’, 1680-1750.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol. 57, no. 3, 1987, pp. 321–44: 321. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/VJPWCBM6/collection |
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Vassal states and a centralised system were present. “A combination of internal and external factors was responsible for the decline of Oyo after the death of King Abiodun in 1789. One notable external factor was the increasing power of its provincial and vassal states, which began to break away because the central government could not effectively administer the expanding empire. Provincial chiefs and warriors who were required to respect the order of the alaafin began to carve out part of the empire for themselves.”
[1]
Rulers of provincial towns “usually” appointed by the central authorities. “The appointment of [provincial towns’] rulers was usually ratified by the alaafin. Provincial towns were also required to send representatives to the Oyo metropolis during important festivals. Similarly, the alaafin would appoint a local representative (ajele) to monitor and oversee the affairs of provincial towns in order to maintain his interest.”
[1]
Though some of the outer parts of the Empire had their own rulers, they may still have an ajele (Egbado Corridor), and still paid taxes to the central government and to follow Oyo orders and give access to markets (Ajaland). “Provincial towns of the empire were allowed autonomy in their internal affairs alone; the central government controlled external affairs throughout the empire. But it was ensured, through the stationing of ajele (resident officials), that provincial towns did not conduct their internal affairs to the detriment of the Alafin and his government.”
[2]
“Except in the conduct of external relations, the implementation of capital punishment and the recruitment of the head chief, each subsidiary polity in a typical central Yoruba state (including tribute-paying polities) enjoyed autonomy in the conduct of its political affairs. The authority of the central states over their subsidiary polities was exercised mostly in raising manpower for military campaigns and revenue collection”.
[3]
As power shifted in the region, the nature of the empire also changed. Though the Oyo Empire still existed in 1835, it was past its peak and now subordinate to some states which has previously been tributary states of Oyo. “There is abundant literature on the establishment of Ilorin, but it must be emphasized that it was formerly a military outpost of Oyo until Afonja declared it an independent state. Afonja, the military leader of Oyo empire had earlier been sent to Iwere by Alaafin Aole. Though, Iwere was captured, Afonja refused to go back to Oyo; instead he came to Ilorin, where he embarked upon his secessionist career (Danmole et al, 1985: 21 - 26). Afonja was helped in his secessionist bid by the Islamic zealots from the newly established Sokoto Caliphate. […] d, Abd al-Salam applied and got a flag from the Emir of Gwandu to spread Islam to the south. Thus, he became the first emir of Ilorin in about 1823. Ilorin’s determination to survive as a muslim state amidst its hostile neighbours led to the creation of a military state with soldiers and civilians participating in the war of expansion. Ilorin soon began to expand at the expense of Oyo until 1840 when it was defeated at Oshogbo by Ibadan. The emergence of Ilorin indeed upset the military power in the region. The incessant raids on Oyo empire and the subordinate states in the 1820s and 1830s constituted a great threat to many states. […] Oyo’s Specific Reasons Oyo Empire had every reason to go into a military alliance with Borgu. As we have mentioned earlier, this was an empire that had enjoyed great power and influence until the late 18th century when it started to decline. At the beginning of the 19th century, it was already a vassal state to Ilorin. Several attempts were made to re-assert Oyo hegemony over Ilorin.”
[4]
[1]: Aderinto, Saheed. African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations. ABC-CLIO, 2017: 246. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/EB5TWDG7/note/U7W4UF33/collection [2]: Atanda, J. A. ‘The Fall of the Old Ọyọ Empire: A Re-Consideration of its Cause’. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria vol.5, no.4 (June 1971): 480–481. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NR9MAEAE/collection [3]: Ejiogu, EC. ‘State Building in the Niger Basin in the Common Era and Beyond, 1000–Mid 1800s: The Case of Yorubaland’. Journal of Asian and African Studies vol.46, no.6 (1 December 2011): 598. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/2H2CJNHP/collection [4]: Akinwumi, O. D. (1992). The Oyo-Borgu Military Alliance of 1835: A Case Study in the Pre-Colonial Military History. Transafrican Journal of History, 21, 159–170: 161–162. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J42GPW63/collection |
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“What is clear is that those chiefs who served as governors of subordinate villages of the kingdom enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in their local administration: as was noted in the 1690s, ‘these in the King’s absence and in their Vice-royalties, command as arbitrarily and keep up as great state as the King himself.’ The governors exercised an independent local judicial authority in minor cases, acted as spokesmen before the king on behalf of those under their government, and transmitted their tribute to him. They also raised contingents of soldiers for the national army, and commanded them in battle. The king’s power in practice was clearly limited by that of these provincial governors, and its effectiveness dependent upon their cooperation.”
[1]
[1]: Law, Robin. “‘The Common People Were Divided’: Monarchy, Aristocracy and Political Factionalism in the Kingdom of Whydah, 1671-1727.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 23, no. 2, 1990, pp. 201–29: 208–209. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/8JKAH2V5/collection |
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"Contexts that could shed light on the dynamics of social structure and hierarchies in the metropolis, such as the royal burial site of Oyo monarchs and the residences of the elite population, have not been investigated. The mapping of the palace structures has not been followed by systematic excavations (Soper, 1992); and questions of the economy, military system, and ideology of the empire have not been addressed archaeologically, although their general patterns are known from historical studies (e.g, Johnson, 1921; Law, 1977)."
[1]
Regarding this period, however, one of the historical studies mentioned in this quote also notes: "Of the earliestperiod of Oyo history, before the sixteenth century, very little is known."
[2]
Law does not then go on to provide specific information directly relevant to this variable.
[1]: (Ogundiran 2005: 151-152) [2]: (Law 1977: 33) |
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The following quote, which refers to changes in the Late Formative period, suggests that, at this time, people were largely organized into single independent households or hamlets. "As a result, a new social configuration featuring formalized association and integration of multiple households under a single leadership became necessary as a means of organizing and safeguarding land and labor. It was the beginning of a departure from the two- to three-generation households and hamlets that had been the preferred unit of social organization in the preceding centuries."
[1]
[1]: (Ogundiran 2020: 47-48) |
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Arochukwu exerted the most cultural and mercantile control in Aro. “Regrettably, there is no such collection of the oral traditions of the villages and towns making up the home chiefdom of Arochukwu, which would have been more relevant and reliable for the study of the Aro than the reports of British colonial officers.”.
[1]
“The Aro confederacy emerged uniquely as a state in southeastern Nigeria in ca. 1690–1720, according to the dating structure worked out by the author (Nwauwa 1990). Three heterogeneous ethnic groups, namely, the Igbo, Ibibio, and Akpa were confederated to form Aro state or chiefdom (Arochukwu).”
[2]
“He noted that the Aro indigenous system was founded on a "clan" basis whereby matters of importance were deliberated on by a special body fully representative of the whole chiefdom while allowing each town the power to regulate purely domestic affairs.”
[3]
“Before the foundation of Arochukwu confederacy, the Igbo and the Ibibio of the area operated a political system - village republicanism - based on gerontocracy. However, the end of Igbo-Ibibio hostilities, following the victory of Igbo-Akpa alliance against the Ibibio, culminated in the foundation of the Aro chiefdom comprising elements of the three ethnic groups. Thus, the political system which ultimately emerged - federation under one authority - appeared to be an ostensible aberration of the traditional Igbo-Ibibio system based on kinship. In the emergent organization, there was a king (chief) with a council of representatives of the various towns.”
[4]
“Politically, the Igbo no doubt might have lacked large-scale organizations in the structure of kingdom and empires. However their socio-political system operated within the frame work of what could in the present times be described as a democracy and republicanism. In other words, the Igbo system lacked authoritarian and monarchical tendencies common then among a number of indigenous people of Africa.”
[5]
“The Aro evolved a confederate political system headed by a hereditary leadership”.
[6]
“The most famous account of the Arochukwu tradition of origin has it that the land of Arochukwu was initially inhabited by Ibibio people that arrived in the area at about 300 AD from the Benue valley and founded the early settlements of Obong Okon Ita and Ibom. Many years passed before the first Igbo group led by Agwu Inobia and who referred to themselves as Ezeagwu group came along and pressed into the Ibibio occupied territory and founded several other settlements. The Igbo settler group (Ezeagwu) and their Ibibio landlords became entangled in war over who would possess the land, but there was a stalemate. In reaction, the Eze-Agwu clan invited a priest named Nnachi from Edda clan of northeastern Igbo land and another group from the east of Cross River came through Nnachi (Onwuejeogwu, 1981). These people were identified as Akpa people. Akpa forces led by Osim and Akuma Nnubi helped the Igbo group to capture the rest of the area. The capturing of the entire area led to the formation of an alliance of nineteen (19) new and old settlements in the area known as the Arochukwu kingdom around 1650-1700.”
[7]
“The Aro confederacy is another instance of regional institution in precolonial West Africa. The Aro Confederacy evolved between 1690 and 1700 in South Eastern Nigeria, as a confederated union held together by a symbolic oracle, the Aro Oracle (the Long Juju), based at Arochukwu. It was comprised of three ethnic groups, Ibibio, the Akpa, and Igbo all previously independent.58 The Aro Oracle became a viable integrating institution in the region. Through its mystical power, it established constitutive conditions for smooth regional socio-economic and religious interactions.”
[8]
Though Arochukwu was dominant, largely because of the Ibini-Ukpabi oracle, the Aro confederacy was largely acephalous and had no strongly centralised governance. “According to oral tradition, the Aro chiefdom was founded as a consequence of the intermingling of three distinct groups: the Ibibio, Igbo, and Akpa. The chiefdom was a product of interethnic rivalry. Aro traditions vary in respect to the details of the conflict. However, the various traditions agree on the essential features of the crises in relation to the Igbo-Ibibio strife and the subsequent interference of the Akpa group. According to the traditions the original inhabitants of the Aro area were the acephalous Ibibio. They were said to have possessed an oracle, Ibini-Ukpabi, which was of very local significance prior to the foundation of Arochukwu. In the previous decades the Igbo came to settle among the Ibibio of the region as land-hungry immigrants, slaves and traders. Subsequently these migrant Igbo tended to dominate the indigenous Ibibio, who resented them. The resultant hostilities degenerated into disorder.”
[9]
“At the height of their economic prosperity and influence, Arochukwu people founded satellite settlements outside their native homeland (but not tributary States) scattered in different parts of Igbo land. Some of the better-known settlements include Arondizogu, Aro-Okigwe, Aro-Ezinachi, Aro-Amuro, Aro-Ihube, Aro-Obinikpa, Aro-Ubahu etc (Imo State); Aro-Okporoenyi (Umuahia), Aro-Ngwa, Aro-Isuochi (Abia State); Aro-Ajalli (Anambra); Aro-Abakaliki (Ebonyi); Aro-Ngwo (Enugu) and Aro-Ikwerre in River State.”
[10]
[1]: Nwauwa, A. O. (1992). On Aro Colonial Primary Source Material: A Critique of the Historiography. History in Africa, 19, 377–385: 384. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/DINGJJC2/collection [2]: Nwauwa, A. O. (1995). The Evolution of the Aro Confederacy in Southeastern Nigeria, 1690–1720. A Theoretical Synthesis of State Formation Process in Africa. Anthropos, 90(4/6), 353–364: 353. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/G4DWA3GQ/collection [3]: Nwauwa, A. O. (1992). On Aro Colonial Primary Source Material: A Critique of the Historiography. History in Africa, 19, 377–385: 383. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/DINGJJC2/collection [4]: Nwauwa, A. O. (1995). The Evolution of the Aro Confederacy in Southeastern Nigeria, 1690–1720. A Theoretical Synthesis of State Formation Process in Africa. Anthropos, 90(4/6), 353–364: 356. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/G4DWA3GQ/collection [5]: Nwaezeigwe, D. N. T. (2013). THE ARO AND THE CONCEPT OF ARO-OKIGBO: FACTS AND FALACIES OF A HISTRIONIC IGBO HEGEMONY. 15, 12: 2. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TU5APW74/collection [6]: Nwauwa, A. O. (1990). The Dating of the Aro Chiefdom: A Synthesis of Correlated Genealogies. History in Africa, 17, 227–245: 227. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TEXMFD2H/collection [7]: Chidume, C., & Nmaju, U. (2019). The Aro Hegemony: Dissecting The Myth And Reality. 8, 76–87: 76–77. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/WJ5NDV5U/collection [8]: Izuagie, L. (2014). Pre-Colonial Regionalism in West Africa. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 4(1), 21–42: 31. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/R2STQVZV/collection [9]: Nwauwa, A. O. (1990). The Dating of the Aro Chiefdom: A Synthesis of Correlated Genealogies. History in Africa, 17, 227–245: 228. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TEXMFD2H/collection [10]: Chidume, C., & Nmaju, U. (2019). The Aro Hegemony: Dissecting The Myth And Reality. 8, 76–87: 78. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/WJ5NDV5U/collection |
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“The Sokoto caliphate originated in 1804, when the Fulbe Islamic scholar Shehu Usumanu dan Fodio declared an Islamic reformist movement, or jihad, in northern Nigeria. The state that he founded eventually spread to encompass all of northern Nigeria, the northern Republic of Benin, and southern Niger, with the Shehu as caliph, or spiritual and political leader. In 1806 the various groups of seminomadic pastoral Fulbe residing in northern Cameroon joined the jihad under the leadership of the respected Islamic scholar Modibo Adama. The region was incorporated into the larger caliphate as the emirate of Adamawa, named after its founder. The various Fulbe leaders of the region founded subemirates, owing allegiance to the emir, or governor, Modibo Adama and ultimately to the caliph. Throughout the history of the caliphate, however, there was tension between the centralized rule of the caliph and the autonomy of the local rulers.”
[1]
“The Sokoto Caliphate emerged from the amalgamation of over 30 emirates in 1812 through a series of jihads that began in 1804 and were led by a Fulani named Usman dan Fodio. The jihads were carried out by Usman and 14 flag bearers chosen by him. The caliphate was organized into semiautonomous emirates that ceded religious authority to the caliph, seated in Sokoto. The old Hausa aristocracy was replaced by a Fulani one, but with a revival of Islam and expansion of literacy.”
[2]
“To assess how far the ideals of the leadership were actually put into practice, one must bear in mind the political and social configuration of the Sokoto Caliphate. Direct central administration was confined to the metropolitan districts in the heartland of the Sokoto-Rima Basin, the region formerly occupied by the pre-jihad kingdoms of Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir. The emirates which comprised the rest of the Caliphate owed the central authority a looser form of allegiance. The policy prescriptions of the central leadership were thus addressed largely to the metropolitan districts, although they were also intended to provide guidelines for the emirs as the representatives of the Caliph in the emirates. In practice, the emirates tended to evolve their own forms of government.”
[3]
“Though the taxation system was regularized by the Caliphate from being extortionist and overburdening as it used to be by sanctioning only those taxes which were legislated by the Shariah, the mode of assessment, collection and administration also became flawed as time went by.”
[4]
[1]: Delancey, Mark D. “The Spread of the Sooro: Symbols of Power in the Sokoto Caliphate.” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, vol. 71, no. 2, 2012, pp. 168–75: 168–169. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/87XHFF23/collection [2]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 331. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection [3]: Chafe, Kabiru Sulaiman. “Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination.” Paideuma, vol. 40, 1994, pp. 99–109: 104. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ZANHCUFH/collection [4]: Okene, Ahmed Adam, and Shukri B. Ahmad. “Ibn Khaldun, Cyclical Theory and the Rise and Fall of Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria West Africa.” International Journal of Business and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 4, 2011, pp. 80–91: 88. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/H7J2NC37/collection |
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“It seems clear that many larger states — Igala, Benin and the Yoruba kingdoms among them — grew out of the fusion of small polities into a larger conglomerate, a transition which may well have occurred, in at least some cases, in the fifteenth century.”
[1]
“The distinction between towns and villages located in Great States and those outside them is more apparent than real. In a very real sense, the power of the court did not extend far beyond the capital and historical maps — including those in this book — which suggest blocks of territory like modern nations, where the impact of government is equally felt everywhere, are misleading. Distant towns sent tribute, which was sometimes essentially symbolic and a description of the Lunda empire in Central Africa is much more widely applicable: ‘a chain of political islands in a sea of woodlands occupied mostly by dispersed villagers recognising no overlord at all.”
[2]
“Nri and Aguleri are part of the Umueri clan, a cluster of Igbo village groups which traces its origins to a sky being called En, and, significantly, includes (from the viewpoint of its Igbo members) the neighbour kingdom of Igala.”
[3]
[1]: Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press, 1997: 243. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection [2]: Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press, 1997: 243. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection [3]: Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press, 1997: 246. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection |
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“Especially the case of Nri has fuelled both academic and popular imagination, because the stirring archaeological findings at Igbo-Ukwu seem to suggest to some authors (especially Onwuejeogwu 1980, 1981; see also Hahn-Waanders 1985, Grau 1993) the existence of a one thousand year-old tradition of Nri sacral kingship and ’hegemony’ over large parts of Igboland.”
[1]
“As regards these leadership positions, a common feature is their high degree of local diversity, in two ways: First, the rules by which an individual obtained a position differed from place to place. Second, while certain Igbo communities (especially Nri and Arochukwu) exerted a certain wide-range commercial or ritual influence, the leaders even of these communities did not exert direct power outside of their own community.”
[2]
“The Kingdom of Nri (1043–1911) was the West African medieval state of the Nri Igbo, a subgroup of the Igbo people, and is the oldest kingdom in Nigeria. The Kingdom of Nri was unusual in the history of world government in that its leader exercised no military power over his subjects. The kingdom existed as a sphere of religious and political influence over much of Igboland, and was administered by a priest-king called the eze Nri. The eze Nri managed trade and diplomacy on behalf of the Igbo people, and was the possessor of divine authority in religious matters.”
[3]
[1]: Harneit-Sievers, A. (1998). Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’: Chieftaincy and the State in Southeastern Nigeria. Africa Spectrum, 33(1), 57–79: 59–60. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TUHHXK22/collection [2]: Harneit-Sievers, A. (1998). Igbo ‘Traditional Rulers’: Chieftaincy and the State in Southeastern Nigeria. Africa Spectrum, 33(1), 57–79: 60. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/TUHHXK22/collection [3]: Ngara, C. A. (n.d.). An Ethnohistorical Account Of Pre-Colonial Africa, African Kingdoms And African Historical States. 25:11. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/UJG3ED8W/collection |
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“Bawo, who succeeded his father, had six sons, three sets of twins, who became the rulers of Kano and Daura, Gobir and Zazzau (Zegzeg or Zaria) and Katsina and Rano respectively. Together with Biram, which was ruled by Bayajidda’s son by the Bornu princess, these seven states formed the hausa bakwai (the seven Hausa states). Karbogari’s sons established another seven states, namely Kebbi, Zamfara, Gwari, Jukun (Kwararafa), Yoruba, Nupe and Yawuri, which were together called banza bakwai (the seven bastards or worthless ones).”
[1]
“The Hausa Kingdoms were organized under a hereditary chief, or emir, who was advised by a council of title-holders. The kingdom, or emirate, was divided into districts, with each under a district head. The Hausa kingdom, or emirate, structure, for the most part, remained unaltered during the 19th century. These first seven kingdoms are referred to as the Hausa bakwai (“Hausa states”) or Habe kingdoms. Of these seven, the most influential were Kano and Zazzau. Hausa oral tradition also says that Bayajidda had several illegitimate children, who founded seven kingdoms: Gwari, Kebbi, Kwararafa, Nupe, Zamfara, Yoruba, and Jukun. These kingdoms are referred to as the banza bakwai (“bastard states”). Some oral sources identify these kingdoms as being not of blood relation to Bayajidda or the Hausa. Much more evidence exists for this version. Scholars may exclude Zamfara and Kwararafa and include Yauri and Borgu in the list of seven states. Historians often describe these Hausa Kingdoms as city-states.”
[2]
“It was in Rumfa’s reign that the first war took place with Katsina; this lasted eleven years, with neither side gaining the upper hand. His successors, Abdüjjähi (1499-1509) and Muhammad Kisoki (1509-65) continued his policy and, although they fought without much success against Katsina, they defeated Zaria. The growing might of Bornu still loomed menacingly over Hausaland, and Kano was not spared the humiliation of its sarki before the mai, but it managed on other occasions to defend its territory.”
[3]
[1]: Niane, D. T., & Unesco (Eds.). (1984). Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century. Heinemann; University of California Press: 270. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ERZKPETN/collection [2]: Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009: 149. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SJAIVKDW/collection [3]: Niane, D. T., & Unesco (Eds.). (1984). Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century. Heinemann; University of California Press: 273. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/ERZKPETN/collection |
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“Even though it is difficult to generalize the nature of political power for more than 1000 years of history, some features seem to have been present throughout the history of Bornu. The royal family was at the heart of the political system meaning that the head of the Sayfawa family was also the mai. It seems that to prevent wars of succession, the chiroma, generally the eldest son or the brother of the mai, was designated during the lifetime of the mai. Members of the royal family were also important office-holders. For example, the magira, the queen mother, held for a long time the highest number of fiefs in the kingdom while the first wife of the mai, the gumsu, was responsible for the palace duties with the three other wives of the mai (Cohen 1967). As a consequence, the stability of the empire was synonymous with the stability of the royal family. However, political power was not solely in the hands of the ruling family as members of the council were also in charge of political affairs. It appears that there were around twelve members in this council and that apart from the descendants of the close advisors of the first Sayfawas, their office was not hereditary. It would be difficult to attribute a specific role to each of the members of the council over the centuries but some office-holders seem to exert the same roles. For example, the mainin kenandi was the Islamic advisor of the mai whereas the kaigama was in charge of the armies of Kanem-Bornu. This highly structured political system could also be found in the territorial organization of the kingdom. Indeed, the empire of KanemBornu was organized territorially and divided into different administrative regions. For example, the galadima was supposed to be the viceroy of the Western part of the kingdom. He had his own capital at Nguru and when present in Birni Gazagarmo was a full member of the council (Alkali 1983). One of the striking features of the empire of Kanem-Bornu was its complex territorial organization which allowed it to survive for more than a millennium. Diplomatic correspondence and oral history confirm that the Kanem-Bornu Empire was an empire with different types of borders. Some of them may have been rather vague, such as those along the Saharan trade route, whereas others could have been precisely delimited, such as the borders south of Lake Chad with the Bagirmi or westwards with the Hausa states. Moreover, the core of Bornu and the newly conquered regions had sensibly different territorial structures. In metropolitan Bornu, a double fief system enabled the mais and later the shehus to levy taxes and troops in their empire. The first one was a personal fief where the fief-holder, the chima jilibe, owned a fief over people, the second one was territorial: here the fief-holder, the chima chidibe, was in charge of a specific territory. This system enabled the empire to control its sedentary population as well as incorporating its nomadic or semi-nomadic subjects such as the Shuwa Arabs. This administrative structure was present in metropolitan Bornu whereas the satellite regions were still administered by a local ruler. For example, the sultanate of Zinder was semiautonomous but still part of the Kanem-Bornu Empire until the middle of the 19th century.”
[1]
[1]: Hiribarren, V. (2016). Kanem-Bornu Empire. In N. Dalziel & J. M. MacKenzie (Eds.), The Encyclopedia of Empire (pp. 1–6). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.: 4. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/KNHK5ANQ/collection |
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“The success of the kings of Dahomey, in origin rebels with no traditional claim to authority, in winning acceptance of the legitimacy of their rule and uniting the conquered communities in a new sense of national identity, is remarkable. The successful consolidation of the Dahomian monarchy in the eighteenth century, it seems clear, cannot be adequately explained solely by the exercise of the coercive powers of the state, and its physical liquidation of rivals to and opponents of its authority, but requires consideration also of the sphere of ideology.”
[1]
“Thus, provincial governors were royal agents: they were responsible for public order, collecting taxes, providing military quotas, maintaining national highways, and settling all land disputes.”
[2]
[1]: Law, R. (1989). ‘My Head Belongs to the King’: On the Political and Ritual Significance of Decapitation in Pre-Colonial Dahomey. The Journal of African History, 30(3), 399–415: 399. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5335RH4I/collection [2]: Lombard, J. (1976). The Kingdom of Dahomey. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 70–92). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 76. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/T6WTVSHZ/collection |
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“Relationships between the village and palace hierarchies prior to 1320 - under the first Benin dynasty - were maintained and reinforced through the mechanism of minimal allegiance and redistributive tribute. […] The emergence of the second dynasty in c. 1320-1347 did not, initially at least, fundamentally alter the political, social, and / or economic balance in the state.”
[1]
“Oba Ewedo (c. 1374-1401) took major initiatives to establish a more hierarchical central administration and remove the monarchy from Uzama domination. Ewedo established an autonomous palace protected by a loyal standing army and maintained by an independent tribute network (Egharevba 1968, 9-10). The ability of the Oba to demand and receive tribute from the village Onojie, thus circumventing Uzama domination, was apparently based upon the development of coercive authority. This newfound capability enabled the Oba to restrict the authority and prestige of the Uzama and impose the new central administration forcefully. The Uzama Nihinron, naturally enough, objected violently, but the coercive power of the monarchy forced ultimate acquiescence (Egharevba 1968, 10). The creation of a drastically altered and expanded political hierarchy in c. 1374- 1401 marked a significant change in the economic and social development of Benin and concomitantly established the Oba as paramount authority in the state. However, ‘... as the state organization became more centralized it began to use the concept of territorial power ... the prestige of the sovereign never completely effaced the tribopatriarchal authority. At most, the kingship took the form of a superimposed bureaucracy which nonetheless respected the structure of rural life (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1976, 92).’”
[2]
Oba Ewuare built on the work started by Oba Eweko (c. 1374–1401) to move the Benin Empire towards increased centralization. “Oba Ewuare seems to have transformed Benin from a segmentary tribute paying formation into a national trading structure. The incorporation of the majority of Edo-speaking people in the Benin political framework established a national character for the state, a polity ruled by a dynasty that was becoming progressively Edo-speaking. The dominant mode of production in the new social formation was still the village Otu system, and tribute remained one of the principle supports for the national elite. However, under Oba Ewuare (c. 1428-1455), commercial revenues and levies were appropriated at an increased rate. According to Webster’s typology for Africa, the basis of primary support for the elite determined the classification of the social formation (1982, 2). The concern for trade, the management of commercial enterprise, and the control of major trade routes contributed to the expansion of trade and commerce. This development provided the opportunity for elite support that may have been greater in value than that extracted from allegiance, supportive, and redistributive tribute. It seems, therefore, that Oba Ewuare transformed Benin from a tribute-based social formation to a national trading state.”
[3]
“In fact, the transformation of the segmentary redistributive social formation into a highly exploitative centralised administration had taken only three generations. From about 1374 to 1455, therefore, Benin had experienced a rather dramatic shift toward centralised coercive state exploitation, clear evidence of a transformation from a redistributive social formation to a highly organised tribute paying structure. Real tribute paying social formations suggest a dual economy - enclave and hinterland - and the process of underdeveloping the hinterland begins. The next generation (c. 1455-1482) in the development of this centralised exploitative political structure was even more dramatic than all previous generations combined. The reign of Oba Ewuare witnessed a drastic increase in the state bureaucracy; Ewuare appointed no less than seventeen new officials to the palace administration (Egharevba 1960, 78-79). Ewuare went even further in his reorganisation of the state by annexing the Ishan chiefdoms and incorporating them as vassal tributary village clusters (Okojie 1960, 209; Miller 1983).”
[4]
“It is useful to distinguish what we may call the Benin kingdom from the outlying territories which at various times accepted the Oba’s suzerainty. […] Generally speaking, the Benin kingdom may be defined as the area within which the Oba was recognized as the sole human arbiter of life and death. Within it no one could be put to death without his consent, and any person accused of a capital offence had to be brought before his court.”
[5]
“From about 1293 to 1536, Benin evolved from a segmentary redistributive chiefdom to a centralised imperial power.”
[6]
“It is possible to see not only a major evolution in the political and economic structures of Benin from about 1293 to 1536 but also major changes in power relations, social structures, and economic organisation. The state had evolved from a segmentary redistributive social formation to a centralised tributary state. Subsequent economic and political policy further transformed the society into a major regional partner in long distance trade, into a conquest state, and ultimately into an imperial trading formation.”
[7]
“In the late fifteenth century Benin was a well-established state with a large army conducting long campaigns far afield. It was already approaching the peak of its power and prosperity. By the late sixteenth century its frontiers had reached out westwards along the coast to beyond Lagos, north-west through the country of the Ekiti Yoruba to Ottun, where there was a boundary with Oyo, and eastwards to the Niger. Thus, it embraced considerable populations of eastern Yoruba and western Ibo. The former largely retained their characteristically Yoruba political systems. Their titles, regalia, and ceremonial forms were influenced by Benin, but these were matters of style rather than structure. Within a limited framework of controls exercised by the Oba—tribute, assistance in war, facilities for Edo traders—they enjoyed internal autonomy. Many western Ibo groups developed into small centralized states in which Benin-type institutions, copied with varying degrees of similitude, were superimposed on and accommodated to local social forms. Most of their chiefs (obi) accepted the Oba’s suzerainty, but others, some of them founded by dissident groups from Benin itself, lay beyond his control.”
[8]
“The last three centuries of Benin’s independence saw a gradual shrinking of the area from which its government could enforce delivery of tribute and military service and secure safe passage for Benin traders, though this decline was by no means uninterrupted. During the eighteenth century there were many campaigns aimed at maintaining control over the western Ibo area. In Osemwende’s reign, in the early nineteenth century, control over the Ekiti Yoruba to the north was reconsolidated. Throughout the nineteenth century this latter area was the most important, though not the only, hinterland for Benin traders.”
[9]
“Benin warriors played some part in the Ekiti wars, but on a freelance basis; they took advantage of the confused situation to raid for slaves and loot. They sent gifts to the Oba, for they were dependent on the Benin route for their supplies. In return he occasionally dispatched reinforcements to help them, but his control over them was minimal. In the 1880s the official Benin army, under the Ezɔmɔ, was occupied subduing rebellious villages on the very north-west borders of the kingdom itself, no more than fifty miles from the capital.”
[10]
“Their territories consisted only of the villages or hamlets in which they lived with, in some cases, one or more villages farther afield; but in the internal affairs of these territories the Oba ought not to interfere. Their inhabitants were subjects of the Uzama rather than of the Oba. Freemen of Uzebu, for example, were eviɛn-Ezɔmɔ rather than eviɛn-Ɔba.”
[11]
“Thus, it becomes necessary to differentiate between the "state" of Benin and Benin proper.’ For the state, in fact, consisted of many "independent communities" which "were seldom at peace," which enjoyed "very full powers of local government," and which "were left pretty much alone to work out their own destinies". [I9] The peoples of the territory between Bonny and Lagos constituted a "state," only insofar as their tribute and services were rendered to the Oba of Benin.”
[12]
“But, since the "state" of Benin was thoroughly decentralized, it existed only insofar as outlying provinces paid their due tribute to the Oba. The fluid situation in which the Benin "state" existed defies precise definition of the extent of that state”.
[13]
[1]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 406–407. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [2]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 408. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [3]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 414. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [4]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 412. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [5]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 3. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [6]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 402. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [7]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 421–422. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [8]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 5. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [9]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 4. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [10]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 7. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [11]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 15. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [12]: Graham, J. D. (1965). The Slave Trade, Depopulation and Human Sacrifice in Benin History: The General Approach. Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 5(18), 317–334: 320. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/4AS9CVZH/collection [13]: Graham, J. D. (1965). The Slave Trade, Depopulation and Human Sacrifice in Benin History: The General Approach. Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 5(18), 317–334: 331. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/4AS9CVZH/collection |
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“Relationships between the village and palace hierarchies prior to 1320 - under the first Benin dynasty - were maintained and reinforced through the mechanism of minimal allegiance and redistributive tribute. […] The emergence of the second dynasty in c. 1320-1347 did not, initially at least, fundamentally alter the political, social, and / or economic balance in the state.”
[1]
“Oba Ewedo (c. 1374-1401) took major initiatives to establish a more hierarchical central administration and remove the monarchy from Uzama domination. Ewedo established an autonomous palace protected by a loyal standing army and maintained by an independent tribute network (Egharevba 1968, 9-10). The ability of the Oba to demand and receive tribute from the village Onojie, thus circumventing Uzama domination, was apparently based upon the development of coercive authority. This newfound capability enabled the Oba to restrict the authority and prestige of the Uzama and impose the new central administration forcefully. The Uzama Nihinron, naturally enough, objected violently, but the coercive power of the monarchy forced ultimate acquiescence (Egharevba 1968, 10). The creation of a drastically altered and expanded political hierarchy in c. 1374- 1401 marked a significant change in the economic and social development of Benin and concomitantly established the Oba as paramount authority in the state. However, ‘... as the state organization became more centralized it began to use the concept of territorial power ... the prestige of the sovereign never completely effaced the tribopatriarchal authority. At most, the kingship took the form of a superimposed bureaucracy which nonetheless respected the structure of rural life (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1976, 92).’”
[2]
Oba Ewuare built on the work started by Oba Eweko (c. 1374–1401) to move the Benin Empire towards increased centralization. “Oba Ewuare seems to have transformed Benin from a segmentary tribute paying formation into a national trading structure. The incorporation of the majority of Edo-speaking people in the Benin political framework established a national character for the state, a polity ruled by a dynasty that was becoming progressively Edo-speaking. The dominant mode of production in the new social formation was still the village Otu system, and tribute remained one of the principle supports for the national elite. However, under Oba Ewuare (c. 1428-1455), commercial revenues and levies were appropriated at an increased rate. According to Webster’s typology for Africa, the basis of primary support for the elite determined the classification of the social formation (1982, 2). The concern for trade, the management of commercial enterprise, and the control of major trade routes contributed to the expansion of trade and commerce. This development provided the opportunity for elite support that may have been greater in value than that extracted from allegiance, supportive, and redistributive tribute. It seems, therefore, that Oba Ewuare transformed Benin from a tribute-based social formation to a national trading state.”
[3]
“In fact, the transformation of the segmentary redistributive social formation into a highly exploitative centralised administration had taken only three generations. From about 1374 to 1455, therefore, Benin had experienced a rather dramatic shift toward centralised coercive state exploitation, clear evidence of a transformation from a redistributive social formation to a highly organised tribute paying structure. Real tribute paying social formations suggest a dual economy - enclave and hinterland - and the process of underdeveloping the hinterland begins. The next generation (c. 1455-1482) in the development of this centralised exploitative political structure was even more dramatic than all previous generations combined. The reign of Oba Ewuare witnessed a drastic increase in the state bureaucracy; Ewuare appointed no less than seventeen new officials to the palace administration (Egharevba 1960, 78-79). Ewuare went even further in his reorganisation of the state by annexing the Ishan chiefdoms and incorporating them as vassal tributary village clusters (Okojie 1960, 209; Miller 1983).”
[4]
“It is useful to distinguish what we may call the Benin kingdom from the outlying territories which at various times accepted the Oba’s suzerainty. […] Generally speaking, the Benin kingdom may be defined as the area within which the Oba was recognized as the sole human arbiter of life and death. Within it no one could be put to death without his consent, and any person accused of a capital offence had to be brought before his court.”
[5]
“From about 1293 to 1536, Benin evolved from a segmentary redistributive chiefdom to a centralised imperial power.”
[6]
“It is possible to see not only a major evolution in the political and economic structures of Benin from about 1293 to 1536 but also major changes in power relations, social structures, and economic organisation. The state had evolved from a segmentary redistributive social formation to a centralised tributary state. Subsequent economic and political policy further transformed the society into a major regional partner in long distance trade, into a conquest state, and ultimately into an imperial trading formation.”
[7]
“In the late fifteenth century Benin was a well-established state with a large army conducting long campaigns far afield. It was already approaching the peak of its power and prosperity. By the late sixteenth century its frontiers had reached out westwards along the coast to beyond Lagos, north-west through the country of the Ekiti Yoruba to Ottun, where there was a boundary with Oyo, and eastwards to the Niger. Thus, it embraced considerable populations of eastern Yoruba and western Ibo. The former largely retained their characteristically Yoruba political systems. Their titles, regalia, and ceremonial forms were influenced by Benin, but these were matters of style rather than structure. Within a limited framework of controls exercised by the Oba—tribute, assistance in war, facilities for Edo traders—they enjoyed internal autonomy. Many western Ibo groups developed into small centralized states in which Benin-type institutions, copied with varying degrees of similitude, were superimposed on and accommodated to local social forms. Most of their chiefs (obi) accepted the Oba’s suzerainty, but others, some of them founded by dissident groups from Benin itself, lay beyond his control.”
[8]
“The last three centuries of Benin’s independence saw a gradual shrinking of the area from which its government could enforce delivery of tribute and military service and secure safe passage for Benin traders, though this decline was by no means uninterrupted. During the eighteenth century there were many campaigns aimed at maintaining control over the western Ibo area. In Osemwende’s reign, in the early nineteenth century, control over the Ekiti Yoruba to the north was reconsolidated. Throughout the nineteenth century this latter area was the most important, though not the only, hinterland for Benin traders.”
[9]
“Benin warriors played some part in the Ekiti wars, but on a freelance basis; they took advantage of the confused situation to raid for slaves and loot. They sent gifts to the Oba, for they were dependent on the Benin route for their supplies. In return he occasionally dispatched reinforcements to help them, but his control over them was minimal. In the 1880s the official Benin army, under the Ezɔmɔ, was occupied subduing rebellious villages on the very north-west borders of the kingdom itself, no more than fifty miles from the capital.”
[10]
“Their territories consisted only of the villages or hamlets in which they lived with, in some cases, one or more villages farther afield; but in the internal affairs of these territories the Oba ought not to interfere. Their inhabitants were subjects of the Uzama rather than of the Oba. Freemen of Uzebu, for example, were eviɛn-Ezɔmɔ rather than eviɛn-Ɔba.”
[11]
“Thus, it becomes necessary to differentiate between the "state" of Benin and Benin proper.’ For the state, in fact, consisted of many "independent communities" which "were seldom at peace," which enjoyed "very full powers of local government," and which "were left pretty much alone to work out their own destinies". [I9] The peoples of the territory between Bonny and Lagos constituted a "state," only insofar as their tribute and services were rendered to the Oba of Benin.”
[12]
“But, since the "state" of Benin was thoroughly decentralized, it existed only insofar as outlying provinces paid their due tribute to the Oba. The fluid situation in which the Benin "state" existed defies precise definition of the extent of that state”.
[13]
[1]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 406–407. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [2]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 408. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [3]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 414. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [4]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 412. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [5]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 3. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [6]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 402. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [7]: Sargent, R. A. (1986). From A Redistribution to an Imperial Social Formation: Benin c.1293-1536. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 20(3), 402–427: 421–422. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AUEZSTBR/collection [8]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 5. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [9]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 4. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [10]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 7. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [11]: Bradbury, R. E. (1967). The Kingdom of Benin. In West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Repr, pp. 1–35). Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press: 15. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z8DJIKP8/collection [12]: Graham, J. D. (1965). The Slave Trade, Depopulation and Human Sacrifice in Benin History: The General Approach. Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 5(18), 317–334: 320. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/4AS9CVZH/collection [13]: Graham, J. D. (1965). The Slave Trade, Depopulation and Human Sacrifice in Benin History: The General Approach. Cahiers d’Études Africaines, 5(18), 317–334: 331. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/4AS9CVZH/collection |
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“The list of the State offices among the Jukun Wapa of Wukari seemed inexhaustible. It is a clear indication that it was an elaborate political system that gave detail to virtually all aspect of political organization. With respect to the political system of the other Jukun chieftaincies, it was obvious that they were strikingly similar to that of Wukari but without the latter’s titles. Each had its chief surrounded by counselors comprising elders and religious dignitaries under an official equivalent to the Abo of Wukari. It was in this regard that C.K Meek concluded that the various Jukun groups were organized under a loosely knit confederacy composed of a number of semi-independent chiefdoms, the heads of which recognized the supremacy of the king of Kwararafa and later of Wukari.”
[1]
“The identification of Jukun, Apa, Kwana and Kwararafa goes back to at least the mid-nineteenth century, but modern Jukun have no memory of Kwararafa or a supposedly martial past, and Kwararafa invasions ended mysteriously in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth, the Jukun lived, not in a unified kingdom, but in a number of small communities in the Benue valley. It is possible that Kwararafa was a generic name for non-Muslim peoples from Dar al-Harb, the Land of Unbelief. It may well have been a multi-ethnic federation, which acted together for specific purposes and then disbanded.”
[2]
“C.K. Meek suggested that the of political organization of the Jukun people of Wukari Division might be described as a theocracy, based on the conception that the king was the representative of the gods and the divinely appointed intermediary between them and the people. ‘It follows, therefore, that the Jukun system of government is in theory at least, of a highly despotic character. The king is supreme. His decisions have a divine authority and there is then no appeal. Before the advent of British Government, he had the power of life and death. As head of a spiritual principality, which included a number of nominally independent chiefdoms, he could order the deposition or execution of chiefs who disobeyed his behest.’ The Aku-Uka of Wukari, who is the supreme ruler of the Jukun people, exercised political cum religious influence on other Jukun communities, yet these Jukun communities maintained certain degrees of their uniqueness. In this sense, one could liken the political system that existed among the Jukun before the advent of Colonial rule to a confederal system.”
[3]
“Ministers were unable to make their offices hereditary; the only strictly hereditary offices in the Jukun constitution were cere- monial and priestly ones with minimal secular powers. Although some of the ministers were territorial chiefs economically independent of the king, their ad- ministrative ’ fiefs ’ were attached to their offices, so they were unable to claim lasting ties of personal allegiance from outlying parts of the state.”
[4]
[1]: Zhema, S. (2017). A History of the Social and Political Organization of the Jukun of Wukari Division, c.1596–1960 [Benue State University]: 128. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/U667CC36/collection [2]: Isichei, E. (1997). A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge University Press: 235. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/Z4GK27CI/collection [3]: Zhema, S. (2017). A History of the Social and Political Organization of the Jukun of Wukari Division, c.1596–1960 [Benue State University]: 122. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/U667CC36/collection [4]: Young, M. W. (1966). The Divine Kingship of the Jukun: A Re-Evaluation of Some Theories. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 36(2), 135–153: 141. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/NTI9GQMF/collection |
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“The empire’s territories included the Wolof provinces of Jolof, Waalo, Kajoor, and Bawol and the Sereer provinces of Siin and Saalum, all of which later became independent kingdoms.”
[1]
[1]: (Aderinto 2017, 281) Aderinto, Saheed. 2017. African Kingdoms: An Encyclopedia of Empires and Civilizations. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/4E8Q8Z29/collection |
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"Most African kingdoms have ill-defined frontiers, a wide borderland where the king’s commands may or may not be obeyed, but Buganda, as has been well said, had ’sharp edges; one was either in it or outside it’. Royal power was exercised close to the border not much less effectively than within a mile of the palace. Beyond the border there was a wide domain of influence and depredation but not government. Kings Kamaanya, Ssuuna and Muteesa launched regular raids into these areas, interfered in succession disputes so as to secure pliant rulers, sometimes exacted tribute, but did not incorporate them into their own system."
[1]
[1]: (Wrigley 2002: 66) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/DNKVW9WZ/collection. |
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The following quote suggests a high level of centralisation. "In these chiefdoms, and especially in Karagwe, the pastoralists, known as Hima, held a distinct social predominance which may have resulted from their ability to make cultivators their clients by loaning cattle. Yet the kings attempted to exert an independent authority over both classes of men, prohibiting blood feuds between clans, appointing royal relatives as sub-chiefs and village headmen occupying nyarubanja estates, waginga long and largely successful struggle to control the mediums of the kubandwa cult which dominated local religion, and organising elaborate courts at which each clan performed a specialised function. In Karagwe, unlike Ufipa, villagers did not even elect their headmen or allocate land. It was Tanganyika’s most stratified and authoritarian society, and its cultivators’ misery struck several early visitors."
[1]
[1]: (Iliffe 1979: 24-25) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/SB2AJMVC/collection. |
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"During Ndori’s reign a large part of the realm was divided into small chiefdoms headed by allies who were not ritualists but who had still welcomed him into the country. All these chiefs were probably linked to the king by an ubuhake contract since such a contract would have reified their submission to and alliance with him. In accordance with the ubuhake contract, they would then have sent tribute in food, objects, or cattle to the court according to its needs. The local chiefs (abatware) could not be deposed, kept their own intore, and governed their lands without any interference by the court. They waged private wars and vendetta without any restriction at all. [...] The main ritualists also still held territories that were totally free. [...] All these ritualist lands were exempt from royal authority in return for the ritual obligations owed by their chiefs."
[1]
"The curtain rises around 1720 and reveals the following scene: Gisanura is king, but the great chiefs Mpaka in Nduga and Mayaga, Mpumba at Gishubi in Ndiza, Kogota in Rukoma from Kamonyi to Ruhanga, Kazakanyabuseri in Marangara around Kabgayi, and Rugabyi, son of Bwakiya, in the Burembo of Ndiza are all independent. Those are all the chiefs south of the middle Nyabarongo save for Busanza in the far south. But Gisanura succeeds in convincing them to recognize him as overlord, allowing them to remain lords in their lands. [...] But starting with Gisanura the kings and their courts attempted to obtain a stronger hold over their subjects and succeeded in this endeavor. It was an enterprise of long duration, which was grounded in part in the strength of the royal armies, but consisted mainly in the seizure of those great herds that constituted the wealth and power of the lords. [...] At the outset of the century, five great territorial lords controlled southern central Rwanda. At its conclusion, none remained. Barring only the domains of the Tsobe ritualists, all great territorial masses had disappeared. During the century, a genuine centralization had occurred, resulting from the institutions of the royal ubuhake and the armies, which had become multiple and permanent. This centralization benefited the whole court, the elites as much as the king. The descendants of those great lords of yore were co-opted by a system that promised them more wealth and more influence than they could ever have acquired by themselves. And, finally, let us not forget that the modest dimensions of the country, no part of which was more than a three days’ walk at most from central Rukoma, made such a centralization feasible."
[2]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 64) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 68, 95) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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"During Ndori’s reign a large part of the realm was divided into small chiefdoms headed by allies who were not ritualists but who had still welcomed him into the country. All these chiefs were probably linked to the king by an ubuhake contract since such a contract would have reified their submission to and alliance with him. In accordance with the ubuhake contract, they would then have sent tribute in food, objects, or cattle to the court according to its needs. The local chiefs (abatware) could not be deposed, kept their own intore, and governed their lands without any interference by the court. They waged private wars and vendetta without any restriction at all. [...] The main ritualists also still held territories that were totally free. [...] All these ritualist lands were exempt from royal authority in return for the ritual obligations owed by their chiefs."
[1]
"The curtain rises around 1720 and reveals the following scene: Gisanura is king, but the great chiefs Mpaka in Nduga and Mayaga, Mpumba at Gishubi in Ndiza, Kogota in Rukoma from Kamonyi to Ruhanga, Kazakanyabuseri in Marangara around Kabgayi, and Rugabyi, son of Bwakiya, in the Burembo of Ndiza are all independent. Those are all the chiefs south of the middle Nyabarongo save for Busanza in the far south. But Gisanura succeeds in convincing them to recognize him as overlord, allowing them to remain lords in their lands. [...] But starting with Gisanura the kings and their courts attempted to obtain a stronger hold over their subjects and succeeded in this endeavor. It was an enterprise of long duration, which was grounded in part in the strength of the royal armies, but consisted mainly in the seizure of those great herds that constituted the wealth and power of the lords. [...] At the outset of the century, five great territorial lords controlled southern central Rwanda. At its conclusion, none remained. Barring only the domains of the Tsobe ritualists, all great territorial masses had disappeared. During the century, a genuine centralization had occurred, resulting from the institutions of the royal ubuhake and the armies, which had become multiple and permanent. This centralization benefited the whole court, the elites as much as the king. The descendants of those great lords of yore were co-opted by a system that promised them more wealth and more influence than they could ever have acquired by themselves. And, finally, let us not forget that the modest dimensions of the country, no part of which was more than a three days’ walk at most from central Rukoma, made such a centralization feasible."
[2]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 64) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 68, 95) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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"During Ndori’s reign a large part of the realm was divided into small chiefdoms headed by allies who were not ritualists but who had still welcomed him into the country. All these chiefs were probably linked to the king by an ubuhake contract since such a contract would have reified their submission to and alliance with him. In accordance with the ubuhake contract, they would then have sent tribute in food, objects, or cattle to the court according to its needs. The local chiefs (abatware) could not be deposed, kept their own intore, and governed their lands without any interference by the court. They waged private wars and vendetta without any restriction at all. [...] The main ritualists also still held territories that were totally free. [...] All these ritualist lands were exempt from royal authority in return for the ritual obligations owed by their chiefs."
[1]
"The curtain rises around 1720 and reveals the following scene: Gisanura is king, but the great chiefs Mpaka in Nduga and Mayaga, Mpumba at Gishubi in Ndiza, Kogota in Rukoma from Kamonyi to Ruhanga, Kazakanyabuseri in Marangara around Kabgayi, and Rugabyi, son of Bwakiya, in the Burembo of Ndiza are all independent. Those are all the chiefs south of the middle Nyabarongo save for Busanza in the far south. But Gisanura succeeds in convincing them to recognize him as overlord, allowing them to remain lords in their lands. [...] But starting with Gisanura the kings and their courts attempted to obtain a stronger hold over their subjects and succeeded in this endeavor. It was an enterprise of long duration, which was grounded in part in the strength of the royal armies, but consisted mainly in the seizure of those great herds that constituted the wealth and power of the lords. [...] At the outset of the century, five great territorial lords controlled southern central Rwanda. At its conclusion, none remained. Barring only the domains of the Tsobe ritualists, all great territorial masses had disappeared. During the century, a genuine centralization had occurred, resulting from the institutions of the royal ubuhake and the armies, which had become multiple and permanent. This centralization benefited the whole court, the elites as much as the king. The descendants of those great lords of yore were co-opted by a system that promised them more wealth and more influence than they could ever have acquired by themselves. And, finally, let us not forget that the modest dimensions of the country, no part of which was more than a three days’ walk at most from central Rukoma, made such a centralization feasible."
[2]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 64) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 68, 95) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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"During Ndori’s reign a large part of the realm was divided into small chiefdoms headed by allies who were not ritualists but who had still welcomed him into the country. All these chiefs were probably linked to the king by an ubuhake contract since such a contract would have reified their submission to and alliance with him. In accordance with the ubuhake contract, they would then have sent tribute in food, objects, or cattle to the court according to its needs. The local chiefs (abatware) could not be deposed, kept their own intore, and governed their lands without any interference by the court. They waged private wars and vendetta without any restriction at all. [...] The main ritualists also still held territories that were totally free. [...] All these ritualist lands were exempt from royal authority in return for the ritual obligations owed by their chiefs."
[1]
"The curtain rises around 1720 and reveals the following scene: Gisanura is king, but the great chiefs Mpaka in Nduga and Mayaga, Mpumba at Gishubi in Ndiza, Kogota in Rukoma from Kamonyi to Ruhanga, Kazakanyabuseri in Marangara around Kabgayi, and Rugabyi, son of Bwakiya, in the Burembo of Ndiza are all independent. Those are all the chiefs south of the middle Nyabarongo save for Busanza in the far south. But Gisanura succeeds in convincing them to recognize him as overlord, allowing them to remain lords in their lands. [...] But starting with Gisanura the kings and their courts attempted to obtain a stronger hold over their subjects and succeeded in this endeavor. It was an enterprise of long duration, which was grounded in part in the strength of the royal armies, but consisted mainly in the seizure of those great herds that constituted the wealth and power of the lords. [...] At the outset of the century, five great territorial lords controlled southern central Rwanda. At its conclusion, none remained. Barring only the domains of the Tsobe ritualists, all great territorial masses had disappeared. During the century, a genuine centralization had occurred, resulting from the institutions of the royal ubuhake and the armies, which had become multiple and permanent. This centralization benefited the whole court, the elites as much as the king. The descendants of those great lords of yore were co-opted by a system that promised them more wealth and more influence than they could ever have acquired by themselves. And, finally, let us not forget that the modest dimensions of the country, no part of which was more than a three days’ walk at most from central Rukoma, made such a centralization feasible."
[2]
[1]: (Vansina 2004: 64) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 68, 95) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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"Indeed, considering what is recorded it seems fairly certain that following Nkuba’s consolidation of personal power over the Hima clans until the eventful reign of Ntare IV (1699-1727/26), the absence of historical information stems from the fact that few people in Ankole then or since would recognize the society of the first ten generations as either an historical or political unit much less as a state. Nkuba and his successors emerge dimly from the spare record as what Ruhinda himself was — a wandering herdsman and warrior. The Mugabe (king) of later years was at this stage merely the leading member of the central clan of a cluster of pastoral clans — the giver of gifts of cattle as his title literally implies rather than the monarch or ruler (Mukama) of a sovereign state."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 136) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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"Though Ntare Rugamba is said to have doubled the area of the country, the administrative legacy of Ntare’s rule was at least as important history to Burundi political history as were his military exploits. With such rapid expansion, Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four- tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). (See Figure 8.) From this pattern, three types of political relations emerged. Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi. [...] In the northwest, by contrast, pretenders to royal power had more tenuous claims to Ganwa identity; they drew on local traditions of resistance and benefited from the resources of the Lake Tanganyika trade network (as well as support from other states such as the Shi kingdoms west of Lake Kivu)."
[1]
[1]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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"Karagwe, Nkore, and Buhaya formed small neighboring states to the major kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda in the Great Lakes region. Karagwe and Nkore were individual polities, while Buhaya refers to an area along the western side of Lake Victoria in which seven small states were recognized: Kiamutwara, Kiziba, Ihangiro, Kihanja, Bugabo, Maruku, and Missenye."
[1]
[1]: (Shillington 2005: 591) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/AWA9ZT5B/collection. |
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"Unlike the Spanish and the French, the British never attempted to rule colonies directly from the metropole ... At the core of Imperial administration .... a series of essentially bilateral relationships which entailed constant negotiation rather than the imposition of rule and the acceptance of subjection."
[1]
"Rather than constituting one empire, this conglomeration of large land masses and territorial fragments comprised several empires ... as a political entity it was loosely held together". [1] Imperial agents in the colonies "exercised considerable latitude of authority and were notoriously difficult to control ... Far from being subordinates, many masterful individuals had their own agendas and ambitions; often they acted independently, disregarding directives or exceeding instructions with cavalier exuberance and frequently with impunity." [1] [1]: (Burroughs 1999) Peter Burroughs. Imperial institutions and the Government of Empire. Andrew Porter. ed. 1999. The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century. Oxford University Press. Oxford. |
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The central government exerted some control over military matters and international relations, but regional rulers enjoyed significant autonomy in governing their territories. This period saw the Carolingian empire’s gradual fragmentation, where loyalty to the central authority was often nominal, and regional rulers held the real power in their lands.
[1]
[1]: Carlrichard Brühl et al., Die Geburt zweier Völker: Deutsche und Franzosen (9. - 11. Jahrhundert) (Köln Weimar Wien: Böhlau, 2001). Zotero link: JNUIX7CZ |
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East Francia moved towards a more "confederated state", particularly during the reign of Arnulf of Carinthia. While regional dukes and nobles still held considerable power, there was a concerted effort by the central authority to assert greater control over the realm. This period saw the establishment of more hereditary rule and the beginnings of the feudal system, where the central authority recognized the hereditary rights of regional lords in exchange for military and political support. The central government had some influence over regional taxation and governance, but regions enjoyed a high degree of autonomy.
[1]
[1]: Carlrichard Brühl et al., Die Geburt zweier Völker: Deutsche und Franzosen (9. - 11. Jahrhundert) (Köln Weimar Wien: Böhlau, 2001). Zotero link: JNUIX7CZ |
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The Electorate of Brandenburg’s degree of centralization saw gradual increases during this period, particularly as the Hohenzollerns worked to consolidate their control over the territory and diminish the power of the local nobility, known as the Junkers.
Initially, the Hohenzollerns faced a fragmented state with significant autonomy held by local nobles. Frederick I, the first Hohenzollern Elector of Brandenburg, and his successors worked to centralize authority but were often constrained by the power of the estates. Albert Achilles’s establishment of the Dispositio Achillea in 1473, which ensured that Brandenburg would remain united under a single ruler, was a crucial step towards centralization. Joachim II introduced the Lutheran Reformation to Brandenburg in 1539, which, alongside centralizing religious authority, also allowed for the consolidation of secular power as church properties were secularized and brought under Elector control. After 1656 the outright bypassing of the Estate rule and the establishment of new governance structures by the territorial lord mark a definitive move towards a ’unitary state’. [1] [1]: Johannes Schultze, Die Mark Brandenburg, 2e ed. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989). Zotero link: TBJ2MH6T |
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Maximilian I, through various reforms, rehabilitated the country financially and made it economically productive. By eliminating the Landstände’s rights of participation, he became the actual founder of absolutist rule in Bavaria.
[1]
[1]: Biographie, “Maximilian I. - Deutsche Biographie. Zotero link: J73E62FS |
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After the death of Bolesław III Wrymouth in 1138, the Kingdom of Poland entered a period of feudal fragmentation that lasted for nearly two centuries.
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[1]: Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland: In Two Volumes, Rev. ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Zotero link: LUJ3NYJU |
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With the coronation of Władysław I as king in 1320 and the subsequent reign of Casimir III the Great, Poland once again moved toward the structure of a unitary state. Casimir III’s made extensive reforms and centralization efforts, including legal and administrative reforms.
[1]
[1]: Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland: In Two Volumes, Rev. ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Zotero link: LUJ3NYJU |
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The issuance of the Golden Bull by Andrew II marked a significant shift towards a "confederated state" , explicitly limiting the power of the monarchy in favor of greater rights and autonomy for the nobility.
[1]
[1]: Pál Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526 (London ; New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2005). Zotero link: 9BBKM3AR |
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The formation of the Hungarian state under the leadership of Árpád and his successors involved the unification of various Magyar tribes and the establishment of a Christian monarchy under Stephen I. The governance structure was still evolving, with significant autonomy retained by tribal leaders and the early nobility.
[1]
[1]: Pál Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526 (London ; New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2005). Zotero link: 9BBKM3AR |
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