| # | Polity | Coded Value | Tags | Year(s) | Edit | Desc |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
absent
Naqada I-IIB Naqada IIC-III disputed_present_absent Trade and recording Probably the earliest evidence of bureaucratic processes can be observed in relation to trade and recording, and controlling of access to some goods which was standing behind that trade. Presumably it was not so much a full-bureaucracy but a set of obligations for a certain group of people. From the Naqada IIC and Naqada IID existence of an administrative apparatus is well represented in the works of Andelkovic (2004) and Hendrickx (2002). [1] [2] However there is currently are only indirect sources of evidence. We can name “artifacts of administration” [1] such as cylinder and stamp seals, seal impressions, labels, etc. Altogether, those artifacts and architecture indicate the beginning of bureaucracy apparatus on the quite developed if not centralized level. Not all scientists, however, agree that existence of full-time, centralized bureaucracy is without any doubt. They rather talk about a “simple form of administration.” [3] . [1]: Andelković, B. 2004. "Paramets of Statehood in Predynastic Egypt". [in:] Hendrickx,S., Adams B. et al. [ed.]. Egypt at Its Origins: Studies in Memory of Barbara Adams : Proceedings of the International Conference "Origin of the State, Predynastic and Early Dynastic Egypt," Krakow, 28 August - 1st September 2002. Leuven:Peters Publishers. pg: 1048. [2]: Honoré, E. 2007. "Earliest Cylinder-Seal Glyptic in Egypt: From Greater Mesopotamia to Naqada". paper from The International Conference in Naqada and Qus region’s heritage. Naqada. pg: 39,43. [3]: Wengrow, D. 2006. The Archaeology of Early Egypt. Social Transformation of North-East Africa, 10,000 to 2650 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pg:264. |
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absent
Naqada I-IIB Naqada IIC-III disputed_present_absent Trade and recording Probably the earliest evidence of bureaucratic processes can be observed in relation to trade and recording, and controlling of access to some goods which was standing behind that trade. Presumably it was not so much a full-bureaucracy but a set of obligations for a certain group of people. From the Naqada IIC and Naqada IID existence of an administrative apparatus is well represented in the works of Andelkovic (2004) and Hendrickx (2002). [1] [2] However there is currently are only indirect sources of evidence. We can name “artifacts of administration” [1] such as cylinder and stamp seals, seal impressions, labels, etc. Altogether, those artifacts and architecture indicate the beginning of bureaucracy apparatus on the quite developed if not centralized level. Not all scientists, however, agree that existence of full-time, centralized bureaucracy is without any doubt. They rather talk about a “simple form of administration.” [3] . [1]: Andelković, B. 2004. "Paramets of Statehood in Predynastic Egypt". [in:] Hendrickx,S., Adams B. et al. [ed.]. Egypt at Its Origins: Studies in Memory of Barbara Adams : Proceedings of the International Conference "Origin of the State, Predynastic and Early Dynastic Egypt," Krakow, 28 August - 1st September 2002. Leuven:Peters Publishers. pg: 1048. [2]: Honoré, E. 2007. "Earliest Cylinder-Seal Glyptic in Egypt: From Greater Mesopotamia to Naqada". paper from The International Conference in Naqada and Qus region’s heritage. Naqada. pg: 39,43. [3]: Wengrow, D. 2006. The Archaeology of Early Egypt. Social Transformation of North-East Africa, 10,000 to 2650 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pg:264. |
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absent
Naqada I-IIB Naqada IIC-III disputed_present_absent Trade and recording Probably the earliest evidence of bureaucratic processes can be observed in relation to trade and recording, and controlling of access to some goods which was standing behind that trade. Presumably it was not so much a full-bureaucracy but a set of obligations for a certain group of people. From the Naqada IIC and Naqada IID existence of an administrative apparatus is well represented in the works of Andelkovic (2004) and Hendrickx (2002). [1] [2] However there is currently are only indirect sources of evidence. We can name “artifacts of administration” [1] such as cylinder and stamp seals, seal impressions, labels, etc. Altogether, those artifacts and architecture indicate the beginning of bureaucracy apparatus on the quite developed if not centralized level. Not all scientists, however, agree that existence of full-time, centralized bureaucracy is without any doubt. They rather talk about a “simple form of administration.” [3] . [1]: Andelković, B. 2004. "Paramets of Statehood in Predynastic Egypt". [in:] Hendrickx,S., Adams B. et al. [ed.]. Egypt at Its Origins: Studies in Memory of Barbara Adams : Proceedings of the International Conference "Origin of the State, Predynastic and Early Dynastic Egypt," Krakow, 28 August - 1st September 2002. Leuven:Peters Publishers. pg: 1048. [2]: Honoré, E. 2007. "Earliest Cylinder-Seal Glyptic in Egypt: From Greater Mesopotamia to Naqada". paper from The International Conference in Naqada and Qus region’s heritage. Naqada. pg: 39,43. [3]: Wengrow, D. 2006. The Archaeology of Early Egypt. Social Transformation of North-East Africa, 10,000 to 2650 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pg:264. |
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Unclear.
Nizami suggests a rudimentary bureaucratic system before the conquest of Ghazna. “Government machinery in the earlier period was confined to the management of essential government functions, but when Ghazna came under Ghurid control, it was natural that the administrative institutions as developed by the Ghaznavids should be adopted. A certain number of features of the Seljuq administrative system were also taken over. […] The vizier was the head of the civil administration.” [1] Thomas suggests that nepotism was prevalent in higher administrative ranks, which perhaps suggests that it was present all the way down the ladder as well. Moreover, Thomas briefly refers to the lack of a robust, coherent centralized imperial administrative structure. “… in the center and west of the Ghurid empire, Ghiyath al-Din continued the Ghurid tradition of assigning appanages, or provinces, to his relatives, who displayed varying degrees of loyalty and were prone to flee in the face of adversity. This lack of a robust, coherent centralized imperial administrative structure contributed to the demise of the dynasty and its empire.” [2] At the same time, Husseini points to the existence of bureaucratic officials, though much key information about them appears to be unknown, including whether they received a state salary, which would help us determine whether or not they were professional, and therefore may have received some sort of official training. Equally, however, Husseini does suggest that the role of muqaddam may have been assigned to people for their knowledge of a region rather than through nepotism. “Persian documents from Ghur offer new information on the administrative role of the Ghurid Muqaddam. In all the relevant documents, the term Muqaddam is specifically associated with the village (qarya). The Muqaddam was an influential person within his village, had good knowledge of his region, and was recognized as the village headmen by the administration in Ghur. In KMS 36, the Muqaddams of a place called Bandalizh are mentioned alongside the notables (Khwajagān), suggesting that the Muqaddams were important figures in their villages. In some documents they are praised with a specific formula, dāma ʿizzahum (“may their glory continue!”). Possibly, their knowledge about the village and their social position as local notables paved the way for them to be the Muqaddam. “Whether the Muqaddam was appointed by the state is not clear from the KMS documents. However, the Muqaddam is mentioned in documents issued by the fiscal department suggesting that he worked for the state. Whether the Muqaddam received a state salary or was entitled to a portion of the yield is also not mentioned. It is also not known if the state share was taken after the harvest was collected and winnowed or before that. In any case, the Muqaddam was allowed to borrow grain from the government stores if he needed it. We know this because one of the KMS documents include a letter in which certain Muqaddams are ordered to return the grain that they borrowed. “The main responsibility of the Muqaddam was to collect ʿushr when it was ready and to check if his village paid the state share in full.33 In KMS 34, the Muqaddams of Bandalizh were asked to make sure that all ordinary (ʿām) and elite (khās)̣ people paid the taxes.34 The collection of ʿushr was done in the presence of the state’s agent, the Muʿtamid. The Muqaddam had no right to collect the state share without the Muʿtamid’s presence and without his direct supervision.” [3] [1]: (Nizami 1999, 194) K A Nizami. The Ghurids. M S Asimov. C E Bosworth. eds. 1999. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part One. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. Delhi. [2]: Thomas, David C. 2016. Ghurid Sultanate. In MacKenzie (ed) The Encyclopedia of Empires. John Wiley & Sons. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/EJJTSHCM/library [3]: (Husseini 2021, 98-99) Husseini, Said Reza. 2021. The Muqaddam Represented in the pre-Mongol Persian Documents from Ghur. Afghanistan 4(2): 91–113. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/ID6DBB75/library |
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The first of following excerpts summarise the early development of Ottoman bureaucracy. They seem to suggest that at this stage, elements of professional bureacracy were in place but it only properly emerged more than a century after the end of the Emirate period.
"The Ottoman bureaucracy is defined here as the men who were paid to manage the affairs of the government: specifically the members of the scribal service and financial officers (kalemiye), along with the ubiquitous secretaries who accompanied every bureau in the empire. […] It is not until the reign of Süleyman in the sixteenth century that the kalemiye and the government as a whole may properly be called a bureaucracy. As the Ottoman armies pushed west into Hungary and Austria and south and east to the Indian Ocean, the influx of new territories brought about increases in the bureaucracy’s size, influence and degrees of specialization and professionalization. So while the origins of the Ottoman bureaucracy lay in the patrimonial house of the sultan and while its general contours reflect this fact, the administration developed characteristics of an impersonal, predictable and rationalized organization as it expanded. This process of bureaucratization did not come about immediately or easily. It took time, and people continued to rely on patrimonial relations to advance in rank while adopting bureaucratic styles. The transition mostly took place during Süleyman’s reign, although, once established, bureaucracy continued to coexist with elements of patrimonialism for centuries. […] Looking at the core regions of the empire, we quickly get a sense of the bureaucratic features of Ottoman rule that had formed by the end of the sixteenth century. In these regions, administrators and judges were appointed from the capital on a rotating basis, rules of office were codified and passed down, training was formalized, career lines and hierarchies were present, and universalistic principles as well as an ‘ethos’ of office – being an Ottoman bureaucrat – were all in evidence. Elements of the system – which had roots in the traditions of Near Eastern and Islamic governance as well as Byzantine land practices – were already discernable in the fourteenth century when the house of Osman was still an Anatolian principality." [1] The first emirs issued charters and foundation documents, but these were probably written by members of the ulema, serving for the ruler´s chancery part-time. [2] Bayezit I (1389-1402 CE) attempted to break from the Turkish aristocracy by recruiting trained slaves to government positions. The aristocrats saw this as a challenge to their power. Murat I (1362-1389 CE) had previously attempted this with the army, Bayezit I took it further. [3] [1]: (Barkey 2016: ) Barkey, K. 2016. The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority. In Crooks and Parsons (ed) Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century pp. 102-126. Cambridge University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/JGQJ29PI/library [2]: Personal communication. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller. 2016. Institute for Medieval Research. Division of Byzantine Research. Austrian Academy of Sciences. [3]: (Shaw 1976) |
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Qara Otman 1398 CE "had at his command at least a rudimentary bureaucratic apparatus of the Iranian-Islamic type."
[1]
[1]: (Quiring-Zoche 2011) Quiring-Zoche, R. 2011. Aq Qoyunlu. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aq-qoyunlu-confederation |
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Qara Otman 1398 CE "had at his command at least a rudimentary bureaucratic apparatus of the Iranian-Islamic type."
[1]
[1]: (Quiring-Zoche 2011) Quiring-Zoche, R. 2011. Aq Qoyunlu. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/aq-qoyunlu-confederation |
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Early 17th Century (Time of Troubles): In the early 17th century, during the Time of Troubles, Russia’s administrative system was relatively less developed. The bureaucracy was not highly specialized, and many officials were members of the nobility who held multiple roles, including military duties.
Reforms in the 17th Century: Throughout the 17th century, especially under the reign of Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich (1645-1676), there were efforts to centralize and streamline the Russian government. This period saw an increase in the number of government departments (prikazy), indicating a move towards more specialized administrative roles. However, it’s important to note that many of these roles were still not entirely specialized, and the concept of a full-time, professional bureaucrat was still developing. Peter the Great’s Reforms: The most significant changes came with Peter the Great (1682-1725), who implemented widespread reforms across Russian society, including the government. He established a more modern, bureaucratic state with a clearer division of labor and the creation of new government bodies. Peter’s reforms marked the beginning of the true professionalization of the Russian bureaucracy, with officials dedicated solely to administrative tasks. [1] [1]: Pipes, Richard. Russia under the Old Regime. 2nd ed, Penguin Books, 1995. Zotero link: LEIXLKAP |
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“Moreover, between 1800 and 1802, a set of new regulations placed the marine registry and the bureaucrats who ran it under centralized military control, replacing local civilian administrators.”(Philips and Philips 2010: 200) Philips, William D. and Carla Rahn Philips. 2010. A Concise History of Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/ZT84ZFTP “Working from zero, and with the help of a new bureaucracy organized on the French pattern, Philip V’s government achieved a spectacular rise in tax income, derived almost entirely from national rather than overseas sources.”(Kamen 2003: 448) Kamen, Henry. 2003. Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763. New York: Harper Collins. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/YRK2VXUS
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“Expanding infrastructures and new public entitlements compelled the governments of Austria and Hungary to add layers of bureaucrats to fulfill new functions, and then more layers to monitor the effectiveness of the first layers. Competence in producing desired outcomes became critical to maintaining political legitimacy, in local town halls and in imperial ministries alike. Parliaments, crownland diets, and town halls now engaged in archival record- keeping on a scale as yet unknown, while enforcing a maze of legal standards for everything from workplace safety to public health to transportation to conditions of emigration. Bureaucracy begat more bureaucracy as popular expectations fueled the state’s expansion into the everyday lives of its citizens.”
[1]
“But the system of ‘double administration’ (Doppelverwaltung) that the Liberals sanctioned in 1861—each Crownland had a professional, state-appointed bureaucratic hierarchy in the persons and staffs of the District Captains (Bezirkshauptmänner) and the imperial governors (Statthalter or Landespräsidenten) juxtaposed to a politically appointed, regional bureaucracy headed by the elected Provincial Executive Committee of the diet— created a powerful space for the training of local political elites, and rich sources of local political patronage, new job creation, and regional political education uncontrolled by the Crown.”
[2]
[1]: (Judson 2016: 336) Judson, Pieter M. 2016. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Cambridge, USA; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/BN5TQZBW [2]: (Boyer 2022: 117) Boyer, John W. 2022. Austria, 1867–1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/CG3P4KKD |
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The Revolution of 1917 swept away the tsarist civil service. The Communist Party at first held that a strong administrative organization was bound to damage the revolution by dampening spontaneity and other revolutionary virtues. But it soon became clear that a regime dedicated to social engineering, economic planning, and world revolution needed trained administrators. The party fell back, albeit reluctantly, upon the expertise of the more reliable tsarist civil servants. It did, however, surround the new civil service with elaborate controls in an attempt to ensure that its members remained loyal to party directives.
As the Communist Party itself became bureaucratized and as the more enthusiastic revolutionary leaders were eliminated, special industrial academies were set up for party members who had shown administrative talent. With the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32) the status of civil servants was improved, and their conditions of service were made less rigid, even though the party never relaxed its tight system of control over all branches of the state apparatus. In 1935 the State Commission on the Civil Service was created and attached to the Commissariat of Finance with responsibility for ensuring general control of personnel practice. This commission laid down formal patterns of administrative structure, reformed existing bureaucratic practices, fixed levels of staffing, standardized systems of job classification, and eliminated unnecessary functions and staff. The inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance ensured that the commission’s general policies were carried out in the ministries. The commission itself remained under the close supervision of the Council of People’s Commissars to ensure that it complied with party directives, and the commission’s members were appointed directly by the council. [1] [1]: (Public Administration - Soviet Union, Bureaucracy, Planning | Britannica) Zotero link: FARM9XPB |
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’As there was no state, there were no professional state bureaucrats. The chieftains performed most of the duties later assumed by state bureaucrats. However, professional bureaucrats were used for the running of the church and of large manors.’
[1]
There were no formal state institutions in Commonwealth-Era Iceland: ’One of the peculiarities of early Iceland was the lack of formal state institutions. The legislature, extensive law code, and judicial system of local and higher courts left prosecution and the enforcement of settlements in the hands of individuals. From an early date, the country was divided into Quarters. Each quarter constituted a broad community with three assemblies (ÞINGS), with the exception of the Northern Quarter that had four, and a system of local courts. Once a year the General Assembly (ALÞINGI) met in the southwest of Iceland. Judicial cases that could not be resolved in local quarters were heard and the parliament (LÖGRÉTTA) convened. The parliament was the principal legislative institution and was responsible for the introduction and maintanence of law. It consisted of chieftains (GOÐAR) from the local quarters. After the conversion to Christianity, the two Icelandic bishops were each given a seat in the parliament. The institution of chieftaincy (GOÐORÐ) was the main locus of political leadership in the country. Originally there were 36 but this number was later expanded. Chieftaincies themselves were a form of property and could be alienated and even divided among multiple individuals. In some cases, individuals asserted power beyond the scope of the political system and controlled multiple chieftaincies. All independent farmers had to be affiliated with a chieftain, although they could choose among any of the chieftains in their quarter and could switch allegiances if they did not feel that their needs were being met. Other than a seat on the parliament, chieftains had few rights beyond those of other independent farmers and few institutional means of dominating others. Chieftains derived much of their authority from their ability to broker support as advocates for their constituents in legal disputes or feuds.’
[2]
Chieftains and assemblies fulfilled political leadership roles, but these institutions were not bureaucratic in nature: ’Following the establishment of the Althing in 930, executive power at the regional level was vested in the goðar, whose possession of goðorð and common participation in the judicial and legislative branches of the general assembly defined them as chieftains. However, the chieftains were not linked hierarchically. After A.D. 965 Iceland was divided into thirteen assembly districts, each with three chieftainships and a district assembly site. The assembly districts were in turn grouped into four quarters. While goðar were tethered to particular districts by law, the political office of chieftainship, the goðorð, did not imply control over a defined territorial unit. It was instead a shifting nexus of personal, negotiated alliances between a chieftain and those bœndur who became his supporters or pingmenn through public oaths of allegiance.’
[3]
There was no centralized institution for the purpose of law enforcement: ’Iceland had established systems of laws, assemblies, and judicial institutions to serve in resolving conflict but no centralized power to enforce order or verdicts. Everyone was legally required to belong to a farming household and individual farmers had authority over and responsibility for their households. Disputes, including injuries and killings, were settled through arbitration. The offending party paid compensation to the offended party. In more extreme cases the offending individual was outlawed, either for three years or permanently, and was official cast out of society and any right to compensation. Prosecution and collection of settlements was up to private individuals. Conflicts often overstepped institutional boundaries into blood feuds. Feuds could escalate well beyond the immediate individuals or households until the involved whole social networks. With the rise of chiefly power and territoriality in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries regional conflicts developed that eventually encompassed t he entire island. The decades of civil strife ended in 1262 A.D. when Iceland came under the authority of the Norwegian crown.’
[2]
We decided in the end not to include church and manor bureaucrats.
[1]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [2]: Bolender, Douglas James and Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for Early Icelanders [3]: Smith, Kevin P., and Jeffrey R. Parsons 1989. “Regional Archaeological Research In Iceland: Potentials And Possibilities”, 182 |
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"[T]he Gahadavalas either themselves evolved an elaborate taxation system or improved upon the existing practices. As far as the official records are concerned, we can say that they had a large number of revenue terms such as bhaga-bhoga-kara, hiranya, pravanikara, turuskadanda, jalak ara, gokara, visayadana, kumaragadyanaka, yamali-kambala, kutaka, valadi, vimsaticchavatha (vimsatyathu, visatiathuprastha), aksapataladaya (ak shapatalaprastha), pratiharaprastha, varavajjhe (varavajha), dasabandha, loha-lavanakara, parnakara, taradaya, svanaukabhataka, dagapasadidir gha-govica, vahyavahyamtarasiddhi, etc. No doubt, all these myriad terms if collected in word and deed would have accounted for a handsome royal share of revenue. Such a large number of taxes would have required a well-qualified class of officials involved in tax collection and maintenance of accounts and records. U.N. Ghoshal has credited the Gahadavala kings for having made remarkable changes in the prevailing revenue system."
[1]
[1]: (Kumar 2015: 30-31) Kumar, S. 2015. Rural Society and Rural Economy in the Ganga Valley during the Gahadavalas. Social Scientist , May–June 2015, Vol. 43, No. 5/6 (May–June 2015), pp. 29-45. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/PQEZNJ3T/library |
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"The significant aspect of Gupta bureaucracy was that, since it was less organized and elaborate than the Mauryan administration of the third century b.c. (seen in Kautilya’s Arthasastra),it allowed several offices to be combined in the hands of the same person and posts tended to become hereditary. In the absence of close supervision by the state, village affairs were now managed by leading local elements who conducted land transactions without consulting the government.
"Similarly in urban administration, organized professional bodies enjoyed considerable autonomy. The law-codes of the Gupta period, which provide detailed information about the functioning of the guilds, even entrusted these corporate bodies with an important share in the administration of justice. With the innumerable ja ̄tis (which were systematized and legalized during this period) governing a large part of the activities of their members, very little was left for central government. Finally, the Gupta kings had to take account of the brahman donees, who enjoyed absolute administrative privileges over the inhabitants of the donated villages. Thus in spite of the strength of the Gupta kings, institutional factors working for decentralization were far stronger during this period. This Gupta admini tration provided the model for the basic administrative structure, both in theory and in practice, throughout the early medieval period." [1] [1]: (Chakrabarti 1996: 199) Chakrabarti, K. 1996. The Gupta Kingdom. In History of civilizations of Central Asia, v. 3: The Crossroads of civilizations, A.D. 250 to 750 pp. 188-210. UNESCO. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/S8ZACV8X/library |
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State officials in Norman England, including sheriffs, earls, and knights, performed multiple functions:
Administrative duties: Tax collection, law enforcement, and land management. Military duties: Leading troops, organizing local defenses, and garrisoning castles. The lack of functional specialization meant these officials were not dedicated full-time administrative specialists. [Carpenter 2003] |
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East Francia’s governance was based on the feudal system, where administrative duties were carried out by regional lords, dukes, and counts, who combined these tasks with military and judicial responsibilities. [Riché 1993], [Reuter 1991]
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Uruk phase c3800-3000 BCE: "The ruling class had to work on an operational and ideological front, leading to the formation of a bureaucracy and a priesthood. Bureaucracy, managed by the scribes and hierarchically subdivided, took care of the economic administration of the city-state."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 79) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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Unclear.
Nizami suggests that the Ghurids may have inherited the Ghaznavids’ more complex bureaucracy after conquering their territories. “Government machinery in the earlier period was confined to the management of essential government functions, but when Ghazna came under Ghurid control, it was natural that the administrative institutions as developed by the Ghaznavids should be adopted. A certain number of features of the Seljuq administrative system were also taken over. […] The vizier was the head of the civil administration.” [1] [1]: (Nizami 1999, 194) K A Nizami. The Ghurids. M S Asimov. C E Bosworth. eds. 1999. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part One. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. Delhi. |
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Inferred as appointments to positions within the state made directly by the king, and were often people closely related to the King, suggesting bureaucracy was not a full-time position.
[1]
However, it is possible that lower-ranked administrators worked full-time.
[1]: Panhwar, M.H, An illustrated Historical Atlas of Soomra Kingdom of the Sindh p. 134 |
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"The advent of the Parthians did not mark a break in the cultural history of the Greek cities, which retained their constitutions and magistrates, their schools, language, and law, long after the decline of Seleucid power."
[1]
Documents from Susa and Dura Europus show "the governments of these places preserved the pattern of the Hellenistic city state." [2] An example of bureaucratic role in the Seleucid era is the position of dioiketes, or ‘the financial counterpart of the strategos/satrap in each satrapy and the oikonomoi of the hyparchs’. [3] [1]: (Neusner 2008, 10) Neusner, Jacob. 2008. A History of the Jews in Babylonia. 1. The Parthian Period. Wipf & Stock. Eugene. [2]: (Debevoise 1938, xli) Debevoise, Neilson C. 1938. A Political History of Parthia. University of Chicago Press Chicago. https://oi.uchicago.edu/sites/oi.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/shared/docs/political_history_parthia.pdf [3]: Aperghis, G. G. 2004. The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p280 |
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present for Greco-Bactrians in 200 BCE
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Authority was informal on the village and hamlet level: ’The Magpie Miao live in villages, occasionally compact but normally consisting of a cluster of separate hamlets. These are located on mountain slopes, usually far enough away from main transportation routes to be inaccessible and readily defensible. The Miao lack any political organization of their own, and are thoroughly integrated into the Chinese administrative system. The basic political, as well as economic and social unit, is the village. Villages are grouped into townships and divided into hamlets of about ten to twenty households each. The headmen of both the village and the hamlet are appointed by the chief of the township. The members of different villages or hamlets are bound principally by affinal ties. They may cooperate for the common good, but they lack any formal organization of an indigenous character. Disputes between members of the same hamlet are settled, if possible, within the hamlet. Those between members of different hamlets of the same village are adjudicated by a council composed of the village headman and the heads of the hamlets involved. If this council cannot effect a settlement, the litigants have a right to carry their dispute to the chief of the township or even to the Chinese court of the county.’
[1]
The Hmong population was subject to Chinese administrative integration even before the republican period: ’From Song on, in periods of relative peace, government control was exercised through the tusi system of indirect rule by appointed native headmen who collected taxes, organized corvée, and kept the peace. Miao filled this role in Hunan and eastern Guizhou, but farther west the rulers were often drawn from a hereditary Yi nobility, a system that lasted into the twentieth century. In Guizhou, some tusi claimed Han ancestry, but were probably drawn from the ranks of assimilated Bouyei, Dong, and Miao. Government documents refer to the "Sheng Miao" (raw Miao), meaning those living in areas beyond government control and not paying taxes or labor service to the state. In the sixteenth century, in the more pacified areas, the implementation of the policy of gaitu guiliu began the replacement of native rulers with regular civilian and military officials, a few of whom were drawn from assimilated minority families. Land became a commodity, creating both landlords and some freeholding peasants in the areas affected. In the Yunnan-Guizhou border area, the tusi system continued and Miao purchase of land and participation in local markets was restricted by law until the Republican period (1911-1949).’
[2]
’Throughout the Republican period, the government favored a policy of assimilation for the Miao and strongly discouraged expressions of ethnicity. Southwestern China came under Communist government control by 1951, and Miao participated in land reform, collectivization, and the various national political campaigns.’
[2]
The Chinese administration established a bureaucratic infrastructure in the towns: ’Like Kweiyang, the hsien city of Lung-li was in an open plain, but a narrow one. The space between the mountains was sufficient for a walled town of one long street between the east and west gates and one or two on either side. There were fields outside the city walls. Its normal population was between three and four thousand, augmented during the war by the coming of some “companies” for the installation and repair of charcoal burners in motor lorries and the distillation of grain alcohol for fuel, an Army officers’ training school, and the engineers’ corps of the railway being built through the town from Kwangsi to Kweiyang. To it the people of the surrounding countryside, including at least three groups of Miao and the Chung-chia, went to market. It was also the seat of the hsien government and contained a middle school, postal and telegraph offices, and a cooperative bank, with all of which the non-Chinese, as well as the Chinese, had some dealings. A few of the more well-to-do families sent one of their boys to the middle school. Cases which could not be settled in the village or by the lien pao official, who was also a Chinese, were of necessity brought to the hsien court, as well as cases which involved both Miao and Chinese.’
[3]
The administration relied on clerics and other professionals, as evidenced in primary sources: ’Article 9. The secretary of the Bureau will receive his orders from the chief of the Bureau, and will attend to such matters as the writing of official despatches of the Bureau, the keeping of the archives, and directing the copying of documents. Article 10. The clerks will receive orders from the chief of the Bureau, and, under the direction of the department head, will assist in carrying out the various duties of the department. Article 11. The copyists will receive their orders from the chief of the Bureau and the departmental heads, and, under the direction of department members and the secretary, shall be responsible for copying despatches and telegrams.’
[4]
The expanding Chinese state also relied on some quasi-feudal arrangements in the Hmong area until the 1920s: ’Opium was also an important feature of the economy until the 1920s: the Hua Miao grew it, but they had no control over its sale, and very few were attracted to its use. Most Hua Miao villages were tenant communities on lands held by Han or Hui, or more commonly in this area, by members of the elite strata of the Yi (also called Nosu or Black Yi). In the pacification of the region, large tracts of land were awarded to the Yi nobility by the expanding Chinese state. In return for the right to claim rentals and labor service, the Yi “native officials” (tu si) collected taxes for the state and generally maintained law and order within the boundaries of their estate holdings. This feudal system lasted until the 1920s. The Hua Miao met their obligations to these overlords by the forced growing of the opium poppy, payments in kind or in cash or a specified number of days of labor service (agricultural work, collecting of firewood, household service, transport work). However, as tenants they were free to move residence, to change landlords and to make their own marriage arrangements, rights that were not granted to the slave class within Yi society. Within the ethnic stratification of the area, the Hua Miao ranked below the Yi nobility and freeborn classes, and below the Hui and the Han, but their status was better than that of the Yi slaves-some of whom were Han who had been forced into slavery. Relations between the Hua Miao and their Yi overlords were tense but in general the Yi made no attempt to force the Hua Miao to assimilate to Yi cultural [Page 65] practices, and at times the Miao fled from the Han to the protection of the Yi.’
[5]
Given the participation of Hmong petty officials in the administrative structure, we have decided to code the variable ’present’. We have provisionally assumed this to be true of the A-Hmao as well, but this is open to re-evaluation (see military sections above).
[1]: Rui, Yifu 1960. “Magpie Miao Of Southern Szechuan”, 145 [2]: Diamond, Norma: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Miao [3]: Mickey, Margaret Portia 1947. “Cowrie Shell Miao Of Kweichow”, 40b [4]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 179 [5]: Diamond, Norma 1993. “Ethnicity And The State: The Hua Miao Of Southwest China”, 64 |
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Old Kingdom
Scribes [1] [2] . The assembly panku/tuliya. "Chief of the Scribes", a powerful figure [3] - a professional official. New Kingdom:The Hittite Empire was probably more developed than the Old Kingdom. [1]: Burney C. (2004) Historical Dictionary of the Hittites, Lanham: Scarecrow Press, pp. 242 [2]: Bryce T. (2002) Life and Society in the Hittite World. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 11 [3]: Bryce T. (2002) Life and Society in the Hittite World. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 67 |
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There is some evidence of administrative activities at Koktepe in this period, but not enough to demonstrate that full-time, specialist bureaucrats were present.
Maracanda was an administrative center. [1] -- "Reflecting the major social and political development of the region, this monumental architecture is evidence of a strong local state organization. The inner buildings of these courtyards are at present difficult to reconstruct. Although this question has still to be resolved, it would seem that the courtyards of Koktepe housed earlier religious and administrative institutions." [2] [1]: (Francfort 1982, 186) Francfort, Henri-Paul. The economy, society and culture of Central Asia in Achaemenid times. in Boardman, John. Hammond, N. G. L. Lewis, D. M. Ostwald, M. 1988. The Cambridge Ancient History. Second edition. Volume 10. Cambridge University Press. [2]: (Rapin 2007, 35) Rapin, Claude. "Nomads and the Shaping of Central Asia: from the Early Iron Age to the Kushan Period." in Cribb, Joe. Herrmann, Georgina. 2007. After Alexander: Central Asia before Islam. British Academy. |
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Full-time specialists. Shuar political authority was informal and decentralized: ’Each community is politically independent with its own headman. Each is also located four or more kilometers from their nearest neighboring community. The community is made up of patrilineally and affinally related individuals, traditionally consisting of from 80 to 300 people (30 to 40 people in the twentieth century), living in one house called a JIVARIA. For defensive purposes, this house is built on a steep hill usually at the upper end of a stream. The house itself is approximately 13 meters by 26 meters in size, elliptical in shape, and has a thatched roof. In times of war, two or more communities united to fight a common enemy, as was the case when the Spanish attempted to conquer them.’
[1]
’“From the statements I have previously made as to the distribution of the Jibaro tribes it appears that their social organization is loose. In fact, the whole people is split up into a great number of tribes which in their turn are sub-divided into smaller clans or septs comprising a few families closely related to one another by blood. These sub-tribes do not form village communities; each family inhabits its own big communal house (héa), but these are not situated close to one another, they lie scattered here and there in the virgin forest. Generally one has to march for one or several hours to arrive at the next house. Each Jibaro house forms in fact a separate and independent social, political, and economic unit with its own household, its own plantations in the vicinity of the house, and its own ruler or chief, the oldest family father who, at any rate in time of peace, is not controlled by anybody. It is much the same feature that we meet in other parts of tropical South America, where the impenetrable virgin forests necessarily lead to social disintegration, which is further increased by the general anti-social tendencies of the Indians. The state of things found among the Jibaros, however, is in many respects unique.’
[2]
Some more prominent leaders emerged as well: ’Four or five years ago there was a strong chief on the Upano River named Tuki, known to the Ecuadoreans as José Grande. In the manner previously described, all of the curakas from Macas on the Upano River to Mendez on the Paute River became subchiefs under him until he was generally recognized as the strongest of all of the Jivaro curakas. However, he was beginning to grow old by this time and some of his subcurakas were strong men in their own right. About 2 years ago, Ambusha, who had been gradually gaining in power and becoming famous for his head-hunting activities, split off with his own group, taking several curakas and their men with him. A little later Utita did the same thing. At the time of the writer’s visit (1931), although Tuki was recognized by the Government of Ecuador as being head chief of the Macas-Mendez region, actually he had lost all power excepting that over his own family group and was in reality no more than a capito. These divisions of the organization, if it may be termed such, took place apparently without any ill-feeling or formal announcements.’
[3]
The Shuar bartered with whites and other Amerindians: ’The commercial activities of the Jivaro are very restricted. In the early days of European contact hogs and chickens were raised for sale to those of European background. Salt, a rare commodity in the region, was gathered in clay pots from a few brackish springs in the area, allowed to evaporate, and the resulting hardened ball of salt used in exchange transactions with neighboring tribal groups. The Jivaro were famous for the shrinking of the human heads () of their enemies (actually only the skin). Passing out of Jivaro country through a series of exchanges, these heads eventually found their way into the hands of traders who brought them down the Amazon to Para where they were sold. Soon the traders had a burgeoning trade in these items, and the Jivaro were hard-put to keep up with the demand. The Indians were by no means particular as to whose head was used, and advance orders were taken and filled. Eventually this native "industry" was brought to a halt by the Ecuadorian and Peruvian governments although by the late twentieth century life-like replicas of the heads made from animal skins are still being sold commercially.’
[1]
There was no bureaucratic penetration of Shuar territory at the time: ’“Rising in the western foothills of the Cordillera Oriental the Rio Zamora flows through Loja, where it is joined by the Rio Malacatos. ( ) Ten miles farther north, in confluence with the Rio de las Juntas, it breaks through the Andes and enters the province of Oriente, the Amazon region of Ecuador, comprising a northwestern part of the basin of the great river. Vast in extent and largely unknown, unexplored and unmapped, this territory has always been a bone of contention among the republics of Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. But although the particular portion of it which I visited, on a reconnaissance of the Rio Zamora, was supposedly under the sovereignty of Ecuador, no evidence of administrative authority was to be found there, nor did the savages of the Jíbaro tribe who live there acknowledge allegiance to the government at Quito.”’
[4]
The same seems to be true for missionary attempts: ’Since all attempts to win back the lost territories by force of arms were unsuccessful, there was recourse to the cross in order to bend the Indians again under the yoke of slavery by this apparently gentle means. The missionaries were successful among some tribes, but the Jívaros turned away all intruders and have maintained their freedom up to our time. Only the small mission of Mácas, inhabited by the Quichua Indians, is located in their territory, and neither the secular clergy nor the Jesuit fathers, who have alternately tried their luck there, have been successful in making converts.’
[5]
[1]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [2]: Karsten, Rafael 1935. “Head-Hunters Of Western Amazonas: The Life And Culture Of The Jibaro Indians Of Eastern Ecuador And Peru”, 183p [3]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 40 [4]: Hermessen, J. L. 1917. “Journey On The Rio Zamora, Ecuador”, 435 [5]: Reiss, W. (Wilhelm) 1880. “Visit Among The Jivaro Indians”, 2 |
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Full-time specialists. Shuar political authority was informal and decentralized: ’Each community is politically independent with its own headman. Each is also located four or more kilometers from their nearest neighboring community. The community is made up of patrilineally and affinally related individuals, traditionally consisting of from 80 to 300 people (30 to 40 people in the twentieth century), living in one house called a JIVARIA. For defensive purposes, this house is built on a steep hill usually at the upper end of a stream. The house itself is approximately 13 meters by 26 meters in size, elliptical in shape, and has a thatched roof. In times of war, two or more communities united to fight a common enemy, as was the case when the Spanish attempted to conquer them.’
[1]
’“From the statements I have previously made as to the distribution of the Jibaro tribes it appears that their social organization is loose. In fact, the whole people is split up into a great number of tribes which in their turn are sub-divided into smaller clans or septs comprising a few families closely related to one another by blood. These sub-tribes do not form village communities; each family inhabits its own big communal house (héa), but these are not situated close to one another, they lie scattered here and there in the virgin forest. Generally one has to march for one or several hours to arrive at the next house. Each Jibaro house forms in fact a separate and independent social, political, and economic unit with its own household, its own plantations in the vicinity of the house, and its own ruler or chief, the oldest family father who, at any rate in time of peace, is not controlled by anybody. It is much the same feature that we meet in other parts of tropical South America, where the impenetrable virgin forests necessarily lead to social disintegration, which is further increased by the general anti-social tendencies of the Indians. The state of things found among the Jibaros, however, is in many respects unique.’
[2]
Some more prominent leaders emerged as well: ’Four or five years ago there was a strong chief on the Upano River named Tuki, known to the Ecuadoreans as José Grande. In the manner previously described, all of the curakas from Macas on the Upano River to Mendez on the Paute River became subchiefs under him until he was generally recognized as the strongest of all of the Jivaro curakas. However, he was beginning to grow old by this time and some of his subcurakas were strong men in their own right. About 2 years ago, Ambusha, who had been gradually gaining in power and becoming famous for his head-hunting activities, split off with his own group, taking several curakas and their men with him. A little later Utita did the same thing. At the time of the writer’s visit (1931), although Tuki was recognized by the Government of Ecuador as being head chief of the Macas-Mendez region, actually he had lost all power excepting that over his own family group and was in reality no more than a capito. These divisions of the organization, if it may be termed such, took place apparently without any ill-feeling or formal announcements.’
[3]
The Shuar bartered with whites and other Amerindians: ’The commercial activities of the Jivaro are very restricted. In the early days of European contact hogs and chickens were raised for sale to those of European background. Salt, a rare commodity in the region, was gathered in clay pots from a few brackish springs in the area, allowed to evaporate, and the resulting hardened ball of salt used in exchange transactions with neighboring tribal groups. The Jivaro were famous for the shrinking of the human heads () of their enemies (actually only the skin). Passing out of Jivaro country through a series of exchanges, these heads eventually found their way into the hands of traders who brought them down the Amazon to Para where they were sold. Soon the traders had a burgeoning trade in these items, and the Jivaro were hard-put to keep up with the demand. The Indians were by no means particular as to whose head was used, and advance orders were taken and filled. Eventually this native "industry" was brought to a halt by the Ecuadorian and Peruvian governments although by the late twentieth century life-like replicas of the heads made from animal skins are still being sold commercially.’
[1]
There was no bureaucratic penetration of Shuar territory at the time: ’“Rising in the western foothills of the Cordillera Oriental the Rio Zamora flows through Loja, where it is joined by the Rio Malacatos. ( ) Ten miles farther north, in confluence with the Rio de las Juntas, it breaks through the Andes and enters the province of Oriente, the Amazon region of Ecuador, comprising a northwestern part of the basin of the great river. Vast in extent and largely unknown, unexplored and unmapped, this territory has always been a bone of contention among the republics of Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. But although the particular portion of it which I visited, on a reconnaissance of the Rio Zamora, was supposedly under the sovereignty of Ecuador, no evidence of administrative authority was to be found there, nor did the savages of the Jíbaro tribe who live there acknowledge allegiance to the government at Quito.”’
[4]
The same seems to be true for missionary attempts: ’Since all attempts to win back the lost territories by force of arms were unsuccessful, there was recourse to the cross in order to bend the Indians again under the yoke of slavery by this apparently gentle means. The missionaries were successful among some tribes, but the Jívaros turned away all intruders and have maintained their freedom up to our time. Only the small mission of Mácas, inhabited by the Quichua Indians, is located in their territory, and neither the secular clergy nor the Jesuit fathers, who have alternately tried their luck there, have been successful in making converts.’
[5]
[1]: Beierle, John: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Jivaro [2]: Karsten, Rafael 1935. “Head-Hunters Of Western Amazonas: The Life And Culture Of The Jibaro Indians Of Eastern Ecuador And Peru”, 183p [3]: Stirling, Matthew Williams 1938. “Historical And Ethnographical Material On The Jivaro Indians”, 40 [4]: Hermessen, J. L. 1917. “Journey On The Rio Zamora, Ecuador”, 435 [5]: Reiss, W. (Wilhelm) 1880. “Visit Among The Jivaro Indians”, 2 |
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Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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levels. "We emphasise from the beginning that our historical knowledge of kings and the length of their reigns, and of the political structure and organisation of Kaabu remains very limited."
[1]
[1]: (Giesing and Vydrine 2007: 4, quoted in Green 2009: 92) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. |
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Code for Early Carolingian
The number of full time bureaucrats was however very small (maximum a 1000) and most of them were based at Aachen and a smaller number at the other levels of government. |
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Full-time specialists The Omanhene was chosen from royal lineages and assisted by multiple officials: ’The several Akan peoples each consist of a single kingdom ruled by a king, OMANHENE (lit. "state-chief"). The king comes from whatever clan provides the royal line in a particular kingdom, and is chosen in rotation from one of this clan’s kingly lineages (there are often other, non-kingly, lineages within a royal clan). He is elected by various officials, of which the most important is the OHEMMAA (or similar terms; lit. "woman-chief" and usually translated in the literature as "queen-mother") although she is typically not the actual mother but a senior woman of the clan, who "knows" genealogy and may have her own court and be assisted by various officials. Criteria for the selection of a king include assumed competence, general personality, and the fact that kingly lines usually rotate in providing the king. Once selected, the king is "enstooled"-that is, seated upon the stool of kingship. His former status is annulled symbolically, his debts and lawsuits are settled, his clothing and personal possessions st ored; he is then symbolically reborn and given the identity of one of his forebears. He assumes the royal name and title borne by that previous ruler. A king has his palace, in which work members of his court. Details vary considerably, but, in general, the royal officials comprise several categories: those from the royal clan itself; those representing the remainder of the people; and ritual officials, drummers, and others who were considered the "children" of the king, being recruited from many sources, including royal slaves, and often observing patrilineal descent. The king is a sacred person. He may not be observed eating or drinking and may not be heard to speak nor be spoken to publicly (speaking only through a spokesman or "linguist," OKYEAME). He is covered from the sky by a royal umbrella, avoids contact with the earth by wearing royal sandals, and wears insignia of gold and elaborate and beautiful cloth of royal design. In the past, an Akan king held power over the life and death of his subjects and slaves. These powers were eroded during colonial rule, but today an Akan king remains extremely powerful, representing his people both politically an d ritually and acting as a focus for the identity of his kingdom. By far the most powerful is the king of Ashanti, who has the largest of all the Akan kingdoms, the Asantehene at Kumasi.’
[1]
Councillors aided the Omanhene in judicial matters, but there was no formalized system of examination or merit promotion for them: ’But as a man attracts the favourable attention of the observant ones of his tribe, as he more and more impresses the people by his ability in their public gatherings, by the soundness of his opinion, by the depth of his knowledge of the customary laws and traditions, by his skill in public debate, by his keen interest in public affairs, by his bravery or warlike qualities, or by some other qualifications, he acquires public influence, and is accepted, in a greater or less degree, as a public man, representative of a portion of the community. Success in trade, or other personal attributes, are likewise qualifications for this post. The position of such a person is definitely confirmed when the head ruler with his council invites him to be a councillor. Attending an Omanhene or Ohene are always to be found some councillors, who assist him in hearing and determining lawsuits and administering justice. In the town of the [Page 11] Omanhene these men perform many of the duties of officers, who in European countries are known as ministers of state. It is worthy of note that, as a general rule, a Tufuhene is not a member of the Council (Begwa) of the Ohene or Omanhene.’
[2]
Much public authority was attached to stools: ’Before proceeding further, it is necessary to explain the origin of stools, whether family or public. Where the head of a family has more than one stool, he may give one to a member of the family on appointing him the Penin of a junior branch of the large family. The person so appointed thereby acquires possession of all the goods, chattels, and lands appurtenant to that stool. His own property becomes stool property, and is merged in whatever is given him. The children of the last stoolholder call him father, and the widows become his wives; each woman can, however, obtain her freedom on repayment of the Consawment money, that is, dowry. But a new stool is created in this wise: when the family of a man of wealth or influence on his death so will, they create a family stool which is named after the deceased. For this purpose the favourite chair of the deceased, generally a small one, which was in constant use by him, is cleaned, then rubbed all over with the blood of sheep, and finally smeared with a mixture of soot and eggs. The stool is afterwards wrapped in some skin and safely kept. During this consecration, libation is made and prayers are freely offered for the prosperity of the family, and that its members may, in time to come, attain greater influence and prominence. These stools are added to from time to time, but count is made of only the prominent ones. Too often the name of the original founder of the family is dropped for that of one of his successors of greater eminence. When an old stool is so decayed that it ought to be destroyed, it is burnt, and the ashes thereof are made into a paste with oil, blood, eggs, and other substances. The paste is then daubed on a new stool, which is [Page 13] consecrated as a family stool and named after the old one. When an old stool is lost a new one is specially made and consecrated.’
[3]
We follow Arhin Kwame’s characterization of this system as ’patrimonial’ rather than ’bureaucratic’ (see the Ashanti Period sheet).
[1]: Gilbert, Michelle, Lagacé, Robert O. and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Akan [2]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 10p [3]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. "Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asant, And Other Akan Tribes of West Africe Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration of Early English Voyages, And A Stody Of The Rise of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.", 12p |
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Full-time specialists The time period in question was characterized by a trend towards greater bureaucratization and functional specialization: ’State organisation became extremely complex in the Kumasi state because at the close of the 17th century it became the capital of the union of Asante states and, in the course of the following century, the seat of an empire which was roughly coterminous with the boundaries of modern Ghana and southeastern Ivory Coast (Wilks 1975: 374-86). The expansion of the state made necessary administrative reforms within Kumasi itself and for the maintenance of effective relations between the Asantehene, the head of the Asante Union and, by consent, also the head of the Kumasi state, and the heads of the conquered territories. The palace administration ( gyase) was expanded with appointive headships of innumerable functional units or palace associations ( afekuo, sing. fekuo) (Rattray 1929: 81-92; Wilks 1967: 214-28; Hagan 1971). The memberships of the palace associations, each of which had either military or nonmilitary functions, cut across the divisions, so that they formed checks on, and counterpoises to, the traditional power units. The heads of the most important of the palace associations, including the units assigned to the offspring of former and reigning Asantehene (Busia 1951: 95), were included in the state council. Since appointments to the headships of the palace associations were in the gift of the Asantehene, the administrative reform represented an intrusion of patrimonialism (Weber 1947: 347) into the traditional political organisation.’
[1]
The purpose of this new administrative structure was to ’enforce subordination of the conquered rulers to the Asantehene. For this purpose the Asante kings used an administrative staff recruited from their gyase, household organization, consisting of units of functionaries with appointive headships [...] These palace associations, called afekuo (Reondorf, 1895: 119; Rattray, 1929: 91), were recruited from free attendants, warcaptives, purchased slaves (nnonkofo), and other bondsmen; in other words, persons connected by “ties of personal loyalty” (Weber, 1947: 342) to the various Asante Kings.’
[2]
Senior public functionaries had a stool system of their own: ’In Kumasi proper there were seventy-seven stools, representing seventy-seven public functionaries, as, for example, the Bantuma Chief, or the Chief of the Royal Burial Grove, the Ateni Chief, or the Chief of the Lamplighters.’
[3]
Some foreigners were employed in highly specialized roles: ’A form of treasury partly staffed by literate Muslims was created. Groups within the capital began to build up expertise in particular areas of administration and to concentrate on this as a way to power and wealth. Careers began to open for those with intelligence, negotiating skill and a steady nerve.’
[4]
[1]: Arhin, Kwame 1983. “Peasants In 19Th-Century Asante”, 474 [2]: Arhin, Kwame 1986. “Asante Praise Poems: The Ideology Of Patrimonialism”, 165 [3]: Hayford, J. E. Casely (Joseph Ephraim Casely) 1970. “Gold Coast Native Institutions With Thoughts Upon A Healthy Imperial Policy For The Gold Coast And Ashanti”, 26 [4]: McLeod, M. D. (Malcolm D.) 1981. “Asante”, 17 |
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Bureaucratic control was exercised by ippis, a board of free-citizens.
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Full-time specialists
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Evidence for administrative activities dated 2400-1900 BCE might indirectly imply the existence of "bureaucrats".
[1]
[1]: e.g. Sbonias, K. "Social development, management of production, and symbolic representation in Prepalatial Crete," in Chaniotis, A. (ed.), From Minoan Farmers to Roman Traders. Sidelights on the Economy of Ancient Crete, Stuttgart, 25-51. |
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inferred from discussion in sources of development/introduction in later periods
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Full-time specialists The village headmen and war-leaders were not bureaucrats, as there was little formalization on the village level. Longhouse communities are headed by informal leaders doubling as village functionaries: ’In every Iban long-house there are two offices of great importance--one secular and the other ritual. They are the positions of tuai rumah and tuai burong . In most long-houses they are held by different individuals, but it is perfectly permissible for one man to hold both offices, and in some communities this does happen. Neither position is ever held by a woman. (c.f. Footnote No. 22). When used as an adjective, the word tuai means old, or mature, but as a noun it refers to any senior and influential member of a community. Here, the emphasis is not primarily on age, but on the personal qualities of the individual concerned. Thus, a party of young men setting off on an expedition ( bejalai ), to gather jungle produce, always has its leader, or tuai , though he may be no more than in his early twenties. And in long-house communities, able, though only middle-aged men often come to exert very considerable authority and influence. In all contemporary long-houses however, there is one man who holds the title of tuai rumah , or house headman.’
[1]
Only in the colonial period did rulers superimpose an administrative system of regional chiefs onto the village-based social structure of autonomous longhouse communities: ’Prior to the arrival of the British adventurer, James Brooke, there were no permanent leaders, but the affairs of each house were directed by consultations of family leaders. Men of influence included renowned warriors, bards, augurs and other specialists. Brooke, who became Rajah of Sarawak, and his nephew, Charles Johnson, created political positions -- headman (TUAI RUMAH), regional chief (PENGHULU), paramount chief (TEMENGGONG) -- to restructure Iban society for administrative control, especially for purposes of taxation and the suppression of head-hunting. The creation of permanent political positions and the establishment of political parties in the early 1960s have profoundly changed the Iban.’
[2]
Iban social organization remained relatively egalitarian even then: ’The economic self-sufficiency of the bilik -family is reflected in other areas of Iban social life. Unlike the Kayan, Kenyah, pagan Melanau and several other Bornean peoples, the Iban are not divided into social classes. Nor is there any form of institutionalized leadership based upon hereditary succession, or some other socially divisive principle. Instead Iban society is characterized by a strongly egalitarian ethos. In this respect, each bilik -family jurally constitutes a discrete and autonomous social unit, which manages its own affairs and recognizes no higher authority than that of its own household head.’
[3]
[1]: Freeman, Derek 1955. “Report On The Iban Of Sarawak: Vol. 1: Iban Social Organization”, 46 [2]: Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr. and John Beierle: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Iban [3]: Davison, Julian, and Vinson H. Sutlive 1991. “Children Of Nising: Images Of Headhunting And Male Sexuality In Iban Ritual And Oral Literature”, 159 |
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Full-time specialists The village headmen and war-leaders were not bureaucrats, as there was little formalization on the village level. But the White Rajahs established an administrative structure which was superimposed on the local-level system of the Iban: ’Throughout the twenties, the following administrative innovations were introduced: the establishment of a formal Secretariat under the chief secretary in Kuching in 1923; the creation of a legal department in 1928, and between 1924 and 1926, municipal administration was established in Kuching and Sibu. This trend towards establishing and expanding the administrative bodies of Vyner Brooke’s rule continued until 1929, when the effects of the world depression brought about a decline in revenue, and necessitated some retrenchment (ibid, p. 335).’
[1]
Initially, Iban males were excluded from the newly established administration: ’As the Brooke’s administrative positions were not opened to Iban then, these men on the whole had to be content with becoming medical assistants or policemen, while the more adventurous ones left for Singapore and Malaya to join government services. After the war, while most groups in the country were recovering from the impact of the Japanese occupation, Paku Iban were in a better position to take advantage of the rubber boom of the mid 1940’s and early 1950’s.’
[2]
Government officials and codes nevertheless sought to regulate Iban affairs, even though villages remained relatively autonomous in most matters: ’In ancient times before a large gawai was celebrated, such as the Gawai Burong and Gawai Antu, tubai fishing was carried out by the sponsoring longhouse and the catch salted and smoked in order to provide provisions for the feast. Today this method of fishing is regulated by the government and those who wish to engage in tubai fishing are expected to obtain prior permission from the local District Officer, although not all do so and individual violations are relatively frequent, and are highly destructive especially when insecticides or chemical poisons are used to kill fish, rather than the traditional tubai.’
[3]
In general, though, the Brooke Raj administration sought to shield their Iban subjects from the adverse effects of ’modernization’: ’Only an unusually strong and far sighted ruler would have seen any virtue in such a suggestion in the pre-war years. If there were some administrators who recognized the need for change, and whose efforts initiated the limited new programs already described after 1935, there was in general little sense of urgency abroad in the land. The Rajah might talk of eventual independence in introducing the new constitution, but self-government was not yet an idea which many people took seriously. There were some Ibans who were already anxious for more education, but the majority were still living in a world of wholly local, traditional concerns. Because it was a state of smallholders, and owing partly to the oil field at Miri, Sarawak had weathered the world depression with only minor hardships and dislocations. In 1941 it was a comparatively comfortable, profoundly isolated corner of colonial Southeast Asia. A weekly steamer provided the only connection between Kuching and Singapore, and when it sailed up the Sarawak River, a cannon shot from the damp-stained parapets of the old fort boomed out to signal the great event. To most Europeans and Asians alike, the great centers of trade, learning and politics all seemed very far away. It was altogether easy for a Government to remain convinced that modernization was remote and irrelevant.’
[4]
Iban ’government chiefs’ were appointed regional leaders rather than full-time bureaucrats. Some Iban may have joined the civil and military administration early on, but expert feedback is needed on the matter.
[1]: Kedit, Peter M. (Peter Mulok) 1980. “Modernization Among The Iban Of Sarawak”, 61 [2]: Kedit, Peter M. (Peter Mulok) 1980. “Modernization Among The Iban Of Sarawak”, 96 [3]: Sandin, Benedict, and Clifford Sather 1980. “Iban Adat And Augury”, 23 [4]: Pringle, Robert Maxwell. 1968. “Ibans Of Sarawak Under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941", 577 |
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"ministers"
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Full-time specialists
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Full-time specialists
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Full-time specialists The village headman and elders were not bureaucrats. A colonial bureaucratic structure was superimposed onto the A’chik system of informal village and lineage leadership only after British occupation. ‘Many of the disputes of the Garos were decided in their village Panchayats. When a man has some complaints against another he reports them to the Nokma or the village-head. If the nature of the complaints is simple, the Nokma in a meeting of the few leading persons of the village, decides the dispute; but if the nature of the complaints is complicated and not easy of solution the Nokma reports the matter to the Laskar. The Laskar is a very important and influential man in the Garo Hills District. The hills areas are divided into some elekas and each of such elekas is placed under a Laskar for convenient collection of the house tax as well as for deciding the disputes of small nature locally. The Laskar need not essentially be a literate man, worldly prudence is enough for the management of his eleka. In practice a Laskar wields immense influence in his eleka.’
[1]
The office of loskor was introduced even before occupation, but became fully formalized only after that: ‘The loskor has several duties. He collects the house tax within his district, keeping a fixed portion of this as his own payment, and he organizes work parties to keep the roads open. His most important duty, however, is to supervise and try to settle legal disputes. The loskor sometimes appoints one or more assistants called sordars, to whom the District Council pays an annual stipend of 100 Rupees, together with a shirt and a pair of short pants. Saljing, who lived in Rengsanggri, was a sordar; but not every village had one, and a sordar does not have jurisdiction over a particular village. As a general assistant to the loskor he may assist in collecting information about a dispute, and in petty matters a sordar may sit as representative of the loskor and preside at a trial. The loskorship demands a large part of a man’s time, but a sordar spends most of his time working in his fields like his neighbors.’
[2]
The British administration interfered with the Zamindar system. ‘During the first few years of the British rule in Assam the district of Garo Hills was treated as a part of the Goalpara district. The whole tract was placed under a Civil Commissioner. This officer took into his hands the collection of rents claimed by the Zaminders from the Garos, and abolished the duties levied by them on the hill producers. For some years a policy of non-interference was followed but without the desired success; so it was decided to appoint an officer-in-charge of the hills and in 1869 a.d. the Garo Hills were formed into a separate district with Tura as its headquarters. It is said in some parts of the district even now that the British administrators had to get away with many of the influential chiefs and other men of the tribe by killing them for, they could not easily bow down to the foreigners. Once this hills area was completely brought under the control of the government, the Garos lived peacefully.’
[3]
The Zamindars were aristocrats from neighbouring territories attempting to collect taxes from the local population, and therefore should not be considered bureaucrats. The precise structure of the Zamindar system and its geographical extent in the Garo Hills remains to be confirmed. ’Zamindar, in India, a holder or occupier (dār) of land (zamīn). The root words are Persian, and the resulting name was widely used wherever Persian influence was spread by the Mughals or other Indian Muslim dynasties. The meanings attached to it were various. In Bengal the word denoted a hereditary tax collector who could retain 10 percent of the revenue he collected. In the late 18th century the British government made these zamindars landowners, thus creating a landed aristocracy in Bengal and Bihar that lasted until Indian independence (1947). In parts of north India (e.g., Uttar Pradesh), a zamindar denoted a large landowner with full proprietary rights. More generally in north India, zamindar denoted the cultivator of the soil or joint proprietors holding village lands in common as joint heirs. In Maratha territories the name was generally applied to all local hereditary revenue officers.’
[4]
‘There remains no record of when the Garos migrated and settled in their present habitat. Their traditional lore as recorded by Major Playfair points out that they migrated to the area from Tibet. There is evidence that the area was inhabited by the stone-using peoples-Palaeolithic and Neolithic groups-in the past. After settling in the hills, Garos initially had no close and constant contact with the inhabitants of the adjoining plains. In 1775-76 the Zamindars of Mechpara and Karaibari (at present in the Goalpara and Dhubri districts of Assam) led expeditions onto the Garo hills.’
[5]
‘In pre-British days the areas adjacent to the present habitat of the Garo were under the Zeminders of Karaibari, Kalumalupara, Habraghat, Mechpara and Sherpore. Garos of the adjoining areas had to struggle constantly with these Zeminders. Whenever the employees of the Zeminders tried to collect taxes or to oppress the Garo in some way or other, they retaliated by coming down to the plains and murdering ryots of the Zeminders. In 1775-76 the Zeminders of Mechpara and Karaibari led expeditions to the hills near about their Zeminderies and subjugated a portion of what is at present the Garo Hills district. The Zeminder of Karaibari appointed Rengtha or Pagla, a Garo as his subordinate.’
[6]
The British administrative structure later curtailed the more informal powers of village headmen: ’In the same way the introduction of offices of sardar, hill mandal and hill mauzadar curtailed the powers and authorities of the nokmas and their village councils. The new offices were created for the effective administration over the Garo with the idea of village self-government under the direct control of Deputy Commissioner at the centre.’
[7]
[1]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 40 [2]: Burling, Robbins 1963. “Rengsanggri: Family And Kinship In A Garo Village”, 245 [3]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 8 [4]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/zamindar [5]: Roy, Sankar Kumar: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Garo [6]: Majumdar, Dhirendra Narayan 1978. “Culture Change In Two Garo Villages”, 29 [7]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 52 |
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Full-time specialists. The village headman and elders are not bureaucrats, but a colonial bureaucratic structure was superimposed onto the A’chik system of informal village and lineage leadership. ‘Many of the disputes of the Garos were decided in their village Panchayats. When a man has some complaints against another he reports them to the Nokma or the village-head. If the nature of the complaints is simple, the Nokma in a meeting of the few leading persons of the village, decides the dispute; but if the nature of the complaints is complicated and not easy of solution the Nokma reports the matter to the Laskar. The Laskar is a very important and influential man in the Garo Hills District. The hills areas are divided into some elekas and each of such elekas is placed under a Laskar for convenient collection of the house tax as well as for deciding the disputes of small nature locally. The Laskar need not essentially be a literate man, worldly prudence is enough for the management of his eleka. In practice a Laskar wields immense influence in his eleka.’
[1]
The degree of professionalization differs according to administrative level, with full-time bureaucrats restricted to the higher ones: ‘The loskor has several duties. He collects the house tax within his district, keeping a fixed portion of this as his own payment, and he organizes work parties to keep the roads open. His most important duty, however, is to supervise and try to settle legal disputes. The loskor sometimes appoints one or more assistants called sordars, to whom the District Council pays an annual stipend of 100 Rupees, together with a shirt and a pair of short pants. Saljing, who lived in Rengsanggri, was a sordar; but not every village had one, and a sordar does not have jurisdiction over a particular village. As a general assistant to the loskor he may assist in collecting information about a dispute, and in petty matters a sordar may sit as representative of the loskor and preside at a trial. The loskorship demands a large part of a man’s time, but a sordar spends most of his time working in his fields like his neighbors.’
[2]
To these less professionalized regional officers recruited from the general population were added British executive and judicial officials: ‘During the first few years of the British rule in Assam the district of Garo Hills was treated as a part of the Goalpara district. The whole tract was placed under a Civil Commissioner. This officer took into his hands the collection of rents claimed by the Zaminders from the Garos, and abolished the duties levied by them on the hill producers. For some years a policy of non-interference was followed but without the desired success; so it was decided to appoint an officer-in-charge of the hills and in 1869 a.d. the Garo Hills were formed into a separate district with Tura as its headquarters. It is said in some parts of the district even now that the British administrators had to get away with many of the influential chiefs and other men of the tribe by killing them for, they could not easily bow down to the foreigners. Once this hills area was completely brouht undegr the control of the government, the Garos lived peacefully.’
[3]
This new structure curtailed the powers of village headmen: ’In the same way the introduction of offices of sardar, hill mandal and hill mauzadar curtailed the powers and authorities of the nokmas and their village councils. The new offices were created for the effective administration over the Garo with the idea of village self-government under the direct control of Deputy Commissioner at the centre.’
[4]
Judges employed at government courts functioned on a higher administrative level than the native village councils and were solely dependent on the colonial or independent Indian district executive: ‘The judicial officers (who preside over those courts) are appointed by, or with the approval of the Governor. The rules as to administration of justice do not contain specific provisions as to their tenure and salary, or as to their full time or part time character. But most of these matters will be regulated as rules or orders issued under Rule 15 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951. It may be of interest to note that there is a specific prohibition against a member of the Executive Committee being appointed to these courts. To this extent, their independence is protected. A legal practitioner can appear before these courts. But in cases where an accused is not arrested, the legal practitioner takes the permission of the District Council Court for such appearance.’
[5]
The material seems to indicate that native officials performed their duties on a part-time basis only.
[1]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 40 [2]: Burling, Robbins 1963. “Rengsanggri: Family And Kinship In A Garo Village”, 245 [3]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 8 [4]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 52 [5]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 62 |
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Professional scribes, land registrars etc.
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"The main instrument of public administration and governance under the long history of the federal state of Elam was the bureaucracy, which also played a powerful role under the Median and the Persian empires."
[1]
[1]: (Farazmand 2009, 21) Farazmand, Ali. 2009. Bureaucracy and Administration. CRC Press. Boca Raton. |
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darughachi were specialist administrators.
"The Chaghatay ulus was a decentralized state, with governors appointed by the Kaghan (for the settled regions, until 1289) and rulers of provincial districts, i.e. princes assisted by special officials, the darughachi or tammachi, the representatives of Mongol power." [1] [1]: (Akhmedov and Sinor 1998, 269) |
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There were likely no bureaucrats at all in this period.
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"In each of the more important dependent cities she placed a civil governor, called the Podesta, and a military commandant, called the Captain, whose duty it was to raise levies and look after the defence of the city; these two when acting together were called the Rectors. ... The smaller towns were governed by a Podesta, a Capitano, or a Provveditore."
[1]
[1]: (? 1902, 263) ?. Chapter VIII. Venice. A W Ward. G W Prothero. Stanley Leathes. eds. 1902. The Cambridge Modern History. Volume I. The Renaissance. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. |
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The Karakhanids had the bureaucratic position of Vizier.
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’The best known was entered at Ishanapura [...], just east of the Great Lake (Tonle Sap) in Cambodia, where a dynasty of kings is recorded in inscriptions (Vickery 1998). These rulers progressively adopted the characteristics of fully-fledged states, with a central court, splendid temples, water-control measures, and a bureaucracy of office holders.’
[1]
’One more text which is relevant, and probably belongs in [H] though possibly south of it in [K]-the exact provenance is unknown-is k.155, by a technical official, dhanyakarapati, "chief of the grain stocks", and one of only eight or nine such specialized functions mentioned in the pre-Angkor corpus, [Footnote 143: There are seven inscriptions by, or referring to, such technical or administrative specialists. The others are K.133 [I], a "chief ship pilot", mahanauvaha, in K.140 [K] a "master of all elephants," or "vassal king", samantagajapati; in K.765 [T] a mahanukrtavi-khyata, "celebrated for his great following"; in K725 three such titles or names of functions, samantanauvaha, "chief of the naval forces", mahasvaptai, "great chief of horse", sahasravargadhiptai, "chief of a group of a thousand"; in K726 yuddhapramukha, military officer; and the latest in date a certain mahavikrantakesari, a name meaning "great bold lion", probably indicating a military person, who is mentioned 4 times in K1029 [R].]’
[2]
’From the middle of the first millennium C.E., more early historical states are known (for example, Chenla, Dvaravati, Champa, Kedah, and ̋rivijaya). These states exhibit a shared in- corporation of Indian legal, political, and reli- gious ideas and institutions, including the use of Sanskrit names by rulers, as seen in stone inscriptions (first in South Indian and then in indigenous scripts) and in the layout and styles of religious architecture and carvings.’
[3]
’Jayavarman I was the great-grandson of Ishanavarman. His inscriptions indicate the tightening of central power and control over a considerable area, the creation of new titles and admin- istrators, and the availability of an army, the means of defense and destruction. A text described how King Jayavarman’s commands were obeyed by “innumerable vassal kings.” Jayavarman also strengthened the legal code: “Those who levy an annual tax, those who seize carts, boats, slaves, cattle, buffaloes, those who contest the king’s orders, will be punished.” New titles were accorded highly ranked retainers who fulfilled important posts in government. One lineage held the priestly position of hotar. Another functionary was a samantagajapadi, chief of the royal elephants, and a military leader; the dhanyakarapati would have controlled the grain stores. The king also appointed officials known as a mratan and pon to a sabha, or council of state. Another inscription prescribes the quantities of salt to be distributed by barge to various foundations and prohibits any tax on the ves- sels going up- or downriver. Thus Jayavarman I intensi- fied royal control over dependent fiefs begun by his great-grandfather, Ishanavarman. Thereafter this dynasty loses visibility, although the king’s daughter, Jayadevi, ruled from a center in the vicinity of ANGKOR.’
[4]
[1]: (Higham 2013, 586) [2]: (Vickery 1998, 125) [3]: (Bacus 2004, 619) [4]: (Higham 2004, 75) |
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"It is important to appreciate that the overlords were increasingly served by advisers versed in Indian statecraft."
[1]
This may be more accurate toward the end of the Early Funan period.Inscription titles from stelae provide specific title for bureaucracy, like for example the one recorded in an inscription from Ta Prohm where there is a reference to an inspector of the royal property.
[1]
They also refer to the title poñ, which refers to a district leader with administrative powers
[2]
. The inscriptions, however, date no earlier than the 7th century CE.
[1]: (Higham 1989, p. 248) [2]: (Vickery 2003, p. 108) |
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The chief of the village "worked to maintain peace and was the authority in regard to all matters legal or moral, including land ownership, religion, and ceremonies."
[1]
[1]: (Keil 2012, 108) Sarah Keil. Bambara. Andrea L Stanton. ed. 2012. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa: An Encyclopedia. Sage. Los Angeles. |
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R 2004, K+S 2006
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Full-time specialists not considered present during the later Xiongnu Imperial Confederation.
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"Local officials were responsible for keeping their people in line and reporting external or internal disorder. The commoner officials were required to assemble periodically at the palace-yurt (örgöö) of their noyon, and otog elders had to assemble the demchis; failure to appear was subject to a fine. Government was maintained almost entirely by in-kind contributions. The commoners were required to give food, mounts, and other necessary supplies to government messengers and “feed” their own nobles, tabunangs, and the high officials."
[1]
This quote seems to indicate that high officials in the government were supported through tribute and had no other occupation. Besides, the presence of tax officials reinforces the probability that there were full-time bureaucrats. AD. "According to Liang Fen, Galdan also established a rudimentary taxation system by delegating a traveling inspector to exact payments of horses, oxen, and sheep from fron- tier tribes, and to keep careful track of income and expenses. This man, who “represented Galdan’s eyes and ears . . . gathered up people and goods in his net.”7" [2] "Galdan-Tseren reorganized the Zünghar principality, nominally numbering 200,000 households, into directly ruled otogs and appanages, or anggis. His directly subject households, nomadizing in the Ili valley, numbered 24 otogs administered by 54 albachi zaisang (tax officials), with a nominal strength of 87,300 households. These were his personal Choros subjects, captured Siberian and Mongolian peoples, and functional units such as the 4,000 Kötöchi-Nar (equerries), 1,000 Buuchin (musketeers), 5,000 Uruud (craftsmen), and 2,000 ZAKHACHINs (borderers). The appanages of the great nobles, which surrounded the Ili center, were arranged into 21 anggis, specified as six Choros, one Khoshud, two Torghud, eight Khoid, and (presumably) four Dörböd. The anggis did not pay regular taxes to the ruler." [3] [1]: (Atwood 2004, 421-422) [2]: (Perdue 2005, 305) [3]: (Atwood 2004, 622) |
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Although there must have been organised activity (e.g. to construct the public buildings and defensive palisade at San José Mogote) sources do not suggest there is evidence for full-time bureaucrats.
[1]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London, p88 |
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Full-time specialists ’There were several royal officials in the service of the crown and charged with the king’s business such as collecting taxes and administering justice. However, these were usually members of the local elite and at least equally concerned with their own business. This was quite common in the Middle Ages. The sheriffs could be considered full-time bureaucrats.’
[1]
The establishment of the office of jarl proved unpopular, leading to its discontinuation: ’During the first years following the establishment of the union conditions in Iceland remained quite unchanged. The godords were still in the hands of the leading chieftains. Gizur, who was to exercise the highest authority as jarl, was unpopular, and his power was very limited. Royal commissioners were sent to Iceland to exercise control with or without his consent, and and he had to share his nominal authority with the powerful Oddaverjar chieftains of southern Iceland, Hrafn Oddsson of the Borgarfjord district, and Orm Ormsson of eastern Iceland. The king regarded him with suspicion; the chieftains hated him because of his rank and title; opposition and difficulties confronted him everywhere. Even his own character and previous record rendered him unfit to maintain peace and order, which was his principal official duty. He was unable to see the need of any change in the general régime, and the last chapter of his stormy life formed a fitting close to the drama of bloody feuds in which he had played so conspicuous a part. Shortly after the meeting of the Althing of 1264, while visiting in southern Iceland, he was suddenly attacked by Thord Andrisson, the head of the Oddaverjar family. With great difficulty he escaped from his assailants, and after gathering an army of 750 men he cruelly ravged the Rangarvalla district, where the Oddaverjar chieftains were dwelling.’
[2]
The crown appointed royal magistrates (valdsmadr): ’After Gizur’s death no new jarl was appointed, and for a time there was no real head of Icelandic affairs. In 1267 Orm Ormsson and Thorvard Thorarinsson went to Norway, Hrafn Oddsson following in 1268. Both Hrafn and Orm seem to have aspired to succeed Gizur, but the king found it advisable not to elevate another chieftain to the rank of jarl, as the title had been very unpopular. After some delay, and probably with the advice of Sturla Thordsson, he gave both ranks as hirdmenn and placed them in charge of Icelandic affairs with no other title than that of valdsmadr, or royal magistrate. Hrafs was to govern the western and Orm the eastern districts. Hrafn assumed the duties of his office, but Orm was drowned shortly after his appointment, probably on the homeward voyage.’
[3]
The institutional reform that followed the initial phase of transition involved the creation of other new offices, such as that of lawman. Royal officials were to preside over the general assembly: ’Some of the most important parts of the code were, nevertheless, sanctioned already in 1271, as the thingfararbölkr, or constitution of the thing, the thegngildi, or laws governing the payment of fines to the king in cases of murder of freemen, and a part of the arfabölkr, or laws about inheritance. The remaining portions of the code received sanction in 1272 ad 1273. The introduction of this code wrought a fundamental change in the Icelandic constitution and jurisprudence. Norwegian law had been substituted for the old Icelandic code, the "Grágás"; the godords were abolished, so also the characteristic features of the Althing: the fjordungsdómar, the fimtardómr, and the office of lögsögumadr. The thing system was reorganized according to Norwegian pattern. The valdsmadr should choose a certain number of men from each thing district, 140 in all, to constitute the thing, and from these the lawman should select three from each thing district, in all-thirty-six, to sit in the lögrétta. Instead of the lögsögumadr there should be a lawman, after 1277 two lawmen, as in Norway. Royal officials and representatives of the crown should preside over the Althing and take part in its decisions.’
[4]
Sýslumenn were in charge of larger districts, and governors oversaw the political process on the island: ’The willingness of the king to grant privileges to the church hitherto denied reveals a growing indifference of the Norwegian government to the real welfare of Iceland. An administration by royal officials had been established as a result of the union. Two lawmen were appointed by the king, one for the southern and eastern, and one for the western and northern quarters; sýslumenn were appointed as administrative officials for larger districts, as in Norway, and hirdstjórar were placed as royal governors over the island. But Iceland was now treated so much like other dependencies that the chief interest of the government was to secure from its inhabitants revenues for the royal purse. Víseyrir, or taxes payable to the king, were levied upon the whole country, and became a definite income payable to the king’s purse, like the taxes from the Norwegian colonies. This system of taxation gave rise to a royal monopoly on trade with the colonies which proved disastrous to their economic well-being, and hindered their progress. The royal officials usually asserted the authority of the government with stern harshness, and severe punishments for crimes were introduced. In some cases criminals were even buried alive; but law and order were but imperfectly maintained. Even the higher officials themselves would engage in quarrels which sometimes resembled the bloody feuds of earlier periods.’
[5]
Gjerset also mentions the office of merkismadr, although its relationship to that of governor remains unclear in his description: ’These new codes wrought a fundamental change in the conception of positive law as well as in legal practice in Iceland. The old court procedures with its intricacies and formalities was replaced by the simpler Norwegian system. The king was ruler and lawgiver was regarded as the source of justice, and behind the laws now stood the royal authority, ready to execute the decrees of the courts even against the most powerful offenders. Violation of the law was no longer viewed as a private affair to be settled by the offender and the party injured, but as a crime for which the wrong-doer had to answer to the government. The fines to be paid and other punishments to be inflicted were still to be determined by twelve men according to ancient usage. The old punishment of banishment for serious offenses was retained, but fines payable to the king were instituted in numerous cases, and capital punishment was to be inflicted for grave crimes, like murder, robbery, rape, counterfeiting, forgery, and seduction. Other severe punishments were also established. [...] But care had been taken by the lawgiver to guard against hasty action and undue harshness in the treatment of wrong-doers. In a chapter about legal decisions he advises the judges to consider carefully truth, justice, patience and mercy, in order that their decisions not bear the marks of cruelty and hatred. [...] The first lawmen appointed under the new law were Stural Thordsson and Jon Einarsson. The first royal magistrates who received the title of sýslumadr were Hrafn Oddsson in western Iceland, and Thorvard Thorarinsson for the southern and eastern districts, and Asgrim Thorsteinsson in the south-western districts. Others may have been appointed, but their names are not known. In 1279 Hrafn Oddsson became royal merkismadr with authority over all Iceland, as already noted.’
[6]
Karlsson equally describes a system comprised of lawmen, district commissioners, and governors, with many Commonwealth institutions abolished or weakened: ’The Icelanders also received two new law codes during Magnus’ reign. In 1271 the king sent to Iceland a new legal code known as Járnsída (Ironside), followed by another book which bears the name of its main author, Jón Einarsson, Jónsbók (Jón’s Book). But, contrary to developments in Norway, this second revision led Iceland further from conformity with Norwegian law. Jónsbók was admittedly based largely on Norwegian law, but it was drawn up for Iceland alone, and it remained in force there for four to five centuries, while Norwegian law underwent many revisions. Jónsbók thus made Iceland a separate jurisdictional area under royal rule. Iceland’s system of government was radically altered by Járnsída and Jónsbók. Alpingi continued to meet, but the Law Council, which had been a legislative body, became primarily a court of law. The four regional courts, the Fifth court and the spring assemblies were abolished; new officials, lögmenn (lawmen) and sýslumenn (district commissioners) presided over regional court proceedings as required. Iceland was also assigned its own administrative officials. Around 1300 a demand was first put forward at Alpingi that Icelanders of the old chieftain clans should be apointed royal representatives in Iceland. For centuries after this, most administrative offices were held by Icelanders. Only the office of governor (hirdstjóri), the supreme royal official in Iceland, was held by foreigners as often as Icelanders.’
[7]
[1]: Árni Daniel Júlíusson and Axel Kristissen 2017, pers. comm. to E. Brandl and D. Mullins [2]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 211p [3]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 213 [4]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 214 [5]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 239p [6]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 215pp [7]: Karlsson, Gunnar 2000. "A Brief History of Iceland", 18p |
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"Cuzco also appointed a centrally controlled set of inspectors (tokoyrikoq, “He Who Sees All”) who checked on affairs in the provinces. Diez de Betanzos (1996: 110-11) wrote that the sons of the ruler were charged with the inquiries. The highest-ranking official may have been the “Inspector General” of the conquered territories, a position that was sometimes filled by the emperor’s brother. The existence of these independent agents implies that the rulers evidently did not fully trust the provincial officials to conduct all affairs with the best interests of the Sapa Inca and the state in mind."
[1]
"Imperial overseers and specialized record keepers produced tribute levies, population counts, and assessments of provincial development potential"
[2]
Given-Wilson writes of the important role played by the ’curacas’ who functioned below the governor (’toqrikok’) appointed for each province. Day-to-day organization or labour and tribute and the administration of justice was entrusted to the curacas, with the toqrikoks acting as overseers or magistrates, who were themselves monitored by superior inspectors, usually members of the royal family.
[3]
The most important bureaucratic tools for the Incas was the quipu (a number of strings or cords tied with various nots at certain points, each signifying a certain piece of information. Given-Wilson argues that a lack of alphabetic writing did not prevent the Inca Empire from running an extensive bureaucracy, it just altered its character and effect.
[4]
Alan Covey: I wouldn’t necessarily call them bureaucrats, although quipu specialists (quipucamayocs) might be the closest thing to non-noble functionaries with regular state duties. [5] [1]: (D’Altroy 2014, 358) [2]: (Covey 2006, 169) [3]: (Given-Wilson 2016: 96) [4]: (Given-Wilson 2016: 81-88) Given-Wilson, C. 2016. Bureaucracy without Alphabetic Writing: Governing the Inca Empire, c.1438-1532. in, Crooks, P and Parsons, T. (eds.) Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. [5]: (Covey 2015, personal communication) |
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The political system was informal and decentralized: ’The social system is characterized by flexibility in arrangements for group membership and for transmission of rights to land. A village normally contains more than one clan branch and consequently is not necessarily a landholding unit. Residents may have closer kinship ties to residents of other villages than with some of their coresidents. Nevertheless, common residence implies some community of interest and a degree of group solidarity that is reinforced by government policy, which recognizes villages rather than descent groups as functional entities. Marriages between members of different clan branches within the village also reinforce this solidarity, which is expressed in ways such as daily food gifts, cooperation in certain tasks, and joint ceremonial activities. On the average, a lineage comprises three households. Usually, several clans are represented in a village, with members of a single clan (clan branches) being scattered among a number of neighboring villages. Lineages are more localized in cha racter, frequently being confined to a single village and tending to occupy one section of it.’
[1]
’Political organization incorporates no central authority or hereditary leadership. Instead, it is characterized by big-men(EMBO DAMBO) and an ascendancy of elders who have proved themselves equal to the task. Such men command the respect of the village, based upon observed qualities of generosity, diligence, wealth, ability to make wise decisions, and skill in arranging ceremonial activities. This status confers no sanctioning authority, however. The Orokaiva tribes, around twelve in number, are very loose units politically and recognize no single leader. The largest unit is the tribe, which has a common territory usually demarcated from neighboring tribal territories by a belt of uninhabited land.’
[1]
These local strongmen were recruited into the constabulary during the colonial period: ’Village Constables. The suppression by force which had marked the early contact phase gave way to a form of ‘indirect rule’ through the appointment of Village Constables. The earliest Village Constables were the strong, leading men who had confronted the Europeans as warriors. As time passed war leaders were no longer a feature of the society, but patrol reports indicate that by and large Village Constables were influential and effective in the maintenance of law and order. The position of Village Constables was an uncomfortable and interstitial one. They had the difficult task of attempting to juggle the interests of their relatives and exchange partners and of the Administration, so that both sides were reasonably happy most of the time. Between 1907 and 1914 the number of Village Constables in the Northern Division rose from fifty-four to eighty-three, indicating that this system of administration was satisfactory to the Australian authorities. The Village Constables were concerned with enforcing legislation which impinged upon many aspects of daily life: burial of the dead, upkeep of roads, construction of latrines, neatness of houses and so on. Failure to obey these regulations could lead to imprisonment.’
[2]
[1]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva [2]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 38 |
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The colonial administration initially struggled to extend its reach to the interior: ’Armed clashes and the threat of use of violence were, of course, not effective means of achieving pacification. Government, commerce and the missionaries all used gift-giving as a method of establishing some kind of modus vivendi with the local people. The missionaries were most likely to handle threatening situations by giving goods such as cloth, iron, tobacco, beads and mirrors. They lamented that their Christian message was taken by the people as secondary to their provision of medical aid and goods. The Administration also made some use of the giving of gifts as a placatory technique. MacGregor and Monckton used presents suspended on trees or left on paths to avert trouble. However, in riskier situations, government officers would not hesitate to use firearms (Cecil King 1934:13; Chignell 1911:6, 140, 226; Wetherell 1977:32, 159).’
[1]
Village constables were installed as intermediaries: ’Village Constables. The suppression by force which had marked the early contact phase gave way to a form of ‘indirect rule’ through the appointment of Village Constables. The earliest Village Constables were the strong, leading men who had confronted the Europeans as warriors. As time passed war leaders were no longer a feature of the society, but patrol reports indicate that by and large Village Constables were influential and effective in the maintenance of law and order. The position of Village Constables was an uncomfortable and interstitial one. They had the difficult task of attempting to juggle the interests of their relatives and exchange partners and of the Administration, so that both sides were reasonably happy most of the time. Between 1907 and 1914 the number of Village Constables in the Northern Division rose from fifty-four to eighty-three, indicating that this system of administration was satisfactory to the Australian authorities. The Village Constables were concerned with enforcing legislation which impinged upon many aspects of daily life: burial of the dead, upkeep of roads, construction of latrines, neatness of houses and so on. Failure to obey these regulations could lead to imprisonment.’
[2]
’Patrol reports from 1915 to the 1920s note regular satisfactory reporting by the Village Constables despite variations in the standard of housing, village cleanliness and road maintenance. Occasionally police would have to deal with disobedience against the colonial authority. In some cases the non-compliance stemmed from confusion about changed regulations but at other times the people deliberately avoided their obligations to carry for the government. In 1918 the Koropatan Village Constable enquired if carrying was still to be compulsory. He was probably confused following rumours of new legislation on carrying conditions. In 1919 and 1924 men in the area ran away when requested to carry (Bowden, 423, 6550, G91; Baker, 3995, 6548, G91; Flint, 402, 6549, G91).’
[3]
’At the time of the eruption, a certain number of new roles had already become firmly established among Papuans: member of the Royal Papuan Constabulary, Village Constable, Mission Teacher, Medical Orderly, Clerk, Labourer. Post-war government policy aimed at greatly increasing the number and scope of these roles, both by [Page 56] instituting numerous training programmes for the development of skills hitherto unknown to Papuans, and by setting up organisations in which Papuans wield a limited amount of political and administrative responsibility. It suffices, for my present purpose, to enumerate modern roles, performed by Papuans, with which the people of Sivepe came into contact during the year of my field study.’
[4]
Government Councils later replaced ad hoc administration by individual officials: ’The Government, keen now to develop a prosperous and loyal colony for defence purposes, no longer used coercion in the establishment of cash crops. They strongly encouraged such activity, but in the context of individual plots as anything co-operative or communal smacked of communism (Schwimmer 1969:86). They promoted coffee and cocoa by promising large, individual returns. The new Local Government Councils became the agencies of the Administration to promote land-tenure conversion and the planting of coffee and Malayan rubber on the individual blocks created (Waddell & Krinks 1968:15; Healey 1961:490; Jinks 1968:31, 28; Griffin, Nelson & Firth 1979:123).’
[5]
The code takes into account the presence of colonial administrators and the recruitment of native men into the military administration. [Janice Newton (pers. comm.): On p 25 of my monograph footnote 6, I claim that the first Resident magistrates and their assistants were ‘a motley group of adventurers varying greatly in their concept of humanity and their methods..... They were trained on the job. The Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea Melbourne University Press 1972, p50 has a detailed entry on the evolution of training under ASOPA (Australian School of Pacific Administration) After the Second World War’’ Patrol Officers and Administrators were trained in Mosman Sydney, with a general orientation course followed up by academic training and refresher courses, ‘ acknowledging that expatriates needed special skills to function effectively in non -European environments.’ Jonathan Ritchie (pers. comm.): Do you think they mean the training provided to patrol officers before or after the war? If after, then of course they were trained at ASOPA. Ian Campbell has written about this, I think, in JOURNAL OF Pacific History (The ASOPA Controversy: A Pivot of Australian Policy for Papua and New Guinea, 1945-49 Journal of Pacific History 08/2010; 35(1):83-99. DOI: 10.1080/713682830.]
[1]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 30 [2]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 38 [3]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 57 [4]: Schwimmer, Eric G. 1969. “Cultural Consequences Of A Volcanic Eruption Experienced By The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 55 [5]: Newton, Janice 1982. “Feasting For Oil Palm”, 66 |
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No evidence for employment specialization characteristic of a developed urban society. Agricultural and herding would be typical occupations with "some internal differentiation ... in view of the sophistication of craft production documented at Mehrgarh.”
[1]
[1]: Agrawal, D. P. (2007) The Indus Civilization: An interdisciplinary perspective. Aryan Books International: New Delhi. |
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Full-time specialists. Prior to Russian rule, Sakha communities were governed by lineage councils, clans, and elders rather than a statist bureaucratic system. Until at least the 19th century, lineage councils were the primary administrative bodies: ’Kinship and politics were mixed in the hierarchical council system that guided AQA-USA, AIMAK, and DZHON. Yakut explanations of DZHON in the nineteenth century included concepts like "people," "community," or "tribe," territorially defined. Councils were composed of ranked circles of elders, usually men, whose leaders, TOYONS, were called nobles by Russians. A lineage head was BIS-USA-TOYON; respected warriors and hunters were BATYR. Lineage councils decided major economic issues, interfamily disputes, and questions of blood revenge for violence committed against the group. AIMAK and DZHON councils were infrequent, dealing with issues of security, revenge, alliance, and, before Russian control, war. Through war, slaves were captured for service in the wealthiest TOYON households. Kin-based councils were rare by the nineteenth century and had little influence on twentieth-century politics.’
[1]
’Key kin relations are based on a patrilineage (AQA-USA) that traces membership back nine generations. Within this, children born to a specific mother are distinguished as a group (YE-USA), and may form the basis for different households (KORGON). Historically, more distant kin were recognized on two levels, the AIMAK (or territorial NASLEG), with one to thirty lineages, and the DZHON (or territorial ULUS), composed of several AIMAK. These larger units were united by alliances, including for common defense, alliances, and by economic relations; these links were renewed at councils and festivals.’
[1]
’Prophets’ and other elders dominated most councils: ’According to tradition, the seseny played no minor role in assemblies in the past. The word sesen comes from the same root as the verb sesenibin - I advise, I think, I predict. Legend portrayes the seseny as white-haired, honored, experienced elders.’
[2]
’This dignity was neither elective nor hereditary, but not every old man was considered to be a sesen. For this he had to have a special gift of prophecy - in other words: an acknowledged intellect, experience, and knowledge. In difficult moments the heroes of olongo frequently turn to such advice-giving, honored, light-eyed Old Men-Talkers.’
[3]
’In the past we did not decide anything without sesen. (Namsk Ulus, 1888). I will note that in this testimony sesen is used in the sense of sorcerer. The sesen decided disputed questions on the basis of custom, and gave advice when the clan was undergoing hard times. At ysyakh, before the games and contests began, the sesen of each clan or clan union would look over their own wrestlers; and they would remove those who were not good enough, who had recently sinned with a woman, who did not restrain themselves sufficiently in eating and drinking, so that they would not bring shame to their own people. They found all this out by feeling the body of the wrestlers, and by looking into their eyes and face. (Namsk Ulus, 1891). In the Bayagantaysk Ulus, when I asked who had named the rivers, hills, and other natural features, they answered: It must be the sesen - the old, ancient men, who knew everything! (Bayagantaysk Ulus, 1885).’
[3]
Sesens were often from the toen class: ’Since within the clan many sesen were at the same time toen, i.e., the representatives of separate groups, they wielded enormous influencein clan councils. Usually in legends they are simply called old men - ogonior.’
[3]
Clan unions and tribal units also held council: ’They wielded less importance in councils of clan unions: there the first place was held by the heads of the clans, bis’ usa toeno.’
[3]
It seems that the Russian period was preceded by a period of heightened social stratification favouring the Toyons: ’At this period, however, the clan-tribal structure was already in a state of decomposition. The tribes and clans were headed by the military aristocracy-the toyons. These possessed large herds of cattle and employed the labor of slaves and dependent fellow clansmen on their farms; they were also the military leaders. Heading detachments of armed servants and junior fellow clansmen, the toyons raided each other’s territory, and frequently looted the farms of the free members of the community, seizing their cattle and destroying their economic independence. These toyon wars and raids were one of the factors which speeded up the decomposition of the clan commune. The ruined members of the commune were reduced to the status of “balyksyts” (poor people without cattle, or fishermen), or else became the indentured slaves of the toyons. Most of the slaves (kuluts or bokans) originated in this way.’
[4]
The Russian administration later reinforced kin-based hierarchies and superimposed a supratribal structure onto the Yakut system (see next sheet): ’The system of tsarist administration was no different here from what existed in any other part of Northern Siberia. The Dolgans, Yakuts and Evenks had to pay the fur-tax as “natives” and formed “clans” headed by princelings, while the tundra peasants were forced to pay a poll tax, were formed into a “community” and headed by an elder. People living many hundreds of kilometers away from the nearest centers were economically dependent on the merchants who monopolized supplies to the region, bought up all the furs, and cruelly exploited the population.’
[5]
[1]: Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Yakut [2]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 736 [3]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 737 [4]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts”, 270 [5]: Popov, A. A. 1964. “Dolgans”, 656 |
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The early invaders imposed tribute on the Sakha population after successful military expeditions: ’By 1620 a report had reached Tobolsk from the Mangaseya Cossacks of the Great (Lena) River and the Lena Yakut. In 1631 they descended by the Viliui River, a tributary of the Lena, to the Lena River and imposed tribute on the adjacent Yakut. In 1632 a party of Cossacks under the command of the Boyar’s son, Shakov, took tribute in sables from a clan of Viliui horse-breeding Yakut. The Viliui River farther up from its mouth was occupied by Tungus only. The northern boundary of the distribution of the Yakut at that time was the mouth of the Viliui. The whole Lena Valley from the mouth of the Viliui River to the south, at a distance of about 500 kilometers (or 710 miles) was occupied by Yakut. In their possession were also all the Lena islands of that region, rich in pasture lands. There is no definite information as to how far inland they penetrated at that period. We may admit, however, that the Yakut, being horse and cattle breeders, were hardly inclined to move into the dense forests far from the majority of their tribesmen, i.e., far from the Lena Valley. In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Yakut abode on the western banks of the Lena must have been the territory of the two present uluses of Yakutsk District, Namskij and Western Kangalassky. There, according to Yakut traditions, was the first place of refuge of their mythical forefather, the “Tatar” Elliei. From there a part of his nearest descendants could also have emigrated over the Lena islands to the eastern banks of the Lena River, where excellent pastures are as abundant as on the western banks.’
[1]
’We have previously noted (see p. 64) that the Yakut were subjugated by two different Cossack parties from Mangasey aand Yeniseisk. The Olekminsk fortress on the Lena River was erected in 1630 when only Tungus lived in the region. In 1637 a Cossack party, under the command of Busa, collected tribute in furs from the Yakut of the Yana River.’
[2]
The czarist administration imposed taxes and established an administrative infrastructure: ’The system of tsarist administration was no different here from what existed in any other part of Northern Siberia. The Dolgans, Yakuts and Evenks had to pay the fur-tax as “natives” and formed “clans” headed by princelings, while the tundra peasants were forced to pay a poll tax, were formed into a “community” and headed by an elder. People living many hundreds of kilometers away from the nearest centers were economically dependent on the merchants who monopolized supplies to the region, bought up all the furs, and cruelly exploited the population.’
[3]
’The committee of Cherkashennikov which worked in the Yakutsk Oblast was only a branch of this All-Siberian commission. On December 14, 1766, an ukaz was issued which called for deputies from all of Russia to form a committee for establishing a better administration, discussing various problems of internal policy, and, incidentally, to establish a new code for the natives of Siberia. The Yakut, who were listed as nomads, were excluded from the list of electors, but they sent their deputy anyway and he was allowed to join the committee by a special order of the Empress.’
[4]
’The overall development of commodity relationships helped to speed up the development of agriculture and here and there ploughing was enforced by the administration.’
[5]
’No less significant changes occurred in the administrative organization of the Yakut country. In the seventeenth century Yakutsk was the center of a great independent country directly subordinate to Moscow, although for some specific questions it was dependent on the governors of Tobolsk. In the time of Peter the Great, Yakutsk entered into the newly organized Siberian Goubernyia (government) and with the division of the Siberian government into provinces was included in Irkutsk Province. In 1775 Irkutsk Province was organized into a government and the Yakut country formed one of the provinces of the new government. In 1783 the government was again reorganized into a vice-royalty composed of four provinces, one of which was Yakutsk Province. In 1797 the vice-royalty was abolished and the government restored. In [Page 225] 1805 under the Emperor Alexander I, the Yakut country was made a separate province dependent upon Irkutsk. In 1852 the Yakut country was given a separate governor. After the revolution in February, 1917, a commissar was appointed by the Provisional Government.’
[6]
Sieroszewski reports corruption and exploitation of the Sakha population by administrators: ’The government undertook to regulate the distribution of Yakut land, [Page 764] partly to cease the disorders which arose as a result of this a nd partly to as sure and regulate the taking of yassak, which was being gathered with unbelievable arbitrariness and accompanied by terrible ill use, was stolen, substituted for, and hidden, and they stole from the Great Tsars by putting far too little in the treasury and by undervaluing the yassak greatly, and they impoverished the yassak-paying people and robbed the taxes and injured them.’
[7]
In addition to Russian officials, land-holding toyons also doubled as officials in their districts: ’The population was also divided into three or four classes: the toyon households belonged to the first class, and received a first-class plot, the middle households were usually assigned to the second class and the poorer people to the third and fourth classes, each receiving the corresponding clan plot. Thus, the system itself gave the toyons plots of land which were three or four times larger than those of the poorer people. It is true that in return for this the toyons had somewhat greater obligations, but the difference in their extent was extremely small. However, this inequality was by no means the only thing. The toyons actually possessed much more land, having seized it in a variety of different ways. For example, they had several plots, rather than just one, by registering them in the names of their children, workers and so on. It was also the custom to give officials (who were more often than not themselves toyons) additional plots of land, so-called [...] (from the Russian word “ukaz” [edict]), for which, incidentally, there was no payment. The influential toyons also obtained extra plots called ugayy (or kharyy). Furthermore, the toyons frequently enjoyed the right of possessing larger plots, sometimes through inheritance, cleared from the forest or formed at the site of a drained lake. The leasing of land was also common.’
[8]
[1]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut", 220 [2]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut”, 220 [3]: Popov, A. A. 1964. “Dolgans”, 656 [4]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research”, 784 [5]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts”, 254 [6]: Jochelson, Waldemar 1933. “Yakut”, 224 [7]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research", 763 [8]: Tokarev, S. A., and Gurvich I. S. 1964. “Yakuts", 271 |
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Full-time specialists
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Efficient civil service.
[1]
Saqaliba - their origin "enigmatic" and land "unidentified". Eunuchs used as courtiers and administrators. E.g. Jawdhar. Some Saqaiba were also used by preceding Ikhshids and owned privately.
[2]
In Tunisia the caliph directly ruled without a vizier. The court administration was run by a vizier after the move to Egypt. "The Fatimids in North Africa had appointed no wazirs and the notion of delegating that level of authority to a subordinate seemed not to have existed." [3] The court was highly stratified [4] and according to traveller Nasir-i Khusraw (c1048 CE) employed 30,000 people [5] , an exaggerated figure which reflects the fact it was involved in more than managing the imam-caliph’s harem and personal life, which was controlled by a "hierarchical corps of eunuchs". [6] The court-based government had heads for military, treasury, chancery (domestic and foreign communications), religious and missionary activities, judiciary and an auditor (from 1011 CE). [7] From the early 11th century a state armoury employed 3,000 craftsmen. [8] "Poets were employed by the state to fill the role of modern-day public relations agents" [9] who were "paid to present truth and lies in a palatable manner." [10] ... At least from 1073 CE the executive became de facto held by the vizier who soon would operate from his own palace. The transition probably began in the regency of the imam-caliph al-Mustansir. Badr al-Jamaili was "a virtual dictator" although "his rank remained that of a wazir, and he was always theoretically subservient to the imam-caliph." [11] The son and successor to the famous vizier Badr al-Jamali after 1094 CE built the Palace of the Vizerate (Dar al-Wizara) which became "the official residence of the vizirs until the end of the Fatimid caliphate". [12] "The Armenian wazir, Badr al-Jamali, is certainly one of the most famous of these and was the de facto ruler of the Fatimid s | ||||||